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Introduction
Julian S. Alworth and Giampaolo Arachi
I believe that we should now build on the ideas that have emerged in the
large financial centres and we should seek consensus on a co-ordinated
approach over the coming months, building on four key elements.
First, that a levy on banks seems likely to be themost practical approach.
Second, that the levy should be designed to go with the grain of neces-
sary regulatory reform not cut across or remove the need for it.
Third, that the levy should support globalisation and avoid double-
taxation of international banks.
And finally that proceeds should be for national governments to use,
whether to put them aside in a dedicated insurance fund, to repay inter-
ventions or to reduce public debt.
Based on these four principles, we now need to work actively in the G20
to forge an internationally consistent approach.
(Gordon Brown, Speech on the Economy
held a Canary Wharf, 10 March 2010)
[The International Monetary Fund is asked to] prepare a report for our next
meeting June 2010 with regard to the range of options countries have
adopted or are considering as to how the financial sector could make a
fair and substantial contribution toward paying for any burden associated
with government interventions to repair the banking system.
(G20 Press Communiqué, Pittsburgh Summit, September 2009)
1.1 Introduction
In the wake of the financial crisis, the taxation of the financial sector has
become a very charged topic and the object of a number of international
policy initiatives most notably that of the G20 (IMF 2010b). The outcome of
A previous version of this paper was presented at the ETPF/IFS conference “Tax policy in an
uncertain world” held in London on 22 March 2010.
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these initiatives and the extent to which they will be coordinated internation-
ally remains unclear but there can be no doubt that the crisis has opened up a
significant debate on the taxation of the financial sector including the tax
treatment of individuals employed in the sector and the structure of incentive
payments.1
This book originated from a conference held in Milan in April 2009. That
conference addressed the issue of what lessons for tax policy could be drawn
from the financial crisis. The papers presented at the conference (Chapters
2–6) examined whether tax arrangements in many countries and across jur-
isdictions may have influenced decision making and been a causal element in
the crisis. The general conclusion from these papers was that the tax system
had on balance played a minor role in triggering the crisis but that the crisis
had served to underscore a number of weaknesses in existing tax systems.
Since then the debate has focused on a number of other issues many of
which relate to the use of tax policy to address the problems in financial
markets resulting from the crisis:
1. the manner in which the financial sector should ‘pay’ for its bailout but
also the role of accumulated tax losses on financial institutions’
behaviour (Chapter 5);
2. should taxes play a role in correcting the systemic externalities associated
with ‘too big to fail’ andmore generally the role of taxes in the regulation
of the financial sector and their possible coordination with other
domains (notably accounting and capital adequacy norms) (Chapter 11);
3. what types of tax are most appropriate for financial institutions and
markets (‘excess profits’ versus ‘financial transaction’ taxes (Chapter 5);
4. the role of taxation in counter-cyclical and macroeconomic policies
(Chapters 9 and 10).
This book attempts to provide a broad overview of these many disparate
issues. Apart from certain clearly defined ‘one-off’ initiatives that have been
passed into law, such as the bonus taxes and special levies on banks, the
current debate has the character of a ‘work in progress’. Because the under-
standing of what occurred in the run-up to the crisis is being constantly
updated and policy proposals have not been finalized, our discussion in
many ways is tentative2 and can be seen as taking stock of existing knowledge
and as a very preliminary assessment of various positions that have been aired
in numerous fora.
1 The IMF opened up a public consultation on the subject <http://www.imf.org/external/np/
exr/consult/2009/index.htm>.
2 For example, a significant reassessment of the background to the Lehman bankruptcy has
resulted from the Valukas (2010) report, which appeared on 11 Mar. 2010.
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This introduction summarizes the main themes that are raised in this book
and highlights why the issue of how best to tax the financial sector will remain
high on the agenda of future tax policy debates.
1.2 Did tax policy contribute to the crisis?
1.2.1 Salient features of the crisis
A long ‘laundry list’ of causal factors has been suggested as having caused the
financial crisis or contributed to its character and severity, such as:
 the large global macroeconomic imbalances;
 the protracted period of low interest rates and credit boom in the USA
and UK;
 the asset bubbles in the housing market in a number of countries;
 the concentration of risk in the financial sector;
 the leverage of households and financial intermediaries;
 the flaws in techniques to measure, price, and manage risk;
 the inadequacy of the regulation of the financial sector;
 the structure of compensation schemes encouraging managers to
forsake long-run prospects for short-run return.
While these factors have often been country or jurisdiction specific, the
financial crisis has been truly global in nature and has involved significant
spillovers between financial institutions and across jurisdictions.
It is interesting to note that taxation and fiscal policy do not appear in the
list of major culprits responsible for the financial crisis. There is a consensus
that is reflected in the papers presented inMilan that the tax system appears to
have played a secondary role, albeit a possibly decisive one in some circum-
stances, in determining the precise features of certain transactions. The most
important appear to have been:
(a) the deductibility of mortgage interest by households;
(b) the aggressive use of debt financing in M&A and private equity
transactions;
(c) the use of hybrid financial instruments by financial institutions;
(d) the use of tax havens to structure tax-efficient securitization vehicles.
In assessing the importance of each of these tax drivers it is important to
appreciate their role within the broader dynamic changes under way. In other
words, the reason why these tax factors may have fostered a more unstable
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financial environment depends heavily on other changes occurring in the
financial environment.
1.2.2 Household sector: indebtedness and tax
The US housing bubble played a central role in the financial crisis. It is,
therefore, not surprising that the first tax factor that came under scrutiny
after the crisis was the tax treatment of residential housing.
The returns to owner-occupied housing, which include the value of using
the property (the ‘imputed rent’) and any capital gains from house price
appreciation, are very lightly taxed inmost countries. Despite the low taxation
of returns to housing, some costs, notably interest costs, are often deductible.
Mortgage interest tax relief encourages the build-up of (gross) housing debt,
and there is evidence that countries offeringmore favourable tax treatment for
home ownership do indeed have higher ratios of mortgage debt (Chapters
2 and 4). There is also evidence that mortgages fell significantly relative to
home value (in the UK and USA) after reforms that reduced the value of
mortgage interest relief. High levels of mortgage debt are also associated
with very low savings rates of the household sector (Agell et al. 1995).
However, the provisions relating to mortgage interest tax relief do not
appear sufficient to explain the timing and size of the increase in leverage of
the personal sector and the geographical concentration of the increase in
leverage across countries. This contrasts with the Nordic Countries’ financial
crisis in the early 1990s, where changes in the tax system coincidedwith a very
significant decline in housing prices.3 A number of other policy developments
as well as changes in the lending practices of financial intermediaries appear to
have played a much more significant role in the current crisis,4 and any tax
effect needs to take account of the complex interplay with these other devel-
opments (especially on the regulatory front) as well as some other subtle
changes in tax provisions. Even in the Scandinavian case, where tax appears
to have played a more significant role in the financial debacle, the build-up in
debt by households was driven largely by a prolonged period of unprece-
dented financial liberalization.
3 Englund et al. (1995) suggest that demand for owner-occupied homes decreased by around
15% including the effects of the withdrawal of interest subsidies. They also estimated that short-
run impact on market prices of owner-occupied homes was between 10 and 15%, or roughly half
the fall in real prices recorded between 1990 and 1993.
4 Poterba and Sinai (2008) calculate the impact of interest deductibility on the user cost of
housing in the USA and find that on average this provided a tax subsidy equivalent to around
19% of the user cost. While the subsidy is greatest for high-income households (since the
deduction is taken at a higher marginal rate), it is nevertheless around 8% for those with low
incomes.
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Hemmelgarn et al. in Chapter 3 argue that the tax incentive for homeowners
to take mortgages in the United States can be considered as a catalyst in a
chemical reaction: the deductibility did not cause the bubble, but it may have
favoured the run-up in prices. One example that may illustrate the interaction
between taxes and the macroeconomic and regulatory framework is given
by the housing policies enacted in 2004 and subsequent years, such as the
AmericanDreamDownpayment Act (see Chapter 3). Thesemeasures appear to
have had a significant impact onUS housingmarket dynamics, as low- and no-
downpayment mortgages expanded very markedly. Chapter 3 suggests that
the decrease ofmortgage downpaymentsmayhave given rise indirectly to a tax
break because of the asymmetric treatment of personal debt and equity: the
cost of personal housing debt is deductible, whereas the opportunity cost of
housing equity is not, so the consequence of lower- or no-downpayment
mortgages may have been an abrupt decrease of the user cost of housing.
The spread of mortgages, in particular subprime loans, was also helped by
more lax regulation of the financial sector and the development of new
financial instruments. The technique of securitization, which consists of
pooling the loans into an investment vehicle and then selling securities
backed by payments for these loans, has received considerable attention in
this respect (Chapter 4). This securitization process was itself helped by the
emergence of a new class of derivatives that allowed the credit risk to be
transferred to a third party: the credit default swaps (CDSs).
The role of tax in these securitizations is difficult to evaluate. However, it is
clear that the existence of vehicles allowing for a full pass-through ofmortgage
payments unencumbered by tax was necessary for securitizations to prosper.
As recently argued by Han et al. (2010), there is some evidence to suggest that
the differential tax treatment of loans on banks’ books (subject to corporation
tax) and the exempt status of securitization vehicles may have been a factor
for the growth of securitizations. While many vehicles were created on shore,
the vast majority of securitizations traded internationally were issued through
special purpose vehicles (SPVs) domiciled inoffshore centres (Chapters 4 and 8),
where tax conditions for structuring financial securities as well as market
regulation were negligible (Eddins 2009).
1.2.3 Corporate sector: leverage
The role of taxes in corporate financing decisions has long been recognized:
when interest payments are deductible against the corporate income tax (CIT)
but returns to equity are not, then, all else being equal, firms will have an
incentive to issue debt until the expected marginal tax benefit is just offset by
themarginal increase in expected bankruptcy costs. These preferences for debt
over equity can be mollified in the presence of personal taxes, but in practice
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tax systems appear to favour debt over equity finance. This is particularly true
if exempt investors tend to be the dominant source of external finance, as has
been increasingly the case in recent years.
The tax advantage to debt appears to have been decreasing over time as a
result of the generalized decline in inflation rates as well as statutory corporate
tax rates across countries (Chapter 2). At the same time, other tax factors may
have led to an increased reliance on this form of financing, such as the
elimination of imputation systems inmost European countries and the greater
reliance on international capital markets where various forms of tax-exempt
investors dominate bond markets.5 The extent to which these developments
have mattered varies from country to country.
Changes in debt ratios of the non-financial corporate sector in the years
immediately preceding the financial crisis do not show a clear pattern. Accord-
ing to some measures, the leverage of the non-financial corporate sector
appears to have increased somewhat in the UK and the euro area in recent
years (2005–8) following a period of stability in the 1990s (BIS 2009). By
contrast, the leverage of the US corporate sector has remained unchanged.
On the basis of these observations there is a broad consensus that the tax
advantage afforded to debt did not contribute to the crisis.
However, there are two elements that deserve attention in assessing the
importance of the tax advantage to debt in affecting the potential systemic
weakness of the corporate sector. First, the absolute level of indebtedness,
rather than changes in indebtedness, is what matters in terms of systemic
risk. As highlighted in Chapter 2, when firms borrow, they are likely to
internalize the expected bankruptcy costs they themselves incur but not the
impact of their own failure and default on others (effects that are not present
in the use of equity finance).6 As a consequence, debt ratios may be ineffi-
ciently high from the point of view of the society as a whole. These external-
ities are likely to be especially large for financial institutions, given their
systemic importance and the (explicit or implicit) government’s guarantees
on bank deposits or other debt. While little is known on the magnitude of
externalities from increased leverage, there is evidence that high leverage is
correlated with greater output losses in bad times: Davis and Stone (2004) find
that higher debt–equity ratios are associated with greater post-crisis output
declines, and IMF (2008) that the cumulative output loss following periods of
5 Other factors such as cross-border arbitrage activity in equity markets suggest that the tax
privilege of debt over equity may not be so significant.
6 Chapter 2 also argues that there may also be strong effects on the balance of payments:
preferential tax treatment of debt can provide an implicit subsidy to corporate and household
borrowing, including from abroad, so increasing vulnerabilities through the capital account. The
authors suggest that this might have happened in Latvia: the implicit corporate-level tax subsidy
made the cost of investments financed by borrowing about 130 basis points lower than it would
have been in the absence of tax.
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financial stress tends to be larger the greater the run-up in non-financial
corporate debt before the onset (see Chapter 2).
The second element of systemic relevance is that leverage ratios tend to be
set to withstand external shocks based on historic experience. One area where
such an approach may have given rise to potential problems in recent years is
that of leverage buyouts, which rose to historic highs in the build-up to the
crisis (see Chapter 2). The possibility of exploiting higher levels of leverage in
target (and potential target) companies to achieve tax savings appears to have
been in many instances a contributing motivation to the value of the transac-
tions. The benefits of the tax shield depended on the assumption that reven-
ues would grow in line with past experience.
In summary, while tax-induced behaviour of the non-financial corporate
sector does not appear to have been one of the causes of the crisis, the high
levels of indebtedness of some sectors may have exacerbated the real effects
of the financial crisis. Keen et al. in Chapter 2 and Shaviro in Chapter 7 discuss
several methods for eliminating debt bias, and more generally making the
debt–equity choice tax neutral.
1.2.4 Financial sector: regulatory and tax arbitrage
Formally, the financial choices of financial institutions and non-financial
corporations are affected by the tax system in the same way (Hanson et al.
2011). However, the high profitability of financial institutions in the years
preceding the crisis increased the effective CIT rate, making the tax incentive
to debt even stronger than for many non-financial corporations.
In the financial sector the tax bias to debt runs counter to regulatory
objectives, which usually entail an implicit penalty to debt. Chapter 2 suggests
that the tension between regulatory objectives and tax incentives has fostered
the emergence of devices that enable debt-like instruments, attracting interest
deduction, to be included in Tier 1 capital.7 Prominent among these are trust
preferred securities (TruPS), which accounted for a large share of hybrid issues
in the USA by both domestic and foreign financial intermediaries. There are
two strategies to deal with this tension. The first is to introduce specific
measures to close possibilities of this kind. However, if the underlying tax
bias remains high, there will be a strong incentive to find other ways of
achieving the same end. The second is to reduce the distance between tax
and regulatory concepts and definitions.
7 Basel guidelines allow up to 15% of Tier 1 capital to be in the form of hybrid instruments that
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Both strategies should be evaluated by taking into account that tax policy
pursues objectives that are largely different from those of regulatory and
accounting practices. There are obvious advantages in terms of administrative
and compliance costs in applying common definitions and concepts for tax
and accounting reporting, and corporate governance may also benefit if tax
and book profits are more closely aligned (Desai et al. 2007). However, the
most accurate measure of current income is not necessarily the best tax base.
There may, for instance, be several good reasons for allowing accelerated
depreciation or full expensing of investment for tax purposes, and provision-
ing may be best treated differently for accounting purposes than for those of
assessing taxable income (see Chapter 2).
1.2.5 New financial instruments and tax arbitrage
The difficulties in measuring pricing and managing risk are greater for new
financial instruments. Differential taxation of dividends, interest, and capital
gains creates many inconsistencies in capital income taxation (see Chapter 7).
Tax inconsistency can be exploited through the ability of derivatives to repli-
cate a portfolio in a variety ofways and to expand the opportunities to tailor the
nature of the payments to the tax preferences of the investor (transforming it
into lightly taxed capital gains, for instance).8 However, most observers believe
that tax played only a secondary role in encouraging the growth of the deriva-
tives markets (Chapter 8). One important reason why tax planning may not
have borne greater responsibility for the derivatives explosion, at least in the
USA, is that tax law requires businesses that qualify as dealers in securities to use
mark-to-market accounting with respect to all inventory items, and to treat all
gains and losses on such items in a consistent way. In Chapter 7 Shaviro also
notes that companies often used the same carefully structured derivatives
transactions to achieve several objectives at the same time: minimize tax liabil-
ities,manipulate reported earnings, avoid regulatory constraints, andminimize
the effectiveness of investor oversight. In these circumstances, tax considera-
tions, standing alone, may not have made a large difference, even though they
clearly encouraged the underlying transactions.
A more direct connection between new financial instruments, tax, and the
crisis has been suggested by Eddins (2009). He argues that collateralized debt
obligations (CDOs) organized as pass-through entities became especially
attractive because their owners entered into CDSs with sellers that could
treat default losses as ordinary loss, while the CDO has pass-through tax
treatment and therefore would have to treat defaults as capital losses. By
8 See Alworth (1998).
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attaching the expected losses to the mark-to-market seller of the swaps, the
CDO tranches allowed more tax offsets, thus providing a higher after-tax
expected rate of return. The strategy was especially advantageous for the
riskier tranches with higher expected default rates (Slemrod 2009). Ceriani
et al. in Chapter 4 provide a detailed account of this tax arbitrage, highlighting
the role played by CDSs. Further research is still needed to understand the real
impact of the tax factors in the securitization process. While there is little
denying that such arbitrage incentives may have existed, their importance
appears difficult to assess in practice.
1.2.6 Compensation schemes
The dramatic rise in bonuses and stock option remuneration plans in the
financial sector has been among the most debated aspects of the crisis. It is a
common belief that stock options and other stock-based forms of remunera-
tion are tax favoured compared to cash compensation. Tax rules for employee
stock options are complex and vary substantially across countries and
schemes. Ceriani et al. in Chapter 4 provide a detailed analysis of such provi-
sions in OECD countries and come to the conclusion that there is no general
tax preference for stock option plans once both employee and employer taxes
are taken into account. Nevertheless, they argue that in the USA there is
evidence of a preferential tax treatment on the employer’s side, which, in
conjunction with other factors, may have contributed to the success of stock-
based remuneration plans. In other cases, it is possible that a tax preference
emerged as a consequence of a unilateral perspective, with the favourable tax
treatment at employee level prevailing over corporate tax considerations.
A somewhat different set of issues arises in the case of private equity and
hedge fund managers, who receive most of their compensation as ‘carried
interest’ (‘performance fees’), subject, in some countries, only to relatively
light taxation as dividends or long-term capital gains. Some have criticized
this approach on the basis that it entails taxing managers at inappropriately
low rates on what is effectively labour income(see Chapters 2 and 8).9 In the
eyes of these same critics, the growth of ‘hedge funds’ and ‘private equity’
firms would appear to be driven in part by these tax considerations.
The basic argument used to support the recharacterization of income is that
carried interest is compensation for performing a service. The sponsor (general
partner or manager) is analogized to a money manager, who determines how
best to invest a client’s funds. Accordingly, the carried interest should be taxed
9 If this income were taxed as earnings, however, coherence would require that a corresponding
deduction for payment of compensation be available to other partners—enabling an increase in
the pre-tax remuneration of the fund managers.
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similarly to risky returns given to other service providers, such as stock, stock
options, or royalties. Indeed, investment advisors’ fees are already taxed as
ordinary income. This is the case, even if the fees are contingent on perfor-
mance. For example, if investment advisors receive equity compensation, say
in the company that employs them, typically either ordinary income-tax
treatment or the principles governing options apply. According to this view,
the funds remain the investor’s funds. The investor gets taxed on the gains or
losses in the funds and potentially can deduct the fees paid to the advisor
(Bankman 2007).
According to others (Weisbach 2008), the structure of a private equity
partnership does not perfectly fit this analogy. Typically, an investment advi-
sor is not treated as owning the funds that are invested. Instead, the invest-
ment advisor is merely the agent for the investor. In a private equity
partnership, the partnership is the owner of the funds and not merely an
agent for the investors. An alternative way to view the activities of a sponsor of
a private equity fund is as an entrepreneur who raises capital to make invest-
ments. The form used for raising capital is a limited partnership in which the
sponsor is the general partner and the capital providers are limited partners.
The limited partners are paid a market rate of return for their provision of
capital and have no more involvement in partnership operations than any
third-party provider of capital. Under US law, anyone who makes an invest-
ment and holds it as a capital asset, even if made with third-party capital,
receives capital gain or loss on the investment. Accordingly, changing the tax
treatment of general partners would have wider-ranging implications than
simply affecting private equity. Another analogy used by supporters of the
capital gains treatment of carried interest is that it is given to anyone buying
shares through a margin account and profiting on the sale is using in part
someone else’s money and his or her own effort and ideas about stock valua-
tions to make money.
The discussion of carried interest highlights two key problems in taxing
capital income: the distortions to behaviour induced by differences in tax rates
and the difficulty of distinguishing labour from capital income. In this as
other areas, incentives to income shifting are unavoidable and give rise to
complexity. As argued byWeisbach (2008), there is simply no general method
of making this distinction, and attempts to do so are complex and give rise to
other forms of tax avoidance.
1.3 Implications for tax policy
The fallout from the financial crisis and the impending budget deficits result-
ing from government bailout and counter-cyclical interventions has
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prompted a series of policy initiatives that extend the remit of tax policy
beyond mere revenue collection.
Three conceptually distinct areas have attracted the attention of policy-
makers:
1. special taxes on the financial sector to recover the costs incurred for the
bailout;
2. taxes to correct for distortions (particularly of a systemic character)
resulting from the safety net that applies to the financial sector;
3. problem areas with the taxation of the financial sector, which have been
highlighted by the crisis (VAT on financial services, the interaction with
accounting and regulatory definitions of income, anti-avoidance
measures in particular with respect to tax arbitrage).
These topics are not disjointed, and in some instances potential policy pre-
scriptions overlap with regulatory measures (see Chapters 5 and 11).
1.3.1 Special levies on the financial sector
Initially much of the policy debate was driven by the desire to placate public
anger over the costs of the bailout measures. One response was to limit the
bailout expenses by reappropriating windfall profits and rents in the financial
sector. This approach is much in the same spirit (albeit with different implica-
tions) as the suggestions coming from the international supervisory and
regulatory community.10 The main objective is to raise revenues from those
institutions and their stakeholders that have benefitedmost from government
intervention.11 These proposals have taken various forms.
1.3.1.1 THE OBAMA PROPOSAL
Some proposals attempt to achieve both efficiency and revenue objectives. The
US government proposal for a Financial Crisis Responsibility Fee (FCRF) at a rate
0.15 per cent on financial firms’ liabilities provides a prominent example. It has
been presented both as a corrective device12 and as a means ‘to compensate
10 ‘It is imperative that these profits be retained in financial institutions to rebuild capital . . .The
international supervisory and regulatory community is agreed that restricting dividend payments,
share buybacks and compensation rates are appropriate means to these ends’ (Financial Stability
Board 2009: 2).
11 Some observers, in particular of the US package, have noted that a large number of the banks
that are targeted for special tax treatment have already repaid the loans extended under the TARP
programme and that a number of non-financial corporate entities should also in theory be subject
to a special levy.
12 ‘As it would be based on an institution’s size and exposure to debt, it would also further the
Administration’s financial reform goals by providing a check against the risky behavior that
contributed to this crisis’ (Office of Management and Budget 2011: 39).
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taxpayers fully for the extraordinary support they provided’.13 In essence, the
feewould apply to the largestfinancialfirmswith consolidated assets exceeding
$50 billion. Under the initial proposal the base for the tax would be the firm’s
assets less Tier 1 capital and Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC)-
assessed deposits. In essence, the tax would apply to financial firms’ funding
in wholesale markets, which in the view of many was the engine behind the
build-up of leveraged risky portfolios. It also appears to be closely related to the
ideas put forth by Paul Volcker to limit proprietary trading activities of com-
mercial banks subject to the ‘safety net’ and more generally the systemic risks
arising frommaturity mismatches (Hanson et al. 2011).
A similar approach has been taken by the European Council. In March 2010
the Council agreed that ‘Member States should introduce systems of levies and
taxes onfinancial institutions to ensure fair burden-sharing and to set incentives
to contain systemic risk’ (European Council 2010: 6). Bymid-2011 a number of
special levies and taxes on financial institutions had been actually introduced in
ten Member States (Table 1.1), and four other countries had announced the
introduction of similar duties. However, no clear pattern can be detected in
the European experiences, as tax rates and bases differ considerably.
1.3.1.2 THE TAXATION OF BONUSES
Otherproposals aimmainly to achieve revenue and fairness objectives, aswell as a
means to support indirectly bank recapitalizations or a retroactive measure for
banks that received state aid. Thesemotivationswere given for the tax onbonuses
introduced in a coordinated move by the UK and France in 2009. The UK bank
payroll tax applied tobankinggroups (includingbuilding societies) andwas levied
at a rate of 50 per cent on all discretionary and contractual bonus awards, to the
extent that the bonus exceeded £25,000. It took effect from the time of the
announcement, on 9 December 2009, until 5 April 2010. The French tax applied
to bonuses, including deferred payments and awards of stock as well as cash.
Some interesting lessons can be learned from the UK and French bonus tax
experiment. The first one is that the two governments were well aware of the
potential consequences of the tax on the location of financial services as
shown by the effort to coordinate their policies and by the one-off nature of
the levy.14 The second is that the tax, while formally applying to labour
income, appears in many instances to have been paid out of profits (via a
grossing-up of pre-tax compensation). The tax appears to have raised revenue
for £2.5 billion, an amount about five times larger than the government initial
13 Office of Management and Budget (2011: 39).
14 In the British case, the tax on bonus is only partly one off, as from 6 Apr. 2010 the top
marginal rate of the personal income tax was raised from 40% to 50% for income above £150,000.
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Table 1.1. Financial levies and taxes in the European Union, 2011
Country Rate Base
Germany Progressive fee for liabilities: • Liabilities excluding capital and
deposits
• 0.02% for liabilities under €10bn; • Derivatives (notional value)
• 0.03% over €10bn; and
• 0.04% above €100bn
Flat fee for derivatives
• 0.00015%
Capped at 15% of credit institution’s
annual profit (after tax)
France 0.25% of the capital requirements
(based on Risk weighted assets)
Risk-weighted assets
Austria Progressive levy: Unconsolidated balance-sheet total
excluding subscribed capital and
reserves, secured deposits, and
certain liabilities to banks, provided
they are necessary to fulfil liquidity
provisions plus add on for financial
derivatives on trading book
• no levy for base under €bn;
• 0.055% for base over €1bn; and
• 0.085% for base over €20bn
plus 0.015% on the volume of all
financial derivatives
Portugal 0.05% on banks’ liabilities (i) liabilities excluding Tier 1 and Tier 2
capital and insured deposits (only
the amount effectively covered)
0.00015% on off-balance-sheet
derivatives
(ii) notional value of off-balance-sheet
derivatives will also be ‘levied’
(excluding those used for hedging)
For both cases, the amount on which
the levy will be calculated
corresponds to the annual average
of each end-of-month balance.
Denmark Ex post levy depending on the need
but annual contributions capped at
0.2% of covered deposits and
securities
Covered deposits and securities
Hungary Progressive levy: Balance-sheet total corrected for
interbank loans• 0.15% below and
• 0.5% above HUF50bn
Sweden 0.018% for 2009 and 2010
0.036% after 2010
Liabilities excluding equity capital,
debt securities included in the
capital base, group internal debt
transactions between those
companies paying the fee, and debt
issued under the guarantee
programme
United Kingdom 1 Jan. 2011–28 Feb. 2011: 0.05% for
short-term chargeable liabilities and
0.025% for long-term chargeable
equity and liabilities.
Liabilities excluding Tier 1 capital,
insured deposits, policy holder
liabilities, and assets qualifying for
FSA liquidity buffer
1 Mar. 2011–30 Apr. 2011: 0.1% for
short-term chargeable liabilities and
0.05% for long-term chargeable
equity and liabilities.
1 May 2011–31 Dec. 2011: 0.075%
for short-term chargeable liabilities
and 0.0375% for long-term
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estimate.15 The high tax yield provides evidence of the choice of many banks
to absorb the cost by ‘grossing up’ their bonus pools.16 Themotivations for the
‘tax shifting’ in the UK appear to originate in the ‘mobility’ of skilled labour
(Radulescu 2010). Shareholders appear to have borne the tax partly to reduce
the impact of a higher top marginal tax on their globally mobile employees.
This desire to maintain a UK presence may be suggestive of the existence of
locational rents associated with a London presence. The nature of these and
the extent to which they are durable over time are not clear.
Tax shifting raises two issues. The first one is related to the effect of the tax on
bank capitalization. To the extent that the tax is borne by banks’ profits through
grossed-up bonuses, the levy may have a negative effect on bank capitalization,
thereby running against the regulatory objective of strengthening the capital
base of banks. The second is whether a direct levy on banks’ profit may not be a




1 Jan. 2012 onwards: 0.078% for
short-term chargeable liabilities and
0.039% for long-term chargeable
equity and liabilities.
Latvia 0.036% Liabilities excluding equity capital,
deposits subject to a deposit
guarantee scheme, mortgage
bonds, and subordinated liabilities
that are included in equity capital as
subordinated capital
Cyprus 0.095% on the overall level of deposits
in Cyprus (see base) for the years
2011 and 2012. Capped at 20% of
credit institution’s taxable income
for the two years 2011 and 2012.
Overall level of deposits (of residents
and non-residents) in Cyprus,
excluding the interbank deposits of
credit institutions operating in
Cyprus. The tax imposed for 2011
will be calculated on the basis of
deposits at 31 Dec. 2010.
Respectively for 2012, the tax
imposed will be calculated on the
basis of the deposits at 31 Dec.
2011.
Source: Economic and Financial Committee (2011).
15 Brooke et al. (2010).
16 George and Megan (2010). There is also anecdotal evidence that some bank had planned to
raise its base salaries for managing directors and others in order to make up for lower bonuses
(Schaefer et al. 2009). The discussion about the extent of the tax revenue windfall does not appear
to have taken account of the reduction in the corporate tax base associated with higher gross
compensation.
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1.3.1.3 EXCESS-PROFITS AND ‘HIGH-PROFITS’ TAXES
A possible candidate in this respect is an excess-profits tax. There are several
types of excess-profits taxes. In the USA an excess-profits tax was levied several
times during wartime periods between 1917 and 1953.17 The various taxes
implemented in this period may be classified in two broad families: the first,
technically known as a war-profits tax, was designed to recapture the excess
over standard profits that an individual corporation would have earned in the
absence of defence- or war-induced expenditures; the second, frequently iden-
tified as a ‘high-profits’ tax, is based on the excess over some presumed reason-
able standard rate of return on invested capital (Lent 1951). High-profits taxes
are also similar to resource rent taxes such as the petroleum revenue tax in the
UK or the Australian petroleum resource rent tax (Fraser 2002).
Ahigh-profit taxmay achieve the objectives of the bonus tax and the FCRF: it
places the financial burden of the bailout on the institutions that have bene-
fited most and is a means to tax ‘rents’ in the financial sector. To prevent the
avoidance of the tax by the distribution of a high bonus, compensation above a
given threshold should be added back to profit. Similar levies have recently
been proposed by Keen et al. (2010) and by Kleinbard and Edgar (2010).
The effects of a high-profit tax on incentives depend on the manner in
which it is implemented. There are two crucial issues. The first concerns
whether the tax operates as an additional levy or as an allowance for corporate
equity (ACE). In the former case, the excess-profit tax would apply only on
profits in excess of a threshold amount, whereas the standard (normal) return
on capital would be taxed at the general statutory rate. It is easy to show that
this would leave existing incentives to capital structure unchanged, since at
the margin debt equity decisions would be driven by the standard rate of tax
on ‘normal profit’.18 Furthermore, an additional levy might lead to greater risk
taking if the excess return were not a pure rent but a return to risk taking
(Kaplow 1994). By contrast, under an ACE the cost of debt and equity capital
would be the same. This would favour the recapitalization of financial institu-
tions and potentially offset the effects on greater risk taking resulting from the
higher rates of tax on the excess returns.
In addition, an ACE tax could be aligned with bank regulation. To the
extent that the standard rate of return is calculated on regulatory (that is,
Tier 1) capital, the high-profit tax may provide a tax incentive to increase
regulatory capital (see Chapter 2). A further advantage of an excess-profit tax
17 The first Canadian experiment with a corporation income tax, enacted in 1916, was also based
on the high-profits principle.
18 A recent example of such an excess-profits tax was the Italian dual income tax (DIT). Under
this arrangement, however, the normal return on equity was subject to a rate below the standard
rate of tax. See Alworth and Lovisolo (1998) and Bordignon et al. (2001) for a discussion of the
incentives in the context of cost of capital framework.
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of the ACE type is that it could be implemented as a structural reform rather
than a temporary or one-off measure and can be coordinated with a more
general attempt to reduce the debt bias of the corporate tax.
Under current circumstances, the introduction of high-profit taxes or addi-
tional levies would need to take account of the stock of losses carried forward
bymany financial institutions (see Chapter 8). Taxpayers would benefit from a
shift to an ACE the higher the excess-profit tax rate (relative to the ordinary
rate) and the greater the size of the losses.19
1.3.2 Correcting market failures
Broadly speaking, the financial sector is prone to two types of problems requir-
ing correction: (1) distorted incentive structures and undesired behaviour
of economic agents (moral hazard) and/or (2) externalities within the
financial sector (the failure of an institution propagates other financial inter-
mediaries) and from the financial sector to the real economy (systemic risk).20
Corrective taxes are part of wider array of policy instruments, including bank-
ing supervision, the application of capital requirements and fees, typically to
pay for deposit insurance, as well as general regulation of financial markets by
both governments and financial intermediaries themselves (see Chapter 11).21
Proposals to utilize taxes to correct for moral hazard and externalities are
relatively new and apply both to economic agents and to financial market
transactions. They aim to correct different distortions but appear to have the
overarching aimof reducing the importance of the financial sector (see Chapter
6). It is inevitable that such taxes may also provide important sources of reve-
nue, and the border line between revenue collection and corrective objectives
often tends to be blurred.22Moreover, in this discussion the difference between
‘user charges’, capital requirements, and taxes is very tenuous, and typical
revenue authorities may not ultimately be responsible for administering the
‘tax’. Hence the role of corrective taxes cannot be divorced from othermeasures
aimed at safeguarding the soundness and resilience of the financial system.
1.3.2.1 PRUDENTIAL REGULATION
Prudential regulation of financial institutions takes the form, on the one
hand, of solvency or capital adequacy ratios, which aim through the imposi-
tion of minimum standards to prevent the failure of individual institutions
19 A solution to this issue would be to allow loss carry forwards at the pre-ACE statutory rate.
20 There are also many positive externalities resulting from well-functioning financial markets
(Levine 1997).
21 For example, futures markets have a number of features, such as collateral arrangements
(margin), that are meant to safeguard the clearing house against a default by one of its members.
22 This close connection was already apparent in the previous discussion regarding ACE.
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(Chapter 11). On the other hand, prudential regulation aims to prevent
liquidity crises resulting from the mismatch between banks’ assets and liabil-
ities and the potential risk of bank runs; the most common instruments used
for this purpose are implicit or explicit deposit guarantees, especially for retail
deposits. Demand deposits are explicitly or implicitly insured in most
countries up to some threshold amount per individual (or deposit account).
In most cases, the capital in these deposit insurance funds is the reserve built
up over time through the collection of insurance premiums from banks that
receive the benefits of deposit insurance.
While the appropriate form of deposit insurance schemes has been the
subject of long-standing debates, the financial crisis has highlighted the
need for deposit insurance-related reforms that would improve the efficiency
of the financial system. As shown by Pennacchi (2009) and Acharya et al.
(2010), FDIC deposit insurance premiums in the USA have either been risk
insensitive or relied only on individual bank failure risk. They have never
focused on systematic and systemic risk.
Pennacchi (2009) argues that fair market deposit insurance premiums
should contain a systematic risk premium in addition to expected losses.23 If
a deposit insurer does not include a charge for systematic risk when setting
premiums, insured deposits will be subsidized relative to other forms of unin-
sured funding. This leads to financial system distortions that excessively
expand deposit insurance and encourage banks to make investments that
have extreme systematic risk.24
1.3.2.2 SYSTEMIC RISK: TAXES, USER CHARGES, CAPITAL
REQUIREMENTS
However, the charge for systematic risk that accounts only for the skewness in
bank failure distribution is not sufficient to internalize the external effects of
a single bank failure over the financial and economic system as a whole
(systemic risk25). As argued by Acharya et al. (2010) and Hanson et al. (2011),
when a bank with insured deposits fails, the deposit insurance fund takes over
the bank and sells it either as a going concern or piecemeal. During periods of
23 Pennacchi (2009) reviews empirical evidence that firms’ actual credit spreads on uninsured
debt contain, in addition to an expected loss component, a significant systematic risk premium.
Thus, these uninsured debt holders, who can be viewed investing in default-free debt along with
underwriting debt insurance, earn average returns greater than a holder of only default-free debt.
24 Duffie et al. (2003) and Falkenheim and Pennacchi (2003) provide techniques for estimating
fair deposit insurance rates for privately held banks.
25 Systemic risk is a negative externality and is defined by the extent of propagation of an initial
shock (failure of one institution) through the financial system. Systemic risk is sometimes described
as a form of (financial) pollution. However, the analogy with environmental externalities is
imperfect, since the amount of systemic risk is endogenous to the reaction function of the public
sector. In the financial sector, the bigger the accident, the higher are the chances to be rescued.
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widespread bank failure, it is difficult to sell failed banks at attractive prices
because other banks are also experiencing financial constraints.
In particular, the failures of large banks lead to greater ‘fire sale’26 discounts
(Shleifer andVishny2011).Acharya et al. (2010)note that this eventmaygenerate
a significant pecuniary externality with adverse contagion-style effects on other
banks and the real economy. As a consequence, the resolution of large banks is
more costly for the deposit insurance regulator, because the liquidation of large
banks entails both higher direct losses and higher indirect losses owing to conta-
gion effects. This suggests that higher premiums per dollar of insured deposit
should be charged to large banks compared with that for small banks.
Finally, forbearance during systemic crisis creates a moral hazard problem as
banks have an incentive to herd and become interconnected to increases their
chance of a bailout. To discourage banks from excessive correlation in their
investments the incentive-efficient premium should be higher than the actu-
arially fair premium and should increase in systemic risk (Acharya et al. 2010).
To summarize, the ‘user charges’ that can be used to correct for distorted
incentives and for externalities can be decomposed into two components. The
first is akin to the FDIC insurance fee and should cover the expected cost of
failure for each single institution, where the expected cost takes also into
account systematic risk. The second component should measure the external
cost of failure and should also discourage moral hazard because of the implicit
insurance to institutions that are deemed to be ‘too big to fail’. This second
component would be essentially Pigouvian, aimed at making banks internal-
ize the negative systemic effects of their behaviour. Various alternative pro-
posals are currently being debated.
1.3.2.3 FEES BASED ON THE COMPOSITION OF LIABILITIES
The development of the 2008 financial crisis has confirmed that the scale and
speed of liquidity runs are the primary causes of propagation. Banks that rely
excessively on short-term uninsured funding contribute to ‘fire sales’ and to
contagioneffects (Hansonet al. 2011). Perotti andSuarez (2009) propose a system
of liquidity risk charges for correcting the negative externalities caused by banks’
excessive reliance on short-term, ‘uninsured’ funding. As Pigouvian taxes they
would complement deposit insurance charges, without creating any explicit
commitment to liquidity support. A unit of short-term funding should pay a
tax proportional to itsmarginal contribution to a bank’s contribution to systemic
vulnerability. A general approach would require the estimation of the systemic
contribution of many bank characteristics (Adrian and Brunnermeier 2008).
26 The liquidation of securities by financial intermediaries at the same time as competitors.
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An alternative approach discussed by Weder Di Mauro (2010) proposes that
the tax base should be composed of all liabilities, excluding insured deposits
(since they are already insured) and capital. The tax rate should varywith the size
of the externality. The degree of systemic relevance could be estimated based on
a series of indicators,whichwould includemeasures of size, interconnectedness,
and complexity. These indicators could then be compressed (with a simple
average of the ranks) into a risk score. Each risk scorewouldbe assigneda tax rate.
The tax rate should be set at such a level to eliminate the implicit subsidy to
systemic institutions. There are several approaches that would help establish
at least a range for the value of the subsidy. Weder di Mauro (2010) suggests
measuring the subsidy by comparing the cost of the funding of small and large
institutions before and after the ‘too systemic to fail policy’ was officially
established. The idea is that the tax rate should eliminate extra profitability
resulting from being able to tap capital markets with a ‘too-systemic-to-fail’
guarantee (see also Drehmann and Tarashev 2011).
1.3.3 Transaction taxes
The introduction of a financial transaction tax (FTT) as a tool to stabilize
financial markets and improve their functioning is one of the policy options
that are being discussed for correcting potential market imperfection (Chapter
5 andMatheson 2010) In the most recent discussions on proposals for an FTT,
it is argued that such tax could solve three problems at the same time:
1. stabilize the financial markets by reducing speculative and technical
trading, especially in the derivatives market by increasing transaction
costs;
2. raise substantial tax revenue while creating only small distortions in the
real economy;
3. serve as a contribution of the financial sector to the financing of bailout
costs caused by the financial crisis.
FTTs have existed for a long time in various guises and represent a significant
source of revenue in many countries (especially in Latin America). Discussion
of their use as an instrument to correct for ‘distortions’ in the financial
markets, especially after economic downturns, started with Keynes’s reflec-
tions (1936) on stock markets following the Great Depression. The idea of an
FTT is also linked to the proposal of James Tobin on an international uniform
tax on all spot currency conversions. Tobin (1974, 1978) argued that the
increased mobility of private financial capital—especially after the end of the
BrettonWoods system—might lead to excessive shifts of funds that create real
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economic costs for national governments and economies. Tobin reasoned
that the tax would increase the effectiveness of domestic monetary policy.
The proponents of an intervention argue that the tax could improve the
functioning of financial markets by reducing speculative short-term activities,
which they consider as a reason for price volatilities and price bubbles (Chapter
5 andMatheson 2010). It is argued that potentially harmful financial activities
with a high amount of transactions per day would be reduced even by a very
low tax rate, but long-run investmentswould not be distorted by such a low tax
rate because of the low frequency of such transactions. Hence the debate on
FTTs has generally narrowed down to the question of the influence that
transaction costs on trade volume, and price volatility, and if they can serve
as a corrective device to reduce the number of allegedly harmful short-term
traders.
The theoretical literature does not provide clear-cut answers. The various
empirical studies fail to detect a strong relationship between an increase in
transaction costs (via either taxes or other means) and the functioning of
markets. Most studies find that trade volume is reduced, but the effects on
volatility and prices are less clear, even though results based on panel data and
estimation approaches that better identify transaction cost effects seem to find
unexpectedly a positive relationship between transaction costs and volatility.
As argued above, a general transaction tax is advocated not only as a means
for correcting market failure, but also as an efficient way to raise revenue.
Schulmeister, Schratzenstaller, and Picek (2008) estimate that in Europe rev-
enues from an FTT at a rate of 0.01 per cent would lie between 0.59 per cent
and 0.78 per cent of GDP, an amount roughly similar to the estimated loss in
revenue that is due to the exemption of financial services from VAT.27 How-
ever, as noted by Matheson (2010), the argument that an FTT would cause
little distortion because it would be levied at a very low rate on a very broad
base is not persuasive once account is taken of the potential incidence of the
tax. A tax levied on transactions at one stage ‘cascades’ into prices at all further
stages of production.
The international experience also shows that tax design is crucial both for
the effect of the tax on the functioning of the market and for revenues
(Chapter 5 and Matheson 2010).
Finally, as noted in Chapter 11, the setting of transaction taxes is affected by
the nature of the political process, which can lead to outcomes that are far
from the optimal level of tax rates.
27 They estimate a revenue loss from financial services VAT exemption of about 0.7% of
GDP, assuming a share of the financial sector in overall value added of 3.5% and an average VAT
rate of 20%.
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1.3.4 Redesigning the taxation of financial institutions
The financial crisis has highlighted the distinctive features of the financial
sector raising the issue of whether financial institutions deserve a special tax
treatment because of the peculiar nature of their activities or whether their
taxation should be subsumed under general principles applying to income
and consumption taxation. Possible reforms can be grouped into two distinct
sets: (1) piecemeal revisions of existing taxes or (2) more radical reform of the
taxation of the financial sector.
1.3.4.1 FINANCIAL AND TAX ACCOUNTING
Despite the fact that banks are generally subjected to the same general tax
provisions as non-financial companies, existing tax rules acknowledge the
specific nature of their activities by allowing several differential tax treatments
and exceptions to the rules that apply generally to business income. Banks are
unique in that interest income and expenses represent the core of cash flows,
depreciation allowances for fixed assets are relatively minimal, and the valua-
tion of complex financial transactions (such as activities in the foreign
exchangemarkets, trading in securities, and operations in derivative products)
is recurrent. High degrees of leverage also typically characterize banking activ-
ity. The valuation of assets and liabilities is also subject to different criteria
depending on whether the assets and liabilities are held in trading or invest-
ment portfolios. Trading portfolios are typically marked to market, but also
investment portfolios are being increasingly subject to ‘fair-value’ rules.
The conformity of financial accounting and tax accounting (book-tax con-
formity) is of great importance for banks. Financial accounting standards and
tax laws frequently provide specific, and often different, rules for how to
report income for book and tax purposes, even though both income reports
are based on the same underlying fundamental transactions.
1.3.4.2 MARKING TO MARKET
The taxation of gains (or losses) only when realized, rather than as they accrue,
can create significant distortions, creating an incentive to defer the realization
of gains and accelerate that of losses. Not surprisingly, marking gains and
losses to market and treating them as current have gained in acceptance as a
general policy principle. The principle also means that financial institutions
are neutral in respect of transactions that involve simultaneous gains and
losses such as wash sales.
There are some potential pitfalls in marking to market. Taxation on fair
market value may induce the sale of assets to finance the accruing liability,
though there is little sign that this has been a significant problem in the
financial sector. Schizer (2000) has argued that the extent to which marking
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to market has been used for tax purposes may have led dealers to become
‘accommodation parties’ for other taxpayers in transactions that artificially
defer income for one party while accelerating losses for another. It has also
been suggested that extensive use of marking to market in the taxation of
financial institutions may increase the volatility of revenue.
1.3.4.3 PROVISIONING FOR LOAN LOSSES
The crisis has also drawn attention to difficulties in the tax treatment of loan
losses (Chapters 6 and 8). Losses are an inevitable cost that banks incur in
providing credit and are recognized as an expense for financial, regulatory,
and tax purposes. The principal issues surrounding the treatment of loan
losses concern the timing and manner in which expenses are recognized.
These may differ depending on the different objectives pursued by auditors,
regulators, and the tax authorities.
Three constraints affect the level of provisioning and the amount of write-offs
that a bank may decide to make. First, company law lays down what banks are
required to disclose in their balance sheets and profit and loss accounts. Sec-
ondly, supervisors are concerned to see that banks follow a prudent and respon-
sible approach to making provisions. In the past, general reserves, which have
not been earmarked, have been included in bank capital, whereas specific
provisions have been excluded from such calculations. Finally, the tax autho-
rities set out specific guidelines as to what they regard as allowable deductions
against profits. One of the problems in understanding provisioning and its
possible effects is that each of these various types of valuation may differ
markedly within a single country.
For financial and regulatory accounting purposes, banksmay set aside either
specific or general provisions to reflect the possible deterioration in the value
of their assets. In the first instance it falls to the banks to decide what they
consider to be the correct value of their assets and, consequently, to choose
the appropriate level of provisioning that should be made. Specific provisions
(or reserves) are made against clearly identifiable problems, which can be
expected to occur in connection with the affairs of a particular customer or
group of customers. General provisions permit a blanket cover against all
possible expected future as well as current losses. For financial accounting
purposes (IAS 2002), general provisions relating to losses that are present in
existing portfolios of loans but have not been identified specifically are treated
as an expense. However, provisions relating to future losses are accounted as
appropriations of reserves.
Provisioning is materially assisted by the possibility of an offset against tax
for the annual charge that is made in the profit and loss account. Decisions on
tax deductions are made by the fiscal authorities and need not be consistent
with regulatory and supervisory requirements.
Julian S. Alworth and Giampaolo Arachi
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Tax accounting practices do not generally conform to financial accounting
practices and prudential regulation. The broad objective of both tax and
financial accounting is measuring income. However, the objective of financial
and especially prudential accounting is conservatism—that is, to delay
income and anticipate expenses. Tax accounting is designed to ensure that
income is not understated. Nonconformity gives rise to timing differences.
The tax treatment varies widely across countries. There are broadly two
approaches. The so-called charge-off method recognizes a tax deduction only
when loans become worthless. Countries that follow this approach are the
United States, Australia, Korea, Malaysia, and the Philippines. The tax autho-
rities in most other countries for which information is available tend to allow
specific provisions but differ widely in terms of the degree of conformity with
financial and accounting for loan losses, the required evidence regarding the
deterioration in asset values, and in some instances the maximum amount of
loan losses allowed in a single year. The most favourable countries from this
standpoint appear to be France, Germany, and the Netherlands. Finally a few
countries (for example, Germany and Singapore) also allow general provisions
(as a percentage of qualifying loans), but these are subject to limitations.
Provisioning rules can have several effects on the international activities of
banks of different nationalities and the allocation of banks’ assets across finan-
cial centres. First, banks may decide to allocate their loans in centres where
provisioning is most generous. Second, generous provisioning policy can be an
implicit subsidy to banking relative to other forms of financial intermediation
and can affect interest rates charged on differing forms of financing. Generous
provisioning may allow certain financial institutions to shield a sizeable part of
their income from tax and thereby obtain a competitive advantage. Third,
where accounting and fiscal definitions of income do not broadly coincide,
banks may be unwilling to set aside an appropriate level of provisions unless
the tax authorities permit tax deductibility. Finally, different tax-provisioning
policies can affect the character of risk taking by banks and the distribution of
their profits over time. The treatment of claims onproblemdebtor countrieswas
one area where differing tax provisioning rules led banks to adopt diverse
behaviour.28 In those countries where tax provisioning for such claims was
limited, there was an incentive for banks to realize losses outright, through
28 One of the clearest examples of the subtle tax distinctions between various nationality groups
of banks occurred at the time of the Mexican financing package (1990) put together under the
Brady debt relief initiative. Under that scheme banks agreed to convert their rescheduled credits
(amounting to about 85% of Mexico’s external debt) into bonds at a reduced face value (65%) and
market interest rates (LIBOR + 13/16), into bonds having the same face value but a reduced and
fixed interest rate (6.25%), or to provide new loans equal to 25% of banks’ exposure. A survey of the
major banks involved indicated that tax considerations together with regulatory and business
strategies with Mexico were the major factor determining the decision of which instrument to
choose (Hay and Paul 1991).
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sales of their loans in secondary markets or by establishing losses through
specially authorized loan sales.29 By contrast, the possibility of tax deductions
for provisions encouraged banks in some countries to allocate large amounts of
their capital to less-developed countries (LDCs), possibly inhibiting the disposal
of their assets on the secondary market for country loans.30
Though there are important overlaps, the objectives of tax policy need to be
recognized as distinct from those of regulatory and accounting practices if all
are to be well aligned with one another. Tax policy towards financial decisions
is appropriately charged with raising revenue without creating excessive dis-
tortions. Any remaining non-tax distortions to financial decisions are then
best left to regulatory policy. Clearly there are monitoring and compliance
advantages in applying common definitions and concepts for tax and
accounting purposes, and there has been substantive discussion of possible
corporate governance advantages in closely aligning tax and book profits. But
the ideal tax base is not necessarily the most accurate measure of current
income. There are, for instance, and as will be seen, potential advantages in
allowing full expensing of investment for tax purpose. And even where, or if,
marking to market were felt to be inappropriate for financial accounting
purposes, a strong tax rationale for doing so—as much to avoid distortions
as it is to fine-tune the measurement of income or wealth—would remain.
Issues concerning the tax treatment of provisions for bad loans would be
raised by moving towards dynamic provisioning. Dynamic provisioning would
include a systematic and mandatory counter-cyclical element of general provi-
sioning, raising questions as to their tax treatment. To the extent that dynamic
provisioning would be analogous to depreciation allowances for physical assets
that reflect their expected reduction in value (or sometimes more, if accelerated
depreciation is allowed), deductibility could be argued to be appropriate. Other
approaches would be appropriate if the CIT were to be fundamentally reformed.
1.3.5 Other issues
1.3.5.1 REVISITING HARD-TO-TAX AREAS
More recent discussions appear to have taken the direction of suggesting that
financial institutions andmarket should be subjected to special tax treatment.
29 In the United States the value of a tax deduction depends in part on whether it is applied
against domestic or foreign source income. Sincemany banks have only limited potential liabilities
in respect of foreign source income by virtue of the tax credits from double taxation relief, tax
deductions against foreign source income reduce the value of these tax credits.
30 In Japan, where tax deductibility for provisions against loans to problem debtor countries has
until recently been limited, losses realized on loan sales in the secondary market have generally not
been recognized. However, in some instances these restrictions have been waived and Japanese
banks have been able to sell exissssting loans to a factoring company set up jointly by the major
banks.
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While many of the proposals overlap with the topics already covered in the
previous sections, mention should also be made of proposals to change the
VAT status of financial institutions. These proposals that have been suggested
only informally31 may be seen as an alternative to corrective taxes, as a
manner to reduce the excessive size of the sector as well as a means to raise
revenues in a relatively efficient way by reaping the rents of the sector.
1.3.5.2 THE TREATMENT OF TAX HAVENS
Tax havens have been the object of intense scrutiny in the 2000s. The focus
has been on both the lax tax regimes of these jurisdictions as well as the often
weak regulatory framework particularly in respect of hedge funds and various
types of SPVs. Often, the centres are said to facilitate criminal activities, since
some centres do not comply with the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) rules
in respect of anti-money laundering regulations.
The crisis has coincided with a step-up in a generalized clampdown on
undeclared offshore accounts, which had been building up over the previous
decade. A number of very publicized episodes have involved the transfer to the
tax authorities of the names of holders of offshore accounts. Individual finan-
cial institutions have been held responsible for encouraging unlawful activity
and faced significant fines. The authorities appear to have exploited the wave
of anti-bank feeling to extend their extra-territorial powers and step up inter-
national cooperation to push through further anti-evasion measures.
A different set of issues is raised by the exploitation of regulatory and tax
arbitrage involving offshore centres. The use of offshore centres to create
corporate or other types of vehicle is often driven by the absence of adequate
onshore forms of intermediation, particularly for foreign investors. This may
be due to delays in creating enabling legislation and uncertainty in respect of
the nature of domestic legislation.
1.4 The tax policy and the macroeconomy
During the crisis the governments implemented several measures to avoid the
collapse of the financial system and to alleviate the economic consequences of
the crisis on the real economy. The direct effect of these policy measures has
been a sharp deterioration of public budgets. In the EU the average public-
sector deficits increased from 0.9 per cent of GDP in 2007 to 6.8 per cent in
2010 and over the same period the public sector debt jumped from below 60 to
above 80 per cent of GDP (Chapter 5).
31 This suggestion appears implicitly in IMF (2009a).
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Government debt management and fiscal consolidation will certainly
remain crucial issues in the public policy debate for several years. In Chapter 9
McCauley and Ueda notice that government debt management is often dis-
cussed with reference to the question of whether central banks should proceed
to extraordinary buying of government bonds. There are other relevant issues,
such as how treasury debt management can contribute to maintaining the
growth of bank assets, lowering the long-term bond yields or reducing net
government interest payments, which are rarely analysed, despite the relevance
they have in the post-crisis scenario. Based on the experience of the United
States in the 1930s and Japan in the 2000s, McCauley and Ueda suggest that
governments may indeed benefit from issuing long-term debt with interest
rates tied to short-term bill rates in the confidence that monetary policy will
keep yields low. As long as short-term rates remain low, treasuries will benefit
from interest cost savings. When the economic activity quickens and interest
rates rise again, they will benefit from higher taxes in compensation for higher
servicing costs.
Chapter 10 addresses the crucial question of whether fiscal consolidation
may have a contractionary or expansionary effect. According to the conven-
tional ‘Keynesian’ approach, a public deficit reduction, achieved either
through a cut in government expenditure or through an increase in taxes,
brings about a decline in aggregate demand and depresses the rate of growth of
GDP. Fiscal consolidation may curb the recovery with the risk of pushing the
economy back into recession. In recent years the Keynesian view has been
challenged by several papers on both theoretical and empirical grounds.
Bilicka et al. in Chapter 10 present a survey of the theoretical literature and a
critical evaluation of the empirical evidence. They identify several factors that
seem to increase the probability of a fiscal consolidation being expansionary
and use them to attempt an evaluation of the possible impact of UK fiscal
consolidation announced in 2010. However, the authors highlight a number
of weakness in the empirical literature, which include the lack of very clear
identification of both fiscal consolidations episodes and expansionary effects.
1.5 Conclusions
While there is little conclusive evidence that the tax system played amajor role
in triggering the tax crisis, there is growing support for making taxes play
a prominent role in policy responses. A number of special taxes have been
introduced and proposed to recover the cost of the ‘bailout’. These have
involved both special taxes onfinancial institutions aswell as taxes on bonuses.
The revenues of these special taxes have been quite significant, but the ultimate
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incidence of these measures remains uncertain. It is also unclear whether these
measures will continue in the future.
The ongoing debate has also highlighted that taxation may be used as a
corrective instrument to complement prudential regulation of the banking
sector. Some corrective tax proposals aim to curtail activity in the financial
sector (‘Tobin taxes’), on the grounds that a large number of transactions are
either speculative or of no social use. No international consensus has emerged
to date as to the most appropriate approach. Without some of global coordi-
nation, such measures would inevitably create competitive distortions across
countries and market segments, as suggested by numerous past experiences.
The crisis has also drawn attention to a number of well-known weaknesses
in the taxation of the banking sector, particularly in respect of loan loss
provisioning, the relationship between financial and tax accounting, mark-
to-market accounting, and value-added taxation. These issues are by nomeans
new. The crisis has added saliency to finding longer-term solutions. Unfortu-
nately, after renewed attention to these questions, the political climate no
longer appears propitious to address the needed structural reforms.
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2
Culprit, Accomplice, or Bystander?
Tax Policy and the Shaping of the Crisis
Michael Keen, Alexander Klemm, and Victoria Perry
2.1 Introduction
This chapter considers channels by which tax distortions are likely to have
contributed to excessive leveraging and other financial market problems that
came to the forefront during the financial crisis, and what this may mean for
sensible directions of future tax reform.
This is an ambitious task. Economists are likely to be unpacking the financial
crisis for years to come, and thismaywell lead to better understanding—relative,
it must be said, to quite a low base—of the impact of taxation on the perfor-
mance ofmodernfinancialmarkets. The discussionhere1 is simply afirst pass on
the issue in the wake of the crisis: a health check on the most obvious possible
channels of effect. Several such come to mind and are examined here. These
include the corporate tax bias towards the use of debt finance (considered in
Section 2.2), tax distortions in housing markets (Section 2.3), and a range of
effects through the development of complex financial instruments and struc-
tures, including extensive use of low-tax jurisdictions,2 and on risk taking,
This is a revised version of IMF (2009a), previously published as Keen, Klemm, and Perry (2010).
We have benefited greatly from the comments and advice of Alan Auerbach, Carlo Cottarelli,
Geoffrey Lloyd, Gareth Myles, John Norregaard, Jeffrey Owens, Joel Slemrod, and Peter Birch
Srensen, as well as those of many colleagues at the IMF and seminar audiences in Milan and
Toronto. Views expressed are ours alone, and should not be attributed to the International
Monetary Fund, its Executive Board, or its management.
1 This chapter is based on IMF (2009a), which was prepared, in early 2009, for the Executive
Directors of the IMF. An account of their views is at<http://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/pn/2009/
pn0976.htm>. For other discussions of tax issues raised by the crisis, see Lloyd in Chapter 8 and
Slemrod (2009).
2 The terms ‘tax haven’ and ‘low-tax jurisdiction’ are not used here synonymously: the former
having come to be associated with illegal concealment of income, we use the latter term to
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including through executive compensation (Section 2.4). The chapter also
considers the activist use of tax policy to impact on asset prices (Section 2.5).
A central conclusion is that tax distortions do not appear to have triggered
the crisis: there are, for instance, no obvious tax changes that explain rapid
increases in debt in some parts of affected economies in recent years. But
tax distortions may have made the crisis more painful, by, for example,
leading to levels of debt higher than would otherwise have been the case.
Early alleviation of these distortions could have helped offset the factors that
over the last few years led to higher leverage and other financial market
problems—and would reduce exposure to future crises. Though not a culprit
in the sense of having been a proximate cause of the crisis, tax policy was also
no innocent bystander: an accomplice for sure, if an unwilling one.
The chapter describes that complicity and broad lessons for structural tax
reform, to be undertaken once more pressing concerns have subsided, arguing
for firmer action on long-standing (and deep-rooted) distortions. These dis-
tortions have mostly long been recognized, but few countries have acted
on them decisively. There remains much to learn, but one lesson of the crisis
may be that the benefits from mitigating them are far greater than previously
thought.
The benchmark for the analysis is taken to be neutrality in the tax treatment
of alternative financial arrangements. Financial markets are marked by exten-
sive informational asymmetries and other imperfections, so there may in
principle be scope for corrective taxation. Some would argue, for example,
that non-tax factors create an inherent tendency towards excessive leverage
and that the tax system ought, therefore, actively to disfavour debt. But there
is no consensus on the precise nature and magnitude of such inefficiencies, or
on the relative merits of tax and regulatory responses in addressing them.
Neutrality of tax arrangements thus remains a core benchmark for policy
evaluation and design in this, as in other areas of tax design. Of course,
neutrality and efficiency considerations in tax design need to be tempered
by distributional concerns, administrative and compliance capacity, and
other considerations likely to vary substantially across countries. The impor-
tance of neutrality is as a benchmark relative to which differential treatments
may be evaluated, providing a check on special pleading and inadvertent side
effects (from, for example, the use of tax measures to pursue objectives for
which spending measures are better targeted).
highlight the perfectly legal avoidance opportunities that low tax rates (and/or narrow bases) may
create: see Section 2.4.2.
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2.2 Debt bias and other key tax distortions to corporate finance
Tax is one of many determinants of corporate financial policies. In a world of
complete markets, perfect information, and no taxation, the parcelling of
returns between equity and debt claims has no real consequence. Informa-
tional imperfections, however, introduce considerations that can lead to a
determinate choice. Issuing debt, for instance, can help constrain managers in
their self-interested use of free cash flow (though there may be other better-
targeted incentive structures to achieve that). But tax considerations are also
critical: with interest payments deductible against the corporate income tax
(CIT) while equity returns are not, firms have an incentive to issue debt until
the expected tax benefit is just offset by the increase in expected bankruptcy
costs. While the focus in what follows is on the debt bias this can create,
taxation can distort other margins of financial choice too—such as whether
and when to realize capital gains or losses—and some of the issues this creates
are also considered.
2.2.1 Assessing tax distortions to financial policies
The heart of the issue is the almost ubiquitous practice of allowing interest
payments, but not the cost of equity finance, as a deduction against CIT.3
Leveraged buyouts (LBOs) are a prominent instance of the use of interest deduct-
ibility, but the potential tax incentive to debtfinance appliesmore generally. The
consequent bias towards debt finance is greater the higher is the effective CIT
rate, since this means that more tax is saved as a result of the deduction. It will
thusbe lower, for example, forfirms that are, or expect tobe, in a tax loss position:
since losses are not carried forward with interest, any future reduction in tax
liabilities has lower present value (PV) than an immediate deduction.
Levels of corporate indebtedness appear tohave increased in recent years. In the
UK, bank lending tonon-financial companies increased from themid-1990s from
around 20 to nearly 40 per cent of GDP in 2007 (Bank of England 2008), and the
aggregate ratio of debt to the replacement value of capital for non-financial
corporations rose from around 30 per cent at the turn of the century to about
50 per cent in 2006 (Bank of England 2007). In the eurozone, the ratio of non-
financial corporate debt to GDP rose from around 50 per cent to 66 per cent
between1998 and2006 (ECB2006).Debt–equity ratios appear tohave beenmore
stable in the USA—where they also tend, historically, to be lower than in other
3 The original rationale for this was a legalistic one, the view being that the corporation is so
entwined with its shareholders that payments to them should not be deductible, whereas
payments on debt are to true third parties and so should be. In economic terms, of course, both
kinds of payment represent a return to capital, and it is their combined treatment at corporate and
personal levels that matters. Shaviro (2009a) discusses further.
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countries4—at around 40 per cent since 2003 (Board of Governors of the Federal
Reserve System 2008). Many financial institutions, of course, took on very high
leverage prior to the crisis, with investment banks, for example, commonly
operatingwith equity only 3–4 per cent of assets (and in some casesmuch lower).
LBOs, marked by especially heavy use of interest deductions, increased
substantially up to mid-2007. Post-acquisition interest deductions under
these schemes can be so large as to eliminate CIT payments for several years.
There is also likely to have been an indirect effect in encouraging other firms to
increase their borrowing to defend against possible LBOs. Many LBOs cross
national borders, moreover, and so are characterized by complex structuring
intended to minimize tax liability and in some cases exploit opportunities for
‘double dipping’.5 Between 2003 and 2006, the amount raised by private
equity funds,6 which arrange most LBOs, increased about fivefold, to around
$230 billion (UKHouse ofCommons, TreasuryCommittee 2007); and between
2000 and 2007 their share of merger and acquisition activity in the USA rose
from 3 to nearly 30 per cent (US Government Accountability Office 2008).
Personal taxes on interest, dividends, and capital gains may also affect the
choice between debt and equity finance (with a distinction, in the latter case,
between finance by retaining earnings and by selling new shares). Box 2.1
provides a detailed discussion of the tax factors affection financing decisions.7
The key conclusions are as follows:
 The taxation of interest income at personal level offsets to some degree
the tax advantage at corporate level.
 Finance by retained earnings, since it leads to an appreciation of the share
price, is less attractive the higher is the effective rate of capital gains tax
(CGT). Commonly, however, the effective CGT rate is low, largely
because gains are typically taxed when they are realized rather than as
they accrue, so that the tax liability can be reduced in present value by
deferring realization (the ‘lock-in’ effect).8
4 Davis and Stone (2004), for example, report a ratio of debt to the market value of equity ratio of
28% for the non-financial corporate sector in the USA in 1999, relative to a G7 median of 59%.
Reflecting the magnitude of corporate liabilities, however, the ratio of corporate debt to GDP in the
USA, at 46%, is close to the G7 median of 0.50.
5 That is, taking multiple interest deductions: by, for instance, borrowing in a (high-tax) country
to acquire equity in a subsidiary located in a low-tax jurisdiction that then lends to another
subsidiary in a third country (see Mintz 2004).
6 Private equity and hedge funds are partnerships, so are taxed not at entity level but by ‘flow-
through’ to the partners (raising issues related to the tax treatment of the general managers that are
discussed in Section 2.4.4). Hedge funds typically do not push debt down to corporations, so this
leverage issue does not arise.
7 For a more complete treatment, see, e.g., Auerbach (2002).
8 In addition, capital gains are often charged at a lower statutory rate the longer assets are held
(as in the USA, and until 2008 in the UK and Germany); and, in the USA, CGT can be avoided by
holding assets until death.
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 Dividend taxation raises the cost of new equity finance. It does not in
principle affect that of retention finance: in a choice between (1) retaining
current profits and distributing them later, and (2) distributing themnow,
the dividend tax has to be paid in either case, and so—though it reduces
shareholders’ net income—does not affect the relative attractions of the
two. The dividend tax matters for new equity finance, however, since the
funds to be invested are not already trapped within the corporation.
Many countries allow some integration of personal and corporate taxes to
mitigate this effect, by providing an explicit credit (as under imputation
systems)9 or charging a lower rate than is applied to interest income.
Box 2.1. TAXATION AND THE COST OF CAPITAL
The after-corporate tax rate of return r that a company needs to earn in order to
generate the post-tax return required by those investing in it, when the gross interest
rate is R, dependson the marginal source of finance, as follows:
Debt finance. Interest deductibility means that to pay lenders interest of R the com-
pany need earn only an after-CIT return of
r ¼ ð1 TCÞR; ð1:1Þ
where TC is the rate of CIT.
Retention finance. As shown in the appendix to this chapter, the company needs to
earn




where TR is the shareholder’s personal tax rate on interest income (relevant because their
alternative to leaving money in the firm is to lend it out) and TGthe effective rate of CGT
(relevant because of the gain that retaining earnings will generate).
New equity finance. As also shown in the appendix, in this case:




where TD is the rate of tax on dividends at personal level.
In practice, a key margin of choice is that between borrowing and retaining earnings.
Comparing (1.1) and (1.2), borrowing will be tax-preferred to retention if
1 TC < ð1 TRÞ=ð1 TGÞ, or
TC > ðTR  TGÞ=ð1 TG). ð1:4Þ
For instance, at a CIT rate of 30%, and with interest taxed at 40% and CGT at 20%, debt
is preferred. Retentions would be preferred, however, if gains were taxed at 14% or less.
9 These were common in Europe, but have become less so in recent years, partly because of
complexities in dealing with cross-border investments but also as decisions of the European Court
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While high-income individuals may prefer equity finance, for others—includ-
ing tax-exempt institutions and non-residents—the corporate-level tax advan-
tage to debt dominates. Tax-exempt investors—pension funds, charitable
foundations, and, in many cases, sovereign wealth funds10—clearly prefer
debt finance: for them indeed there is a clear arbitrage gain in lending to
tax-paying corporations and taking the interest untaxed. In addition, for
non-resident investors, not liable to domestic personal taxes, the deductibility
of debt finance is critical. Tax exempts are quantitatively important. In the
UK, pension funds and insurance companies held around 30 per cent of all
equities in 2006, and non-residents—probably subject only to withholding
taxes—held 40 per cent. Direct holdings by resident individuals, in contrast,
were only 13 per cent. Some put the comparable figure for tax-exempt equity
holdings in the USA at around 50 per cent. The scale and active management
of the tax exempts may give their tax interests heavy weight in corporate
financial decisions.
These distortions11 create advantages to the use of debt measurable in
hundreds of basis points. Table 2.1 shows, for G7 members, the costs of the
three sources of corporate finance in 1990 and 2008; the upper panel relates
to investors facing top marginal tax rates and the lower to tax-exempt
investors—the two extremes. It shows the proportion of the gross market
interest rate available to investors that a company needed to earn, after CIT,
to meet the after-tax return required by those investors. At a 10 per cent
interest rate, for instance, in 1990 a Japanese corporation needed to earn
6.25 per cent after CIT to finance borrowing (if its marginal shareholder paid
at the highest marginal rate) but 8.42 per cent on retained earnings. Even for
top-rate taxpayers, debt is cheaper than new equity finance in almost all cases,
and, except in Canada, Germany, and the UK, it was cheaper than retention
finance too. For tax-exempt investors, of course, debt is always tax preferred.
Table 2.1 also suggests that the tax advantage to debt finance has in most
cases fallen since 1990. The trend reduction in statutory CIT rates—the
of Justice have suggested that the Community’s non-discrimination rules require member states to
provide credit for CIT paid in other member states. Australia and New Zealand retain full
imputation, and Canada partial.
10 While practice varies, sovereign wealth funds are generally exempted on their passive
investments.
11 Analyses of the kind above leave unclear how equilibrium is reached in financial markets,
since incentives for tax arbitrage—borrowing infinitely large amounts to pay infinitely large
dividends, for example—will remain unless tax rates happen to meet particular ‘knife-edge’
conditions for all investors. Elements of an answer (which also revolve around the nature of any
equilibrium, given, for instance, the likely non-unanimity of shareholders with different tax
positions as to the best policy for the firm to pursue) include non-linearities in marginal tax rates
(progressivity of the personal tax as stressed in M. H. Miller (1977), and the effective rate of
corporate tax falling as more debt is issued, for example), heterogeneity of risk attitudes across
investors, and legal and other constraints on short-selling (analysed, e.g., in Auerbach and King
1982).
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(weighted) OECD average has fallen by nine percentage points since 1990—
has raised the cost of debt finance. Changes in personal tax rates, however,
have had more mixed effects, and the overall impact for top-rate taxpayers
varies across countries: in both the UK and the USA, the relative tax advantage
of debt for top-rate taxpayers has been reduced; in France it has increased.
While developments in the tax advantage to debt in itself are thus mixed,
the increasing importance of tax exempts—for which the tax advantage of
debt, though it has fallen, remains substantial—and the growth in the use of
complex financial arrangements, including through low-tax jurisdictions,
may well have meant more aggressive exploitation of those tax incentives to
high leverage.
The empirical evidence suggests that tax distortions have caused leverage to
be substantially higher than it would have been under a neutral tax system.
Surveying the empirical literature, Weichenrieder and Klautke (2008) con-
clude that a 10-point increase in the CIT rate increases the debt–asset ratio
by 1.4 to 4.6 points. As a rough order of magnitude, the debt bias from a CIT at
20 per cent (ignoring personal taxes) would then be to increase a debt–equity
ratio that would otherwise be 40 per cent, up to between 45 and 60 per cent.
The effect may thus be far from negligible.
Significant tax policy effects on leverage have been found in studies differ-
ing in country coverage andmethodology. For the USA,MacKie-Mason (1990)











Canada 62.0 58.5 78.5 62.0 56.9 70.5
France 63.0 45.0 66.7 66.7 76.1 100.0
Germany 64.0 47.0 64.0 75.0 55.0 71.0
Italy 64.0 70.0 82.4 72.5 75.4 83.4
Japan 62.5 84.2 100.0 70.0 84.2 88.9
UK 65.0 66.7 75.0 72.0 62.8 80.0
USAa 66.0 77.4 100.0 65.0 67.5 76.5
Tax-exempt investor
Canada 62.0 100.0 100.0 62.0 100.0 100.0
France 63.0 100.0 100.0 66.7 100.0 100.0
Germany 64.0 100.0 100.0 75.0 100.0 100.0
Italy 64.0 100.0 100.0 72.5 100.0 100.0
Japan 62.5 100.0 100.0 70.0 100.0 100.0
UK 65.0 100.0 100.0 72.0 100.0 100.0
USAa 66.0 100.0 100.0 65.0 100.0 100.0
a Federal taxes only.
Source: Authors’ calculation.
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finds that, as the arguments above imply, the probability of issuing debt is
comparatively low for firms with large losses carried forward and for unprofit-
able firms with large investment tax credits. Recent work on a panel of
European medium-sized enterprises (Cheng and Green 2008) finds that tax
policy has a significant impact on debt ratios. Reviewing the evidence, Gra-
ham (2003) comes to the same conclusion, while Auerbach (2002) also reads it
as confirming an impact at firm level. Tax effects on the debt–equity
ratios of subsidiaries of multinationals are particularly strong. For US multi-
nationals, Desai et al. (2004) find that leverage is higher in high-tax countries:
a 10 per cent increase in the tax rate boosts the debt–asset ratio by 2.6 per cent.
Very similar results have been obtained for European multinationals (Mintz
and Weichenrieder 2005; Büttner et al. 2006; Huizinga et al. 2008). At a more
aggregate level, Devereux et al. (2006) note that the proportion of inward
direct investment taking the form of debt is greater the higher the statutory
CIT rate.
Little is known, however, of the welfare costs of these distortions. Weichen-
rieder and Klautke (2008) estimate a deadweight loss from tax distortions to
financial decisions of 0.05–0.15 per cent of invested capital (at an interest rate
of 5 per cent). This, though, reflects only the loss relative to what would
otherwise be the firm’s optimal financing choice, so ignores any consequences
external to the firm itself. Importantly, even small tax distortions can have
large welfare effects if they act on large pre-existing inefficiencies, reflecting,
for instance, adverse externalities from the use of debt.
These distortions imply a marginal subsidy to debt-financed investment if
the tax system provides accelerated depreciation allowances for physical as-
sets, as it commonly does. Leaving personal taxes aside, a corporate tax system
that allowed deduction of both financing costs and true economic deprecia-
tion would have no effect on investment decisions, since it would enable full
recovery of all costs over the lifetime of a project. Tax would then be levied
only on supernormal profits: the marginal effective tax rate (METR)12 would
be zero. Allowing more than true economic depreciation along with interest
deductibility costs thus amounts to a (marginal) subsidy: at the margin,
unprofitable projects can become profitable, purely for tax reasons, if financed
with debt. Equity-financed investments, enjoying no corporate-level deduc-
tion, are tax discouraged. Table 2.2 reports METRs on alternatively financed
investments, showing that these effects have been sizeable. In France, for
instance, debt finance received a 36 per cent subsidy at the margin while
equity-financed investment faced a 20 per cent tax.
12 Defined, more precisely, as the proportion by which the pre-tax return on a project that the
investor just finds worthwhile exceeds the post-tax return he or she requires.
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The distinction between debt and equity, however, has become blurred.
A focus of financial innovation has been constructing instruments with many
features of equity but enough features of debt to attract interest deduction.
Hybrids of this kind (such as convertible bonds and preferred securities13)
have come to play a large part in corporate financing,14 exploiting the intrin-
sic difficulty of making firm distinctions between the two.15 To the extent that
such hybrids enable what is really equity to attract the same treatment as debt,
they may ease the inefficiencies created by differential tax treatment of the
two. But this comes at some cost: a loss of CIT revenue, and increased com-
plexity and opacity of financial arrangements.
While much of the literature in this area has had non-financial institutions
in mind, if only implicitly, financial institutions face qualitatively the same
tax considerations in balancing equity and debt finance (including deposits).
Banks have traditionally been able to sustain high debt ratios by virtue of
having relatively safe assets, and implicit or explicit deposit guarantees rein-
force this. Moreover, the high profitability of financial institutions in recent
years will have made debt more attractive for them than for many non-
financials, since the low probability of tax exhaustion it implies means a
high effective CIT rate.
The tax bias to debt runs counter to regulatory objectives in the financial
sector. Banks face both an explicit tax advantage of debt and, through regulatory
requirements, an implicit penalty—with evident risk of policy incoherence.
Tax incentives towards high leverage may have undercut the effectiveness of
regulatory requirements.
This tension is reflected in the emergence of devices that enable debt-like
instruments, attracting interest deduction, to be included in Tier 1 capital.
Basel guidelines allow up to 15 per cent of Tier 1 capital to be in the form of
Table 2.2. Marginal effective tax rates, selected countries, 2005 (%)
Source of finance France Germany Italy UK USA
Equity 20 29 19 20 24
Debt –36 –37 –48 –28 –46
Source: Devereux et al. (2002); updated data available at <http://www.ifs.org>.
13 The former give the holder the option to convert to equity (and sometimes the issuer the
option to call the bond); the latter pay distributions at a fixed rate but allow the issuer to defer
payment.
14 Devereux et al. (2006) report a survey of finance officers as indicating that anti-avoidance
legislation adopted in the UK in 2005 has substantially reduced the use of hybrid entities and
instruments.
15 Shaviro (2009a) notes, for instance, that the US Congress instructed the Treasury to issue
comprehensive regulations setting out the tax distinction between the two in 1969: but, not for
want of trying, it has been unable to do so.
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hybrid instruments that may attract interest deductions—in itself suggestive
of the tax bias to debt finance that banks face. Beyond this, moreover, devices
have emerged by which banks can include as Tier 1 capital what is arguably
closer to debt. Prominent among these is the trust preferred security (TruPS),
which has accounted for a large share of hybrid issues in the USA.16 Measures
can be conceived to close specific possibilities of this kind (in the case of TruPS,
for example, by appropriate consolidation rules to look through the trust)—
and the crisis itself may have restored the appeal of simple equity—but so long
as the underlying tax bias remains so too will an incentive to find other ways
of achieving the same end.
2.2.2 Possible policy responses
The concerns raised by potential debt bias are clear. Issues also arise at the
interface of tax, regulation, and accounting.
2.2.2.1 ALLEVIATING DEBT BIAS
Given the potentially large macroeconomic damage from excess leverage, it is
hard to see why debt finance should be systematically tax favoured. Micro-
theory results on the probable inefficiencies of financial markets—whether
there will be too much borrowing or too little—are model specific.17 The
impact of externalities operating at a more macro-level, however, seems
clear-cut: when firms borrow, they are likely to internalize the expected
bankruptcy costs they themselves incur but not the impact of their own
failure and default on others (effects that are not present in the use of equity
finance). These externalities are likely to be especially large for financial
institutions, given their systemic importance. Some aspects of government
policy exacerbate these concerns, as with guarantees (explicit or implicit) on
bank deposits or corporate debt. There may also be strong effects on the
balance of payments: preferential tax treatment of debt can provide an
implicit subsidy to corporate and household borrowing, including from
abroad, so increasing vulnerabilities through the capital account. This may
have happened in Latvia, to give just one example, where—though other
factors were probably the major sources of external imbalances—the implicit
corporate-level tax subsidy made investment financed by borrowing
16 Preferred securities are treated as Tier 2 capital if issued directly by the bank. If issued,
however, by a trust in which the bank has an interest, which then makes a loan to the bank, the
interest is deductible to the bank, while Basel guidelines allow inclusion of the bank’s equity
interest in Tier 1 capital.
17 Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) and de Meza and Webb (1987), for instance, derive contrasting
results from different assumptions on the joint distribution of projects’ probability of success and
return if successful.
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(including from abroad) something like 130 basis points cheaper than it
would have been in the absence of tax.18 Externalities from increased leverage
are hard to quantify, but there is evidence that high leverage is associated with
greater output losses in bad times.19 These macro-externalities raise the ques-
tion of whether taxation should actively discriminate against debt finance.
Current knowledge, however, does not allow a definitive view on this. Most
important for present purposes is that there is no compelling reason why debt
should be actively tax favoured—movement towards neutrality would thus be
seen as desirable even by those who would wish to go further and tilt the
playing field against debt.
Fundamental but conceptually straightforward reforms to the CIT—for
which there are some encouraging precedents—can eliminate the debt bias
at corporate level. Levelling the treatment of debt and equity costs can be done
in either of two broad ways.
One approach is to limit the extent of interest deductibility:
 Thin capitalization rules deny deductibility for interest payments in excess
of some level. Such rules have become more common in recent years.
But they are essentially ad hoc, failing to capture all avoidance-related
transactions and to acknowledge the differing debt capacities of different
enterprises.
 A comprehensive business income tax (CBIT, see US Department of the
Treasury 1992) would deny interest deductibility altogether (while
retaining depreciation allowances broadly unchanged).
 ‘Cash-flow’ forms of CIT would allow investment to be deducted in full
(rather than depreciated over time), while giving no deduction for
interest. One such approach—for example, the ‘S-base’ of Meade
(1978)—would be to tax net distributions to shareholders (so that, while
banks would have no deduction for interest paid, interest received
would not in itself be taxable). Since the PV of net distributions is the
PV of the firm’s fundamental value, such a tax—and all other cash-flow
taxes, to which it is equivalent—is non-distorting not only for financing
but also for real investment decisions.
The CBIT and cash-flow routes, however, involve transitional difficulties in
dealing with pre-existing debt. And if adopted unilaterally they run the risk of
multinationals being unable to claim foreign tax credits in their home
18 There are no data on corporate leverage in Latvia during this period, though the financial and
real estate sectors did become highly leveraged.
19 Davis and Stone (2004), for instance, find that higher debt–equity ratios are associated with
larger post-crisis output declines, and IMF (2008) that the cumulative output loss following periods
of financial stress tends to be larger the greater the run-up in non-financial corporate debt before
the onset.
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country, since interest deductibility is often taken as a necessary condition for
any tax to be regarded as a creditable income tax. (This will be less of a concern
for multinationals whose home countries operate a territorial system.) A CBIT
would also require somewhat complex treatment of banks.
The alternative is to keep interest deductibility but also allow a deduction
for a notional cost of equity finance: the allowance for corporate equity (ACE)
form of CIT. Under an ACE, corporations deduct not only interest on debt but
also a notional return to shareholders’ equity.20 Tax is thus ultimately levied
only on profits in excess of investors’ required return, so that the ACE is fully
neutral. Several countries have already experimented with the ACE (or var-
iants), and with some success. Croatia implemented an ACE from 1994 to
2001, and it has recently been adopted in Belgium and Latvia. A variant is
applied in Brazil, and partial ACEs were applied in Austria and Italy. Although
some ACE experiments were terminated—with changes of government, and
in some cases a cut in the headline CIT rate—technical assessments of these
experiences have beenbroadly positive,with evidence thatmovement towards
an ACE is indeed associated with reduced debt–equity ratios.21 There are
certainly important practical issues in the implementation of an ACE. Promi-
nent among these is the choice of notional rate of return, there being a strong
argument for the use of some proxy for a risk-free rate of return: so long as the
availability of a future tax reduction is perfectly certain—which requires appro-
priate arrangements in the event, for example, of the firm ceasing operations—
the associated cash flow is appropriately discounted as risk free.22
For banks, an ACE would essentially mean giving a tax deduction for a
notional return on Tier 1 capital. Its adoption would thus send a strong and
clear signal that accumulating capital reserves is no longer to be tax penalized.
Restricting the deduction for interest to the same notional rate for debt as
well as equity—an extended form of ACE—would also eliminate the problems
associated with hybrids.23 This might appear to ride roughshod over the
traditional legal distinctions between straightforward debt and equity claims:
but the argument set out above in the case of the ‘equity-only’ ACE suggests
that the use of a risk-free rate as the marker for deductibility is appropriate for
both forms of finance. Uniform treatment would not be a necessary feature of
ACE adoption, but would eliminate the need to make the inherently
20 This and other issues in implementing an ACE are discussed in Griffith et al. (2010).
21 See Klemm (2007); for Croatia, Keen and King (2002); for Italy, Bordignon et al. (2001) and
Staderini (2001), the latter finding reduced debt–equity ratios consequent on movement to the
partial ACE.
22 See Bond and Devereux (2003). The use of a single notional rate, rather than one varying by
firm or sector, clearly also has the merit of simplicity.
23 A ‘uniform cost of capital allowance’ of this kind is proposed and discussed further by
Kleinbard (2007b).
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problematic distinction between debt and equity for tax purposes, and also
limit the narrowing of the tax base.
The principal difficulty with the ACE is the reduction in revenue it can
imply. Moving to an ACE narrows the tax base: it may have reduced CIT
revenue in Croatia by one-third.24 Raising the statutory CIT rate to recover
this lost revenue is problematic if done unilaterally, as it would risk increased
profit shifting to lower tax jurisdictions. The risk of revenue loss can be over-
stated, however. To the extent that the pre-existing CIT led to a marginal
subsidy to debt-financed investment, movement to neutrality would actually
lead to an increase in revenue—an effect ignored in standard revenue calcula-
tions. The immediate revenue impact can bemitigated,moreover, by providing
relief only in respect of equity built up after some initial date (with anti-
avoidance provisions to prevent recharacterization of ‘old’ equity as new).
Importantly for both its distributional and revenue impact, much of the
efficiency gain from moving towards an ACE would probably benefit labour,
not equity-holders. In an economy open to capital movements, much of the
real burden of a source-based tax on the normal return to capital will be passed
on by internationallymobile capital to immobile factors, notably labour: if the
required after-CIT return to capital is fixed on world markets, then taxing that
normal return must lead to a higher before-tax return; and the only way this
can happen is if the return to immobile factors falls. Emerging evidence
suggests that this effect may be substantial.25 This implies—though no
doubt not an easy political sell—that eliminating a tax on the normal return
to capital would lead labour income to increase by enough for revenue to be
recovered through taxing labour explicitly and still leave labour better off.26
Adopting an ACE or cash-flow CIT would not eliminate all distortions to
financial decisions, for which changes to personal taxation would also be
needed. But both would remove normal profits from the CIT base. This
would be consistent with a range of approaches to achieving a more neutral
tax treatment of alternative forms of capital income. It could readily be
integrated into a broader expenditure tax. Or it could be part of a more
traditional income tax, with neutrality between the alternative forms of
finance achieved by taxing interest and dividend income at the same rate
while exempting capital gains on corporate stock.27 That, in turn, could be
done either as part of a comprehensive income tax (treating capital and labour
24 Simulation results in De Mooij and Devereux (2009) suggest that unilateral movement to an
ACE by EU members would reduce corporate tax revenues by an average of 44%.
25 Arulampalam et al. (2008) and Hassett and Mathur (2008).
26 If, on the other hand, the normal return is subsidized (which, as noted above, may well be the
case for debt-financed investments), eliminating the distortion would increase tax revenue bymore
than labour income falls: taxes could be cut so as to leave labour better off and tax revenue
ultimately no lower.
27 Since, given the dividend tax, not doing so would amount to double taxation.
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income identically) or as part of a ‘dual’ income tax (applying a progressive tax
to labour income and a flat tax to all forms of capital income). The choice of
accompanying measures would evidently be key in shaping the overall distri-
butional impact of the reform.
Fundamental change in the CIT treatment of debt and equity would proba-
bly be too unsettling for some while, but movement to an ACE or cash-flow
system is in this respect likely to be the less problematic route. Removing
interest deductibility—even if only for ‘new’ debt—would risk amplifying
financial distress. The alternative route of extending deductibility to equity
finance, however, would have the opposite effect, and might make recapitali-
zation of banks, for instance, more attractive than under current rules. The
revenue impact, however, remains a concern, not least given the very deep
fiscal challenges, amplified by the financial crisis and response to it, that many
advanced countries now face.28
2.2.2.2 TAX, REGULATORY, AND ACCOUNTING LINKAGES
The crisis has drawn attention to difficulties in the regulatory treatment of
financial institutions’ tax losses. The reduction in future tax liabilities implied
by accumulated tax losses can, under certain circumstances, be included in
Tier 1 capital. The requirement for inclusion is that such deferred tax assets
have a reasonable prospect of being realized in the near future—within the
following year, under US rules. On occasion, however, tax losses have appar-
ently been valued for these purposes far above their likely PV.
Increased use of marking to market (fair value accounting) in taxing finan-
cial institutions may increase the volatility of revenue, but is the right direc-
tion for tax policy. The lock-in effect of levying CGT on realization rather than
accrual, noted earlier, creates an incentive to defer realizing gains and acceler-
ate realizing losses.29 Even if taxed at the same nominal rate, capital gains thus
become inherently more favourably treated than other forms of capital
income, such as interest. This creates opportunities for tax arbitrage—a signif-
icant concern at personal level (where taxation on realization remains the
norm) as well as corporate. As banks have expanded their trading books,
increased use of marking to market in assessing their tax liability—in this
area tax rules generally follow accounting treatment—will have made revenue
more volatile (albeit in the direction of strengthening the automatic stabilizers
that other tax developments over recent years may have weakened). A poten-
tial difficulty is that taxation on fair market value may induce the sale of assets
simply to finance the accruing liability. There is though little sign that this has
been a significant problem in the financial sector. It is possible, moreover, to
28 These are stressed and discussed in Cottarelli and Viñals (2009).
29 As Slemrod (2009) notes, this latter ‘lock-out’ effect may be of some importance at present.
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design schemes that tax on realization but mimic taxation on accrual, and
there is some practical experience with them.30 Greater neutrality in taxing
capital income is likely to require more rather than less marking to market.
Though there are important overlaps, the objectives of tax policy need to be
recognized as distinct from those of regulatory and accounting practices if
each is to serve its proper purpose. Clearly, there are monitoring and compli-
ance advantages in applying common definitions and concepts for tax and
accounting purposes, and some see corporate governance advantages in
closely aligning tax and book profits: this can create a helpful tension between
the temptations to overstate profits for financial accounting purposes and to
understate them for tax purposes. But the ideal tax base is not necessarily the
most accurate measure of current income. For instance, valuing depreciation
at (some reasonable approximation of) true economic rates is generally appro-
priate for financial accounting, but there can be a case for encouraging invest-
ment by allowing faster depreciation—or even full expensing—for tax
purposes. It may also be appropriate to treat provisioning for bad debt differ-
ently for accounting and tax purposes.
Recent proposals to move towards dynamic provisioning (as in the Turner
Review (FSA 2009) and IMF 2009b, for instance)—meaning a systematic and
mandatory counter-cyclical element of general provisioning—raise issues
concerning the tax treatment of provisions for bad loans. The most common
approach is to allow tax deductions only for specific provisions (related to
the impairment of particular assets), not general. To the extent that dynamic
provisioningwould be analogous to depreciation allowances for physical assets
that reflect their expected reduction in value (or sometimesmore, if accelerated
depreciation is allowed), deductibility could be argued to be appropriate. Other
approaches might be needed if the CIT were to be fundamentally reformed.31
2.3 Housing
Housing is commonly subject to special tax treatment that may have
increased household leverage and house prices. Taxation does not explain
30 One such scheme, developed in Auerbach (1991), effectively charges tax on the excess of the
actual sale value not over the acquisition price but over what that price would have been had the
asset earned the risk-free rate, in effect taxing only the normal return while leaving the realization
decision undistorted; Auerbach and Bradford (2004) describe a more general class of schemes
achieving the same effect. Alworth et al. (2003) describe experience in Italy with schemes
intended to mimic the effects of taxation on accrual.
31 An incidental advantage of an ACE, for instance, is that tax incentives to overstate specific
provisions would in principle be eliminated, since any increased deduction from doing so would be
offset in PV by a reduction in Tier 1 capital and hence in the future imputed tax allowance on
equity.
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the widespread house price boom—that occurred in countries with very dif-
ferent tax systems—and there are no obvious tax changes that might have
triggered its collapse. But taxation does create substantial distortions in a
market of central macroeconomic importance.
2.3.1 The tax treatment of housing
Within a comprehensive income tax, fully neutral taxation of owner-occupation
would require full taxation of imputed rents and capital gains on housing,
and deductibility of mortgage interest payments. Consider the alternative of,
for instance, renting instead and investing in fully taxed assets: taxation of
imputed rents—the consumption value of housing services—is needed to
match the payment of market rents from taxed income; taxation of capital
gains is needed to match the CGT liability on other financial assets; and deduct-
ibility of mortgage interest is needed to match the taxation of the interest
available from investing in other assets.
In practice, imputed rents and capital gains on primary residences are rarely
taxed, creating a general bias towards housing that mortgage interest relief—
where it remains—is likely to reinforce. Very few countries bring imputed rents
into the income tax (theNetherlands and Switzerland being exceptions).32 Some
tax capital gains on owner-occupied housing, but typically more lightly than
other income or only beyond a high threshold (or both). Even in the absence of
distortions on the financing side, these features would tax-favour owner-occupa-
tion relative to renting. And mortgage interest costs attract tax relief, subject to
limits, in a number of countries (including Denmark, France, Italy, Spain, Italy,
France, and the USA). Since borrowing to acquire other assets is generally not
deductible, this makes investment in housing even more favoured.
Mortgage interest relief would not tax-favour mortgage finance if the alter-
native to borrowing were investing less in fully taxed assets and other interest
were also deductible—but that is commonly not the case. If alternative invest-
ments were fully taxed, mortgage interest deductibility would mean that the
opportunity costs of acquiring housing by borrowing and by running down
other assets would in each case be the after-tax interest rate—so mortgage
finance would not be tax favoured. Many countries, however, tax other forms
of saving (such as pensions) at reduced rates. In that case, if the return on
those assets matches the pre-tax interest rate on mortgage debt, there is an
arbitrage gain from leveraging against housing and investing own-funds in
the non-housing asset. And, while interest on loans used to finance
32 Several countries charge VAT on first sales of residences, which—to the extent that house
prices are the present value of housing services—amounts to an implicit tax on imputed rents,
though one that is not tailored to household circumstances in the same way that income tax is.
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consumption is generally not deductible, home equity loans have provided
(within limits) just such a tax-favoured way to borrow and spend.
The distributional impact of mortgage interest relief can be complex, but
deductibility probably favours the better off. On the one hand, higher-income
individuals may be more likely to face constraints on their access to tax-
favoured assets (since this is often subject to caps), so that their opportunity
cost of investing in housing is the after-tax return. This creates an argument
for some tax relief to ensure that the less well off also pay an after-tax rate.
Against this, however, deductions are typically worthmore to the better off, as
they take them against a higher marginal rate of tax. The latter effect would be
avoided if relief were provided—as many countries do—not as a deduction but
as a credit (reducing tax paid, rather than the income taxed).
Ownership/occupation and transaction taxes are also important elements
in the tax treatment of housing. Recurrent taxes based on ownership or
occupation have potential appeal both as serving as user charges reflecting
the value of local public services—and as such they are often allocated to
lower-level governments—and, to the extent that these and other features
are location specific, as being less vulnerable to interjurisdictional tax compe-
tition than the CIT and other taxes on more mobile bases. There is indeed
evidence that such taxes (along with consumption taxes) have significantly
less adverse effects on growth than income taxation (Johansson et al. 2008).
Housing transactions themselves are often subject to tax, sometimes in signif-
icant amounts (up to 9 per cent in Ireland).
2.3.2 Impact on prices and leverage
Tax policy can affect two key aspects of housing markets: house prices and
households’ leverage. These are interrelated, as high house prices encourage
removing equity through increased borrowing, the availability of cheap loans
drives up house prices, and the expectation of price increases raises the ex-
pected return on borrowing to acquire housing.33
2.3.2.1 HOUSE PRICES
Favourable tax treatment is likely to be capitalized in house prices, may be
reflected in the rate of house price inflation, and can also increase housing
price volatility. In the short run, when the physical stock of housing is
virtually fixed, most taxes (or tax subsidies) will be fully capitalized in housing
prices, with the incidence mainly on the seller (though the effect may be
mitigated by changes in the supply of housing offered for sale). A reduction
33 Taxation also affects other features of the housing market, not considered here—including
the share of housing in the aggregate capital stock.
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in the rate of CGT on housing, for instance, would be expected to increase
house prices (with some offset as sellers enter the market to realize deferred
gains). It might also lead to a slower—not, as one might expect, a faster—rate
of house price appreciation (because a lower pre-tax gain is needed to yield the
required post-CGT return).34 In the longer term, supply responses will ease
price effects, but marked effects can remain. Importantly too, distortions
affecting most directly prices in one segment of the market (the greater
value of mortgage interest deductions for high-income taxpayers, for exam-
ple) will generate substitution effects that then feed price effects through to
others. There is also evidence that more favourable tax treatment of housing is
associated with greater volatility of its price (van den Noord 2005).
Tax effects can substantially reduce the user cost of—and hence increase the
demand for—housing. Poterba and Sinai (2008) find, for the USA, that mort-
gage interest deductibility and other tax features on average provided a tax
subsidy equivalent to around 19 per cent of the user cost.35 This means that,
for households facing a user cost of capital of, say, 10 per cent, the favourable
tax treatment of housing was equivalent to a reduction of 235 basis points, a
substantial amount by the usual standards of monetary policy discussions.
The reduction is greatest for high-income households (since they take the
mortgage interest deduction at a higher marginal rate), but it is nevertheless
around 8 per cent for those with low incomes.
Effective tax rates on housing vary enormously across countries, and with
the circumstances of the investor and investment. An effective (average) tax
rate (EATR) on housing can be calculated as the ratio of the PV of total taxes
over an expected holding period to the sum of the PV of imputed rent and
capital gains. EATRs can be very high—sometimes more than 100 per cent—
when investors keep a house for a short period and are subject to high
transaction taxes. They can also be negative—for example, in countries that
allow mortgage interest deductions but do not tax imputed rents and alterna-
tive assets.
Figure 2.1 shows calculated EATRs for ten countries, a mix of small and
large, industrialized and emerging economies, and booming and flat housing
markets. These assume a property purchased for $250,000, held for ten years,
80 per cent mortgage financed, and appreciating in value by 5 per cent per
year—and then track how EATRs vary across countries as each of these as-
sumptions is changed. Such changes affect the ranking of countries, but:
Spain, France, and to a lesser extent Denmark have relatively high tax rates
across a range of assumptions; Ireland and the USA have low EATRs. Italy
34 See Box 2.2.
35 The comparison is with an idealized personal income tax of the type described above.
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stands out as a country with an almost consistently negative tax rate, reflect-
ing very low taxation combined with interest deductibility.
These EATRs show a number of interesting patterns. Virtually all countries
show a falling tax rate as the investment period increases: this is the result of
transaction taxes, which are relatively more important for short investments. In


























































































Figure 2.1. Effective average tax rates on owner-occupation (%)
Source: Authors’ calculation.
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increases. This effect is strongest for the USA, reflecting the very high upper limit
for mortgage interest deduction (on debt of up to $1,000,000). Other countries
have much lower limits (Ireland, Italy, and Spain) or allow deduction only
against capital income, which is taxed at a lower rate (Denmark). Higher house
prices increase taxation in some countries, reflecting progressive elements of
ownership or transaction tax rates, or capital gains tax imposition if a threshold
is exceeded. House price inflation has different effects across countries.
Special vehicles—not captured in these calculations—may have created
further tax biases towards housing. Real estate investment trusts (REITs) pro-
vide CIT exemption for corporations whose main business is property invest-
ment (subject to fulfilling certain criteria, notably distributing a large share of
profits to shareholders); dividends are taxed at shareholder level, potentially at
low rates. This makes investing in property through REITs tax favoured rela-
tive to doing so directly (which would attract tax, and deductions, at ordinary
income-tax rates). Further, in the USA a substantial proportion of the required
cash distributions from REITs is typically in the form of non-taxable return of
capital, as the earnings and profits of the REIT are frequently reduced by high
leverage and depreciation.
Taxation does not appear, however, to have been the main driver of house
price developments since 1990. Strong price increases occurred in all countries
examined above, including in the high-tax group (see Table 2.3). The same
conclusion flows from the diverse experience of local markets: in the USA, for
example, booming property markets in coastal cities went with more stagnant
developments inland, despite relatively small inter-state variation in tax rates.
Nor are there changes in tax rules that clearly account for housing price
movements over the period. Some commentators attach importance, for
instance, to a substantial increase in the CGT exemption for housing in the
USA in 1997, something of an inflection point for house prices. The impact of
this change is not clear-cut, however, since it also eliminated rollover relief,36
which for some taxpayers was a marked reduction in generosity.
Table 2.3. Real cumulative house price inflation between 1998 and end 2007 (%)
High-tax countries Medium-tax countries Low-tax countries
Spain France Denmark Brazil Canada Germany UK USA Ireland Italy
110.9 105.9 75.7 n.a. 65.2 –18.0 124.1 45.3 108.5 56.4
Note: n.a. = not available.
Source: Authors’ calculation based on data from OECD (2008a).
36 This provided that any gain on disposal of a house would not be taxed if the proceeds were
reinvested in another property: so no tax liability arose as long as taxpayers traded up with each
move.
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2.3.2.2 MORTGAGE DEBT
Mortgage interest tax relief encourages the build-up of (gross) housing debt if
alternative investments are less than fully taxed, which, as noted above, is
often the case because, all else being equal, the after-tax return on other
investments then exceeds the cost of mortgage-backed borrowing.
There is evidence that countries offering more favourable tax treatment for
home ownership do indeed have higher ratios of mortgage debt (see Figure
2.2). Analyses for the UK (Hendershott et al. 2003) and the USA (Dunsky and
Follain 2000) confirm that mortgages fell significantly relative to home value
after reforms reducing the value of mortgage interest relief. Of course, other
factors are also at work, notably regulatory limits on maximum loan-to-value
ratios of realistic appraisals. As a result, even some countries without mortgage
relief—such as the UK, since 2000—have experienced substantial growth in
housing debt and housing price bubbles.
2.3.3 Possible policy responses
Alleviating tax distortions to housing markets would improve efficiency and
help avoid macroeconomic imbalances—but timing is important. The social
objectives underlying these distortions—realizing the beneficial externalities
from owner-occupation for which there is some evidence—can be achieved
through better-targetedmeasures (such as outright grants): Glaeser and Shapiro
(2002), for example, note that, while mortgage interest deduction does appear
to increase the amount spent on housing in the USA, home-ownership rates
have beenbroadly stable, despite large changes in the tax subsidy. To the extent
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Figure 2.2. Debt ratios and the tax treatment of owner-occupation
Source: Cardarelli et al. (2008).
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that they are capitalized in house prices, existing tax subsidies do not even help
first-time buyers. Some reforms towards greater tax neutrality, however, would
probably reduce house prices and/or construction activity, and so be inappro-
priate during times of recession.
Policy thus requires balancing the needs of short-term recovery and those
for ultimate structural improvement in the taxation of housing. Transaction
taxes can be easy to collect, but scaling them back would remove an impedi-
ment to efficient trading, increase prices, and speed up clearance of any
excess stock of unsold houses. It would also be helpful for labour mobility.
When housing markets regain robustness, other distortions should be
addressed. Since housing tax regimes vary widely, so too should reform
priorities. Possibilities—to be coordinated with both each other and any
wider changes in the tax system—include:
 Taxing imputed rents (perhaps proxied from market values) and capital gains
on housing. The former in particular goes to the heart of the bias towards
housing (and would be appropriate under both income- and expenditure-
based approaches to personal taxation).
 If imputed rents remain untaxed, phasing out mortgage interest relief, where it
remains. Experience in the UK indicates that this can be done without
undue controversy or adverse impact.37
 Fully taxing first sales of residences under the VAT (or other sales tax). This
is structurally attractive irrespective of the income-tax treatment of
housing—since anything elsedistorts consumptiondecisions tonoobvious
purpose—but may also serve as a proxy for income taxation of imputed
rents. It would raise (tax-inclusive) house prices, including of existing
houses, but (by reducing the tax-exclusive price on new sales) adversely
affect construction activity.
 Raising ownership taxes. As well as providing a relatively efficient revenue
source, this would go someway towards implicitly taxing imputed rents—
but would probably require improved valuation practices in many
countries.
The desirability of many of these reforms has long been recognized; the
question is whether experience with the costliness of housing market distor-
tions will increase willingness to address them.
37 The UK phased out mortgage interest relief gradually. From 1983 the upper limit (of £30,000)
was frozen and hence slowly eroded by inflation. In 1991 relief was restricted to the basic rate, then
reduced to 20% (1994), 15% (1995), and 10% (1998), before finally being abolished in 2000.
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2.4 Complexity, low-tax jurisdictions, and risk taking
This section considers the tax treatment of innovative financial instruments,
the presence of low-tax jurisdictions, and other tax provisions, including in
relation to executive compensation. It concludes that tax has through these
channels contributed to the opacity of financial arrangements, but the direct
impact on risk taking has been less clear-cut.
2.4.1 Financial innovation
Financial innovation has been driven primarily by the search for new ways to
allocate risk—but also by tax considerations. These can be a matter essentially
of manipulating legal form (as with hybrid instruments), but may also be
achieved by creating substantively new instruments: swaps, for instance,
may be used solely to avoid withholding taxes. Generically, the ability to
replicate a portfolio in a variety of ways expands opportunities to tailor the
nature of the payments to the tax preferences of the investor (transforming it
into lightly taxed capital gains, for instance).
Tax policy has in some cases facilitated, and even encouraged, securitization—
potentially increasing the attraction of subprime lending, for instance—but has
not driven it. It is not always clear how innovative transactionswill be taxed. The
creation in theUSA, for instance,of theReal EstateMortgage InvestmentConduit
in 1986 and Financial Asset Securitization Investment Trust in 1997 provided
clear and neutral tax treatment for the issuance of mortgage and debt-instru-
ment-backed securities, respectively.38 Subtler considerations suggest, however,
that this element of neutrality can set the scene for exploiting distortions in the
taxation of capital gains and other income in ways that are more attractive for
risky original loans39—which consequently become easier to finance.
Lack of clarity in the tax treatment of new instruments can lead to further
complexities through the use of strategies aimed at assuring taxminimization:
one way of trying to ensure that special purpose vehicles (SPVs) themselves—
which are just intermediating receipts40—are not subject to an additional
layer of tax, for example, is by locating them in low-tax jurisdictions.
38 Tax issues raised by securitization include: whether any gains on assets placed in the SPV
by the originator are taxable; whether the special purpose vehicle (SPV) itself is taxable; and
whether payments to holders of the securitized assets will be taxed as interest or dividends.
39 Investors paying tax on interest income at a rate higher than that at which they can offset
capital losses benefit by pooling assets to pay interest at a rate that reflects the expected losses.
Investors facing the same rate on both, on the other hand, do not care about themix of interest and
gains. Bringing the two types together creates scope for tax arbitrage from which both can benefit,
with a role too for the use of CDSs. Eddins (2009) develops this argument.
40 Neutrality argues against taxing intermediation of this kind. A coherent approach is to treat the
SPV itself on a flow-through basis, taxing instead at the level of the originator and security-holder.
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2.4.1.1 POSSIBLE POLICY RESPONSES
Complex financial instruments exploit tax distortions—differential treatment
across types of income, investors, and jurisdictions—that are deeply embed-
ded in current practice. Little is known, however, of when financial innova-
tion has the beneficial effect of reducing the social cost of underlying tax and
other distortions and when, on the contrary, it amplifies them—or of the
practical importance of such effects. What is clear is that tax arbitrage oppor-
tunities, and hence scope for creative ways to exploit them, will remain unless
all forms of capital income are taxed at a single marginal rate—internationally
as well as domestically. One aspect of at least moderating such distortions is
likely to be further movement towards levying CGT on accrual rather than
realization, whether by marking to market or equivalent realizations-based
schemes.
2.4.2 Low-tax jurisdictions
The availability of low rates on capital income in some jurisdictions creates
opportunities for tax arbitrage, including through high leverage—leading to
further opaqueness of financial arrangements. For instance:
 The exemption of foreign profits—either permanently or until
repatriation—creates an incentive to lend from low-tax jurisdictions to
high (taking interest deductions at a high rate and paying tax at a low
rate)—making debt finance in high-tax countries even more attractive.41
 Complex corporate structures, including through the use of hybrid
entities,42 can reinforce this effect still further by enabling interest to
be deducted (possibly twice or more) without offsetting taxation of the
interest receipt.
 Other profit-shifting devices can be used, for example, manipulating
transfer prices and locating intangible property rights and corporate
headquarters judiciously.
 In countries using a residence-based tax system, further complications
arise as funds are routed so as maximize the benefits from double-tax
agreements.
41 Controlled foreign corporation (CFC) rules aim to preclude this by bringing passive income
into tax even if not repatriated.
42 These are entities treated as a corporation in one country but as a branch or partnership
(rather than subsidiary) in another. For instance, a parent company can then locate in a low-tax
jurisdiction a hybrid that the home country treats not as a corporation (and hence is not subject to
its CFC rules) but as a branch of a corporation located in some third, high-tax jurisdiction. The
parent then injects equity into the hybrid, which lends to the high tax affiliate. This generates
interest deductions in the high-tax country, but the interest received by the affiliate is not taxed by
the home country until repatriated.
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Tax-induced complexity in how and where financial assets are held may
hamper financial supervision, even when the motivation for complex ar-
rangements is tax avoidance rather than circumventing supervision.
Low tax rates in some jurisdictions may have increased their own vulnera-
bility, and contributed to high levels of leverage elsewhere. There were no
systematic changes in the tax treatment or practice of low-tax jurisdictions that
would explain the onset of the crisis. Some low-tax jurisdictionsmay, however,
have increased their own exposure by attracting capital inflows vulnerable to
reversal: there is evidence that reducing the rate of CIT, for instance, leads to a
temporary but significant capital inflow (Keen and Syed 2006).
2.4.2.1 POSSIBLE POLICY RESPONSES
Recent developments in relation to ‘tax havens’ focus on evasion concerns, not
opportunities for legal arbitrage. TheOECD reports that all eighty-four countries
that itmonitorshavenowcommitted to the principles of its harmful taxpractice
project, the essence of which is willingness to exchange taxpayer information
on request (as set out in Article 26 of the OECD’s model tax treaty). Such
information exchange is intended to prevent residents of countries operating
the residence principle from evading tax by depositing funds in lower-tax
jurisdictions and failing to declare the proceeds. This is likely to be efficiency
improving, and to increase revenue in residence countries both directly and by
reducing the incentive for other countries to set low tax rates. It does not,
however, address the legal use of low-tax jurisdictions for anyof the tax-reducing
purposes described above. There may be a dampening effect through reduced
availability of finance from investors willing to accept a lower return because
they are not tax compliant. Even with full information exchange, however,
distortions from cross-country divergence in tax rates will remain.
Addressing the distortions associated with low-tax jurisdictions would
require a substantial, controversial, and challenging increase in tax coopera-
tion, as well perhaps as policy action by high-tax countries. Two distinct but
related issues arise. One is the downward pressure on tax rates associated with
international tax competition: all could lose from this, even though ulti-
mately all end up with the same tax rate. The second is the opportunity for
tax arbitrage created by differences in tax rates. Acting on either would require
unprecedented tax cooperation, the challenge being to develop a firmer con-
sensus on what constitutes harmful tax practices. There are clear sovereignty
concerns. And there are intellectual ones too. Some see tax competition as
providing a beneficial constraint on government size, for instance, and it may
ease credibility problems in taxing capital income.43 Prohibiting differentially
43 Pros and cons of international tax competition are reviewed in Wilson (1999) and Keen
(2008).
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low tax rates that are ‘ring-fenced’ from the domestic economy—a possibility
raised at the outset of the OECD project (OECD 1998)—might worsen
tax competition by requiring low tax rates to apply domestically too.44 Impor-
tantly, opportunities for international tax arbitrage are to a large degree con-
tingent on practices in high-tax countries.45 Movements towards exemption,
as sometimes mooted, could increase the attractions of low-tax jurisdictions
by eliminating any tax on repatriation (Mullins 2006). It would be conceiv-
able, indeed, for residence countries to eliminate the deferral that is a key
reason for the use of low-tax jurisdictions. These and other international tax
issues are likely to require closer attention.
2.4.3 Risk taking and tax losses
There are important non-tax distortions to risk taking. Limited liability itself
creates an inherent bias towardsmore risk taking, since shareholders enjoy the
upside of risky investments but are protected against the downside.46 Account-
ing rules can also play a role. In the USA, for example, the cost of stock options
shown in the financial accounts may be lower than the tax deduction gener-
ated. To the extent that non-tax distortions lead to excessive risk taking, a
case can be made that taxation should be structured to counter this.
Proportional taxation of investment returns (with full relief for losses) can
lead to higher investment in risky assets—but progressivity reduces this effect.
A fully symmetric tax system reduces the variance of after-tax returns by
dampening both positive returns in good outcomes and negative ones in
bad outcomes (by reducing other tax liabilities or providing a rebate). If the
tax is applied uniformly to all assets (so leaving their relative expected returns
unaffected), this encourages risk-averse investors to hold more of the risky
asset.47 Progressive taxation (a higher average tax rate when the outturn is
good than when it is bad) mitigates this effect. It could be that this check to
risk taking has become weaker as income-tax systems have become less pro-
gressive over recent years.
Imperfect loss offset—a form of progressivity—tends to discourage risk
taking.48 Under most CITs, the government shares in positive profits but not
in losses. Instead, losses are carried forward and deducted against future
profits, typically without any adjustment for either inflation or the reduction
44 See Keen (2001) and Janeba and Smart (2003).
45 This is the case, for instance, with the potential inconsistencies that make possible the hybrid
entity (explained in the appendix to this chapter).
46 As argued forcefully by Sinn (2008), for example.
47 In the simplest case, the investor ends up bearing the same after-tax risk, with increased
holding of the asset offset by the reduced riskiness of its post-tax return.
48 If denial of loss offset is used to reduce the tax rate, the increased after-tax return in good states
makes the effect ambiguous.
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in the value of the tax allowance from its deferral. In addition to discouraging
risk taking, this creates opportunities for tax arbitrage49 andmay disadvantage
new entrants.
Standard tax treatment of losses can impede corporate restructuring. The
usual principle is that tax losses may not be transferred to the successor entity
if the ownership or nature of the enterprise’s activity substantially changes.
But acquiring a distressed bank, for instance, may be much more attractive if
its accumulated tax losses can be used, as experience during the crisis has
highlighted: a change in an Internal Revenue Service (IRS) ruling50 signifi-
cantly eased the takeover of troubled banks, enabling Wells Fargo, for exam-
ple, to use $19.4 billion of tax losses that it acquired (for $15 billion) with
Wachovia.
2.4.3.1 POSSIBLE POLICY RESPONSES
Refunding tax losses, permitting their sale, or carrying them forward at inter-
est would facilitate efficient restructuring and ease a potential entry barrier.
But it would be costly in revenue terms, increase the potential bias towards risk
taking noted above, and worsen debt bias (by preserving the value of interest
deductions even when the firm has no current taxable income against which
to use it). Addressing this last, as discussed in Section 2.2, would limit the risks
in easing some of the more arbitrary restrictions on the use of tax losses,
including in the context of mergers and acquisitions. Easing these restrictions
may be especially appealing in relation to banks, both for restructuring and in
warranting substantial inclusion of tax losses in regulatory capital. And the
alternative to allowing the transfer of losses may be bank failure, and an
expensive and damaging call on deposit insurance.
2.4.4 Executive compensation
The level and form of executive compensation have attracted considerable
attention, but the question here is whether tax policy has distorted them. The
central issue is the balance between salary and performance-related pay, the
latter (which has come to account for more than half of all executive compen-
sation) in the form of bonuses, stock options, and the like. A key difference
between them is that stock options, in particular, generally increase in their
value to the executive with the riskiness of the actions they take (and hence of
the underlying share price), whereas salary does not. The general considerations
49 Leasing, for instance, can be a way for companies effectively to trade in tax losses, with tax-
paying firms taking investment-related deductions that are then shared by leasing to tax-exhausted
companies.
50 Subsequently reversed, though not retroactively.
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of the previous subsection suggest that taxationmay affect the balance between
the two, even if neither is intrinsically tax favoured: they suggest that tax
consideration may encourage larger performance-related components. Tax dis-
tortions may also affect other components of executive compensation, includ-
ing golden parachutes and carried interest of fund managers.
Tax rules for employee stock options are complex and vary substantially
across countries and schemes—but in many cases offer only limited benefit
relative to salary. Employers choose between (1) paying salary now (with
deduction at corporate level and taxation at personal level) and (2) granting
the right to exercise an option later, with the employer then taking the
difference betweenmarket and exercise price as a deduction and the executive
paying personal tax on the same.51 The main difference is that in the latter
case funds accumulate free of personal tax within the corporation, whereas in
the former the executive is liable for taxation on his or her own holdings. The
advantage of (2) is thus one of deferral, which may be small: for the USA, Hall
and Liebman (2000) put this at only around 4 per cent of compensation cost.
In some cases (as in Germany, for example) restrictions on deductibility of
option costs at corporate level have meant that options are actually tax
disfavoured.
Importantly, tax rules in the USA have clearly encouraged performance-
related pay. Since 1993, the deductibility of non-performance-related execu-
tive salaries has been limited to $1 million—a strong incentive to use more
incentivized pay schemes.
Golden parachutes generally do not receive special tax treatment. They are
usually generally taxed as other earned income—and in the USA are actually
tax penalized, with certain payments subject to a 20 per cent excise and not
deductible against CIT.
Private equity and hedge fundmanagers receivemost of their compensation
as ‘carried interest’, subject, in several countries, only to relatively light taxa-
tion as dividends or long-term capital gains.52 Critics see this as taxing man-
agers at inappropriately low rates on what is effectively labour income. If this
income were taxed as earnings, however, coherence would require that a
corresponding deduction for payment of compensation be available to other
partners—enabling an offsetting increase in the pre-tax remuneration of the
fund managers. Many fund investors, however, are tax exempt and so could
not use the deduction: taxing as earned income would then result in increased
partnership tax payments. The remuneration arrangements for fund man-
agers are in any event likely to encourage risk taking, since only a fixed fee is
51 The tax treatment described here is not universal, but is quite common.
52 This is the case, for instance, in Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy,
Spain, Sweden, the USA, and the UK.
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received until some target rate of return is realized: light taxation of carried
interest once that return is realized may amplify this effect.
2.4.4.1 POSSIBLE POLICY RESPONSES
Practice varies widely, but major tax biases to the form of executive remuner-
ation do not appear to have been endemic. Some country-specific action may
be needed simply to achieve greater neutrality—for instance, removing caps
on deductibility limits on ordinary salary (dealing with any equity concerns
through progressivity of the general income tax). If it were felt necessary to go
further and actively discourage the use of stock options—and a tax argument
might be made that they reinforce the tendency to excess risk taking implied
by limited liability (and implicit government guarantees)—such measures
as denial of CIT deductibility (perhaps above some threshold) could be
considered.
The carried interest issue turns on the fundamental distortion introduced by
taxing capital gains and dividend distributions differently from labour
income—which almost all tax systems are likely to retain. The fairness con-
cern is a real one, but no fully satisfactory solution has yet been found.
2.5 Taxation and financial asset prices
Asset prices reflect expected future returns, and hence expected future tax
payments. Recognizing this, tax policy can be used, and has been, to affect
asset prices. The expectation that future capital gains will be taxed, for exam-
ple, can in principlemake bubbles less likely. Several countries indeed used tax
measures to this end during the housing boom: the Republic of Korea, for
instance, introduced in 2005 a national-level property tax charged at progres-
sive rates on the combined value of all housing and land over a threshold
value (with an exemption for one-person households), and from 2007 rein-
forced a progressive CGT structure for housing. Ireland introduced an anti-
speculative yearly ownership tax of 2 per cent of the market value of homes
other than primary residences. In other cases, tax measures have been used, at
least in part, to support asset prices. One benefit some anticipated from the
2003 dividend tax cut in the USA, for example, was a substantial increase in
equity prices and consequent wealth effects. And in the present crisis, a
number of countries have used tax measures to bolster house prices: Ireland,
for example, removed stamp duty on first-time buyers (of relatively inexpen-
sive properties) and extended mortgage interest relief.
Such asset price effects can be substantial. Poterba (2004) estimates, for
example, that the 2003 cuts in dividend taxation and CGT in the USA
increased share prices by around 6 per cent; ex post, Amromin et al. (2006)
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find the aggregate effect to have beenmuted, but with a substantial impact for
high-dividend-paying firms. And there is evidence that announcements of
reductions in stamp duty on share transactions in the UK have led to greater
price increases for more frequently traded stocks.53
Tax effects on asset prices, however, can be complex and hard to predict.
Three aspects of price behaviour are potentially important: level, rate of
increase, and volatility. Tax measures can affect all three, and in ways that
may be difficult to anticipate:
 A higher rate of CGT may cause the price of an asset to fall but its rate of
appreciation to increase (in order to continue yielding the after-tax return
available on other assets; see Box 2.2 for details). It is even possible for a
higher CGT rate to be associated with higher asset prices (because any
capital loss attracts a larger tax break).
 Reducing dividend taxes may have no effect on equity prices if the
marginal shareholder is non-resident (and so not subject to the tax).
 Preferential tax treatment of the return on some asset can increase the
volatility of its price (implying a relatively high variance of returns, as
discussed in Section 2.3.3 above).
 Transaction taxes, sometimes recommended as a way to decrease price
volatility, have been found in some cases actually to increase it (by
thinning the market).54
Ad hoc tax policy measures are unlikely to be the best way to deal with
unwelcome asset price developments. Compounding the uncertainties of
effect just noted is the risk of creating unintended distortions and avoidance
opportunities: for instance, lowering CGT in the attempt to support asset
prices can create an incentive to transform interest income into capital
gains. Gaps between announcement and implementation (or even the expec-
tation of tax changes) can distort financial decisions (the anticipation of a
reduction in stamp duty in the UK during 2008, for example, was reported to
have led to some delaying of transactions). And lags in the adoption of tax
changes can cause unwelcome pro-cyclical effects: tax increases on land hold-
ings intended to quell the bubble in Japan, for instance, did not come into
effect until after it had burst (Morinobu 2006). Tax measures can be attractive
for their asset specificity and, in some circumstances, relative speediness. But
they are no substitute for counter-cyclical policies, both monetary and poten-
tially fiscal (applied across a range of instruments and maintaining tax
53 See Bond et al. (2005), who examine the effects on share prices of reductions in stamp duty
announced in 1984, 1986, and (though ultimately not implemented) 1990.
54 See, e.g., Westerholm (2003).
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neutrality properties). These would properly operate in part through effects on
asset prices. Targeted regulatory actions are surer and better-focused instru-
ments for dealing with particular assets, with structural tax policy best guided
by the core objective of neutrality across assets and over time.
2.6 Conclusions
Tax distortions are likely to have encouraged excessive leveraging and other
financial market problems evident in the crisis. These effects have been little
explored, but are potentially powerful enough tohave effects ofmacroeconomic
significance. Taxation can result, for example, in a net subsidy to borrowing of
hundreds of basis points, raising debt–equity ratios and vulnerabilities from
capital inflows.
Box 2.2. TAXATION AND ASSET PRICES
In a world of perfect certainty, the price of a share-like financial asset would evolve
according to the arbitrage condition
rVt ¼ ð1 TDÞDt þ ð1 TGÞ V t ð1:1Þ
where Vt denotes the price of the asset of interest at time t, r the (fixed and unchanging)
after-tax return on some alternative asset, D the dividend, taxed at rate TD, and TG the
(accrual-equivalent) CGT rate. (There are new equity issues, for simplicity.)
That a higher CGT rate may lead to faster price appreciation can be seen by taking the
special case in (2.1) in which the current dividend is zero: the proportional price increase
is then V=V ¼ r=ð1 TGÞ.
Solving (1.1), with limiting condition lim
t!1
Dt expðrt=ð1 TGÞ ¼ 0, gives the asset
price as:




Dt expðrt=ð1 TGÞÞdt ð1:2Þ
An increase in the dividend tax rate thus clearly lowers the asset price. The effect of a
higher CGT rate, however, is ambiguous. On the one hand, it reduces the present value
of future dividends because of the additional tax payable as the asset price rises to reflect
them; it also, however, cushions the present value cost of any future reduction in the
asset price. Differentiating in (1.2), the balance between these two effects can be seen to
depend on the duration of the asset (that is, on the average length of time until
dividends are received): a higher CGT rate reduces the current asset price if and only if
duration is sufficiently long. The likelihood of a higher CGT rate leading, counter-
intuitively, to increasing asset prices may be less in practice than this algebra suggests,
however, both because opportunities for loss offset may be limited and because the
taxation on realization rather than accrual provides an opportunity for asset-holders to
lessen the price impact.
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This chapter has reviewed the main channels by which tax distortions can
significantly affect financial markets, drawing implications for tax design once
the crisis has passed. Tax rules vary widely across countries, but some general
conclusions emerge:
 Corporate-level tax biases favouring debt finance, including in the
financial sector, are pervasive, often large—and are hard to justify given
the potential impact on financial stability. There is a strong case for
dealing more decisively with this bias; for example, by also allowing a
deduction of an imputed equity cost (which for regulated financial
institutions would be akin to an allowance for Tier 1 capital).
 Continued favourable treatment of housing in many countries has
supported high housing prices, while mortgage interest relief—where it
remains—may have encouraged heavy household leverage. The risks in
distorting amarket so central to financial stability reinforce long-standing
efficiency and equity arguments for more neutral taxation.
 The development and use of complex financial instruments is generally
driven by non-tax considerations, but is in part a response to, and shaped
by, underlying tax distortions (such as relatively favourable treatment of
capital gains, and cross-country tax differentials). Moreover, securitiza-
tion and other devices can amplify the economic costs of those tax
distortions (for example, by reducing the cost of subprime financing),
and their use to secure favourable tax treatment contributes to opaque
financial arrangements. Solutions are not simple, given the profundity
of the underlying tax distortions.
 Divergences in national tax rates, bases, and practices create substantial
opportunities for international tax arbitrage, further increasing opacity
and reinforcing tax biases to debt. Progress on ‘tax havens’ addresses
issues of evasion but not fundamental ones of tax avoidance. Measures to
address the latter that are both politically acceptable and technically
coherent are hard to identify, but need to be explored further.
 Tax measures can have significant effects on asset price dynamics, but are
unlikely to be the best way to deal with bubbles.
Almost all these issues have long been recognized in the public finance litera-
ture. Their importance, however, may not have been fully appreciated.
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APPENDIX
Taxes and the cost of corporate finance
This appendix explains the tax effects on the costs of retention and new equity finance
reported in Box 2.1 and discussed in the text.
For retention finance, note first that, if the company retains an additional $1 of after-
tax income, this costs the shareholder $ð1 TDÞ as forgone after-tax dividend, where
TD denotes the rate of tax on dividends at personal level. This could have been lent out
to generate interest income R that would have been taxed at rate TP. The net income
forgone is thus $ð1 TDÞð1 TRÞR. Against this, the additional internal funds generate
a capital gain (taxed at rate TG) that reflects additional future net income æ, which will
generate dividends (taxed at TD). The net benefit to retaining an additional $1 is thus
ð1 TDÞð1 TRÞRþ ð1 TGÞð1 TDÞr:
Setting this to zero gives (1.2).
For new equity, (1.3) in Box 2.1 follows from a similar argument55 except that the
initial cost is in terms of funds already in the shareholders’ hands, and so is not
mitigated by the dividend tax, and there are no capital gains consequences (since the
share is purchased at a price reflecting the future earnings). Optimality thus requires
ð1 TRÞRþ ð1 TDÞr ¼ 0;
which gives (1.3). Imputation schemes of the kind mentioned in the text provide a
shareholder-level credit for corporate-level taxes charged at some rate C, so that
1 TD ¼ ð1 TRÞ=ð1 CÞ; if C is set at the CIT rate—‘full’ imputation—the cost of
new equity is the same as that of debt finance.
55 The marginal cost of any form of finance today typically depends on the marginal source in
the future: the latter is assumed throughout this analysis to be retentions.
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The Role of Housing Tax Provisions
Thomas Hemmelgarn, Gaetan Nicodeme, and Ernesto Zangari
3.1 Introduction
The 2008 financial crisis hit the world economy severely. While taxes are not
considered a proximate cause of the crisis, some aspects of tax policymay have
led to increased risk taking and indebtedness (see Chapter 2). Tax incentives
may indeed have exacerbated the behaviour of economic agents, leading
them to wrong economic decisions. Among the tax factors, the widespread
tax-induced bias to homeownership has attracted considerable attention,
because excessive demand in the housing market, combined with lax lending
practices, may have contributed to the speculative bubble in real estate prices.
This chapter proposes a detailed account of the manner in which tax provi-
sions relating to the housing market may have led to the banking crisis. Mone-
tary and regulatory policies opened up the possibility for a housing bubble that
eventually burst and created a credit crunch because of a lack of confidence
between actors on financial markets. Governments reacted by a combination of
capital and liquidity injections, regulatory measures, and fiscal stimulus.
In most narratives of the financial crisis, the dynamics of the US housing
market play a decisive role: in fact, the problems started with the housing
market and the financial structure that was built on it. Not surprisingly, many
commentators have found fault with some tax provisions that may have
contributed to an overheated housing market. In particular, attention has
The authors thank Jean-Pierre De Laet, Vieri Ceriani, Stefano Manestra, David Pitaro, Giacomo
Ricotti and Alessandra Sanelli for useful comments. This chapter was written by Mr Gaetan
Nicodeme (European Commission, Université Libre de Bruxelles, CEPR and CESifo), Mr Thomas
Hemmelgarn (European Commission), and Mr Ernesto Zangari (Banca d’Italia). The views
expressed in this chapter are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the official
positions of the respective institutions with which the authors are affiliated.
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been focused on the tax treatment of residential housing capital gains and on
the deductibility of interest expenses on mortgages.
Some commentators argue that the quasi repeal of residential housing
capital gains taxation in 1997 may have fuelled the housing bubble. On the
other hand, neither the OECD nor the IMF believe that this factor has played a
significant role;1 moreover, the academic research that has analysed the
dynamics of the US housing market tends to have reached the same conclu-
sion (see also Chapter 2).
The roleof themortgage interest deductibility in the crisis is also controversial.
There was no relevant change in the US tax rules on this tax break in the 2000s;
the housing boom did not take place evenly across the country, although the
federal tax system has a nationwide coverage. Housing prices went up both in
countries where interest on mortgages was deductible and in countries where it
was not or where it was deductible only within limits. Nevertheless, this tax
break can be thought of as a catalyst in a chemical reaction: the deductibility did
not cause the bubble, but itmayhave accelerated the run-up in prices. It remains
true that the US regime is one of themost generous in an international compari-
son; while all other countries allow interest deductibility only for acquisition or
renovation of residential buildings, the US tax code extends this allowance to
other purposes (‘home equity loan’); moreover, the relatively generous limits to
the benefit are capped on the amount of the mortgage, not on the amount of
interest payments (as in all other countries). Since it is proportional to debt, the
tax break is more relevant for riskier mortgages with higher interest rates and
may have contributed to trigger ‘gambles’ on housing, especially in the context
of ‘exuberant’ price expectations.
A meaningful comparison can be made between the 2008 financial crisis
and the 1990s Scandinavian banking crises. In the late 1980s Norway,
Sweden, and Finland experienced large credit and asset upswings, followed
by severe downturns after the burst of asset prices. As in the recent US and
world financial crisis, so in the Scandinavian banking crises: deregulatory
measures, expansionary monetary policy, and lax risk analysis interacted
and paved the way for a rapid credit expansion and increases in asset prices;2
an important role was played by the housing market dynamics, which in turn
were probably affected by housing tax provisions; and the asset bubbles burst
when interest rates started to increase.3 An interesting case in regard to the
relationship between housing tax rules and financial crisis is Sweden: here
the housing tax rules may have contributed indirectly to the price upswings
1 See IMF (2009a) and OECD (2009a).
2 See Englund (1999: 80).
3 The increase of interest rates was due not only to a change in the stance ofmonetary policy, but
also to the effects of German reunification (Englund 1999: 89).
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(the ‘catalyst’ argument) and directly to the bursting of the price bubble,
through the 1990–1 tax reform, which substantially reduced the benefit stem-
ming from the deductibility of interest payments, increasing the real cost of
borrowing.4 With respect to the Scandinavian banking crises, the US financial
crisis seems to have been even more related to the housing market develop-
ments; another distinctive and important feature of the current crisis regards
the role of securitization (see below).
This chapter is organized as follows. Section 3.2 provides an introduction to
developments of the 2008 financial crisis. Section 3.3 offers a reflection on
whether specific tax provisions may have aggravated the crisis by encouraging
homeownership and risky behaviour. Section 3.4 contains some final remarks.
3.2 The build-up to the 2008 financial crisis
3.2.1 General economic conditions before the crisis
The events leading to the financial and economic crisis that began in 2008 are
heavily debated and the dust has not yet settled on the real causes of the crisis.
The arguments set out in this chapter are, therefore, somewhat speculative
and subject to debate, and they will eventually be judged by history. Yet, a
majority of commentators point to several elements that have facilitated an





































































































































































































































Figure 3.1. Nasdaq Composite Index, 1993–2004
Source: Yahoo! Finance.
4 See Agell et al. (1995) and Englund et al. (1995).
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The economic conditions in the early 2000s were characterized by the
bursting of the dot-com bubble, which peaked in March 2000 and led to a
pronounced decline in world stock-market indices in the following years (see
Figure 3.1). The reaction of the Federal Reserve to this stock-market decline
and the steady worsening of economic conditions were to reduce interest
rates. Accordingly, the US Primary Credit Discount Rate was progressively
lowered from 6.5 per cent at the peak of the bubble in mid-2000 to 1 per
cent by mid-2003 (see Figure 3.2).5
A second characteristic of the world economy in the early 2000s was mas-
sive inflows of capital on international financial markets. The US Capital and
Financial Account is illustrative of this phenomenon (see Figure 3.3).6
Between 1995 and 2000 it increased from 1.54 per cent to 4.25 per cent of
GDP and continued to rise in the first half of the 2000s to peak at 6.10 per cent
of GDP in 2006. The main driver of this expansion was net portfolio invest-
ment, which grew from $42.7 billion in 1998 to over $807 billion in 2007—a
twentyfold increase over nine years (see Figure 3.4). As a result, in the first half
of the 2000s the US economy was characterized by a rapid recovery in a low-
interest-rate environment, despite a high degree of risk aversion in stock











































































































































































































Figure 3.2. US Federal Reserve discount rate, 2000–9
Source: Federal Reserve.
5 Note that the Federal Reserve most certainly also tried to combat the economic consequences
of the 11 Sept. 2001 terrorist attacks. The US economy was also in a context of low inflation, if not
of deflation risk, which facilitated an ease in monetary policy.
6 The Capital and Financial Account is composed of the net capital transfers, the change in the
domestically owned assets abroad, and the change in foreign-owned assets at home. It mirrors the
current account (which is composed of the trade balance and the net unilateral current transfers).
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3.2.2 Promotion of homeownership, deregulation, and subprime credits
In their search for new places in which to invest, many economic agents saw
property as a safe and more profitable haven. The conditions were conse-
quently slowly put in place for a housing bubble. Between 2001 and 2005 in
the United States the number of houses sold increased by 41.3 per cent and the
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Figure 3.4. US Capital and Financial Account, components






























Capital and Financial Account Capital and Financial Account balance in % GDP
Figure 3.3. US Capital and Financial Account
Source: US Bureau of Economic Analysis.
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nominal and real terms, respectively (see Figure 3.5).7 In addition to favour-
able economic conditions (low interest rates, large inflow of capital that
needed to be recycled in the economy, and cold feet of investors towards
stock markets), several regulatory measures also created incentives towards
homeownership.
First, politicians wanted to expand homeownership, especially for poorer
families. Two institutions played a particular role in this policy: Fannie Mae
and Freddie Mac. The Federal National Mortgage Association (Fannie Mae) was
created in 1938 under the Roosevelt administration to purchase and securitize
mortgages in order to ensure enough liquidity for lending institutions. It became
an independent body—albeit with implicit government guarantee—in 1968 and
was complemented in 1970 by a competitor, the Federal Home Loan Mortgage
Corporation (Freddie Mac), which achieved similar functions on this secondary
mortgagemarket. The role of FannieMae and FreddieMac was to purchase loans
from mortgage sellers such as banks and other financial institutions, securitize
them into mortgage-backed bonds, and resell them on the secondary market,
guaranteeing the principal and interest of the loan in exchange for a fee. This
mechanismproved to be a powerful instrument to refinance lending institutions
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Figure 3.5. Case–Shiller house price index
Source: Shiller (2005). See <http://www.irrationalexuberance.com>.
7 See <http://www.census.gov> for data about house sales. For a description of the Case–Shiller
index, see <http://www.standardandpoors.com/indices/sp-case-shiller-home-price-indices>.
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activities. The US administrations also used these agencies to expand housing
credit to middle- and low-income families as well as in distressed areas.8
Second, the US tax system contained several incentives for homeowners to
increase their use of mortgages. For example, the 1986 Tax Reform Act dis-
allowed consumers to deduct interest payments on consumer loans (car loans,
credit card loans, and so on). This created a perverse incentive for home-
owners to use or refinance their home mortgages—whose interest payments
were tax deductible—to pay off their other debts or to extract cash for personal
expenses. This incentive became increasingly larger because of the wealth
effect of ever-rising home values. In addition, the 1997 Taxpayer Relief Act
simplified the tax treatment of housing capital gains and increased in many
cases the tax exemption for these incomes—giving further incentives to buy
houses. The effects of the Low Income Housing Tax Credit and the 2004
American Dream Downpayment Act provided further fiscal and support mea-
sures in favour of homeownership.9
In this context, financial institutions reacted by opening the credit tap,
helped by more lax regulations. The 1999 Gramm–Leach-Bliley Act repealed
some of the provision of the 1933 Glass–Steagall Act, which disallowed finan-
cial institutions to combine commercial, insurance, and investment activities
and this might have led to more risk-prone attitudes from the part of com-
mercial banks.10 Risk taking was also encouraged by relaxed rules on capital
adequacy and new accounting standards. The decision on 28 April 2004 by
the Securities and Exchange Commission to loosen the capital rules for large
financial institutions (following their request) and to let computer models of
those investment companies determine the level of risk of investment (that is,
de facto self-monitoring) may have led to a sharp increase in the leverage of
the main US financial institutions.11 This trend was also facilitated by the
8 See the 1977 Community Reinvestment Act (CRA), which was extended by the 1992 Federal
Housing Enterprises Financial Safety and Soundness Act and scrutinized by the 1995 New
Community Reinvestment Act, or the decision of the Department of Housing and Urban
Development in 2000 to order Fannie Mae to devote half of its business to poorer families,
which was increased to a 56% goal in 2004.
9 The Low Income Housing Tax Credit was part of the 1986 Tax Reform Act and provides
developers with tax credit for equity investment when investing in low-income units in a housing
project. The 2004 American Dream Downpayment Act provided downpayment grants of a
maximum of $10,000 or 6% of the purchase price of the house (whichever amount was larger) to
first-time homebuyers with annual incomes that do not exceeded 80% of the area median income.
See also Gale et al. (2007).
10 See Lloyd in Chapter 8.
11 See <http://securities.stanford.edu/news-archive/2004/20040428_Headline08_Drawbaugh.
htm>; <http://www.nytimes.com/2008/10/03/business/03sec.html>. Between 2003 and 2007
the leverage of the top five US financial institutions evolved as follow: Lehman Brothers from
22.7% to 29.7%, Bear Stearns from 27.4% to 32.5%, Merrill Lynch from 15.6% to 30.9%,
Goldman Sachs from 17.7% to 25.2%, and Morgan Stanley from 23.2% to 32.4%. In 2007,
their total debt amounted to $4.1 trillion, a third of US GDP (sources: Wikipedia using annual
reports <http://www.lehman.com/annual/2007/fin_highlights>; <http://www.bearstearns.com/
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Basel-II agreements, which entered into force in 2008 and gave more scope for
financial institutions to assess their risks, as well as by the introduction of
the International Accounting Standards in 2005, which forced companies to
register gains and losses on financial assets immediately, possibly leading to
more stock volatility.
In this context, the proportion of subprime mortgages12 soared from 7.2 per
cent of the total in 2001 to over 20 per cent in 2005 and 2006 (see Figure 3.6).
Gambling was also at play, as some studies pointed out that over a third of the
houses bought were for investment or second-residence purposes, and those
specific acquisitions were made with the hope that continued price increases
would allow buyers to resell with profit. Accordingly, a third of the loans
made in 2002 were either interest only (where only interest is repaid) or
negative amortization loans (where less than the interest is paid during a
first period and the accrued unpaid interest is added to the outstanding
amount of the loan).13 Moreover, an increasing number of loans were granted
as adjustable rate mortgages (ARMs)14 between 2001 and 2004—mostly for
the two pre-cited types of loans—and this despite stabilizing interest rates,
which possibly indicates an increasing number of credit-constrained bor-





12 By definition, a subprime loan is a loan that does not meet the ‘prime’ standards and
is consequently risky. There may be various elements that make the loan fail the ‘prime’ test
(e.g., length, structure, etc.). In this context, it is the profile of the borrower and/or the difference
between the loan and the value of the house or the collateral. Loans are usually classified based on
the guidelines of government-sponsored enterprises (GSEs). When a credit fulfils the GSE’s criteria,
it is labelled ‘conventional’. When the loan fulfils all guidelines but the amount of the credit
(usually loans above $300,000), it is labelled as ‘jumbo’. In those two cases, the creditworthiness
of the borrower is not questioned and both loans are ‘prime’ loans. Non-prime loans can be
Alternative A, when, for instance, the borrower has income that is difficult to assess (e.g., self-
employed), a high debt-to-income ratio, little documentation, or several mortgaged houses. In this
case, the creditworthiness is not questioned, but there is a higher risk. Non-prime loans can also be
home-equity loans, which is a heterogeneous category of second- and first-lien mortgages with
high loan-to-value ratios, home improvement loans, and revolving home-equity lines of credits.
Finally, non-prime loans also includes the subprime loans with low-credit-quality borrowers
(Fabozzi 2005).
13 The Economist (2005).
14 For subprime mortgages, the proportion of fixed-rate mortgages dropped from 33.2% in 2001
to 18.6% in 2005, while the bulk of the loans were of hybrid nature (i.e., with a fixed rate during an
initial period of 2–3 years and then adjustable based on a reference rate) and not pure ARM. From
2005 the share of balloon mortgages in subprime mortgages jumped to reach 25–30%. Those
mortgages require a large final payment. Note also that 55–60% of subprime mortgages were
originated to extract cash, while only 30–40% of the loans were to buy a house (Demyanyk and
Van Hemert 2009).
Hemmelgarn, Nicodeme, and Zangari
68
This is an open access version of the publication distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-
NoDerivs licence (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/), which permits non-commercial reproduction and distribution of 
the work, in any medium, provided the original work is not altered or transformed in any way, and that the work is properly cited. For 
commercial re-use, please contact academic.permissions@oup.com 
3.2.3 The securitization of mortgages
The spread of mortgages, in particular subprime loans, was largely helped by
the development of new financial instruments, in particular the technique of
securitization, which consists of pooling loans into an investment vehicle and
then selling securities backed by payments for these loans. In the case of


























Proportion of ARM US long-term nominal interest rate
Figure 3.7. Adjustable rate mortgages
Source: AMECO and Joint Center for Housing Studies at Harvard University (2008, 2009).


















Subprime FHA/VA Home equity Alternative-A Jumbo Conventional
Figure 3.6. US prime and subprime mortgages
Source: Joint Center for Housing Studies at Harvard University (2008).
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(MBS). Typically, the financial institution will buy the claims of thousands of
mortgages and pool them into a so-called special purpose vehicle (SPV), a legal
entity outside the balance sheet of a financial institution and hence
not subject to capital requirements. The securities are separated in several
tranches—senior, mezzanine (or junior), and equity (non-investment grade)—
with a sequential preference for the claims (that is, the senior tranche has
preferred claim on the proceeds over the other two and the mezzanine tranche
has preference over the equity tranche). By doing so, financial institutions are
able to rearrange the risk of the pool and to redistribute it across investors with
different preferences.15 This, in turn, lowers the cost of lending and extends
credit to borrowers with a lower credit quality.
An important development has been the issue of collaterized debt obliga-
tions (CDOs), a family of asset-based securities that is backed by diversified
debt obligations such as mortgage-backed securities, corporate bonds, bank
loans, credit-card debt, and so on.16 While an MBS is backed by mortgage
payments, a CDO is backed by mortgage-based securities within a portfolio
and therefore represents a resecuritization (Baily et al. 2008). The advantage of
a CDO is that it allows financial institutions to rearrange the securities into
new compartments within the CDO and to transform low-rated mortgage-
based securities into high-rated CDOs. According to Baily et al. (2008), CDO
issuances went from virtually zero in 1995 to over $500 billion in 2006 and
virtually all CDOs issued after 2006 were backed by low-rated subprime MBS.
This securitization process was itself helped by the emergence of a new class
of derivatives that allowed the transfer of credit risk to a third party: the credit
default swaps (CDS). These are common instruments, representing 73 per cent
of the $2.3 trillion credit derivative products in 2002 (O’Kane 2005). The
principle is that a third party agrees to assume the default risk of a specific
asset in exchange for an income. This process allows the CDO issuer to shield
from the risk and to increase the rating of its bonds. The CDS market has
developed mainly outside organized markets (that is, they were over-the-
counter operations) and grew exponentially from virtually zero in 2001 to
about $15 trillion in 2005 and over $60 trillion in 2007 (Baily et al. 2008).
3.2.4 The bubble burst
With US inflation rising from 1.6 per cent in 2002 to 2.3 per cent in 2003,
2.7 per cent in 2004, 3.4 per cent in 2005, peaking at 4.3 per cent in June
2006,17 the Federal Reserve gradually raised interest rates from 1 per cent to
15 See Fabozzi (2005) for a description of these instruments and Baily et al. (2008) for an account
description of the processes.
16 See Fabozzi (2005: chs 30 and 31). 17 See <http://www.inflationdata.com>.
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5.25 per cent (see Figure 3.2) and the first cracks appeared in the housing
market. Some borrowers, especially those with ARMs, started feeling the pain
and eventually could not repay their mortgages. The number of foreclosures
increased exponentially from 885,000 in 2005 to 1,259,118 in 2006,
2,203,295 in 2007, and 3,157,806 in 2008.18 The number of houses sold
declined, and prices levelled off before plunging.
Financial institutions started to be hit, as they were heavily indebted and
exposed via mortgage-backed securities, whose value are based on mortgage
payments and house values. HSBC announced in February 2007 that it was
writing down $10.5 billion of subprime MBS. This event was followed in April
by the bankruptcy of NewCentury Financial, the largest US subprime lender. In
July, the collapse of two hedge funds run by Bear Stearns because of subprime
losseswas another alarming signof deterioration, aswere the announcements of
heavy losses in otherfinancial institutions,whichput someof themon theverge
of bankruptcy (for example, Bear Stearn)—with in some cases bank runs (for
example, Northern Rock in the UK19). The near collapse of the banking system
happened in September 2008. On 7 September, ailing government-sponsored
enterprises Fannie Mae and Freddy Mac were urgently nationalized. On 14
September, Merrill Lynch saw itself close to illiquidity and was sold to the
Bank of America. The next day, Lehman Brothers filed for bankruptcy, and the
day after, American International Group (AIG), one of the largest CDS20 provi-
ders, avoided bankruptcy only thanks to a $85 billion loan from the Federal
Reserve.21 The uncertainty about external positions and liquidity or solvency of
financial institutions led to a sharp drop in confidence among financial market
participants. This led in turn to a sharp increase in the TED Spread—an indicator
of perceived credit risk—which went over 300 basis points on 17 September
200722 and to a sharp fall in the interbank lending activities (see Figure 3.8).
These financial problems spread into the real economy via a credit crunch,
creating a drop in available funds for private investment.
The banking crisis also quickly spread to stock markets. The S&P-500 index
started to decline from its peak of 1565.15 points on 9 October 2007 to
18 See <http://www.realtytrac.com> for data sources.
19 Northern Rock asked and received liquidity support from the Bank of England in September
2007 and was eventually nationalized in Feb. 2008.
20 Credit default swaps (CDSs) are ‘insurance’ contracts through which the buyer of the CDS
hedges the risk of default of an investment in a financial asset (the reference instrument). The buyer
of the CDS provides the seller with payments in the form of fees or premiums, and, in exchange,
the seller provides the buyer with a payoff if the reference instrument suffers a credit event
(e.g., default of the counter-party).
21 See Wibaut (2008) for an excellent description of the events.
22 The TED spread is the difference in basis points between the short-term interbank rate
(i.e., the LIBOR) and the three-month US treasury rate. Its historical fluctuation is between 10
and 50 basis points. On 10 October 2008 it reached a record 465 basis points <http://www.
tedspread.com>.
The Role of Housing Tax Provisions
71
This is an open access version of the publication distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-
NoDerivs licence (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/), which permits non-commercial reproduction and distribution of 
the work, in any medium, provided the original work is not altered or transformed in any way, and that the work is properly cited. For 
commercial re-use, please contact academic.permissions@oup.com 
1251.70 points on 12 September 2008, a decline of more than 20 per cent in
less than a year. On 15 and 17 September, amid turmoil in large financial
institutions, it lost twice an additional 4.71 per cent. The descent into hell was
not over yet, with stock crashes of 8.8, 7.6, 9.0, and 8.9 per cent on 29
September, 9 October, 15 October, and 1 December, respectively. On 9
March 2009, the S&P-500 index reached its lowest point: 676.53 points,
only 43.2 per cent of its value fifteen months earlier.
3.3 Did taxes on housing contribute to the crisis?
The end of the speculative price bubble in the US housing market has been
identified as an important trigger for the financial crisis. In Europe, Ireland and
Spain faced similar price bubbles, and, when the international crisis hit, this led
to a severe downturn in these two countries,whichhad formerly shown some of
the best economicperformance in the eurozone.Other European countries such
as the UK, France, Sweden, and the Netherlands had experienced similar in-
creases in house prices since the mid-1990s, albeit to a lesser extent.23
While real house prices rose in many countries, the same was true for the
price-to-rent ratio, which is defined as the nominal housing price index
divided by the rent component of the consumer price index. This is an
indicator of the relative attractiveness to own a house versus renting it; it


















































































































































































































Figure 3.8. US interbank loans
Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (2011).
23 See Hilbers et al. (2008).
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housing market. As seen in Figure 3.9, since the mid-1990s the price-to-rent
ratio has increased significantly in many countries, especially Ireland and
Spain. Ireland also faced the most dramatic decrease after the peak had been
reached in 2005. These dynamics point to an overvaluation of the housing
market in the years prior to 2008 in several countries.
Given these observations, the question arises how taxes might influence
house prices and price-to-rent ratios. To answer this question, we first recall
the main results stemming from a very simple economicmodel of the housing
market, which provides a basis for discussion of the effects of some basic
housing tax provisions. Second, we compare the tax systems of different
countries with respect to the US system. Finally, we discuss the possible role
of housing tax provisions in the financial crisis.
3.3.1 The economic analysis of the housing sector
The decision to buy a house entails two economic dimensions: a consumption
decision and an investment–production decision.24 The first facet is related to
the decision of households to consume housing services, which is mainly
related to the quality of the house. The household decides what type of
house and in which location it would like to consume. The investment–
production decision is related to the potential value increase of the property,
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Figure 3.9. Price-to-rent ratios
Source: OECD (2010b).
24 A detailed analysis of the functioning of the housing market can be found in Pozdena (1988).
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Housing is a durable good that can potentially be sold at a higher price, even
after years of use. This makes the decision to buy a house more complex than
consumption decisions for other goods that are based mainly on the price and
on the consumer’s budget constraint.
A simple and quite general demand-supply model of the housing market
(see Box 3.1) predicts that:
Box 3.1. A MODEL OF THE HOUSING MARKET
The standard economic analysis of the housing sector moves from the observation that
the housing market actually consists of two interrelated markets: one for the existing
stock of houses, which determines their price, and one for the new flow of construction,
which determines residential investment.a
The equilibrium on the market of existing houses requires that owners, as investors,
earn the same return on the housing investment as on alternative investments:
RH ¼ ½ð1 tPIT ÞiM þ dþ bþmþ tP  ð1 tCGÞEðpHÞPH ð1:1Þ
where RH denotes the marginal value of rental services per period, tPIT the relevant
personal income tax rate,b iM the financing cost (for simplicity assumed equal to the
investor’s opportunity cost of funds),c d the depreciation of the stock of existing houses,
b the risk premium required by the investor to be owner rather than tenant, m the
maintenance cost per unit value, tP the property tax rate, tCG the housing capital gains
tax rate, EðpHÞ the expected housing price appreciation, and PH the price of existing
houses.d The above equation can also be interpreted as follows: in the long run the cost
of owning a house should be equal in equilibrium to the cost of renting it, with RH
representing the annual cost of renting and the quantity in square brackets representing
the user cost of housing or ownership (or ‘imputed rent’).e
Assuming that the rental value RH is decreasing in the stock of houses H
(i.e., dRH=dH <0), and that the user cost of housing is positive, equation (1.1) can be
interpreted as a (downward-sloping) demand function, whose slope is steeper the lower
is the user cost.
A housing supply function can be easily derived assuming a positive relationship
between (net) residential investment and the ratio of house prices over building costs
(CH).f Formally:
Ht  Ht1 ¼ Ht ¼ fðPH;t=CH;tÞ  dHt ð1:2Þ
The short-run price elasticity of housing supply is equal to f; the long-run elasticity is
larger and equal to f/d. In this simple model house prices play the same role of the value
of the firm’s stock in Tobin’s q dynamic investment model.
a Standard references are Kearl (1979), Topel and Rosen (1988), and Poterba (1984, 1991, 1992).
b Without loss of generality, we assume the case of mortgage interest deductibility, as in the USA.
c See Poterba (1984: 732); see also Poterba (2008).
d See Van den Noord (2005).
e See Hilbers et al. (2008: 8).
f See Poterba (1991).
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 since housing supply is basically fixed in the short run, the housing
market is subject to price overshooting in the face of demand shocks; the
housing market is therefore intrinsically volatile;
 the deductibility of mortgage interests, by reducing the user cost of
ownership, decreases the demand elasticity; it therefore increases the
volatility of the housing market;25
 the increase in volatility could have negative effects, especially if agents
form expectations (also partially) in an extrapolative manner, inducing
prolonged price upswings or downswings not linked to ‘fundamentals’;26
in the best-case scenario, the choices of households and firms could be
temporarily distorted; in the worst-case scenario, a price bubblemay form;
 rise in expectations on housing price appreciation and more generous tax
breaks on housing (for example, lower capital gains tax rates) may
generate, in principle and under some conditions, unsustainable
dynamics in the housing market.27
3.3.2 The taxation of housing in Europe and the USA
There is a great diversity of housing tax regimes across countries.28 Interna-
tional comparisons are difficult to carry out because of the complexity of tax
codes (in terms of deductions, exceptions, threshold limits, and so on).
Table 3.1 summarizes the information concerning the tax treatment of
mortgage interest expenses and imputed income for owner-occupied housing,
capital gains on first-home selling, and property taxes on owner-occupied
dwellings for a set of countries comprising Belgium, France, Germany, Ireland,
25 In general, the price sensitivity of demand for housing tends to fall with the extent of
preferential tax treatment for housing and with the expected rate of housing price appreciation
(see Van den Noord 2005).
26 For the USA, see Case and Shiller (1988). See also the general discussion in Poterba (1991).
27 The model sketched in Box 3.1 can easily account for disequilibria dynamics. Suppose, for
example, that, for whatever reason, the user cost of ownership becomes equal to zero. This can
happen because of: either a decrease in the (net) mortgage interest rate (for instance, because of
more generous interest deductibility and/or lower monetary policy interest rates), given expected
housing price appreciation; or a sudden increase of the expectations of housing price appreciation; or
a decrease of taxes on housing capital gains; or a combination of the previous factors. The right-hand
side of equation (1.1) in Box 3.1 becomes equal to zero. The left-hand side can be equal to zero only
when the demand for housing is infinite.With very strong demand for housing there will pressure on
prices in the short run (given the low short-run supply elasticity). Regardless of how expectations are
formed, agents will anticipate higher prices, and this would push the user cost into negative territory,
with a further increase in demand, and so on. Here we have a vicious cycle—a price bubble process—
which can be rationalized even by a very simple model, with very general assumptions.
28 For a review of housing tax regimes in Europe, see Hilbers et al. (2008). See also ECB (2003)
and Van den Noord (2005). By comparing the information in these papers with ours, it is possible
to get a picture of how housing taxation changed in the decade prior to 2007.
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Table 3.1. The taxation of owner-occupied housing in Europe and the USA, 2009
Country Taxation of
imputed rents
Mortgage interest tax relief Capital gains
taxation
Property tax
Belgium Yesa Tax deductibility with a limitb No Noa
France No Tax credit for the first five years with a limit No Taxe d’habitation and Taxe
foncièrec
Germany No No No Grundsteuer
Ireland No Tax credit for the first seven years with a limitd No No
Italy No Tax credit with a limit No No
The Netherlands Yese Tax deductibility without limit No Onroerende-zaakbelasting (OZB )
Spain No Tax credit with a limit on the amount of housing costs Nof Impuesto sobre bienes inmuebles
UK No No No Council Tax
USA No Tax deductibility No Yesg
with a limit on the amount of mortgage principal ($1
million)
(if CG <$500,000)
a In Belgium the imputed rent is a ‘cadastral income’, which was last reviewed in 1975 and has been indexed to inflation since 1990. In the case of owner-occupation, the deemed income (after the
deduction of some deemed expenses) is not subject to income tax, but only to an ‘immovable withholding tax’ (precompte immobilier), with a rate that depends on the region where the property is
located (see Haulotte et al. 2010). Taking into account themunicipal surcharges, the effective tax rate of the immovable withholding tax ranges from 18% to 50% (IBFD 2009). In the computations of
the effective tax rate in Figure 3.10 we assume an immovable withholding tax rate of 34% (the average between 18% and 50%).
b The deduction pour habitation propre et unique refers to mortgage interest, mortgage capital, and to particular insurance premiums regarding the loan (Haulotte et al. 2010: 29). The limit to the
deduction is €2,770 for the first ten years and €2,080 thereafter.
c France also levies a net wealth tax with specific rules for owner-occupied houses. More precisely, the impôt de solidarité sur la fortune is an annual tax on the excess of the overall value of assets over a
certain threshold, with a 30% reduction of the value of the owner-occupied house (see Borselli et al. 2010).
d Since 1May 2009 in Ireland the interest relief has been restricted to the first seven years of the mortgage. In 2010 Ireland started to phase out mortgage interest relief: the tax break will be abolished
from 2018; for new loans the relief will be gradually reduced (see IBDF 2010).
e In the Netherlands the imputed income is calculated as a percentage (until 2008 up to 0.55%) of the market value of the property (since 2009 there has been no maximum imputed income (see
IBFD 2009)).
f In Spain full rollover relief is available for the sale of the primary residence. Moreover, housing capital gains are exempt when realized by a taxpayer aged 65 or more.
g The state and local real estate taxes are deductible against the federal personal income tax.
Sources: IBDF (2009); Borselli et al. (2010).
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Italy, the Netherlands, Spain, the USA and the UK (an overview of the property
tax regimes can be found in the appendix to this chapter).29
From a theoretical point of view, under a comprehensive income tax, a fully
neutral taxation of owner-occupation requires the taxation of imputed rents
and capital gains of housing and the deductibility of mortgage interests.30
Real-world tax systems are anything but neutral. In fact, owner-occupancy is
tax favoured with respect to renting in many countries, and with respect to
most forms of return on personal savings: with only a few exceptions, imputed
rents and capital gains on owner-occupied housing are not taxed; the tax relief
on mortgages’ interest further reinforces the tax bias towards housing.
Table 3.1 shows that only Belgium and the Netherlands tax the imputed rent
on owner-occupancy. Mortgage interest costs attract tax relief in all countries
exceptGermany and theUK. In theNetherlands, Belgium, and theUnited States
interest expense is deductible from the tax base (but in Belgium the deduction is
cappedat a givenamount of interest payments,while in theUSA the cap refers to
the amount of mortgage principal), so the tax advantage depends on the mar-
ginal tax rateof theowner. In theother countries the tax relief forfinancingcosts
mainly takes the formof a tax credit, oftenwith limited duration.31 Basically, no
country in our set taxes capital gains on owner-occupied housing. Finally, with
regard to property taxes, only Belgium, Ireland, and Italy do not tax the owner-
occupied property; notice that in the USA it is possible to deduct state and local
real estate taxes against the federal personal income tax.
To get an idea of the quantitative effects of the personal income-tax rules
regarding imputed income, mortgage interests and capital gains, and the fiscal
burden of the property taxes, we compute the effective average tax rate on
owner-occupied housing using a simplified version of the IMF methodology,
which does not consider transaction taxes32 (see Box 3.2 for a description of the
methodology). The results of these computations are shown in Figure 3.10 (see
the appendix to this chapter for the assumptions regarding property taxation).33
29 Tax information refers to the2009 taxcodes reported in IBFD (2009). See alsoBorselli et al. (2010).
30 See Van den Noord and Heady (2001: 30) and IMF (2009a: 17).
31 For example: in Spain, taxpayers are allowed to set off 15% of the costs incurred for
acquisition or renovation of a primary residence against their income-tax liability, up to €9,015
(i.e. themaximum credit is €1,352); in Ireland, for first-time buyers, the relief—given at source with
the effect of reducing the borrower’s interest payments—takes the form of a tax credit at a rate of
25% for years 1 and 2, 22.5% for years 3, 4, and 5, 20% for years 6 and 7 (the interest relief is
restricted to an interest payment of €20,000 for a couple); in France, interest on loans for purchase
or the construction of the principal residence entitles the taxpayer to a 20% tax credit for the initial
five-year period of the loan (40% for the first twelve months), up to €7,500 per year for a couple
(i.e., the maximum credit is €3,000 in the first year and €1,500 for the remaining four years); in
Italy, interest on mortgage loans taken to build or buy the principal residence entitles the taxpayer
to a 19% tax credit up to €4,000 (i.e., maximum credit equal to €760).
32 Which can arguably be substantial for some countries (see IMF 2009a).
33 For Belgium, as Van den Noord (2005: 36), we assume that the imputed income is the same
fraction of the value of the unit of housing as in the Netherlands (0.55%). To take into account the
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In all the countries the personal tax system provides incentives to owner-
occupation: since the effective average personal tax rates are negative in all
countries save Germany and the UK, housing investment is subsidized by the
personal income-tax system. Owner-occupancy is tax favoured de facto by the
Box 3.2. THE METHODOLOGY TO COMPUTE THE EFFECTIVE AVERAGE TAX RATE
The IMF methodology considers the purchase of a house at a predetermined price
($250,000), with a holding period of ten years, an investor in the top-income tax
bracket, no repayment of principal, and proceeds of home sales used to buy another
house. The effective tax rate is computed as the ratio of the present value of all taxes paid
during the holding period to the present value of house incomes.a The yearly housing
income is the sum of the imputed rent and the capital gain, assumed to be equal to 4%
and 5% of the house price, respectively. As in the IMF study, we use a mortgage interest
rate of 6% and a discount rate of 5%, and we assume that the purchase is 80%
mortgage financed. In contrast with the IMF study, the price of the house in our
computations is set at €500,000; this permits the highest possible tax relief to be
obtained in all the countries where the tax allowance for mortgage interest is limited.
a For an early approach, which relies on the cost of capital to compute effective marginal tax rates, see,
e.g., the analyses in Jorgenson and Landau (1993).






















Figure 3.10. Effective average taxation of owner-occupation, Europe and the USA (%)
Source: our calculations. Data: IBFD (2009). Methodology: IMF (2009).
difference between the two tax systems, in contrast with Van den Noord’s analysis, we consider a
‘fiscal value’ of the house lower than the market value. We assume a 33% cut of the market value of
the house. Moreover, we assume that the Belgium ‘fiscal’ imputed income grows at the rate of 2%
(rather than at 5%, as in the Netherlands). For the sake of comparison, assuming no cut of the
market value and a 5% growth rate for the ‘fiscal’ imputed income, the effective tax rate on housing
would be –0.4% (rather than –1.3% of Figure 3.10); assuming a 50% cut of the market value and a
2% growth rate for the imputed income, the effective tax rate would instead be –1.6%.
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personal tax system also in Germany and the UK, since the effective average tax
rate (equal to zero) is generally lower than the tax ratesonalternative investments.
The implicit tax subsidy stemming from the personal income-taxation rules
is particularly strong in the Netherlands and in the USA, where mortgage
interest is deductible basically with no limits.34 The subsidy is also strong in
Ireland; but notice that Ireland started to phase out this tax relief in 2009.
As regards property taxation, the fiscal burden is comparatively higher in
the USA, Spain, Germany, and France than in the UK and the Netherlands (as
noted above, Belgium, Ireland, and Italy do not tax owner-occupied property).
By considering the overall effective tax rate, the tax subsidy for owner-
occupied housing is found to be the largest in the Netherlands, the USA, and
Ireland.
When the international comparison refers, not only to interest tax relief,
taxation of imputed rents and capital gains, and taxes on property, but also to
transaction taxes,35 as in the IMF’s analysis, the results show large differences
across countries.36 However, as regards the United States, the results are consis-
tent with the IMF’s: overall, the USA stands out as having low taxes on owner-
occupiedhousing (see Section 3.3.3.2 for a brief discussion on the cross-country
correlation between measures of effective taxation and house prices).
3.3.3 Housing taxation and the financial crisis
The main direct cause of the financial crisis lies in the bursting of the US
housing bubble, so, in assessing responsibility for the financial crisis, it is
natural to begin by examining the structure and the dynamics of the US
housing market, particularly its demand side. The focus here is on the possible
role of the ‘tax factor’ in the US housing market dynamics.37
The IMF and the OECD do not consider tax rules as the main reason for the
housing bubble: housing prices increased in countries with different tax
systems, and there were no tax breaks clear and big enough to explain the
34 In the countries where the tax allowance related to mortgage interest is limited, the EATR of
the personal income-tax system depends on the value of the house: once the limit of the tax break
is reached, the EATR increases with the value of the house, and it has an upper bound that depends
on the overall housing (personal) tax regime. For instance, if the imputed income is not taxed, the
EATR is negative and will tend to zero as the housing income increases. This happens because the
tax break becomes less relevant as (the present value of) the total housing income gets higher. If we
assume an initial house price equal to € 250,000, and we keep all the remaining assumptions used
in the main text, the EATR of the personal income-tax system would be –0.8% for Belgium (against
–1.3% of Figure 3.10), –3.7% for France (against –1.9%), –7.3% for Ireland (against –6.1%), –2.7%
for Italy (against –1.4%), and –4.9% for Spain (against –2.4%). Notice that the ranking of the
countries is basically unaffected by the change of the assumption regarding the house price.
35 Which can arguably be substantial for some countries (see IMF 2009a).
36 See IMF (2009a: 20–1a).
37 For in-depth analyses of the dynamics of the US housing market, see Case and Shiller (2004);
Glaeser et al. (2005); Himmelberg et al. (2005); and Shiller (2005).
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price dynamics that were observed.38 At the same time, many commentators
have found fault especially with the tax treatment of housing capital gains
and mortgage interest deductibility. Let us consider each of them in turn.
3.3.3.1 CAPITAL GAINS TAXATION
Since the bursting of the US housing bubble, it has been asserted that the
housing policies pursued in the USA since the mid-1990s are partly to blame
for the financial crisis, particularly the policies aimed at increasing homeow-
nership through access to mortgage loans for first-time buyers with low and
variable incomes.39 A taxmeasure in the same vein is the repeal of capital gains
taxation on home selling with the Tax Relief Act of 1997 (henceforth TRA97).
TRA97 generated a change in the tax treatment of housing capital gains.
Previously, housing capital gains had been taxed when homeowners sold their
houses, unless they resorted to the ‘rollover rule’ or to the ‘55-age rule’. The
rollover rule allowed homeowners to postpone the taxation, provided they
bought a house of equal or higher value within two years. The 55-age rule
allowed sellers aged 55 or more to claim a one-time exclusion of $125,000
against the capital gains tax. TRA97 abolished both rules and allowed home-
owners to claim $500,000 exclusion ($250,000 for singles) against the capital
gains tax as often as every two years. Since the ownership and use tests to
claim the exclusion are not very strict, it was often possible to get the tax
benefit for a second home (Shan 2008).
The repeal of capital gains taxationmay have had an important impact on the
effective taxation on housing: using the same IMF methodology and the same
assumptions as above,40 it can be demonstrated that, following TRA97, the effec-
tive average tax rate on housing decreased from –6.37% to –17.12%.41 However,
the overall effects of TRA97 on the US housing market are theoretically ambigu-
ous,42 and the existing empirical evidence does not offer clear-cut answers.43
38 See IMF (2009a) and OECD (2009a).
39 See Katz (2009).
40 In the computations we use the highest marginal tax rate in 1996 and 1997, which was equal
to 39.6%. The capital gains tax rate applied for 1996 is 28% (see Shan 2008).
41 The average tax rate in 1996, –6.37%, is the average between the tax rate for homeowners aged
55 years or more at the time of selling (–8.23%) and the tax rate for homeowners aged less than 55
years at the time of selling who decide to buy after ten years (–4.51%).
42 For example, TRA97 also lowered all long-term capital gains tax rates, which were further
reduced in 2001 and 2003 (see Shan 2008). The reduction of the capital gains tax rate with the
TRA97 may have had effects on the market for rental properties (where the rents are determined),
then indirectly affecting the market for owner-occupied houses (see Box 3.1, equation (1.)). The
lower long-term capital gains tax rates may have allowed the building of rental projects in which
landlords could also break even with lower rents. And lower rents could have eased the demand
pressure on the market for owner-occupied houses, contrasting the possible demand pressure
coming from the repeal of capital gains taxation on first-home selling.
43 See Bier et al. (2000); Cunningham and Engelhardt (2008); Biehl and Hoyt (2008); Shan
(2008); and Quayes (2010).
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Some commentators observe a structural break in the time series of US
house prices between 1997 and 1998 (see Figure 3.5) and associate it with
the repeal of capital gains taxation. In subsequent years, other factors became
important: the rise in house prices, drawing investors’ attention; the end of
the stock-market boom following the peak in March 2000; the attempt by the
Federal Reserve to avoid a severe recession in 2001 by pumping liquidity into
the system; the public policies aimed at increasing the homeownership rate.
However, the new provisions on capital gains taxation of 1997 may have
contributed to the house-price boom, ‘fuelling the mother of all housing
bubbles’,44 playing the role of a precipitating factor. Their effects were then
amplified by mechanisms involving investor confidence and expectations
of market performance (besides the other factors mentioned above); adaptive
or extrapolative expectations may have played a role in these amplification
mechanisms.45
Other commentators hold that the repeal of the capital gains taxation did
not play a significant role in the genesis of the financial crisis. The IMF
considers the role of the 1997 measures unclear, since the elimination of
rollover relief may have resulted in worse tax treatment for some taxpayers,
and since house prices did not increase everywhere, which implied that other
factors were at work.46 More importantly, perhaps, many scholars assign no
significant role in the price boom to the 1997 break.47
3.3.3.2 MORTGAGE INTERESTS DEDUCTIBILITY
In the USA it is possible to deduct interest costs on mortgages taken
to buy, build, or improve a house (so-called home acquisition debt), up to
$1 million.48
In general, mortgage interest deductibility, particularly when unlimited (as
in the Netherlands) or with mostly non-binding limits (as in the USA), de-
creases the cost of ownership and tends to tilt households’ decisions whether
to rent or buy a house towards ownership; it also encourages people to spend
too much on housing, and it may actually end up subsidizing wealthier
homeowners, who have higher marginal tax rates, and the construction
44 See Smith (2007); Bajaj and Leonhardt (2008); and Gjerstad and Smith (2009).
45 See Shiller (2005: 69).
46 See IMF (2009a).
47 See Case and Shiller (2004); Glaeser et al. (2005); Himmelberg et al. (2005); and Shiller (2005).
Burman (2008) argues that the new capital gains tax rules were unimportant with respect to the
bubble, stressing that the previous rules raised little revenue.
48 Mortgage interest is an itemized deduction. In the US system, most taxpayers can choose to
deduct either the total amount of itemized deductions or a standard deduction; the latter depends
on the filing status of the taxpayer. In general, itemized deductions are chosen by wealthier
taxpayers (Glaeser and Shapiro 2002).
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industry.49 Moreover, since the benefit is proportional to debt, the deduction
is basically a subsidy to ‘gambles on housing’,50 and this could lead to exces-
sive risk taking.51
As regards risk taking, since the second half of the 1990s, credit-scoring
methods have been widely used in the USA to price lending. This has probably
facilitated the access to credit for many high-risk borrowers. Obviously, given
the amount of debt, the riskier the borrower, the higher the interest rate
charged, and the greater the tax benefits from deduction. Unlike countries
that cap the deduction at a given amount of interest, the United States estab-
lishes the cap to the mortgage principal, and this implies a tax favour to riskier
borrowers.52
In contrast with other countries,53 in the USA it is possible to claim a
deduction for interest on mortgage loans taken out for purposes other than
house purchase—for example, to buy a car or pay for college tuition, up to
$100,000 (so-called home equity loan). Home equity—the difference between
the market value of the house and the loans secured by the value of the
house—can be used as collateral.
Home equity loans may have played an indirect role in leading up to the
financial crisis. In fact, the run-up in US housing prices, along with the rise in
home acquisition debt fuelled by ‘bull’ price expectations, may have directly
fed the growth of home equity loans, thereby providing part of the mortgage
raw materials for the strong growth of the securitization industry (see Section
2.3). This process may have been magnified by the deductibility of mortgage
interests.
The deductibility of interest on home equity loans clearly creates a bias to
personal debt, encouraging people to prefer borrowing against home equity to
other forms of borrowing, and to extract the equity from their home for
personal and business reasons.
The lowering over time of personal income-tax rates in the USA has reduced
the size of the tax benefit stemming from the mortgage interest deductibil-
ity,54 which nevertheless remains substantial by international standards (see
Figure 3.10).
49 See Glaeser (2009). 50 See Glaeser (2009) and Sullivan (2005).
51 One could argue that there could be positive externalities associated with homeownership
and housing consumption that might be worth subsidizing through mortgage interest
deductibility. These externalities are, however, very difficult to measure, and, moreover, interest
deductibility appears to have been ineffective in promoting homeownership in the USA (see
Glaeser and Shapiro 2002 and the references therein).
52 The same holds true in countries, such as the Netherlands, where there are no limits to
interest deductibility.
53 In the Netherlands it was possible to claim interest deductions on equity withdrawals until
1996.
54 See Poterba (1992).
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However, the role of tax deductibility alonewith respect to the recent bubble
is unclear because of conflicting evidence. If we consider our set of countries
(see Section 3.3.2), it is true that the Netherlands, the other country with
strong interest deductibility and providing substantial tax benefits according
to our computations, belongs to the ‘fast-lane’ set of countries, according to
the IMF ranking based on the house price increases in the 1990s and 2000s.55
On the other hand, the UK was also a ‘fast-lane’ country, basically without
having provision for any interest tax relief for most of the recent boom
period.56 More importantly, as far as the USA is concerned, there was no
break in the tax relief for interest expense to explain the housing boom.
Moreover, the price dynamics in the USA differed across states and regions,
although there are no interstate differences in interest deductibility.
A possible indirect role of the interest deductibility for the US housing
market dynamics may be related to the large increase in low- and no-down-
payment mortgages during the second part of the price boom period,57 which
was probably facilitated by the housing policies enacted in 2004 and
subsequent years.58 Given the asymmetric treatment of personal debt and
equity, the decrease of mortgage downpayments may have given rise indi-
rectly to a tax break: since the cost of personal housing debt is deductible,
unlike the opportunity cost of housing equity, the consequence of the
increase of lower- or no-downpayment mortgages may have been an abrupt
fall in the user cost of housing.59
Despite the inconclusive evidence based on simple time-series and cross-
section comparisons, it is very likely that the interest tax relief may have
somehow contributed to housing price inflation in the USA,60 along the
55 See Hilbers et al. (2008).
56 The UK phased out interest deductibility over the period 1974–99. First, a ceiling on the
mortgage principal eligible for deduction was introduced. Then, the rate at which it was possible to
claim the deduction was gradually lowered to zero (OECD 2000: 151).
57 According to the surveys conducted by the National Association of Realtors, in 2003 the
median downpayment for first-time homebuyers was equal to 6%, a figure that fell to 2% in the
period 2004–7. The median downpayment for repeat homebuyers also declined starting in 2004,
although to a lesser extent (see <www.realtor.org>).
58 On 16 Dec. 2003 the American Dream Downpayment Act was signed into law, with a view to
assisting low-income first-time homebuyers by providing downpayment. Among other things, the
Act expanded the supply of no-downpayment mortgages for first-time homebuyers (US
Department of Housing and Urban Development 2005).
59 As an example, using the highest marginal tax rate of the federal income tax in 2003 and
2004 (35%), and assuming a downpayment to buy the house equal to 5% in 2003 and 0% in 2004,
the effective average tax rate computed with the IMFmethodology (see Section 3.2) would decrease
from –17.97% to –18.92%. Since the reduction of downpayments referred especially to low-
income first-time buyers, it is reasonable to compute the change of the effective taxation also
with the lowest income-tax rate (10%); in this case the effective average tax rate would decrease
from –5.13% to –5.41%. Of course, it is hard to say whether and to what extent these changes in the
economic advantageousness of the housing investment may have been statistically significant at
the margin for housing market dynamics.
60 See Sullivan (2008) and Surowiecki (2009).
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lines of a catalyst in a chemical reaction. The simple and very general eco-
nomic model sketched above predicts that tax relief of the kind provided
in the USA can contribute to the volatility of the housing market; and
that mortgage interest tax relief can be a contributing factor of instability
if it is coupled with low financing costs and/or ‘exuberant’ housing price
expectations.
In conclusion, tax incentives may have played a role in the development of
the housing bubble, but the size of this role is difficult to assess, although the
odds are that this role has been secondary to monetary policy and credit
markets developments.
3.4 Conclusions
The 2008 financial crisis has already proved to be the worst economic crisis
since the Second World War. The burst of a housing bubble in the United
States led to a stop in confidence of investors towards all mortgage-based assets
that had flourished in previous years and to uncertainties with regards to the
financial exposure and liquidity of world major financial institutions. This
banking crisis eventually spread to a stock-market crash and to a credit crunch
in the real economy. The rapid expansion of credit and the increasing degree
of indebtedness and risk-taking behaviour of financial institutions was a
striking characteristic of the build-up to the crisis.
In this context, one important policy question is whether tax systems may
have created negative incentives, favouring risk. Several tax provisions in
favour of homeownership may have led to increased purchases of houses in
several countries. However, the available evidence is mixed when it comes to
assessing whether different tax treatments have led to different price develop-
ments, suggesting that lax monetary policy and increased risk taking by
lenders are more powerful explanations for the housing bubble. In turn, this
risk-taking behaviour may have been exacerbated by tax provisions on the
treatment of executive compensation and by tax arbitrage possibilities across
different types of investors. Chapter 4 discusses these issues in depth.
Countries have implemented strong policy responses to the crisis. In partic-
ular, many countries have taken tax measures as part of broader fiscal stimulus
packages. They have, however, come short of changing tax systems. Two
issues have attracted some attention and are evaluated in Chapter 5: the idea
of a financial transaction tax and/or a financial activities tax to collect more
revenues from the financial sector and to correct for negative externalities.
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APPENDIX
Property taxation on owner-occupied
housing
Belgium
There is no real estate taxation.
France
The property tax (taxe foncière) is a local tax due by the legal owner of the house. It is
based on the notional rental value of the property (valeur locative cadastrale). The tax is
calculated bymultiplying half of the latter value by coefficients determined by the local
councils. In 2008 the average municipal rate was 17.76% (see Borselli et al. 2010).
The dwelling tax (taxe d’habitation) is a local tax owed by the person who occupies a
dwelling. As the property tax, it is assessed on the deemed rental value of the property.
In 2008 the average municipal rate was equal to 13.85%; in special cases, state govern-
ment adds a surtax (0.2% for principal residence) (see Borselli et al. 2010). Tax reduc-
tions are generally granted to taxpayers with dependants, for the principal residence.
The last general revision of the valeur locative cadastrale was made in 1974 (and based
on data for 1970) and updated in 1980. Every year the cadastral values are revised to
reflect the changes of the characteristics of the properties; to some extent the annual
revisions should reflect also the changes of the market values (Lefebvre 2010a: 626).
Germany
The real estate tax (Grundsteuer) is levied annually by the municipalities on immovable
properties. The tax is calculated by applying a federal tax rate of 0.35% to thefiscal value of
the property (Einheitswert). The result is thenmultiplied by a municipal coefficient (Hebe-
satz).Onaverage thefinal effective tax rate is equal to1.9% (see IBFD2011). The real estate
tax is not deductible for income-taxpurposes in caseof owner-occupation. Thefiscal value
of the property is generally much lower than the market value (about 20–50% of the
market value; see Mayer 2006).
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Ireland
There is no real estate taxation.
Italy
There is no real estate taxation on owner-occupation (since 2008).
The Netherlands
The real estate tax (Onroerendezaakbelasting) is levied annually by the municipalities on
immovable properties. The tax base is the fair market value for fiscal purposes (Wet
waardering onroerende zaken (WOZ)) issued every year by the municipalities. On average
the tax rate is equal to 0.1% (see <http://www.cijfernieuws.nl/ozbd.html>). The tax is
not deductible for income-tax purposes in case of owner-occupation.
Spain
The real estate tax (impuesto sobre bienes inmuebles (IBI)) is levied annually by the
municipal authorities on the possession of immovable property. The tax base is the
cadastral value of the property (valor cadastral). The tax rate ranges between 0.4% and
1.1% (see Borselli et al. 2010). The tax is not deductible for income-tax purposes in case
of owner-occupation. The cadastral value is revised with reference to the market values
according to several procedures. The general revision is made at least every ten years
(see Lefebvre 2010b: 1598; see also <http://www.catastro.meh.es/esp/procedimientos/
Renovaciones>).
UK
The council tax is an annual tax on domestic property levied by local authorities. It is
primarily a property tax; it is also a charge on local services users, since the payment is
related to household size. Each property is assigned to one of eight bands (from A to H),
according to its assessed capital value in 1991. Every year, each local council decides the
bill for bandD; the bills for the other bands are charged at afixedproportionof the bandD
bill. On average, in 2008–9 the council tax per dwelling was equal to £1,145; the tax bill
increased at an annual rate of 5%over the period 2004–9 (see<http://www.communities.
gov.uk>).
USA
Property taxes are imposed by local municipalities and counties in each US state. The
tax liability is generally calculated by multiplying a tax rate by an assessment ratio (the
part of the value of the property that is taxed) by the market value of the property. On
average, in 2009 the tax bill was 1.04% of home value (see <http://www.
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taxfoundation.org/research/topic/89.html>). The state and local real estate taxes are
deductible for the purposes of income taxation.
Assumptions used in the computations of the EATR for property taxes
It is well known that cadastral values are usually lower than market values. Hence, in
countries where property taxes are based on cadastral values (as in France, Spain, and
Germany), the burden of these taxes is usually lower than in countries where these taxes
aremore closely related tomarket values (as in theNetherlands and theUSA). To consider
these differences, for the countries where property taxes are based on cadastral values, we
assume that at the beginning of the holding period thefiscal value of the property is lower
than themarket value by a given percentage; thenwe keep the property taxes constant in
real terms over the holding period (we assume a 2 per cent inflation rate).
More precisely, we assume an initial 65 per cent cut of the market value in Germany
(seeMayer 2006) and a 33 per cent cut in France (for which we do not havemore precise
information). For Spain we assume an initial fiscal value equal to the market value
(since the cadastral values are more updated than in other countries; see <http://www.
catastro.meh.es/esp/procedimientos/Renovaciones>).
For the UK, we use actual data on the council tax. More precisely, we use the average
council tax bill per dwelling for 2008–9 and we let it grow at a 5 per cent rate over the
holding period (source: <http://www.communities.gov.uk>).
For the Netherlands and the USA, property taxes are computed with reference to the
market value of the properties.
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4
The Role of Taxes in Compensation Schemes
and Structured Finance
Vieri Ceriani, Stefano Manestra, Giacomo Ricotti, and Alessandra Sanelli
4.1 Introduction
This chapter develops the thoughts initially presented at a conference on ‘Tax
Policy and the Financial Crisis’ held in April 2009 at the Bocconi University in
Milan,wherewe tentatively grappledwith the possible effects of the tax system
on the economic factors that had triggered the 2008 financial crisis. Did any
features of the tax system influence the build-up of the crisis, and, if so, how?
We try to identify cases in which the fiscal regime interacted with other
factors and reinforced them. We do not provide a comprehensive answer, but
highlight some of the observations, doubts, and evidence that have been put
forward so far. Our starting point is that taxation is an important factor, but
usually not the most important driver of economic trends.
We do not deal with the tax biases that favour debt finance and are inherent
in corporation tax systems. This issue, highlighted by the IMF (2009a) and
others, has triggered some proposals for reforming the corporation tax
through the introduction of an allowance for corporate equity (ACE): that is,
a deduction for a notional return on own capital. Nor do we examine the
taxation of residential housing and the deductibility of mortgage interest: the
dynamics of the US housing market and the financial structure that was built
on it, which seem to have played a decisive role in most narratives of the
financial crisis, are analysed in this book in the contribution of Hemmelgarn,
Nicodeme, and Zangari (Chapter 3).
The views expressed in this chapter are those of the authors and do not in any way commit the
Banca d’Italia. Although the work is the product of a joint effort, V. Ceriani wrote Sections 4.1 and
4.5, A. Sanelli Section 4.2, G. Ricotti Sections 4.3, 4.4.1, and 4.4.2, and S. Manestra Section 4.4.3.
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In the following sectionswe concentrate on twomore specificfields. In Section
4.2 we review the taxation of stock options and other performance-based remu-
neration forms (Section 4.2.1); we also illustrate how the favourable tax treat-
ment provided for ‘carried interest’ in many countries may have reinforced the
trend towards aggressive highly leveraged private equity transactions with little
regard to employment issues or the long-term prospects of firms (Section 4.2.2.).
Section 4.4 shows the role of taxation in facilitating the development of
structuredfinance; inparticular,wedescribehow the growthof the securitization
(Sections 4.4.1 and 4.4.2) and credit default swapmarkets (Section 4.4.3), namely
in theUnited States,mayhave been reinforcedby some features of the tax system
and by the interaction between the tax systems of different countries, including
tax havens. Section 4.5 provides some concluding remarks.
4.2 Performance-based remuneration and taxes
4.2.1 Stock options and other stock-based remuneration schemes
It is generally acknowledged that equity-based and other performance-related
compensation plans at large financial institutions were one of the factors that
led to ever greater risk taking and thus contributed to the financial crisis that
began in 2007.
The 1990s and the 2000s have seen an enormous rise in executive remuner-
ation. In theUnited States, between 1990 and 2008 the average pay of the chief
executive officer (CEO) of a large corporation rose from 100 to nearly 400 times
that of the average worker. A similar though less marked pattern can be found
in Europe. The chief factors responsible for this huge gap are the various forms
of performance-based compensation,most notably bonuses and stock options.
Finance began influencing firms’ governance in the early 1990s. The idea of
creating ‘shareholder value’ rested on the assumption that markets could
evaluate executives’ performances better than human judgement. Various
forms of stock-based compensation became very popular, first in the United
States and then in other developed countries, on the theory that they could
motivate employees to act in the interest of the firm’s shareholders and align
the interests of senior executives with the general interest of the firm. Many
large firms paid a significant portion of total compensation in stock or similar
instruments, with the stock-based portion typically greater, the higher the
position of the employee. The increased use of stock-based remuneration gave
rise to ever greater incentives to risk taking that were not counterbalanced by
employees’ exposure to losses in the event of poor corporate performance,
since other factors were in place. In fact, although vesting and other restric-
tions required employees to hold some newly granted stock for significant
periods of time, the sensitivity of equity prices to short-term corporate
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performance and shareholders’ frequent tendency to focus on short-term results
spurred employees, and especially executives, to aim at maximizing stock-price
increases in the short term rather than the firm’s long-term growth.1 The same
factors also led employees to underestimate possible future downside risks.
The incentive to risk taking arising from stock-based remuneration was
particularly strong in the financial sector. Given the structure of financial
markets in most developed countries, banks and other financial firms can
change their desired mix of risk/return much more easily and quickly than
non-financial firms. For financial firms, then, large bonuses linked mainly to
short-term profits regardless of the possible long-term risks may have induced
managers to choose an ever higher level of risk in order to achieve higher
returns, leading to the systemic excessive risk taking that severely threatened
the global financial system.
Compensation practices at large financial institutions have generally been
counted as one of the sources of the system of distorted incentives that led to
the financial crisis. Here the question is: did tax rules favour remuneration
schemes that rewarded high risk taking or those that focused on short-term
performance?
It is a common belief that stock options and other stock-based forms of
remuneration are tax favoured compared with cash compensation. If this is
true, then the tax system could be held responsible for contributing to the
crisis through its pro-cyclical effects by reinforcing a structure of incentives
that led to excessive risk taking.
Stock options are financial instruments that give the owner (usually the
firm’s executives and other employees) the right to buy a certain asset (usually
the company’s shares) at a specified price (strike price or exercise price) at any
time during a predetermined period or at the end of that period. Over the life
of a stock option four different events can be identified: grant, when the stock-
option right is granted to employees; vesting, the expiring of the minimum
holding period required to exercise the option (usually 3–5 years); exercise,
when the employee actually exercises the option right and acquires the stock;
and disposal, the sale of the shares received through option exercise.2
The tax treatment of stock options is linked to a number of issues, such as
the qualification of income (employment income or capital income), the
1 Financial Stability Forum (2009). The theoretical literature has tried to explain the
shortcomings of stock options in terms of the information asymmetries between managers and
shareholders. In this view, stock options are a form of managerial ‘rent extraction’ from the firm at
the expense of shareholders: the assumption here is that executive compensation programmes are
usually developed by insiders (the executives themselves) rather than by shareholders and will thus
reflect executives’ preferences. In this reading, stock options contribute to the corporate
governance problems instead of solving them. See OECD (2005).
2 See OECD (2005).
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applicable taxes and charges (income tax, capital gains tax, and social-security
contributions), the timing of taxation (grant, exercise, or disposal of shares),
and the treatment at corporate level (whether or not the cost can be deducted
from corporate income). As a benchmark we assume a tax treatment that
ensures neutrality between stock options and cash salary, whichwould require
equal treatment of the two forms of remuneration at personal level and the
deductibility of stock-option costs from corporate tax (OECD 2005).3
Against this benchmark, a cross-country analysis of the tax treatment of
stock options offers a mixed picture. According to an OECD study carried out
in 2005 using legislation in force in 2002, tax rules vary substantially from
country to country, but in most cases stock options enjoy only limited bene-
fits compared with a cash salary. Since stock options are considered a form of
deferred compensation, in most OECD countries their benefits are treated as
ordinary income for employees and taxed at progressive income-tax rates.
Taxation is usually applied at the time of exercise. The tax base is the increase
in stock value accrued until exercise—that is, the difference between the
market price of the shares at the exercise date and the strike price. By contrast,
the subsequent gain arising from disposal of the shares—that is, the difference
between the selling price and the market price of the shares at the exercise
date—is usually taxed at the capital gains tax rates (but is exempt in countries
where capital gains are not taxed).
Under given conditions (so-called concessionary schemes) stock options
enjoy a preferential tax treatment at the employee level. The preferential
treatment may consist in the possibility of deferring taxation until the
disposal of the shares (Canada, Denmark, France, Iceland, Ireland, Italy,
the Slovak Republic, the UK, and the USA) and/or in tax-rate reductions.
The latter often consist in the lower capital gains tax rates being applied not
only to the gain accruing after exercise, but also to previous gains arising
between the grant date and the exercise date, which would otherwise be
taxed as ordinary income (Denmark, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Spain, the
UK, and the USA). Other countries give tax relief in determining the tax
base.4 In many countries (including Denmark, France, Ireland, Italy, Japan,
Spain, the UK, and the USA) preferential regimes also include exemption
from social-security contributions.5
3 This neutrality condition also applies under uncertainty if taxation takes place at exercise or
applies at grant on the basis of the option’s fair market value.
4 For example, in Austria a part of the gain (up to 50%) is exempt; in Canada and in Spain the
taxable base is respectively 50 and 70% of the employee benefit. In Luxembourg the employee
benefit is reduced for tax purposes by 5% each year (up to a maximum of 20%).
5 Some countries also exempt stock-option benefits arising from standard plans from employee
and employer social-security contributions.
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At the corporate level, stock options usually give the right to a tax deduction
on the difference between the market price of the shares at the exercise date
and the strike price—that is, for an amount exactly mirroring that taxed as
personal income for the employee. In many countries (Denmark, Germany,
Greece, Iceland, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, Sweden, Switzer-
land, Turkey, the UK, and the USA) the deduction is granted, at least for
some plans, even if the firm has not incurred an actual cash outflow (that is,
when employees are given newly issued shares). In others (including France,
Italy, Japan, Spain, and the USA) or for some plans, the economic cost of stock
options (the dilution in stock value when newly issued shares are assigned to
employees) is a non-deductible item. Finally, in some countries (Austria,
Belgium, Hungary, Ireland, New Zealand, Poland, and the Slovak Republic)
deduction of stock-option costs is never allowed. Consequently, from the
point of view of companies, stock options can be tax disadvantaged compared
with cash salary.
Each country can provide for a different combination of employee and
employer tax treatment of stock-option plans, depending on the specific
characteristics of the plans—that is, on whether or not they fulfil the require-
ments of concessionary schemes. As a result, different tax provisions can
combine in a number of ways in each country, giving rise to an overall tax
wedge on stock-option benefits that can vary from plan to plan.
The OECD report calculates marginal tax wedges on the different types of
stock-option plans in OECD countries and compares themwith tax wedges on
ordinary salaries. The calculation takes into account both employee- and
employer-level taxation and social-security contributions. The results show
that in some countries (for example, Australia, Austria, Canada, and Japan) the
tax wedge on stock options, at least for certain schemes, is greater than that on
ordinary salary. In many countries (for example, Germany, Luxembourg,
Sweden, Switzerland, and Turkey) the tax treatment of stock options and
cash salary is the same and so are the effective tax rates for both average and
higher levels of income. In some cases (including Denmark, Greece, Italy, the
UK, and the USA) neutrality between stock options and ordinary salary ob-
tains only for schemes for which deductibility from the corporate income-tax
base is allowed.
Under certain conditions or for certain schemes, a number of countries
(including Australia, Canada, Denmark, France, Italy, Japan, Korea, Portugal,
Spain, and the UK) grant preferential tax treatment of stock options at the
personal level while also allowing deductibility at the corporate level. In these
countries, stock options are tax favoured compared with ordinary salary;
often, the tax advantage of stock options increases with income. For high-
income taxpayers, the tax advantage seems especially great for certain con-
cessionary schemes in Belgium (more than 22 percentage points), Denmark
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(58.5 points), France (26.5 points), Italy (42.8 points), Spain (48.9 points), and
the UK (30 points).6
Other countries (for example, Canada, Finland, Japan, Spain, and the
USA) combine a preferential tax treatment at the employee level with non-
deductibility at corporate level. Depending on individual cases, the tax wedge
on stock options can be higher or lower than that on ordinary salary. How-
ever, at high levels of income, stock options tend to be tax favoured in these
countries.
Although the preferential tax treatment of stock-option benefits can lower
dramatically the tax burden on equity-based remuneration, the importance of
tax advantages is often limited by the conditions thatmust be fulfilled in order
to qualify for these benefits. For example, in order to enjoy preferential tax
treatment, an employee may need to hold the shares for some time after
exercise (at least one year in the USA); in addition, the concessionary schemes
quite often cap the amount of stock-option benefits that can enjoy the favour-
able tax treatment.7 Although these caps are sometimes high, in conjunction
with other conditions they often result in concessionary plans being used
mainly by start-up firms or in limited cases.
In the light of the foregoing facts and considering the more neutral or even
disadvantaged tax treatment of standard stock-option plans compared with
ordinary salary, the common belief that stock options enjoy a tax advantage
over cash-based remuneration is not confirmed in general. Basing their con-
clusions on a comparison of the relative tax treatment of cash-based and
standard stock-option compensation plans in the USA, the UK, Germany,
and France, Fehr et al. (2004) find that the latter are often tax disadvantaged;8
a tax preference for stock options arises only from large differences between
personal and capital gains tax rates (as in France) or from tax discrimination of
cash compensation (as in the USA).
The empirical evidence on the supposed tax preference of stock options,
mostly referring to the United States, is alsomixed (OECD 2005). Some studies
(e.g., Hall and Murphy 2003) argue that the widespread use of stock-option
plans in the USA during the 1990s can be partly explained by a combination of
tax and accounting rules. Hall and Liebman (2000), examining the relative tax
treatment of stock options and cash salary in the USA in the 1980s and 1990s,
6 OECD (2005: 73–6, table 2.7).
7 For instance, under the UK concessionary scheme known as the Company Share Option Plan,
the total value of shares an employee can receive under option must not exceed £30,000. Another
UK concessionary scheme, the Enterprise Management Incentive option, is targeted to companies
with gross assets of less than £30 million, and provides for a maximum of £100,000 stock-option
benefit to each employee. In the USA, the preferential treatment for Incentive Stock Options is
subject, among other conditions, to the value of the shares underlying stock-option benefits not
exceeding $100,000.
8 Like the OECD, this study considers both employee- and firm-level taxation.
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find only a moderate tax advantage of ‘non-qualified stock options’ over a
cash salary, because the tax advantages to the executives of deferring taxes
until exercise were largely offset by the tax disadvantages to the company of
not being able to deduct option expenses from taxable profits until the time of
exercise.9 In general, however, they find little evidence that changes in the tax
treatment of stock options during the 1980s and the 1990s have played a
major role in the dramatic explosion of executive stock-option pay. Other
factors (such as changes in corporate governance) appear to have had more
influence.
In spite of the controversial results of economic analysis and the inconclu-
sive empirical evidence, it is nonetheless possible that tax considerations
actually do play a role in the choice between ordinary salary and stock op-
tions. For instance, stock options could be tax preferred to cash remuneration
from a unilateral perspective—that is, on the basis of solely employee or
employer taxation: in given circumstances, one of the two levels of taxation
could dominate the other in the determination of remuneration policies. This
could happen, for instance, because of shortcomings in the corporate gover-
nance mechanisms regulating the firm’s remuneration policies. In the case of
large, widely held corporations, it is quite likely that executives’ remuneration
policies are decided by executives themselves, since boards tend to be domi-
nated by CEOs and senior executives of other firms rather than by individual
shareholders. These board members have an interest in keeping executive
compensation high. Under these circumstances, it is very likely that employ-
ees’ taxes outweigh corporate tax considerations.10 An alternative explana-
tion, put forward by some studies (Murphy 2002; Hall and Murphy 2003)
could be that decisions over stock-option grants are made on the basis of the
‘perceived cost’ rather than the real economic cost of the options. The ‘per-
ceived cost’ of an option is lower than the economic cost, because it takes into
account only the actual cash flow for the firm and not the opportunity cost,
equal to what an outside investor would pay for the option (OECD 2005).
Finally, in some countries tax incentives to use stock options instead of
ordinary salary may arise from specific features of the tax system or from the
interaction between tax law and other rules, and not just from the tax treat-
ment of stock options.11
9 They found also a moderate advantage of non-qualified stock options over incentive stock
options (ISOs), because of the fact that option expenses cannot be deducted for ISOs.
10 Smith and Huston (2009) find that individual-level tax incentives also outweigh corporate tax
incentives in employees’ decisions whether to sell the shares immediately after exercise or to hold
them in view of future price increases.
11 Another potentially important issue is cross-country option ownership. Many executives and
other highly qualified employees paid with stock options transfer their tax domicile to low-tax
countries during the holding period. This enables them to reduce their tax burden, even if the tax
rules of the employer’s country do not provide for a favourable tax treatment of stock options.
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Box 4.1. THE TAX TREATMENT OF EMPLOYEE STOCK OPTIONS IN THE USA
The US tax code provides for two possible tax treatments of stock options:
1. In the case of standard stock-option plans, referred to as non-qualified stock options
(NQOs), employees are taxed at the exercise date and at personal progressive rates
on the difference between the market value at the same date and the exercise price.
Any subsequent gain realized upon sale of the shares is taxed at the lower capital
gains rates.a As far as the employer is concerned, NQOs have the advantage of
allowing a tax deduction at the same time and in the same amount as the ordinary
compensation paid to the employee, even when there is no actual cost to the firm
(unlike cash remuneration).
2. If stock-option plans satisfy given criteria, set out by the tax code, they are called
incentive stock options (ISOs).b ISOs allow employees to defer taxation on the gain
emerging at the exercise date until the stock is sold and have it taxed at the lower
capital gains rates.c On the other hand, the employer gets no tax deduction for ISOs.
For both types of plan, there is scarcely any tax favour by comparison with cash-based
remuneration. In fact, the only tax advantage of NQOs may consist in the possibility of a
corporate tax deduction, even if there is no actual cash outflow. For the employee, apart
from the deferment of taxation from grant to the exercise date, NQOs do not have any
particular tax advantage over cash remuneration, except where the employee does not
sell the shares immediately after exercise, since all subsequent gains are taxed at the
lower capital-gains tax rates. On the other hand, under ISOs employees are taxed on
their stock-option income at the lower capital-gains tax rates, but at the same time
companies forfeit their stock-option corporate deductions.
Taking into account both employee and employer tax considerations, ISOs are
preferred to NQOs if under the latter the additional taxation on the employee exceeds
the value of the deduction to the employer. For employees facing high personal tax
rates, ISOs may be better than NQOs in the case of companies with low tax rates, such as
start-ups or companies with net operating losses.d Start-ups, with low taxable profits,
tend to use ISOs, as they would face liquidity constraints if they had to pay high salaries
to attract executives and other highly qualified employees. On the other hand, since the
value of their stock may increase dramatically over time, the use of incentive stock-
option plans is quite common.e In short, in the case of ISOs, employee tax considerations
tend to predominate. By contrast, in the case of NQOs, used mostly by large, profitable
companies, especially for senior executive compensation packages, since the tax advan-
tage depends on the value of the shares at the exercise date and on the company tax
rate, company tax considerations tend to prevail.f
a Provided the shares are held for at least one year after exercise.
b Section 422 of the Internal Revenue Code. Stock obtained under an ISO cannot be disposed of within
two years of the grant date nor within twelve months after exercise. ISOs cannot be granted with an
exercise price below the stock price at grant date, and the aggregate stock value covered by the ISOs is
limited to $100,000 per year per employee.
c Both benefits are allowed provided that the shares are held for at least one year after exercise. If the
employee sells the shares before that period, ordinary personal tax rates apply.
d Although the possibility of corporate deduction linked to NQOsmay have a value for corporations with
net operating losses, since the US tax code allows them to carry the losses back (for two years) or forward
(for up to twenty), for these corporations the relative weight of the corporate tax deductibility of stock-
option costs is likely to be lower, in practice, than the favourable employee tax treatment.
(continued)
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The USA offers the chief example of interaction between tax and other rules.
As with other countries, analysis of the general tax treatment of stock-option
plans in the USA does not reveal a general tax bias in their favour (see Box 4.1).
While the tax advantage for employees may help explain the large use of
ISOs in start-up companies, to understand the widespread use of NQOs in
large companies12 other tax factors and a combination of tax and accounting
rules must be taken into account. First, in 1993 a powerful incentive came
from the newly enacted rule that introduced a $1 million cap on ‘non-perfor-
mance-based’ compensation that a corporation could deduct from its taxes,
since the cap did not apply to stock-option plans. And, until 2004, US
accounting rules allowed companies to issue stock options to employees
and, unlike any other type of compensation, report a zero compensation
expense on their books.13 Moreover, since 1969 the US tax code (Section 83)
has allowed corporations issuing NQOs to deduct from their taxable income,
on the exercise date, the difference between what the employee paid to
exercise the option and the market value of the stock received. This amount
exactly mirrors the amount that is taxed as personal income of the employee.
This combination of accounting rules permitting corporations to grant huge
NQOs ‘free of charge’—that is, without having to register any cost in their
Box 4.1. CONTINUED
e In the context of venture capital, stock options have often been used to overcome capital and liquidity
constraints. The foreseeable increase in value of stock options on the shares of young, high-growth
companies creates incentives not only for executives, but also for other qualified employees, to work for
such companies even if the cash salaries are less attractive than those offered by larger companies. This
argument has found empirical support, and has often been used by policy-makers to justify tax policies that
allow for a favourable tax treatment of stock options in the context of venture-capital-financed firms.
However, in many cases tax incentives have been ill-focused, making benefits available to a much greater
number of entities than those actually suffering from liquidity constraints.
f Empirical evidence on the role of taxes in the choice between ISOs and NQOs is somewhat mixed. On
an aggregate level, over time the relative use of ISOs and NQOs has changed consistently with changes in
the personal, corporate, and capital-gains rates. Hite and Long (1982) show that firms switched from ISOs
to NQOs after the Tax Reform Act of 1969 lowered the top rates for individuals. However, Madeo and Omer
(1994) report that firms that switched from ISOs to NQOs following the 1969 tax reform tended to have
low tax rates, whereas in theory it should have been the high-tax firms switching. Balsam et al. (1997)
report that after the Tax Reform Act of 1986 NQO usage increased relative to ISOs because the top
individual rate was set below the top corporate rate, and the capital-gains rate was set equal to the tax
rate on ordinary income.
12 Jaquette et al. (2003) estimate that in the late 1990s and early 2000s 89% of options granted in
the United States where NQOs.
13 This happened so long as, on the grant date, the stock options were ‘at the money’, i.e. their
exercise price was not lower than the stock price at grant date. More precisely, since 1973
companies could avoid recording any expense on granted options in their financial statements.
However, from 1995 onwards they had to disclose the use of stock options and options’ fair value
in the notes to their financial statements. See Bulow and Shoven (2005).
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financial accounts—and tax rules allowing corporations to deduct the stock-
option income of the employee in the year of exercise, even when there was
no actual cost to the firm (as in the case of newly issued shares), gave compa-
nies an incentive to issue huge stock-option grants, because stock options
made possible a large tax deduction that could dramatically lower their taxes
without affecting the profits shown on their books.14
In 2005, in the wake of huge corporate financial scandals such as Enron and
WorldCom, not to mention the dot-com tech boom and subsequent bust, a
new Financial Accounting Standard (FAS 123R) issued by the Financial
Accounting Standards Board (FASB) became mandatory for all publicly traded
corporations. FAS 123R requires all companies to record a compensation
expense equal to the fair value on grant date of all stock options provided to
an employee in exchange for the employee’s services.15 Thus, since 2005
accounting rules have required companies to expense stock options at the
grant date,16 while tax rules still allow deduction of stock-option expenses at
the exercise date. Although the gap has been reduced and there is some
evidence of a shift from stock options to restricted stock in large firms’ com-
pensation plans (Carter et al. 2007),17 the accounting incentives to grant large
high stock-option benefits to executives are still large, particularly when stock
prices are rising.18 On the other hand, given the current mismatch between
accounting and tax rules, stock options that are granted and vested but never
exercised by the holder (for example, in case of a subsequent price drop)
produce a corporate book expense but no tax deduction.19 Overall, then, the
US tax and accounting rules tend to have pro-cyclical effects.
The wave of corporate financial scandals in which executives received huge
amounts through the exercise of stock options prompted a revision of stock-
14 The lack of a requirement to report stock-option expenses in companies’ financial statements
probably also helps explain the fraudulent practice of ‘backdating’ stock options that many
companies resorted to in the 1990s and early 2000s according to investigations by the Securities
and Exchange Commission. Executives were awarded stock options backdated to a point at which
the company’s stock prices were lower, so that the exercise price could be set at a lower level.
15 The International Accounting Standard Board (IASB) implemented a similar approach
effective 1 Jan. 2005.
16 The fair value is amortized over the vesting period. That is, compensation expense is
recognized prior to the tax deduction (which arises when the employee exercises the NQO),
generating a temporary difference and thus a deferred tax asset in each year of the vesting period
(Scholes et al. 2008).
17 Restricted stock grants are equivalent to call options with an exercise price of zero. Unlike
stock options, they have always had to be reported on companies’ financial statements, thereby
reducing corporate net income at year’s end.
18 Data from tax returns of US companies for tax years 2004–7 show that stock-option
compensation expenses permitted companies huge tax savings and were one of the chief factors
in the difference between book and tax income reported by US corporations. The bulk of this
difference was concentrated in a relatively small number of corporations that awarded substantial
stock options to their executives. See Levin (2009).
19 Only if a stock option never vests can previously booked expenses be recovered. See Levin
(2009).
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option regulations aimed at making remuneration policies more transparent,
improving the structure of incentives for managers so as to reduce excessive
risk taking, and reducing inequalities between different classes of employees.
In April 2009, in the wake of action to counter themain factors responsible for
the 2007–8financial crisis, the Financial Stability Forum (FSF)—now the Finan-
cial Stability Board (FSB)—released a set of ‘Principles for SoundCompensation
Practices’20meant to apply to significantfinancial institutions, especially large,
systemically important ones and aimed at reducing incentives to excessive risk
taking that might arise from the structure of compensation schemes. In this
approach, compensation regimes must be viewed in the broader context of
sound corporate governance and effective risk management; implementation
of the principles at national level will ensure that compensation structures are
consistent with firms’ long-term goals and prudent risk taking.21 Similar prin-
ciples have been endorsed by the European Commission.22
Although neither the FSB nor the European Commission mentioned tax
rules among the reforms needed to discourage remuneration practices that
lead to excessive risk taking, at national level the tax treatment of bonuses and
stock options became part of this debate. In the United States, changes to the
combination of accounting and tax rules that distort firms’ choices between
stock options, other forms of equity-based compensation, and ordinary salary
have been under discussion for several years. During the Bush administration,
the Senate Finance Committee examined a number of bills to raise the taxa-
tion of stock options and private equity managers’ remuneration. Similar
proposals have been presented since President Obama took office.23 However,
20 Financial Stability Forum (2009).
21 The FSF principles identified several lines of action aimed at ensuring that compensation
structures are consistent with firm’s long-term goals and prudent risk taking. Specifically, firms’
boards of directors must play an active role in the design, operation, and evaluation of
compensation schemes. Compensation, particularly bonuses, must properly reflect risk; and the
timing and composition of payments must be sensitive to the time horizon of risks. Stakeholders,
including shareholders, should be adequately and timely informedoncompensation policies in order
to exercise effective monitoring; an annual non-binding shareholder advisory vote on executive
compensation is also recommended. For their part, regulators will have to assess firms’
compensation policies. With regard to risk management, the FSF identified three key principles.
First, compensation must be symmetric with risk, linking the size of the bonus pool to the overall
performance of the firm; employees’ incentive payments should be linked to the contribution of the
individual and business unit to such performance. Bonuses should diminish or disappear in the event
of poor firm, divisional, or business unit performance. Second, compensation payout schedules must
be aligned with the time horizon of risks. Third, the mix of cash, equity, and other forms of
compensation should be consistent with the risk stemming from employee activities. The FSF
principles were followed in 2009 by a set of specific proposals in key areas, including pay structure.
In 2010 a first Peer Review Report on compensation found significant progress in the regulatory
framework in FSBmember states, aswell as in implementationbyfinancial institutions. However, the
report also showed a need of further work to align pay schemes with risk.
22 See European Commission (2009a, 2009b).
23 See, e.g., the bill filed in July 2009 by Senator C. Levin: Ending Excessive Corporate
Deductions for Stock Options Act (Levin 2009).
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none of these proposals has been approved. Some limited measures have been
adopted in connection with the crisis. The Emergency Economic Stabilization
Act (EESA) of 2008 tightened the tax rules for non-qualified deferred compen-
sation schemes involving tax-exempt foreign vehicles24 and restricted the
deductibility of executive compensation for financial institutions selling
troubled assets to the Treasury.25
In Europe, the May 2008 EU Council of Economic and Finance Ministers
condemned overly generous pay and benefit packages for corporate executives
and cited changes to preferential tax rules as one of the possible tools to
address the issue. Since then, some limited measures have been taken at
national level. In 2008 Italy repealed the favourable stock-option rules
providing for lower capital gains taxation (12.5 per cent) at disposal of the
whole gain accrued since grant; the lower capital gains tax rate is now applied
only for the taxation of the gain accrued between exercise and disposal, while
previously accrued gains (that is, between grant and exercise) are now once
again subject to ordinary income tax.26 In 2009 Austria repealed the partial tax
exemption available under a concessionary scheme for stock-option benefits
not exceeding €36,400 at the time of grant. Denmark also abolished one of the
concessionary stock-option schemes. The Netherlands enacted new tax rules
on ‘excessive remuneration schemes’ leading to the application of progressive
personal income tax to many forms of deferred compensation. However, it is
unclear whether these limited restrictions of stock-option concessionary
schemes are aimed at tightening the rules on executives’ pay or instead reflect
national budgetary needs.
A more explicit link to the distortions arising from remuneration policies
in the financial sector seems to have inspired the temporary bonus taxes
introduced between the end of 2009 and the beginning of 2010 by some
European governments. At the end of 2009 the UK and France introduced a
one-off tax on discretionary bonuses in the banking sector, aimed at encour-
aging change in the remuneration practices that had contributed to excessive
24 The new section 457A added to the Internal Revenue Code requires non-qualified deferred
compensation paid by a non-qualified entity (i.e. a non-resident tax-transparent vehicle) to be
taxed as part of the recipient’s income as soon as there is no longer a substantial risk of forfeiture.
The provision was introduced mainly as a response to perceived abuses by hedge funds. Under
previous legislation, the deferred compensation was taxed only in the year of receipt, and not in
the year it was earned. In addition to the immediate taxation, a penalty tax of 20% of the deferred
compensation has also become payable.
25 As part of the Troubled Assets Relief Program (TARP) enacted in the Emergency Economic
Stabilization Act of 2008, Congress tightened existing rules on the tax treatment of executive
compensation and golden parachute payments made by financial institutions that sell troubled
assets to the Treasury as part of the TARP. For institutions selling more than $300 million in
troubled assets, the existing $1 million limit on the deductibility of non-performance-based
compensation paid to the five most highly compensated employees (including the CEO) was
reduced to $500,000.
26 At the same time, a specific tax exemption for investments in start-ups was introduced.
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risk taking and at developing sustainable long-term remuneration policies
that take greater account of risk and facilitate the build-up of loss-absorbing
capital.27 In both countries stock-option plans were excluded from the tax,
provided their structure allowed sufficient links to medium-term corporate
performance. The tax was intended as a temporary measure paving the way
for better remuneration policies. In both governments’ view, in the longer
term remuneration practices should change as a result of corporate gover-
nance and regulatory reforms. Another purpose of the tax was to recover part
of the government subsidies paid to financial institutions and to prevent
government-financed banks from paying excessive remuneration while they
still needed to strengthen their capital base. A similar initiative has been
taken by Portugal, with the introduction of a 50 per cent ‘punitive tax’ on
bonuses paid in 2010 to managers and board directors of financial-sector
institutions.28
In 2010 Italy, where banks had not received government subsidies, intro-
duced a 10 per cent surcharge on stock options and variable bonuses paid to
financial-sector CEOs and directors. However, unlike the British and French
measures, the Italian levy, which applies to variable remuneration exceeding
three times fixed earnings, is permanent and also applies to stock options.29
The measures on the taxation of bonuses are part of the wider debate about
the possible remedies to the crisis and about who should bear the cost of past
bailouts or future bank failures. At the international level, both the IMF and
the European Commission have analysed two possible forms of financial
sector taxation: a financial activity tax applied to the value added of the
banking and financial sector, and a stability levy, a tax on some balance-sheet
items of banks and other financial institutions, possibly used to finance a
special anti-crisis fund. Several countries (including the USA,30 the UK, France,
Germany, and Sweden) have already introduced or are introducing stability
27 The one-off tax applies only to bonuses paid in 2009 in the case of France, and to bonuses paid
between 9 December 2009 and 5 April 2010 for the UK. In both countries the tax rate is 50% and
stock options are excluded from the tax base. In the UK the tax applies to bonuses exceeding
£25,000; in France the exempt amount is €27,500.
28 The tax applies if the bonus represents more than 25% of the annual salary and exceeds
€27,500.
29 Permanent tax measures affecting the variable salary components (or bonuses) in the
financial sector have been proposed in Luxembourg and Switzerland. In Luxembourg, a bill
submitted to parliament in May 2010 introduces restrictions on the deductibility of excessive
bonuses and golden handshakes in the banking sector and for multinationals. In Switzerland,
according to a proposal of the Federal Council presented in April 2010, bonuses that depend on
company profits paid by banks and insurance companies should no longer be treated as business
expenses for tax purposes, but as profit distribution and therefore should be taxable as corporate
profits.
30 In January 2010 the Obama administration introduced a plan for a 0.15% Financial Crisis
Responsibility Fee to be applied to businesses that had received TARP money. The fee would be
levied on the debts of financial firms with more than $50 billion in consolidated assets. See Office
of the Press Secretary (2010).
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levies. A penalty tax on bank bonuses is often considered an appropriate
supplementary measure. However, the temporary levies on bonuses have
proved to be of limited effectiveness: in most cases banks and financial in-
stitutions have preferred to bear all or part of the cost of the tax, leaving the
net amount of bonuses almost unaffected. In some cases, banks active at the
international level have chosen to spread the cost of the tax over all employ-
ees, not just those in the countries directly affected by the levy.
In conclusion, although analysis of the tax treatment of employee stock-
option plans, made taking into account both employee- and employer-level
taxes, does not confirm a general tax preference for stock-option plans over
cash remuneration, it is possible that a tax preference for stock-option plans
has emerged as a consequence of the favourable tax treatment at employee
level outweighing corporate tax considerations (or vice versa). In addition, in
some countries, notably the USA, the dramatic growth of stock-based remu-
neration plans may have been fostered by specific tax provisions, or by a
combination of tax and other rules. Overall, economic analysis suggests that
the key to eliminating improper incentives to risk-taking and improving the
neutrality of the tax system towards different forms of remuneration is to be
found in country-specificmeasures rather than in general policy guidelines for
the abolition of concessionary schemes.
Moreover, better to align the incentives of managers with those of the firm
and to generate positive synergies with the ongoing reforms of corporate
governance affecting remuneration policies, the tax treatment of stock-option
plans should aim to ensure tax neutrality only to plans that meet given
conditions (minimum vesting periods, prohibition of renegotiation in case
of falling stock prices, and so on). Those not meeting the conditions should be
taxed more heavily than ordinary salary.
4.2.2 Venture capital, private equity, hedge funds:
the ‘carried-interest’ controversy
In the second half of the 2000s, high investor demand and cheap loan finance
led many private equity funds to engage in aggressive highly leveraged corpo-
rate restructurings aimed at maximizing the fund’s short-term performance
but often paying little heed to the firms’ long-term prospects and resulting in
staff redundancies, wage reductions, and so on. The growth of private equity
transactions prompted ever greater risk-taking and highly leveraged deals.
Among the tax factors that might have reinforced this trend—including
the possibility to shift debt acquired to finance the deals onto target compa-
nies, which could deduct debt interest, or the tax-haven location of many
private equity and hedge funds, permitting zero taxation at fund level and
opportunities for evasion for high-wealth investors—the tax treatment of
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private equity and hedge fund managers’ remuneration attracted much
attention.
Managers of venture capital and private equity funds receive most of their
compensation in the form of ‘carried interest’—that is, as a share of the funds’
realized profits on its investments above a certain threshold.31 In several
countries, notably those with the most private equity funds (the UK and the
USA), the carried interest is taxed at preferential capital gains rates rather than
ordinary income-tax rates. In several cases the favourable tax treatment also
applies to managers of hedge funds, whose remuneration structure often
follows that of private equity funds. It has been argued that this tax treatment
is inappropriate, since it taxes as dividends or capital gains what is effectively
labour income. Since remuneration based on carried interest is likely to
encourage risk taking, the favourable tax treatment of carried interest may
have reinforced this effect. From a purely economic viewpoint, it is hard to
justify taxing risky compensation at lower rates than other compensation.
And, to the extent that carried interest can be qualified as service or labour
income, taxing it more favourably than other forms of compensation for risk-
taking activities can hardly be justified on grounds of efficiency and equity.32
On the contrary, taxing carried interest on a par with other, economically
equivalent forms of income would yield tax equity and efficiency at the same
time, and probably limit aggressive risk taking by private equity managers.
31 A venture capital or private equity fund manager is usually the general partner in a fund
partnership, and is typically rewarded with a 2% management fee and 20% share of the realized
profits on investments above a certain threshold. This 20% profit share is known as ‘carried
interest’, because the financial capital underpinning it is provided or ‘carried’ by investors, who
are limited partners, even though the management expertise, or ‘sweat equity’, which also
contributes to the profit, is provided by the fund manager.
32 Critics of the capital gains tax treatment of carried interest observe that there are two key
reasons to conclude that carried interest ought to be categorized as compensation for services, and
not as capital gains. First, private equity fund managers are not putting their own financial capital
at risk. A basic standard for establishing whether income constitutes capital gains would seem to be
whether the individual receiving the income had capital at stake. General partners of private equity
partnerships get the 20% in return for management services, not because they put 20% of the
money in the investment pot. Managers do sometimes make a small contribution of capital to the
fund. When this occurs, a small share of the carried interest could be considered a financial
investment. But the amount managers contribute is typically between 1% and 5%—not 20%—
and the carried interest income attributable to it can be separated out and treated differently under
the tax code. Second, private equity managers are performing a service, for which the carried
interest is clearly compensating them. Unlike limited partners, they are responsible for making
investment decisions and managing investments. The main argument that has been offered in
defence of treating carried interest as capital gains is that it entails a lot of risk. However, the
character of carried interest income should not depend on whether the compensation is
performance based. A wide range of performance-based compensation, including arrangements
in which service providers accept the entirety of the risk of the success or failure of the enterprise, is
effectively labour income and taxed as ordinary income for services. See the Statement of Peter R.
Orszag before the Committee on Finance of the United States Senate, The Taxation of Carried
Interest, 11 July 2007.
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In response to criticism of the excessive remuneration of private equity fund
managers, since 2007 several European countries have tightened the tax rules on
carried interest. In 2008 the UK repealed the tax advantage for carried interest,
whichhad been subject to a capital gains taxof 10 per cent, introducing a general
rate of 18 per cent for all capital gains, including carried interest. Germany
reduced the exempt percentage of carried interest from 50 to 40 per cent and
introduced more specifically targeted tax rules for venture capital and private
equity. In 2009 the Netherlands made many forms of deferred compensation,
including carried interest, subject toprogressive income tax, in the context of the
new rules on the ‘excessive remuneration schemes’ recalled above.
The debate on limiting the tax benefits for carried interest has also been
lively in the United States, particularly following the biggest buyout boom in
history in 2007, when firms including Blackstone Group LP and Och-Ziff
Capital Management Group raised their profiles through public stock listings.
Bills were presented in Congress, but no legislative change ensued. In February
2010 President Obama presented the 2011 budget proposal, containing provi-
sions to treat carried interest as ordinary income. This would boost the tax
rate, starting in 2011, to 39.6 per cent for most executives, from the current
15 per cent capital gains tax rate.
4.3 The development of structured finance
It is generally acknowledged that structured finance played a key role in the
financial crisis. The spread of asset-backed securities (ABSs) and credit deriva-
tives, designed to transfer and reduce (or increase) exposure to credit risk,
paved the way for the diffusion of toxic assets and the rise of a ‘shadow
banking system’ (Onado 2009).
Structured finance’s chief objective is the transfer of risk between financial
intermediaries and investors; it is based on securitization technique. There are
several definitions of securitization.33 Broadly speaking, the securitization
process transforms a financial relationship into a market transaction. More
specifically, an ‘asset securitization’ is composed of two stages (see Figure 4.1):
(1) transfer of a pool of assets from the original owner (the originator) to a
finite-lived, stand-alone special vehicle (special purpose entity (SPE), or special
purpose vehicle (SPV)); (2) issuance of securities by the SPV, in order to finance
the purchase of the assets.34
33 For a more detailed discussion of securitization and structured finance, see Scott (2004); BIS
(2005); Fabozzi and Khotari (2007); Lucas et al. (2007); and Duffie (2008).
34 This analysis does not consider the legal issues of securitization, i.e. the ‘true sale’ of the assets
and the ‘bankruptcy remoteness’ of the SPV; on these issues, see Johnsen and Eagan (2003) and
Fabozzi and Khotari (2007).
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The repayment of principal and interest of securities issued by the SPV is
ensured by the cash flow deriving from the assets sold by the originator. As
regards SPV structures, there are ‘pass-through SPVs’ and ‘pay-through SPVs’.
In the former, the SPV issues securities representing an undivided right to a
pro-rata share of the cash flows deriving from the originator assets; in the
latter, the SPV reconfigures the cash flows deriving from the originator’s
assets, in order to issue several classes of securities, each one with different
seniority and distinct risk-return profiles, ranging from AAA bonds to equity.
This permits investors seeking higher yields to have a wider choice on the
financial market. The securities issued by the SPV are generally called ABSs
(asset-backed securities).35
The SPV can be created not by an originator but by a financial intermediary,
who buys assets (loans or bonds) on the market and puts them in an SPV; in
this case, the securitization process creates securities called collateralized debt
obligations (CDOs36), issued in several tranches with different levels of risk;
the SPV is often referred to as a CDO (see Figure 4.2). A CDO usually has fewer
financial instruments as collateral than an ABS.37
asset 1 asset m
… debt … securities






Figure 4.1. The securitization process
35 There are several kinds of ABSs, depending on the type of asset sold by the originator. The
most important are mortgage-backed securities (MBSs), which can be divided between commercial
MBSs (CMBSs), secured by commercial and multifamily properties, and residential MBSs (RMBSs).
ABSs are backed also by home equity loans, car loans, consumer loans, and credit-card receivables.
Most mortgage-backed securities are issued by US government agencies, such as the Government
National Mortgage Association (Ginnie Mae), the Federal National Mortgage Association (Fannie
Mae), and the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation (Freddie Mac), which began mortgage
securitization in late 1970s. The first non-agency mortgage securitization was set up by Bank
America in 1977 (Johnsen and Eagan 2003).
36 CDOs collateralized by bonds are called CBOs; if loans are the collateral, we have CLOs. CDOs
can be backed by ABSs and MBSs too, usually by mezzanine tranches: in this case we have
structured finance CDOs (SF CDOs). CDOs collateralized by other CDOs are called CDOs squared.
37 For a fuller description of the differences between CDOs and ABSs, see Mason and Rosner
(2007).
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A synthetic CDO is a CDO whose underlying portfolio consists mainly not
of bonds but of credit default swaps (CDSs). CDSs are contracts intended to
protect a party (the protection buyer) against credit risk (see Figure 4.3).38
In this case, the SPV sells protection against credit risk via CDSs; at the same
time, by selling tranches of synthetic CDOs to investors, it buys protection
from them. In this way, synthetic CDOs create credit exposures for investors
(Adelson 2004; Remolona and Shim 2008). In other words, with synthetic
CDOs ‘credit risk exposure is transferred via CDS rather than the transfer of
ownership of corporate debt obligations’ (Lucas et al. 2007).
Compared with CDOs or ABSs, a synthetic CDO works differently (see
Figure 4.4). In fact, tranches may be funded or unfunded. The investor pays
an amount to subscribe a CDO’s funded tranche, in order to receive interests,
in addition to the premium linked to the CDSs’ risks. If the investor subscribes
an unfunded tranche, he subscribes the CDS contracts alone, without invest-
ing any capital, and receives a periodic premium; in other words, subscribing
an unfunded tranche is the equivalent of subscribing a CDS on the whole
underlying portfolio of the synthetic CDO. The unfunded tranche has the
highest grade (that is, it is the least risky) and may have to make a payment to
the synthetic CDO only in the event that the portfolio’s losses are not covered
by the funded tranches’ principal.
Obviously, ABSs, CDOs, and synthetic CDOs can be linked to get more







Figure 4.2. Collateralized debt obligations
Risky Assets Holder
(credit protection buyer) CDS 1 unfunded tranche (highest grade)
… funded tranche 1 (higher grade)
CDS n … Investors
(credit protection seller) funded tranche n (lower grade) (credit protection seller)
risk-free bond 1




Figure 4.3. Synthetic CDOs
38 More specifically, a CDS is a contract where one party buys credit protection on a reference
entity (bonds, loans, etc.) from the other party. The credit protection buyer pays a fee during the
term of the contract unless and until a credit event (bankruptcy, default, etc.) regarding the
reference entity occurs; in this case the credit protection seller must refund the buyer’s loss.
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mortgages in an SPV that issues MBSs; the MBSs become collateral of a CDO;
the risk of CDOs is insured by a synthetic CDO, and so on.
Summing up, there is structured finance when three main features are
present: (1) asset pooling; (2) issue of several classes of liabilities; (3) an SPV,
which breaks the link between the credit risk of the asset pool and the credit
risk of the original asset-holder (BIS 2005).
There are many reasons for using securitizations: for example, reducing
funding costs; diversifying funding sources; managing corporate risks; achiev-
ing off-balance-sheet financing; lowering the cost of capital; removing assets
from balance sheets; converting illiquid assets into marketable securities; for
CDOs, also increasing asset management activity and profitability (Adelson
2004; Fabozzi and Khotari 2007). These incentives can explain the rapid
growth of ABSs and CDOs and the demand of banks for new ‘raw materials’
(loans, also of subprime quality). According to some authors (Onado 2009;
Shin 2009), because of the advantages of securitizations, the growth of sub-
primemortgages is duemore to a loan supply excess from banks than to a loan
demand excess from subprime borrowers.
In the next section we point out the role of taxation in this escalation,
referring in particular to the US tax rules.
4.4 The role of taxation in the development of securitization
It has been pointed out that ‘tax planning in the securitization area is gener-
ally defensive rather than offensive. Transactions are undertaken for non-tax
reasons . . . ’ (Peaslee and Nirenberg 2001: 8). In other words, ‘the potential
[tax] abuses in the securitization area appear . . . to be a pimple on the back of
an elephant’ (Peaslee and Nirenberg 2001: 8). Nevertheless, even if there is no
direct tax advantage for the originator or the intermediary, a securitization
may have important indirect tax advantages.
4.4.1 The tax advantages of pooling
One of the main advantages of securitization is the possibility of pooling
assets with different maturity and income characteristics, in order to issue
premium on CDS Investors
(unfunded tranches)Risky Assets Holder payments in case portfolio's losses
reach the highest grade tranchepayments in case of default




cash for subscription of funded
tranchesBonds Issuers Investors
(funded tranches)interest on risk-free bonds periodic premium and interest
periodic premium
Figure 4.4. Cash flows of a synthetic CDO
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securities without any link to the collateralized asset. From a tax point of view,
the assets pooled bear interest and capital gains/losses that could not be taxed
at the same rate (for example, in the USA individuals are taxed at the ordinary
personal income-tax rates on interest income and at special—lower—rate on
capital gains/losses) and at the same time. So, reconfiguring assets also means
mixing interest and losses; in this way, the value of a capital loss is greater than
before securitization, because losses can be offset not only with capital gains
(saving an amount of capital gains tax), but also with interest (saving a higher
amount of taxes). In other words, securitization moves the taxable event from
individual positions (interest and gains/losses on single assets, received from
each asset) to the overall result of the pool of assets (the sum of interest, gains,
and losses from all assets), reducing the expected tax liability (Eddins 2009).
Moreover, the timing structure of flows received from securities issued by the
SPV produces a tax advantage in terms of tax deferral: offsetting between
interest and losses makes it possible to defer the taxation of the revenues
until the SPV distributes incomes on the securities it has issued (or the secu-
rities issued by the SPV are sold and capital gains realized).
To reach these goals, it is essential to avoid taxation of the SPV. In fact, only in
this case is it possible (1) to eliminate the tax otherwise due if assets remained in
the original asset-holder’s balance sheet, and (2) to shift the taxable event from
the taxation of principal and interest stemming from the original assets to the
taxation of flows received on the securities issued by the SPV.
4.4.2 The US tax treatment of special purpose vehicles
Taxation of an SPV can be avoided if the SPV is considered a conduit for US tax
purposes or a tax-free offshore entity.39 Conduit status for tax purposes is
achieved through the ‘check-the-box’ regulation or compliance with the re-
quirements established for some securitization vehicles: real estate mortgage
investment conduit (REMIC), for MBSs; financial asset securitization invest-
ment trust (FASIT), for ABSs.40
Initially, amendments to tax rules were designed to remove hurdles to the
growth of the securitization market development. The introduction of the
REMIC regime in 1986, of the FASIT regime in 1996, and of the check-the-box
regulation in 1997 allowed greater flexibility in designing securitizations and
made market development easier (Nomura 2006).41 According to Peaslee and
39 CDOs are usually issued by offshore SPVs, in order to escape taxation on corporate income
(Lucas et al. 2007).
40 These vehicles are not subject to federal corporate tax, but may be subject to state taxes.
41 REMICs were introduced by the Tax Reform Act of 1986. The FASIT regime, created under the
Small Business Job Protection Act of 1996 and effective from 1997, was subsequently repealed and
has not been enforceable since 1 January 2005.
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Nirenberg (2001: 6), ‘the advent of the REMIC rules has led to a blossoming of
financial engineering in the mortgage-backed securities area’.42 Under these
rules a SPV is considered a conduit for tax purposes, but, at the same time, in
order to preclude tax avoidance, limits are set on allowable securities, substi-
tution of mortgages, cash contributions to the SPV, and so on.
As housing prices began to decline in 2006 and it became clear that a
substantial portion of subprime residential adjustable-rate mortgages would
not survive the interest-rate resets, efforts were begun to renegotiate the terms
of these loans in order to avoid a surge of defaults. These efforts were ham-
pered by the fact that the mortgages had been packaged into REMICs or other
investment trusts, where the ability to modify mortgages is severely limited by
tax rules designed to ensure that the investment trust maintains a substan-
tially fixed pool of mortgages. Modifying mortgages held by a REMIC can
make the vehicle subject to severe penalties, including a 100 per cent prohib-
ited-transaction tax or even possible loss of REMIC or investment trust status
altogether.
As the financial crisis made it necessary to renegotiate mortgage loans, the
Internal Revenue Service (IRS) issued tax guidance43 providing a safe-harbour
list of permitted modifications in REMICs (Beeman 2009).
In some circumstances, avoiding the taxation of SPV may have contributed
to the growth of securitization. Because of the corporate taxation of bank
income, some banks may have an incentive to sell loans, and this incentive
is an increasing function of the corporate income-tax rate (Han et al. 2010).
At least other three tax issues may play an important role in securitization
(Peaslee and Nirenberg 2001; Johnsen and Eagan 2003). The first is the char-
acterization of the originator’s transfer of assets to the SPV, which for tax
purposes may be treated as either a sale of assets (the originator recognizes
gains or losses on the transfer) or a loan secured (without any transfer of tax
ownership). The second issue regards the tax characterization of securities
issued by the SPV as debt or equity; if an investor is treated as an equity
owner, he could be taxed on the SPV’s residual taxable income emerging in
any period (so-called phantom income44). The third issue concerns the tax
treatment of credit default swaps (CDSs), which we analyse below.
42 Owing to temporal mismatching between proceeds from assets held by the vehicle and
payments on the securities it issues, in some periods taxable income exceeding economic income
may have to be recognized. The excess—i.e. the difference between taxable income and economic
income—is called phantom income and constitutes ordinary taxable income for holders of equity
interests in a REMIC. For more information, see Lupo (2008).
43 IRS rev. proc. 2007–72, 2008–28, 2008–47. Initial attempts to relax these rules had beenmade
in 2004 and 2005.
44 See n. 42.
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4.4.3 The taxation of credit default swaps
The taxation of CDSs has enhanced the development of structured finance
through two mechanisms:
 a tax arbitrage, created by asymmetries and inconsistencies in the tax
treatment of the parties to the CDS contract (the credit protection ‘seller’
and the credit protection ‘buyer’), which in turn give rise to uncertainties
in the qualification of CDSs for tax purposes;
 a de facto exemption from withholding tax (or insurance excise tax) on
CDS premium received by non-residents, complementing the tax
arbitrage mechanism.
The tax treatment of CDSs in the USA is a matter of debate.45 The IRS issued
a notice requesting information frommarket participants and experts in 2004,
but did not issue specific tax guidance on the matter; meanwhile, recent
developments in the market of CDSs (standardization, significant upfront
payments, and so on) have increased the complexity of tax issues (see
Munro 2010: passim). Taxpayers can only rely on the opinion of tax experts,
who do not even agree on the approach to analysing the problem and propose
two different methods:
 the analogy approach, with CDSs held to be analogous to other
derivatives and the same tax treatment applied;
 the analytical approach, with the tax treatment of CDSs derived by
analysing single elements of the transactions—for example, the nature of
the reference obligation, the nature of parties, and so on.
The literature has paid little attention to the analytical approach, perhaps
because tax rules operate first ‘by characterizing a financial contract as a
type of financial instruments . . . and then by taking context into account’.46
By contrast, the analogy approach has been extensively pursued and ulti-
mately turned into four different theories: a CDS has been compared to a
guarantee, an insurance contract, a notional principal contract (NPC), or
a (put) option. This list has been considered exhaustive in the absence
of ‘similar breadth and depth of tax law for other potential analogies’ (that
is, letter of credit).47
45 ‘The current state of taxation of financial instruments is a mess . . .Credit default swaps
present a case study of much that is wrong with the extant method of rule promulgation . . . the
tax treatment of financial innovation continues to be regulated in . . . a haphazard “cubbyhole”
approach’ (Brunson 2008: 2, 10).
46 New York State Bar Association Tax Section (2005: 566).
47 New York State Bar Association Tax Section (2005: 567).
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Analyses have substantially rejected the first two hypotheses, underlining
significant and detailed differences between a CDS and a guarantee48 or an
insurance contract;49 in general, CDSs—like all financial derivatives—have
latu sensu a guarantee/insurance function, but this does not necessarily
imply that they are legally equated with those operations. Most opinions
(and recommendations) qualify CDSs as NPCs or options, but there is still
debate on which of these definitions is more appropriate. An NPC,50 like a
CDS, is a financial instrument providing payments at specified intervals, by
reference to a specified index on a notional amount and in exchange for
specified consideration or a promise to pay a similar amount; but the pay-
ments to the credit protection seller should be taxed/deducted over the life of
NPC, whereas the life of a CDS cannot be known in advance. An option, like a
CDS, is a continuing offer plus an agreement to leave the offer open, but the
condition for exercise is the occurrence of a default and not a mere decision of
the credit protection buyer.51
Following the general rules on the taxation of securities, the tax treatment
of an operation with CDSs depends on two major variables:
 characterization either as capital gains or losses, taxed or deductible at 15
per cent, or as ordinary income, taxable or deductible at 35 per cent for
corporations and at the ordinary income-tax rates for individuals;
 timing, with the different options of taxation on a cash basis, for mere
investors, an accrual (mark-to-market) basis, for dealers and traders in
securities.
Usually, the credit protection buyer is an investor and his credits are capital
assets, while the seller is a dealer or a trader. Accordingly, a loss incurred on a
credit by a non-corporate credit protection buyer will be treated as a capital
loss deductible at 15 per cent and netting will be allowed primarily within
‘15 per cent group’ gains;52 the refund the credit protection buyer receives
from the seller must be treated in the same way as the loss.
48 In CDSs the buyer is not required to hold the reference obligation, has no right of subrogation
in a case of default, and his payment obligation is always directed to the seller, not to a third party.
In addition, CDSs are traded, generic, and standard, while guarantees are usually non-traded and
specific.
49 In a CDS, (a) the credit event is not triggered by a ‘fortuitous event’; (b) the loss lacks the
classical elements of loss in insurance contracts (timing, quantification in advance, no insurable
interest if the buyer does not hold the reference obligation, absence of pooling and dilution of risk);
(c) sector regulations permit banks but not insurance companies to engage in CDSs.
50 The definition of NPC encompasses interest-rate swaps, basis swaps, currency swaps, interest-
rate caps, interest-rate floors, equity swaps, and equity index swaps; options are excluded.
51 For a discussion on replacing ‘the customary definition of options in terms of the “rights” of
the parties with a definition that better reflects the true economics of options’, see Brandes (2008:
esp. 80 ff.).
52 Further netting is allowed within ‘25 per cent group’ and, finally, ‘28 per cent group’ capital
gains.
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As for timing, the credit protection buyer will always account for the loss
only when it is realized, on a cash basis, whereas the seller is a mark-to-market
operator and is taxed on an accrual basis, including the gains or losses in its
income subject to corporate income tax.
If we qualify CDSs as guarantees or insurances, the buyer will treat the
refund of loss received from the seller as a capital income (15 per cent); the
seller will treat all the payments made or received as ordinary income or
expense (35 per cent). As for timing rules, while the buyer has only the
option for realization, the loss of the seller may be treated through a bad-
debt deduction (guarantee) or an estimated loss (insurance).
If CDSs are equated with NPCs, the tax characterization of payments made
and received by the buyer and the seller are in principle the same as in
guarantees or insurance contracts. As regards timing, both the buyer and the
seller must account for the payment of premiums on an accrual basis, but the
seller can also mark CDSs to market.
CDS options are deemed to be a capital asset under section 1234 of the US
tax code, so all payments made and received by the buyer are not ordinary
income or expense, but capital losses/gains, deductible or taxable at the
expiration of the option. The seller has no capital gain or loss but only
ordinary income or expense and marks CDSs to market.
Summing up, the tax treatment of operations involving CDSs is character-
ized by asymmetries and inconsistencies, because of the differences between
buyers and sellers in respect of the tax characterization of items and the timing
of taxation. The different views on the nature of CDSs do not eliminate these
problems: for example, if a CDS is qualified as a NPC for hedging, the same tax
treatment can be applied to buyers and sellers, but an asymmetry remains for
the buyer between the loss and the refund. Including CDSs in the general tax
treatment of securities, the qualification by analogy always creates room for
tax arbitrage.
Eddins (2009) has developed a theory (‘tax arbitrage feedback theory’) about
how these tax arbitrage opportunities have been exploited. Simplifying the
situation described above, he identifies three different players: ‘traditional buy
and hold investor’, with interest taxed as ordinary income and losses deduct-
ible as capital items at a different rate; ‘mark-to-market business trader’, with
interest and losses accounted for as ordinary income, at the same rate; and
‘non-taxable investor’ (such as pension funds).
The asymmetric tax treatment of interest versus losses creates a tax penalty
for traditional investors. Since this tax asymmetry does not exist for mark-to-
market operators (and non-taxable investors), the premium paid for CDSs
includes this tax penalty and the mark-to-market operator is able to extract
and retain this tax penalty, transforming a tax loss deductible at 15 per cent
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into a loss deductible at 35 per cent. The ‘Credit Default Swap Tax Arbitrage
Equation’ is the following:
TaxPenalty ¼ b ð1 RÞ  ðTInterest  TLossesÞ
1 TInterest
where b is the annualized bankruptcy risk, R the expected recovery rate, and
TInterest and TLosses are, respectively, the tax rates on interest and losses of a
traditional investor. The arbitrage profit depends primarily on the difference
between the tax rates, but it also increases as  andR increase: thehigher the risk,
the greater the profit. Therefore, the ‘tax penalty’ represents the arbitrage profit
of themark-to-market operator. ‘And because this arbitrage is tax-based, instead
of price-based, it cannot be eliminated by price moves’ (Eddins 2009: 19).
The profit opportunity has a feedback: to exploit it operators need CDSs,
and CDSs need low-grade credit. The consequence is amultiple boost affecting
different markets: loans increase to supply the raw materials of the chain,
CDSs increase to extract risk from loans in exchange for protection, and CDOs
increase to buy from investors the protection sold through CDSs. As Eddins
(2009: 19) observes:
this particular tax arbitrage does not exist for high-grade credit because the odds of
default are so low that there is hardly any tax benefit to arbitrage. Therefore, the
creation of low-grade credit was a requirement to fuel the arbitrage. The extreme
profitability of these businesses to Wall Street provided powerful feedback to induce
the creation of lots of low-grade debt. Unrecognized was the fact that increasing the
quantity of low-grade credit within the financial system also increased the systematic
risk of default. This set off a chain reaction that spread far and wide.
There only remains a final point to analyse, one not mentioned by Eddins:
as the arbitrage profit is extracted by the mark-to-market operator via the CDS
premium (which is equal to the tax penalty), can the taxation of the CDS
premium compensate for (or at least reduce) the arbitrage profit?
As noted by the IRS (2004), taxpayers are also concerned about the treat-
ment of payments from a credit protection buyer in the USA to a non-resident
credit protection seller. The question is whether these payments are subject to
taxation in the USA, either through a withholding tax or through an excise tax
on insurance premiums.53
Let us recall that non-residents are taxed on US source income only if it is
effectively related to a US trade or business (that is, a regular, continuous, and
considerable business); unrelated income is taxed if particular conditions obtain.54
53 For a deeper discussion, see Peter (2006).
54 The income is US source and falls under section 861 or was allocated by regulations to sources
within the USA or is allocated by comparison and analogy; income must be fixed, determinable,
annual, or periodic.
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If we consider the four possible characterizations of CDSs, we find that these
instruments are subject to virtually no form of taxation in the USA when the
recipient is a non-resident.
We have already shown why CDSs appear quite different from guarantees.
But, even if they were comparable, this would not lead to the taxation of
payments to a non-resident: a guarantee is not necessarily subject to with-
holding tax, because it is not necessarily related to a US trade or business (and
this is even more likely for a CDS); the IRS does not cite guarantees among US
source items, and it is an open question whether the proceeds of a guarantee
can be equated with payment of interest.
Even if the definition of insurance does not appear to apply to CDSs, let us
consider CDSs as insurance contracts: if the seller is not an insurance firm,
then it is not engaged in an insurance activity; consequently, the US source
premium is not US source income and is not subject to withholding tax. In
respect of the excise tax of 4 per cent on the premiums paid by a US insured
party to a non-US insurer and levied when the risk is located wholly or partly
within the USA, CDS contracts may provide that the buyer be indemnified
against the risk of paying excise tax via a premium increase. In this case, again,
non-residents are not taxed.
Wehave shown thatCDSs appear tofit the definitionofNPCs; as income from
NPCs is not mentioned in the sourcing rules of the US tax code and the IRS
defines the source of such income on the basis of the taxpayer’s residence, the
income is not taxable in the USA if the credit protection seller is a foreigner.
Again, the CDS payments received by the seller are tax exempt in the USA.
CDSs could be considered as options. Again, income from option premiums
is not mentioned in the sourcing rule; the IRS has not ruled on it, so no
withholding tax is levied. Consequently, such income is US source income
non-taxable in the USA.
To conclude: it is an openquestionwhether aCDS guarantee should be subject
to withholding tax. It is possible that a CDS insurance holder could also be
exempted de facto from the excise tax. A CDS–NPC holder can escape the with-
holding tax. Finally, it is almost certain thatno tax is leviedonpremiums received
from a CDS option. The tax arbitrage described above is accompanied by a de
facto exemption of CDS premiums received by non-residents.
4.5 Conclusions
Although taxation was not the paramount factor in the 2008 financial crisis, a
number of features of national tax systems—and, in some cases, the interac-
tion among them—may have contributed to reinforce the economic factors
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that triggered the financial crisis. In several instances, tax provisions created
opportunities for tax arbitrage and extra-profits for financial intermediaries.
In this chapter we have examined two specific cases, regarding the tax
treatment of performance-based remuneration of managers and venture capi-
tal fees and the tax provisions applying to the securitization and CDSmarkets.
The dramatic rise in bonuses, stock-option plans, and other performance-
based remuneration forms in the financial sector has been singled out as
playing an important role in triggering the crisis because it tends to overem-
phasize short-term profitability compared with longer-term goals. As the
Financial Stability Forum (now Financial Stability Board) has pointed out,
this feature is particularly unwelcome in the financial sector, where higher
returns may quite easily (more easily than in other sectors) be pursued in a
trade-off against higher risks.
The analysis of the tax treatment of stock-option plans, made taking into
account both employee- and employer-level taxes, does not confirm a general
tax preference for these plans over cash remuneration. However, in some
countries, notably the USA, the dramatic growth of stock-based remuneration
plans may have been fostered by specific tax provisions, or by a combination
of tax and other rules. In other cases, it is possible that a tax preference
emerged as a consequence of a unilateral perspective, with the favourable
tax treatment at employee level prevailing over corporate tax considerations.
Overall, economic analysis suggests that the key to eliminating improper
incentives to risk-taking and improving the neutrality of the tax system
towards different forms of remuneration is to be found in country-specific
measures rather than in general policy guidelines for the abolition of conces-
sionary schemes. Moreover, better to align the incentives of managers with
those of the firm and to generate positive synergies with the ongoing reforms
of corporate governance affecting remuneration policies, the tax treatment of
stock-option plans should aim to ensure tax neutrality only to plans that meet
given conditions (minimum vesting periods, prohibition of renegotiation in
case of falling stock prices, and so on).
In a vein similar to that of stock-option plans and other performance-based
remuneration, also the preferential tax treatment provided by many countries
for ‘carried interest’ earned by managers of venture capital and private equity
funds (taxation at preferential capital gains rates rather than at ordinary income-
tax rates) might have contributed to the explosive growth of aggressive private
equity transactions through highly leveraged corporate restructurings aimed at
maximizing the fund’s short-term performance but often paying little heed to
the firms’ long-term prospects and resulting in staff redundancies, wage reduc-
tions, and so on. The favourable tax treatment of ‘carried interest’ reinforced
other tax factors thatmighthave favoured this trend, including the possibility to
shift debt acquired to finance the deals onto target companies, which could
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deduct debt interest, or the tax haven location ofmanyprivate equity andhedge
funds, permitting zero taxation at fund level and opportunities for evasion for
high-wealth investors.
The securitization process, allowing the risks assumed by a company to be
passed on and diluted in themarket, played a fundamental role in shifting risk
from financial firms to the whole system and thus in making the crisis sys-
temic. Taxation also appears to have been a factor in securitization. Although
the intermediaries involved did not seek preferential tax treatment or pursue
tax-avoidance schemes, securitization created opportunities for tax arbitrage
and reduction of the overall tax wedge paid by the originator, the special
purpose vehicle (SPV) and the final investor. The SPV must be a tax-free
vehicle (either a conduit recognized as exempt under domestic tax law or a
foreign entity located in a jurisdiction with no direct taxation). In this case, by
combining different incomes (interest, capital gains and losses), the SPV
makes it possible to pool and offset incomes that are ordinarily taxed at
different rates (hence permitting preferential deductibility of capital losses);
furthermore, it allows the taxation of the revenues generated by the underly-
ing original assets to be deferred until the SPV distributes incomes on the
securities it has issued (or the securities issued by the SPV are sold and capital
gains are realized).
The expansion of credit default swaps has greatly assisted the securitization
process, creating a sort of insurance on the credit risk of the underlying assets.
Their tax treatment has also spurred the growth of securitization: in fact, it
created further possibilities of tax arbitrage and provided for a de facto exemp-
tion from withholding tax on CDS premium received by non-residents.
In conclusion, taxation has not been the main component of the securiti-
zation process, but it certainly has not created disincentives; indeed, it has
created opportunities for tax arbitrage and extra-profits for financial interme-
diaries able to internalize these opportunities.
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5
Can Tax Policy Help to Prevent
Financial Crisis?
Thomas Hemmelgarn and Gaetan Nicodeme
5.1 Introduction
Following a year of progressive worsening of the subprime crisis, the collapse of
Lehman Brothers on 15 September 2008 marked a halt in interbank lending
and plunged the world into a severe economic and financial crisis. Govern-
ments were immediately forced to respond to avoid the collapse of the whole
financial system and to alleviate the economic consequences of the crisis on
the real economy. This response took the form of specific measures aimed
at banks and measures to stimulate the economy. In the European Union,
between October 2008 and May 2010, Member States individually committed
to a total of about€3 trillion (that is about 26per cent of their combinedGDP) in
various measures to support the financial sector (for example, recapitalization
offinancial institutions, guarantees onbank liabilities, relief of impaired assets),
albeit the effective use is about €1.5 trillion, including measures outside
schemes (European Commission 2010a; Stolz and Wedow 2010). This aid was
framed by several communications adopted by the European Commission
between October 2008 and July 2009, setting out how it would apply state aid
rules to government measures aimed at supporting the banking sector in the
context of the economic crisis. In the US, the Emergency Economic Stabiliza-
tion Act of October 2008 launched the Trouble Asset Relief Program (TARP),
which provided the US Treasury with $700 billion to purchase ‘trouble assets’.
This chapter was written by Mr Gaetan Nicodeme and Mr Thomas Hemmelgarn, Directorate-
General for Taxation and Customs Union # European Union, 2011. The views expressed in this
chapter are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the official position of the European
Commission.
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In terms of stimuluspackages, the EuropeanCommission issued the European
Economic Recovery Plan for Growths and Jobs (EERP) in November 2008,
which provides a mix of tax and expenditure measures to support the real
economy and to boost confidence of €200 billion (that is, 1.5 per cent of EU
GDP). For 2009 and 2010, the expansionary stimulusmeasures amounted to 1.5
per cent and 1.4 per cent of EU27 GDP respectively (European Commission
2010b: 20). Consequent to these policy measures and to the economic down-
turn, EU27 average public deficits increased from0.9 per cent of GDP in 2007 to
a 6.4per cent in 2010, and public debt jumped from below 60 per cent of GDP
in 2007 to above 80 per cent for the years to come (European Commission
2010c: 5).
In addition, there is a wide perception that the financial sector bears a major
responsibility for the occurrence and the extent of the crisis. In particular, the
financial sector may be too large and take too much risk because of actual or
expected state support (resulting in moral hazard), information asymmetries,
and remuneration structures, which, together with macroeconomic develop-
ments, contributed to the recent crisis (FSA 2009; High Level Group on
Financial Supervision in the EU 2009; Hemmelgarn and Nicodeme 2010;
Ceriani et al. in Chapter 4 this volume).
Finally, the financial sector has been relatively profitable in the 1990s and
2000s, and there is a desire to ensure that the financial sector makes a fair and
substantial contribution to public finances. Taken together, these elements
constitute rationales for opening a debate as whether additional or increased
taxes on the financial sector could help with consolidation and increased
efficiency and stability of financial markets.
In October 2009, the European Council agreed that a coordinated strategy
for existing stimulus policies was needed for when the recovery was secured
and invited the Commission to examine innovative financing at a global
level. The Staff Working Document (European Commission 2010d) assesses
the potential of innovative financing—newways of raising public revenues, or
of complementing them by leveraging private finance, as well as new ap-
proaches to already existing fiscal instruments—at a global level to raise
revenues for addressing the consolidation, development aid, and climate-
change mitigation challenges in order to narrow down the range of options
to the most promising ones. The analysis suggests that some instruments,
notably certain forms of contributions from the financial system, can bring a
‘significant “double dividend” of both raising revenues and improvingmarket
efficiency and stability could be reaped. In particular, schemes aimed at pric-
ing leverage and risk-taking in the financial sector could raise substantial
revenues while limiting undesirable behaviour by financial institutions and
could be administered at a reasonable cost’ (European Commission 2010d: 5).
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In March 2010, the European Parliament adopted a resolution requesting
the Commission to carry out an assessment on a financial transaction tax. The
Parliament also recommended the use of innovative finance instruments in
the context of a report on the impact of the financial and economic crisis on
developing countries.
In parallel, an increasing international debate has started at the G20 level,
where leaders asked for the IMF to ‘prepare a report for our next meeting [June
2010] with regard to the range of options countries have adopted or are
considering as to how the financial sector could make a fair and substantial
contribution toward paying for any burden associated with government inter-
ventions to repair the banking system’. The IMF (2010a) proposes two possible
forms of contribution from the financial sector, serving distinct purposes: (1) a
‘financial stability contribution’ (FSC) linked to a credible and effective reso-
lution mechanism,1 and (2) a ‘financial activities tax’ (FAT) levied on the sum
of the profits and remuneration of financial institutions if additional revenues
are needed for consolidation purposes.
Finally, the European Commission (2010e, 2010f) put forward a twofold
approach in October 2010. The Commission supports further exploration and
development of a financial transaction tax (FTT) at the global level and will
promote an agreement with the most relevant partners. At EU level, the
Commission sees potential in a financial activities tax (FAT), as, if carefully
designed and implemented, an EU FAT could generate significant revenues
and help to ensure greater stability of financial markets, without posing undue
risk to EU competitiveness.
In the light of these debates, this chapter assesses two potential instruments
to raise additional tax revenues from the financial sector and potentially to
correct for its externalities.2 It is organized as follows. The second section
sheds some light on the current tax treatment of the financial sector. The
third and fourth sections respectively assess the advantages and drawbacks of
a financial transaction tax and a financial activities tax, including the issues
raised by a possible introduction at the EU level only if no agreement is
reached at G20 level. The analysis shows that both instruments could be
candidates for a tax on the financial sector (FAT) or on financial markets
1 With regard to this, the Commission has proposed the establishment of national resolution
funds which would be financed by bank levies (COM(2010) 254 final). This topic is not covered in
this chapter. Other instruments have also been discussed, decided, or already enacted in several
Member States, but will not be discussed here. They include bonus taxes, surcharges to the CIT for
the financial sector, currency transaction levies (CTL), and so on.
2 Note that this issue as to whether and how taxes may have fuelled a speculative bubble is
not part of this analysis. It is reviewed by Hemmelgarn, Nicodeme, and Zangari in Chapter 3,
this volume, in the context of the housing bubble. More generally, models show that higher
capital gains taxes may fuel a bubble, because speculative assets are subject to an arbitrage
condition with other assets, and that a higher tax forces a higher required return (Kunieda
2011).
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(FTT). An important difference between the two instruments is that the FAT
seeks to target the value added by the financial sector, while the FTT is directed
at the transactions executed on financial markets.
5.2 Taxation of the financial sector
The debate on the fair contribution of the financial sector to fiscal consolida-
tion is closely related to the issue of whether the existing tax systems result in
over- or under-taxation with respect to the non-financial sector. For Europe,
the main taxes to be considered are the corporate income tax (CIT) and VAT.
5.2.1 Corporate income taxation
The financial sector accounted for a substantial share of corporate tax reven-
ues before the crisis. The EU27 GDP-weighted average share of the contri-
bution by the financial sector to total corporate tax collection was around
20 per cent in both 2006 and 2007 (European Commission 2010f). It
decreased to 17 per cent in 2008 as a result of the crisis, and this share will
most probably decrease further in the coming years due to the fact that the
accumulated losses during the crisis will reduce future tax payments via loss
carry-forward.3 The values for the EU27 are similar to those for many non-EU
G20 countries, as collected by the IMF for its report to the G20. For example,
between 2006 and 2008, the share of the financial sector in total corporate tax
collection was around 18 per cent for the United States, 23.5 per cent for
Canada, and around 15 per cent in Brazil and Australia.4
Table 5.1. Share of the financial sector in total value added
Year USA Euro area EU27 UK Germany
1980 4.91 4.74 – – –
1990 5.86 5.52 – 6.1 –
1995 6.64 5.46 – 5.8 4.4
2000 7.54 4.99 4.7 5.1 3.9
2005 7.97 6.32 5.2 7.0 4.3
2006 8.05 6.16 5.3 7.6 4.1
2007 7.90 5.89 5.3 8.2 3.6
2008 8.02 5.84 5.3 9.3 3.4
2009 8.08 – 5.8 – –
Sources: USA and euro area: BIS (2010: 77); for EU, UK, and Germany: Eurostat Annual Sectoral Account.
3 The issue of the tax risks involving bank losses is discussed in Chapter 8.
4 It should be stressed, however, that the CIT share concerns incorporated companies only and is,
therefore, not directly comparable to the shares in value added, which also include unincorporated
companies.
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The 20 per cent share in the total CIT collected in EU27 is much larger than
the share of the sector in total employment, which is around 3 per cent and
total value added, which was slightly above 5 per cent at the outset of the crisis
(see Table 5.1). The high share in corporate taxes can, however, be explained
by a profitability that was relatively high.
There is indeed some evidence that the financial sector has been more
profitable than the non-financial sector in the 1990s and 2000s.5 The question
arises as whether the high profitability of the sector could result in economic
rents that could be captured either by managers in the form of higher remu-
neration or by shareholders in the form of higher returns. For example, the
financial sector could be different from other sectors because of the perception
of an implicit or explicit public protection.
Current available data are unfortunately scarce and patchy. Table 5.2 seems
to indicate that return on equity in the financial sector has broadly been at par
with that of the non-financial sector. However, these median values hide large
variations across institutions, years, and countries. For example, the BIS (2010)
reveals that German financial companies have posted higher return on their
stocks than German non-financial companies since the 1970s up to the
financial crisis, but the same cannot be said, for example, for UK companies
except in the 1990s (see Table 5.3).6 Turning to remuneration, there is some
piecemeal evidence that would suggest that remuneration in the financial
Table 5.2. Return on equity in BIS reporting countries
Entities 1995–2009 1995–2000 2001–7 2008–9
Banks 12.2 13.3 12.8 3.2
Non-bank financials 11.2 12.3 11.4 5.4
Non-financials 11.7 10.9 12.8 9.8
Note: Return on equity is defined as net income over total shareholder funds. Median values across years and institutions.
Source: BIS (2010: 75).
Table 5.3. Relative return of financial stocks
Country 1970s 1980s 1990s 2000s
Canada 2.25 –0.39 2.48 5.70
Germany 1.82 3.29 4.10 –6.65
UK –1.10 –4.03 2.66 –6.34
Japan –7.17 2.80 –5.06 –0.25
USA –1.58 –1.33 4.42 0.07
Note: Average return on financial stocks minus that on non-financial stocks, annualized in %.
Source: BIS (2010: 76).
5 See, e.g., Devereux, Griffith, and Klemm (2004), who analyse the corporate tax revenue
structure for the UK and find a higher profitability of the financial sector.
6 Higher performance of stocks also partly reflects higher risk (measured by volatility).
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sector is or has been higher than in other sectors. Philippon and Reshef (2009)
found that, starting in the 1990s, 30–50 per cent of the wage differential
between the financial and non-financial sectors in the USA is due to rents.
In conclusion, it is not clear whether financial sector was under- or over-
taxed under the CIT before the crisis.
5.2.2 Value-added taxation
If statutory provisions of corporate tax systems do not seem to differentiate
between the financial sector and the non-financial activities in the EU, the
same is not true for value-added taxation (VAT). Since the adoption of the Sixth
VAT Directive in 1977, the EU’s common value-added tax system has generally
exempted mainstream financial services including insurances and investment
funds. Article 135(1) of the VAT Directive provides a compulsory exemption
from VAT for most financial and insurance services, but, at the same time, the
Directive allows Member States to grant taxable persons the option of taxing
financial services, to the extent that this is technically possible. Around two-
thirds of allfinancial services aremarginbased,whichmakes the implementation
of the invoice-credit VAT system very difficult in this respect (Kerrigan 2010).
The question of whether applying VAT to the financial sector would raise
additional tax revenues and—consequently—whether the exemption consti-
tutes an under-taxation case for the financial sector is an unsettled empirical
question. Indeed, the exemption means that, as the financial sector does not
charge VAT on most of its output, it cannot deduct the VAT charged on its
inputs. This is known as the ‘irrecoverable VAT problem’. Based on case
studies, PricewaterhouseCoopers (2006) found that VAT recovery rates in the
financial sector varied from 0 per cent to 74 per cent. The variations in
recovery rates could be explained by differences in the way in which the
Member States interpret the scope of the exemption and the option to tax.7
The VAT exemption for the financial sector has the probable consequence
that, assuming that some input VAT is irrecoverable and passed through into
prices, the price of financial services for business users is higher than it would be
under a VAT system with deductible output VAT, while the price of financial
services for final (individual) users is lower than it would be if VATwere applied.
For the latter, this alsomeans that sales from the financial sector are under-taxed
compared to sales from non-financial sectors. Finally, the exemption also
7 The data are not available at the sector level. The accounting practice for non-recoverable VAT
is to subsume it in the general cost structure of an enterprise, and, no matter how significant the
figures are, there is no practice or requirement that would give rise to their appearance in published
reports. In comparison with income taxes, where reporting standards mandate detailed rules for
the computation and disclosure of CIT liabilities, there are no equivalent obligations for VAT
liabilities.
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distorts prices of exported financial services. Under a VAT system, exports are
zero rated. Because of the irrecoverable VAT, assuming a similar costs structure,
the exemption system possibly puts the export of services of the exempted
financial sector at a competitive disadvantage compared to foreign competitors
when the VAT rate that applies to input is higher than the one applied in the
foreign country.
Two questions arise from this exemption. The first one is how the profits of
the financial sector would compare under a VAT system and the current
exemption. The second question is whether the exemption leads to VAT losses
for tax authorities. Both are empirical questions. There have been a few
attempts in the economic literature to quantify the VAT losses deriving from
exemption for financial services, and most studies point to a net revenue loss
(Genser and Winker 1997; Huizinga 2002; De la Feria and Lockwood 2009).
This advantage is estimated to be around 0.15 per cent of GDP (Huizinga
2002), which for the EU27 translates into close to €20 billion.
In some countries, financial institutions are subject to specific tax measures
designed to compensate for the VAT exemption. For example, New Zealand
applies VAT to general insurance (but not to life insurance, creditor protection
policies, and other financial intermediation services), Singapore taxes agency
services, Australia includes financial agency services and non-life insurance
and provides input credits for financial services, and Israel and Quebec apply
the addition method (Poddar 2003). France and Denmark also apply compen-
sation taxes that are close to the financial activities tax described further.
In conclusion, even though the CIT does not seem to tax the financial sector
more lightly than other sectors, the VAT exemption of financial servicesmight
lead to a favourable tax treatment of the sector despite the fact that input VAT
is not deductible for the sector.
5.3 The financial activities tax
Within itsG20 report,which focuses onmaking thefinancial sector pay for public
interventions, the IMF is proposing introducing a financial activities tax (FAT).
In its simplest form, a FAT is a tax targeted to the financial sector and whose
base is the sum of profit and remunerations in the sector. One rationale
behind this base is the fact that, should a rent occur, it will go either to
shareholders in terms of higher profit (dividends or capital gains) or to workers
(via higher remuneration). One additional feature of the FAT is that, in
accounting terms, the sum of profit and remunerations represents the value
added of the sector. With adequate design, a FAT could therefore mimic ex-
post the value added that is difficult to assess on a transaction basis and could
then be a proxy for VAT.
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Besides compensating for VAT exemption and tackling possible rents in the
sector, a FAT could also try to address two additional policy objectives. First,
because it represents an additional burden on the sector, which could translate
into prices of financial services, a FAT could decrease the size of the financial
sector. Second, a FAT could try to reduce risk taking by targeting the profit
generated by risky activities. This relies, however, on the assumption that risk
is correlated with high return. In that case, taking the return to factors above
their ‘normal’ level would achieve the objective.
5.3.1 FAT alternative forms
A FAT can take several possible forms, depending on how profit and remu-
nerations are defined: the addition-method FAT, the rent-taxing FAT, and the
risk-taxing FAT.
In the addition-method FAT, profit can be defined in two possible ways. It
can first be defined in the same way as for CIT purpose. Profit is generally
computed by taking income from sales and deducting several items: material
costs, remunerations, provisions for various risks, interest paid (for most
countries), depreciation, losses carried forward (or backward), and so on, and
by including the net revenue from exceptional operations. Importantly, this
definition of the tax base can include specific tax provisions that have the
purpose of removing or alleviating the tax bias towards debt. This is, for
example, the case of an allowance for corporate equity (ACE) or a comprehen-
sive business income tax (CBIT). Many of these rules differ across countries.
This is the case, for example, for tax provisions for depreciation and rules for
carrying losses. Therefore, unless a common tax base for corporate taxation is
chosen, such a definition will lead to differences across countries.
Such tax can be a source-based tax such as a conventional CIT with a (full or
partial) exemption system for foreign-source income or can be a residence-
based tax such as a conventional CIT with a (direct or indirect) foreign
tax credit system. Both definitions of the base do tax the full return to equity.
A source-based tax can also tax the full return to capital by disallowing interest
deductibility. This is the case of a CBIT. Alternatively, it can tax rents only by
allowing for the deductibility of a (notional or actual) amount for the remu-
neration of equity. This is the case of an ACE.
The profit part of the base can also be defined in cash-flow terms. Cash-flow
taxes have been subject to a relatively rich amount of economic literature,
starting with the recommendations of the Meade Committee (1978) in the
UK.8 In its simplest definition, a cash-flow tax at the corporate level would tax
8 See, e.g., Grubert and Newlon (1997); Bond and Devereux (1995, 2003); Bradford (2000, 2004);
OECD (2007b); or Auerbach and Devereux (2010).
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corporations on the difference between the sales of goods and services and the
purchases of goods and services from other businesses and from employees.
This makes two major differences compared to a classical CIT: (1) assets are
immediately expensed rather than capitalized and depreciated; (2) sales and
purchases are accounted for on a cash basis and not on an accrual basis
(Bradford 1986). A cash-flow tax would include all real (R) transactions.
Because of the nature of the activities of the financial sector, it shall also
include all financial (F) transactions (for example, changes in financial re-
serves, interest paid or received, amounts borrowed or loaned). This is the
so-called (R+F) base (that is, real plus financial).9 There are three main ways of
designing an (R+F) cash-flow tax for the profit part (see Devereux and Srensen
2006).
 A first option is to design a source-based cash-flow tax. This tax would be
levied on the net cash-flow from domestic production. The base would,
therefore, be the cash-flow from domestic and foreign sales minus the
cash disbursements on purchasing domestic and imported inputs
(including capital goods) and minus labour costs.
 A second option is to design a full destination-based cash-flow tax. This
tax would be levied only on domestic sales (from domestic or foreign
companies). The base would therefore be the cash-flow from domestic
sales minus the cash disbursements on the inputs (material, capital, and
labour) used for the production of the goods and services sold
domestically.
 A third option is to design a VAT-type destination-based cash-flow tax.
This tax would be levied on sales to domestic customers (from domestic
and foreign companies). The base would be the cash-flow from domestic
sales minus the cash disbursements from domestic purchases and minus
labour costs. Also like VAT, export sales would not be taxed, but all
imports would be. The base is equivalent to the VAT base minus labour
costs. Although all types of addition-method FAT using a cash-flow
definition of profit would come close tomimicking VAT, this option is the
one that comes the closest to this objective.
Remuneration is defined in its broad sense. It includes wages and salaries,
bonuses and other performance-related pay schemes, as well as non-financial
advantages (for example, company cars, company phones, and so on).
The rent-taxing FAT aims at taxing the rents accruing to the financial sector
while leaving untaxed the normal return to capital and labour factors. Such
9 Note that a positive (negative) net result implies a cash flow to (or from) stockholders. There is,
therefore, an equivalence between the ‘R+F’ base and the ‘S’ base, which consists of net payments
to stockholders (dividends or sales and purchases of shares) (see Bradford 1986: 120 ff.).
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version of the FAT could be designed in the following way: for the profit part,
the normal return to capital can be exempted by one of these two designs:
 using a definition of the base similar to the one used for the CIT and
allowing for an ACE;
 using a definition of the base in terms of cash-flow. All three designs
discussed above (residence based, full destination base, VAT-type
destination based) would have the requested property. This is because any
cash-flow tax allows for an immediate expense of investment. As a
consequence, the present value of future cash-flows from a marginal
investment equals the initial expense of the investment, and themarginal
effective tax rate is zero. A cash-flow tax is, therefore, non-distortionary
and falls only on pure rents.
As for the wage part, the normal return to labour can be exempted by providing
an allowance for ‘normal’ remuneration. Such ‘normal’ remuneration per
employee could, for instance, be defined as the average remuneration in other
non-financial sectors, possibly correcting for the typeof functions. This versionof
the FAT is the one that best achieves the objective of targeting rents in the sector.
The risk-taxing FAT takes into account an allowance that is supposed to take
into account the risk premium that will be paid to factors of productions. It
can be given to shareholders and/or to workers. In both cases, the base would
be identical to the rent-taxing FAT, except for this additional allowance. This
is the version of the FAT that could best achieve a reduction in excessive risk.
5.3.2 The economics of FAT
As it targets the sum of profit and remuneration of a financial institution, the
FAT is not transaction based but relies instead on items of the financial
statements of financial institutions. The FAT’s effects on financial activities
may take several aspects.
First, in terms of its effects onmarket structures and risk taking, the addition-
method FAT would not directly alter the market structures where financial
institutions are active, since it taxes profits independently from how they
are earned. In this sense, it does not discriminate between different products
nor depend on the level of turnover. For all versions of the FAT, however, by
making financial services more expensive, it would decrease the size of the
financial sector. The rent-taxing FAT would not be distortive. If the financial
sector earns economic rents and if the policy goal is to reduce those in order to
correct for the potentially distorted size and behaviour of the financial sector,
this tax offers a solution. The risk-taxing FAT attempts to tax excess return that
is due to unduly risky activities. Such a tax would directly target the harmful
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effects of excessive risk taking. Thiswould be done by applying a relatively high
tax rate (so as to discourage risk) on returns above a defined level. This FAT
therefore introduces some elements of progressivity. For capital, the interest
rate on risk-free investments could be taken and increased by return on risk
component. The latter is, of course, difficult to estimate. For wages, the average
wages in other sectors could serve as a proxy. Thiswould, however, not account
for structural differences in sectors that might lead to different wage structures
in addition to potentially untaxed rents. In addition, this FAT cannot distin-
guish between high returns that are due to unduly risky behaviour or to skills
and efforts. This makes the threshold somewhat arbitrary.
Second, all versions of the FAT would be designed to be neutral vis-à-vis
financing and investment decisions, and hence not to distort the activities of
the financial sector while still reducing its size. This can be achieved by the
application of either an ACE or a definition of profit based on cash-flow. Third,
any version of the FAT could lead to differences in treatment between finan-
cial institutions subject to such a tax and quasi-financial institutions outside
its scope. The implementation of a FAT should, therefore, cover as large as
possible a range of financial institutions.
Fourth, all versions of the FAT can be seen as a tax on the profits from net
transactions and other financial-sector business. This is an important difference
compared to the FTT, which would tax gross transactions and have a cumula-
tive effect. As such, the tax take is independent of the risk characteristics of the
product traded and instead a function of the number of times the product is
traded. Fifth, in the technical design of the risk- and rent-taxing FAT, important
parameters deriving from ‘normal’ profit rates or wage levels would need to be
determined, which illustrates the potential practical complexity of such taxes.
5.3.3 Revenue estimates of FAT
Turning to revenues, the potential of the FAT depends on the type of FAT that is
chosen and, obviously, on the underlying assumptions. An appropriate estima-
tionof revenueswould require comprehensivefirm-level data, as,with aggregate
data, profits of somecompanies are compensatedby losses of others, blurring the
picture. In addition, the estimation of a VAT-type destination-based FAT would
require data on the location of transactions. Using aggregate data and specific
assumptions (for example, profits are defined as gross operating surplus and
mixed income in the financial intermediation sector), the IMF reports that the
tax base for the addition-method FAT varies from 2.5 per cent ofGDP in Sweden
to 8.4 per cent of GDP in Ireland and even 23.2 per cent of GDP in Luxembourg.
The sample’s GDP-weighted average is 4.14 per cent of GDP. For the rent-taxing
FAT and the risk-taxing FAT, the GDP-weighted averages would be 1.78 per cent
and 0.79 per cent per cent of GDP respectively.
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Hence, applying a low FAT rate of 5 per cent and extrapolating the results from
the sample of fifteen Member States collected by the IMF (2010c)—and repre-
senting 91 per cent of EU27 GDP—to the EU27 for the three methods provide
broad orders of magnitude for tax revenues of respectively €25.9 billion, €11.1
billion, and €4.9 billion. Table 5.4 gives an overview of the country values.
For the twenty-two developed economies—representing about 62 per cent
of world GDP—considered in the IMF report to the G20, a 5 per cent rate of
the addition-method FAT would create revenue corresponding to an arithme-
tic average of 0.28 per cent of GDP (IMF 2010c). Using the country-level
estimates for the share in GDP to calculate absolute figures, this would trans-
late into total revenue for the twenty-two countries of roughly €75 billion
for the addition-method FAT. The revenue for other FAT versions would be
€35 billion for the rent-taxing FAT and €10 billion for the risk-taxing FAT.
In terms of their geographical distribution, the potential tax revenues
would—by and large—mirror the share of Member States in the activities of
the financial sector (which is more diversified than their share in trading
places). Figure 5.1 presents the distribution for the addition method.
5.3.4 Implementation
Because it relies on items that are easily identified, a FAT is theoretically easy to
introduce. The easiest version would be the addition-method FAT, as the other
two versions require the determination of some normal or risk-adjusted return
and wage payments. A FAT could potentially add to the existing incentives to
shift profit via relocating profit or remuneration that derive from differences in
current CIT and personal income tax (PIT) systems. The unilateral introduc-
tion of a FAT triggers relocation and competitive disadvantage risks, as in the
case of the FTT, but, given the nature of the base and the need for financial
companies generally to operate for their basic activities where consumers
reside, the risk of relocation can be assumed to be lower than in the case of
the FTT. Technical developments may, however, increase the mobility of the
financial sector. For example, in the field of retail banking the development of
Internet banking may provide opportunities for avoidance.
Another important issue is the inequality of treatment across sectors that a
FAT would create. This issue may potentially conflict with legislation or
general tax practices in some countries. On the other hand, a FAT could
arguably also be seen as a tax surcharge that aims at correcting inequalities
of treatment across sectors (for example, VAT exemption).
In principle, because it relies on existing items of the balance sheet, both
the technical difficulties and the administrative costs of implementing and
collecting the FAT could be limited. However, given the different accounting
rules in Member States, a creation of a coherent framework might be difficult.
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Table 5.4. Revenue estimates for the various forms of FAT (based on 2008 GDPs), tax rate 5%
Member
States























BE 4.2 0.2 724 1.8 0.1 310 1.5 0.1 259
BG n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
CZ n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
DK 4.0 0.2 466 1.8 0.1 210 0.7 0.0 82
DE 3.6 0.2 4,492 1.5 0.1 1,872 0.5 0.0 624
EE n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
IE 8.4 0.4 764 5.7 0.3 518 1.8 0.1 164
EL n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
ES 3.5 0.2 1,905 1.7 0.1 925 0.9 0.0 490
FR 3.3 0.2 3,215 0.9 0.0 877 0.8 0.0 779
IT 3.6 0.2 2,822 1.6 0.1 1,254 0.4 0.0 314
CY n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
LV n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
LT n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
LU 23.2 1.2 456 15.3 0.8 301 5.7 0.3 112
HU 3.6 0.2 190 2.0 0.1 106 0.9 0.0 47
MT n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
NL 4.9 0.2 1,460 2.0 0.1 596 0.6 0.0 179
OE 4.0 0.2 564 1.7 0.1 240 1.8 0.1 254
PL n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
PT 4.8 0.2 413 2.6 0.1 223 0.5 0.0 43
RO n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
SI n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
SK n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
FI 1.9 0.1 175 0.9. 0.0 83 0.2 0.0 18
SE 2.5 0.1 418 0.9 0.0 150 0.7 0.0 117
UK 6.1 0.3 5,537 2.7 0.1 2,451 1.1 0.1 998
Sample 4.14 0.21 23,600.9 1.78 0.09 10,116,1 0.79 0.04 4,479.4
EU27 25,920.7 11,110.5 4,919.7
Note: The estimates assume no behavioural response. For the rent-taxing and the risk-taxing FAT, the IMF takes 40% of the wage differential between the top 25% earners in the financial sector
and the top 25% earners in other sectors. This ‘surplus’ is 12% of wage costs. For the risk-taxing FAT, the benchmark for the return on average equity above which profit would be taxed is 15%.
See IMF (2010c) for other assumptions and details. Note that the IMF applies an R+F base by subtracting capital formation from profit. The EU27 figures are retrieved by taking the GDP-weighted
average values of the sample for the tax base and applying them to EU27 GDP for 2008.
Sources: IMF (2010b) and own calculations.
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Finally, in the context of the EuropeanUnion, the compatibilitywith theVAT
directive, in the light of the existing jurisprudence (e.g. Case C-475/03) would
need to be verified, given that its base proxies value added. For the same reason,
the FAT would require several adjustments to make it interact with the invoice-
credit VAT. These adjustments, discussed by the IMF, include the absence of
input VAT crediting against the FAT and vice versa, border adjustments in the
case of the addition-method FAT, amimicking of zero rating for operationswith
clients outside the EU, and, tomitigate the absence of crediting, a FAT rate that is
lower than the standard VAT rate. These are non-trivial technical issues.
5.3.5 Experiences with FATs
In1968, France introduced a payroll tax (taxe sur les salaires10),which is levied on


























Figure 5.1. Share in tax revenue of EU Member States (addition-method FAT)
Note: Member States for which data are missing in Table 5.4 are assumed to raise tax revenues in
percentage of GDP in the same proportion as the sample's GDP average. The sign (*) indicates the
countries concerned.
10 Covered by articles 231 to 231 bis R and 1679, 1679A, and 1679 bis of the General Tax Code.
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least 90 per cent of their turnover during the previous year. These include bank
and insurance companies. The tax base is defined as gross remunerations, prior
to the deduction of the employee’s national insurance contribution, including
benefits in kind. The measure is therefore not a FAT per se, but the underlying
concept is the same. For employerswhoare partly liable toVAT, the payroll tax is
due in proportion of the exemption. Remunerations paid by public administra-
tions are exempted as long as this does not create distortions in competition.
Remunerations paid to apprentices are fully or partially exempted, depending
on the number of employees. A limited number of remunerations are also
exempted. These are paid mainly in the context of training of workers and
incentives to hire unemployed. Businesses with a turnover that does not exceed
a defined threshold (€80,000 for sales of goods and €32,000 for services) are also
exempted. The tax rate is 4.25 per cent. It is increased to 8.5 per cent for
individual annual pay between €7,491 and €14,960 and to 13.6 per cent
for individual annual pay above €14,960. There is a reduced rate of 2.95
per cent for overseas territories. The tax is not due if its annual total amount is
under €840. If the tax due is between €840 and €1,680, the tax is reduced by an
amount representing three-quarters of the difference between € 1,680 and the
tax originally due. Non-profit associations are eligible to a tax credit of €5,890
per year. The payroll tax is deductible from the CIT or the personal income
tax. In 2008, the annual tax revenues amounted to €11.3 billion. This is
about 0.55 per cent of GDP (European Commission 2010g). About 85 per cent
of this amount would be levied from financial institutions (IMF 2010).
In 1990,Denmark introduced a duty onwage and salary costs (Lnsumsafgift11)
for businesses engaged in certain activities that are exempted from VAT. The
tax base is generally the sum of labour costs and taxable profit.12 For several
sectors, including financial activities, the tax base is defined as labour costs plus
a supplement of 90 per cent. The general tax rate is 3.08 per cent. Specific rates
apply to various sectors. For financial services, the rate is 5.08 per cent of labour
costs plus an additional 4.5 per cent of 90 per cent of labour costs (that is, an
effective rate of 9.13% (5.08+ 90%*4.5%)). This rate will be increased to 10.5 per
cent, but this measure will not be effective before 2013. In 2008, the annual
revenues amounted to DKK4,668.7million (that is, about €650million) or 0.26
per cent of GDP (European Commission 2010g). About 70 per cent of this
amount would be raised from the financial sector (IMF 2010).
Italy introduced in 1997 a regional tax on productive activities (Imposta
Regionale sulle Attività Produttive (IRAP)13). This regional tax is applied to
11 Covered by the law on tax on labour costs (lov om afgift af lnsum mv.).
12 In case of losses, these are deducted from the labour costs. The system is, therefore, symmetric.
13 Covered by D. Lg. N446 of 15 December 1997 and L no. 244/2007.
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taxpayers engaged in commercial business. The tax base is the value of the
net production, which is accounting profit plus most remuneration. Several
exemptions apply for unit trusts, pension funds, European Economic Interest
Groupings, and some small taxpayers. Deductions are allowed for contribu-
tions for labour insurances, expenses related to junior clerks, disabled persons,
and R&D. In addition, there is a €1,850 deduction for each employee (with a
maximum of five) to enterprises with income below €400,000, and certain
regions apply a €9,200 deduction for each employee. The base is allocated
across regions based on the number of workers in each region. The basic rate is
3.90 per cent, and it can be increased by regions up to 1 percentage point.
However, since 2008, the rates increased by regions must be multiplied by
a coefficient of 0.9176. In 2008, the annual tax revenues amounted to
€36 billion or 2.3 per cent of GDP (European Commission 2010g).
5.4 Financial transaction tax
The 2008 crisis indeed showed that, possibly in part because of lax regulation,
financial markets did not work properly in some areas. Since then the discussion
onhow to correct potentialmarket imperfectionhas gainedmomentum, and the
introduction of a financial transaction tax as a tool to stabilize financial markets
and improve their functioning is one of the policy options being discussed. The
FTT was debated at the G20 level14 and has received attention from the Euro-
pean Parliament,15 the European Council, and a number of Member States.
In the discussions on proposals for an FTT, it is argued that such tax could
solve three problems at the same time:
 It could stabilize the financial markets especially in the derivatives market
by increasing transaction costs. The proponents of an intervention argue
that a low-rate tax (for example, 0.1 per cent) could improve the
functioning of financial markets by reducing potentially harmful
financial activities like short-term speculation and technical trading with
a high amount of transactions per day. On the other hand, long-run
investments would not be distorted by such a low tax rate because of their
low frequency of transactions.
14 The IMF report on a fair and substantial contribution of the financial sector came to the
conclusion that the tax should not be dismissed on the grounds of administrative problems.
15 The European Parliament’s Resolution of 10 Mar. 2010 asks the Commission and Council to
look at how the tax could be used to finance development cooperation and help developing
countries to combat climate change, as well as how the tax could contribute to the EU budget. In
March 2011, the European Parliament passed a resolution calling for an FTT at global level and
possibly at EU level if the latter failed to be implemented.
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 It could raise substantial tax revenue, while creating only small
distortions in the real economy. The administrative costs of collecting an
FTT could also be very low compared to other taxes.16
 It could serve as a contribution of the financial sector to the financing of
bailout costs caused by the financial crisis.
However, opponents argue that the FTT would not address the harmful effect
of excessive risk taking seen in the run-up to the crisis, since it does not
address—or only in an indirect way—the underlying market failures—for
example, the misaligned incentives in the financial sector.
5.4.1 The theoretical literature on FTT
Financial transaction taxes have long been discussed, especially after eco-
nomic downturns, starting with Keynes’s reflections in 1936 on stock mar-
kets following the Great Depression. He argued that a ‘substantial
government transfer tax on all transactions might prove the most service-
able reform available with a view to mitigating the predominance of specu-
lation over enterprise in the United States’ (Keynes 1936: 160). The rationale
for his statement was that firms would concentrate on short-term perfor-
mance rather than long-run prospects because of speculation. On the other
hand, Keynes also pointed out that, ‘if individual purchases of investments
were rendered illiquid, this might seriously impede new investment, so long
as alternative ways in which to hold his savings are available to the individ-
ual. This is the dilemma’ (Keynes 1936: 160). This illustrates admirably the
debate that has taken place ever since about the role of trade volume and
liquidity and its effects on price volatility and on the efficiency of financial
markets.
The idea of an FTT is also linked to the proposal of James Tobin on an
international uniform tax on all spot currency conversions. Tobin (1974,
1978) argued that the increased mobility of private financial capital—
especially after the end of the BrettonWoods system—might lead to excessive
shifts of funds that create real economic costs for national governments and
economies. Tobin reasoned that the tax would increase the effectiveness of
domestic monetary policy. Eichengreen et al. (1995) argue that a transaction
tax on currency exchange could create some scope for differences in national
16 Data from the UK show that the collection cost for the stamp duty is around 0.11 pence per
pound collected, to be compared with 1.59 pence for income tax (Bond, Hawkins, and Klemm
2004).
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tax rates. This, in turn, would allow national monetary policy to react better to
domestic macroeconomic needs.17 With the introduction of the euro, the
discussion on speculation in currency markets became less important for
Europe, since the single currency made such speculations impossible within
the euro area. Currency crises in the 1990s in Russia and Asia led neverthe-
less to renewed discussions on the potential benefits of such a currency
transaction tax. In this context, it was primarily seen as a penalty on
short-term currency speculations. At the time, such tax became increasingly
popular among non-governmental organizations, which saw it as a device
for raising revenue to finance development aids or similar projects while at
the same time reducing the size and improving the performance of financial
markets. The idea of such a ‘double dividend’ can still be found in current
discussions.
While Keynes (1936) focused on stock markets and Tobin (1974, 1978) on
currency transactions, the idea of a general and uniform financial transaction
tax is to levy a tax on a wider range of financial transactions. The idea of a
more general securities transaction tax was put forward by Stiglitz (1989) and
Summers and Summers (1989) after the October 1987 stock-market crash.
They argued that noise traders drive stock prices away from fundamentals,
which might lead to higher volatility and price bubbles. Similar to the pro-
ponents of the currency transaction tax, they argued that higher transaction
costs would reduce the amount of speculative trading and in turn give
more room to trading based on fundamental economic data. Stiglitz (1989)
argues that the private return of gathering information in order to respond
morequickly tomarket changes is higher than the social returnof this activity.18
Levying a tax on these activities would improve economic efficiency of the
market by reducing the incentives for this sort of rent seeking.19
However, subsequent theoretical literature gave a mixed picture of the
potential effects of financial transaction taxes. Dooley (1996) argues that the
17 Garber and Taylor (1995) present a sceptical note on this argument.
18 The empirical analysis of some of these trading forms, notably high-frequency trading in
currency markets, has so far not shown strong detrimental as such. Chaboud, Chiquoine,
Hjalmarsson, and Vega (2009) analyse the effect on FX markets and find rather positive effects.
Nevertheless, there are also concerns raised, for example, by the European Central Bank (ECB) that
this high-frequency trading could create negative effects (‘ECBWarns of High-Speed Trading Risks’,
Financial Times, 24 Feb. 2011). In a reply to public consultation of the European Commission, the
ECB stated: ‘In the last few years, automated trading, and in particular High-Frequency Trading
(HFT), has experienced strong growth. Such a development may trigger a number of risks for orderly
trading and for financial stability’ (see <http://www.ecb.int/pub/pdf/other/ecpublicconsultation-
reviewmifideurosystemcontribution201102en. pdf> for the full text).
19 When discussing the potential side effects of such a tax, he assumes that price volatility in the
financial market is not increased but instead decreased. This is a critical assumption. As shown
below, the question of how volatility is influenced by such a tax is central to its evaluation.
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assumption that the tax falls differentially on different types of investors is
invalid, and it is not clear that investors who base their decisions on funda-
mentals have longer holding periods than pure speculators. Mixed results can
be found in Subrahmanyam (1998), who finds that transaction taxes do
indeed reduce market liquidity but also reduce rent-seeking behaviour for
obtaining private information—an element also pointed out by Stiglitz
(1989). Schwert and Seguin (1993) surveyed the arguments for and against
transaction taxes. They conclude that there is little evidence that the potential
beneficial effects of a transaction tax outweigh the potential costs that are due
to tax avoidance and unclear tax incidence.
5.4.2 The empirical literature on FTT
Theoretical studies have not led to conclusive results mainly because results
usually depend on the authors’ assumption about the functioning of the
market. It is, therefore, interesting to check whether empirical evidence gives
a clearer picture. At first glance, the various empirical studies leave the reader
with the impression that the empirical relationship between an increase in
transaction costs (via either taxes or other means) and market functioning is
equally inconclusive. Since the 1990s, a number of empirical studies have been
conducted to measure the effect of changes in transaction costs, and many of
them lead to opposite results. However, a closer look at these studies shows that
the quality of the data and the estimation techniques differ substantially.
Many papers based on time series face problems in identifying increases in
transaction costs and in disentangling those from other potential effects on
trade volume and volatility (Umlauf 1993; Saporta and Kan 1997).
More recent papers have improved this by using panel data and an esti-
mations technique that allow market-wide volatility to be separated from
volatility caused by transaction-cost changes. Hau (2006) shows that transac-
tion costs increase volatility using panel data from the Paris Stock Exchange.
The effect of stamp duties on prices was analysed for the UK by Bond et al.
(2005). The paper uses a natural-experiment approach, which allows them
to use fixed effects in their estimations in order to capture otherwise unob-
servable effects and identify the change of transaction costs.20 A similar
approach with difference-in-differences estimation was taken by Jones
and Seguin (1997) for data on the reduction of commission fees at the
20 Natural experiments were first used in labour economics in the 1970s. The concept was later
applied to tax reforms in order to isolate tax effects from other influences on economic decisions.
The idea of this approach is that reforms often generate two groups of individuals: a ‘control
group’, which is not affected by the tax change, and a ‘treatment group’, which faces different
taxation after a reform. By comparing the behavioural differences of the two groups after a reform,
one can measure the influence of the tax change.
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New York stock exchange. Since this reduction was not the same for all
markets, they could set up a treatment and a control group to estimate the
effects. Their results reject the hypothesis that a decrease of transaction costs
increases volatility.21
Two other recent papers using time series show that results can indeed be
conflicting. Baltagi et al. (2006) use data from stock exchanges in China and
show that stamp tax rate increases from 0.3 per cent to 0.5 per cent led to a
trading volume decrease by a third. This translates into an elasticity of turn-
over with respect to a stamp tax of –0.5. They also find that volatility increases
significantly. On the other hand, Liu and Zhu (2009) find that the relationship
between transaction costs and price volatility is negative in Japan, a result in
line with the argumentations of Stiglitz (1989) and Summers and Summers
(1989). The authors cannot use the estimation approach of Jones and Seguin
(1997), since the reduction of transaction was for the whole Japanese market.
They therefore have to create what they call ‘second-best control portfolios’ in
order to identify the cost effect. Their results are contradicted by Hayashida
and Ono (2011), who study the impact of the repeal of the Japanese stock
transaction tax in 1999 and the decrease in the capital gains tax in 2003. In
both cases, the tax reform led to a decrease in volatility.
More recent research based on experimental economics as well as some
theoretical work points to the fact that the effects of such a tax depend on
the market structure.22 For the European discussion and further research
on this topic, it is necessary to evaluate the market structure in the different
financial centres in Europe. If this structure is heterogeneous, the tax might
affect the markets in question very differently. The empirical literature comes
thus to different results when evaluating the effects of transaction taxes.
While most studies find that trade volume is reduced, the effects on volatility
and prices is less clear, even though results based on panel data and estimation
approaches that better identify transaction-cost effects more often seem to
find a positive relationship between transactions costs and volatility. For the
discussion of the financial transaction tax in Europe, one should keep in mind
the importance of analysing the structure and functioning of the single
national financial markets. The effects of the tax might be varying, depending
on the products traded and the way dealers and brokers interact in themarket.
21 Note that proponents of the tax usually argue that studies that concentrate on short-term
volatility are irrelevant, since the medium-term volatility is the relevant variable that is driven by
technical traders. The problem, however, is that it is not clear whether or not the influence of
technical trading on this medium-term volatility is also driven by the business cycle and other
factors that drive prices. Therefore concentrating on short-term volatility is probably the best proxy
available for econometric analysis. There is also no theoretical model that could explain why short-
term trading is indeed increasing medium-term volatility.
22 See Hanke et al. (2007) and Pelizzari and Westerhoff (2007).
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To summarize, the evaluation of an FTT depends largely on the underlying
assumptions about the functioning of the financial market and whether the
potential market failure can be corrected using a transaction tax. In general,
the proponents of the tax argue that the tax would reduce the number of noise
traders and consequently of technical trading. Furthermore, the tax would
decrease price volatility and unproductive short-term speculation, since in-
vestors would concentrate on the long-run return of projects. Last but not
least, the proponents argue that the tax would lead to substantial tax revenue.
The opponents of the tax argue that it would increase transaction costs. This
increase in transaction costs would reduce liquidity of markets and therefore
market efficiency. It would decrease stock prices and increase the cost of
capital companies, leading to less investment. They also argue that such a
tax would shift transactions away to other markets in countries that do not
apply an FTT.
5.4.3 Revenue estimates of FTT
The broad-base variant of the FTT would tax stocks, bonds, and derivatives
transactions carried on exchange places as well as over the counter (OTC).23
For stocks and bonds, the spot value of the transaction constitutes the tax
base, while for derivatives the notional (or underlying) value of the contract is
taken.24 This variant has a very broad tax base because of the inclusion of
derivatives. In general, the tax base is defined as the total value of the transac-
tion. This is the case for spot transactions such as stocks, bonds, and currency
exchanges. For derivatives, the determination of the transaction value is more
complex. In principle, one could argue that the value of the notional value
could be the tax base. Given the high leverage of some derivatives, this would
create a very large tax base, and the tax payment would be large compared to
the actual price paid for the contract. While taxing these instruments could
potentially reduce companies’ leverage, it would also increase the costs for
23 The OTC transactions include derivative transaction as well as foreign-exchange spot
transactions.
24 The notional value of the asset is defined as the value of a derivative’s underlying assets at the
spot price. In the case of options or futures contracts, this is the number of units of the asset
underlying the contract, multiplied by the spot price of the asset. The notional value is used to take
into account the (sometimes substantial) leverage of financial instruments, like derivatives. The use
of the notional value could, however, lead to substantial problems. Since the real cash flows
connected to the purchase of the derivative are much smaller than its notional value, the tax
burden differs significantly across derivative products. In cases where margins are very small, the
actual tax rate might be much higher than the above-mentioned rates. This leads to the problem
that the real burden of the tax is very high, changing between products and increasing the cost of
hedging activity for companies.
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companies that hedge risk. It might also lead to double taxation if the under-
lying is traded (and taxed) at the spot market when the option is executed.
Instead of taxing the notional value, an alternative could be to tax only the
actual premium.25 However, this would reduce the tax base significantly. The
narrow-base variant is based on the conservative assumption that only bonds
and stock transactions would be taxed.
For the broad-base FTT, Schulmeister et al. (2008) estimated the potential
revenue of a general FTT for 2006 and found that, at a rate of 0.1 per cent, the
tax could raise between $177 billion (about €145 billion) and $467 billion
(about €370 billion) in Europe, depending on the assumptions of the decrease
in trading volume.26 The lion’s share of these substantial amounts (between
80 per cent and 90 per cent of the revenue, depending on the assumptions
about the reduction of transactions) would be collected from taxing deriva-
tives on organized exchanges or on over-the-counter (OTC) markets. These
estimates suffer, however, from several uncertainties. First, it is unclear
whether some of the categories used are based on flows or on outstanding
amounts (that is, stocks). In this latter case, the real flows can be a fraction of
the stocks, if, for example, a derivative contract runs over several periods. In
fact, many swaps can extend to fifty years, and are counted in full for each year
in the inventory data. Second, the data used display the gross amounts of
derivative contracts. Many of these contracts cancel out economically, since
market participants close open positions with new contracts. Hence, the
estimates might underestimate the fact that many of these contracts could
be netted off in case a tax is introduced. It is reported that, in some market
segments, the netting is only a few percentage of the total. Third, they are
based on the assumption that the notional value of the traded derivatives
would constitute the tax base. The idea is to tax the leverage of the products.
As discussed above, the economic case for using the underlying may not be
well funded.
These estimates assume a strong decrease in turnover measured in notional
amounts. However, there might be additional structural effects on markets,
which could change the way these businesses are conducted significantly,
leaving essentially no substantial tax base. These are very difficult to predict
and should be kept inmindwhen assessing the revenue potential. Given these
issues, Table 5.5, with the potential revenue for some EU countries, should be
interpreted with caution.
25 This is possible for derivatives only where a premium is actually paid. This is not the case for
all types of derivatives, notably interest rate swaps.
26 Note that Switzerland and Norway are included in this estimate.
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Using the narrow-base version of the FTT, the tax revenue from spot trans-
actions on exchanges would be between $72 (about €57) billion and $80
(about €64) billion or 0.15 per cent and 0.17 per cent of global GDP. Applied
in the EU27 and Iceland exchanges, the tax revenue estimates are around €18
billion for 2008 (see Table 5.6).
For various reasons, these potential revenues might actually be in the high
end of estimates. First, the reference years of 2006 and 2008 were years of high
Table 5.5. Estimated revenue from taxing shares, bonds, and derivatives (broad-base FTT)
for countries where data were available, tax rate 0.1%, 2006 (€bn)
Country BE DE FR IT OE NL UK
Projected receipts 3.3 35.5 15.0 5.1 1.6 5.1 162.8
Source: Schulmeister et al. (2008).
Table 5.6. Estimated revenue from taxing shares and bonds (narrow-base FTT), EU27 and









Athens (EL) 77,282 28 62 0
BME Spanish (ES) 1,639,054 4,650,178 1,311 3,255
Borsa Italiana (IT) 1,019,484 175,458 816 123
Bratislava SE (SK) 14 23,049 0 16
Bucharest SE (RO) 1,601 46 1 0
Budapest SE (HU) 20,877 1,613 17 1
Bulgarian SE (BG) 1,261 125 1 0
Cyprus SE (CY) 1,397 15 1 0
Deutsche Börse (DE) 3,181,146 123,943 2,545 87
Irish SE (IE) 55,695 24,944 45 17
Ljubljana SE (SL) 1,589 255 1 0
London SE (UK) 4,264,020 4,465,192 3,411 3,126
Luxembourg SE (LU) 1,299 57 1 0
Malta SE (MT) 48 435 0 0
NASDAQ OMX Nordic
Exchange
(DK, EE, FI, IS, LV, LT, SE)
909,832 1,991,782 728 1,394
NYSE Euronext (BE, FR,
NL, PT)
2,999,217 33,099 2,399 23
Prague SE (CZ) 29,880 22,685 24 16
Warsaw SE (PL) 47,253 702 38 0
Wiener Börse (OE) 71,177 800 57 1
Total 14,322,128 11,514,404 10,025 8,060
Note: The (simple) assumption made here is a reduction in trade volumes of only 30% for bonds and 20% for shares and
a tax rate of 0.1%. Note that some exchanges cover more than one country. The data do not provide a split to separate
transactions between those countries that share exchanges.
Source: World Federation of Exchanges and own calculations.
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levels of trading, and exchanges could have fallen ever since. Second, these
estimates may underestimate tax avoidance that is due to relocation and
migration to non-taxed products. Third, it is not clear whether all transactions
volumes used in the estimates can actually be taxed according to the assump-
tions. This is especially the case for the taxation of derivatives, which account
for the largest part of the revenue estimates in the broad-base FTT. In conclu-
sion, the revenue estimates have to be interpreted with caution and are there
to provide order of magnitude.27
The potential tax revenues would be very uneven from a geographical point
of view, because trading is currently concentrated in a few places (even more
when derivatives are accounted for; see Figure 5.2). Nevertheless, in terms of
incidence, the economic burden might be at least partly transferred to inter-














Figure 5.2. Share in tax revenue of selected EU Member States (broad-base FTT)
Source: Schulmeister et al. (2008). Note that data are not available for all Member States for these
estimates. However, it is reasonable to assume that the revenue for most Member States not listed
in the graph is marginal, since their financial sectors are in most cases relatively small compared to
the countries included.
27 For a critical review of revenue collection from transaction taxes, see also Honohan and Yoder
(2010).
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Table 5.6 shows that, for the narrow-base FTT, most revenues are also
collected in larger European exchanges such as the UK, Spain, and Germany.
One might argue that, while all countries introduce the tax and carry some
of its burden, the benefit of the tax in terms of revenue is located in only a
few countries with large financial centres. However, the economic distor-
tions in terms of reduction in trade volumes and risk of relocation of
financial transactions due to the tax might also be strongest in countries
with large financial centres. In conclusion, the uneven revenue collection
might be of less importance if the tax is an effective device to improve
market efficiency to the benefit of all investors, domestic and foreign. If
the goal of the tax is to raise revenue, this would raise the question as to
who should receive the revenues and whether or not an agreement to share
revenues internationally should be envisaged, since otherwise benefits will
be distributed unevenly.
5.4.4 Experiences with transaction taxes
The UK stamp duty on transfers of securities consists of two instruments: (1)
a stamp duty charged on instruments of transfer and (2) a stamp duty
reserve tax (SDRT) charged on underlying agreements to transfer securities
where an instrument is not executed. The two duties go hand in hand.
Stamp duties in the UK are collected on documents used to effect the sale
and transfer of ownership in shares and other securities of UK-based com-
panies. In order to collect duties on transactions carried out through elec-
tronic share-dealing systems, the stamp duty reserve tax (SDRT) was
introduced in 1986. Stamp duties are levied on the underlying value of the
transferred good at a standard rate of 0.5 per cent. The SDRT taxes transac-
tions in shares where no instrument of transfer is executed and which are
therefore outside the scope of the ‘standard’ stamp Duty. In this sense, it is a
transaction tax, levied on agreements to transfer chargeable securities, while
the ‘standard’ stamp duty is charged upon documents. SDRT accounts for
the majority of revenue collected on share transactions effected through the
UK’s exchanges. Both SDRT and standard stamp duty are levied on share
transactions in UK incorporated companies, taxed at 0.5 per cent of the
purchase price of shares. It is charged whether the transaction takes place in
the UK or overseas, and whether either party is resident of the UK or not.
Securities issued by companies overseas are not taxed. This means that the
tax is paid by foreign and UK-based investors who invest in UK incorporated
companies. To put it differently, the tax is connected to the location of
headquarters.
Revenues from duties on the transfer of stocks and shares have increased
over the 2000s. After the economic downturn in 2001–2, revenue declined for
Thomas Hemmelgarn and Gaetan Nicodeme
140
This is an open access version of the publication distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-
NoDerivs licence (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/), which permits non-commercial reproduction and distribution of 
the work, in any medium, provided the original work is not altered or transformed in any way, and that the work is properly cited. For 
commercial re-use, please contact academic.permissions@oup.com 
two years in a row, but from 2004–5 onwards revenue steadily increased,
despite the fact that the tax rate remained unchanged at 0.5 per cent. There
are three main reasons for this development. First, share prices increased
significantly in recent years as a consequence of the economic boom. Second,
volume of traded shares also increased, since the number of incorporated
companies increased. Last, turnover also augmented, since shares have
become important products for medium- and short-term investments. How-
ever, revenue declined also for this category in 2008–9 because of the financial
crisis. This observation suggests that revenue from stamp duties is pro-cyclical.
In fact, revenue from stamp duties on transfers of financial assets was more
than 30 per cent lower in 2008–9 compared to 2007–8.
Table 5.7 shows the revenue data for both types in the first and second
columns.28 The third column shows the total revenue from the two sources.
The peak is in 2000–1 just before the end of the Internet bubble. Columns 4
and 5 show tax revenues in relation to total tax revenues and GDP. The stamp
duty was on average about 0.7 per cent of total tax revenue. In terms of GDP
and total tax revenue, the highest values were reached during the boom years
at the turn of the century, notably in 2000–1. For 2008–9 the value is back to
the level of the mid-1990s, which is around 0.2 per cent of GDP. On average
almost 90 per cent of revenues actually stem from the SDRT.













1995–6 n.a. n.a. 1,810 0.59 0.20
1996–7 n.a. n.a. 1,966 0.60 0.20
1997–8 n.a. n.a. 3,033 0.73 0.25
1998–9 n.a. n.a. 3,696 0.79 0.28
1999–2000 n.a. n.a. 5,617 1.10 0.40
2000–1 n.a. n.a. 7,383 1.26 0.46
2001–2 4,218 367 4,586 0.77 0.28
2002–3 3,669 455 4,124 0.69 0.24
2003–4 3,280 418 3,698 0.65 0.22
2004–5 3,454 548 4,001 0.64 0.23
2005–6 4,105 961 5,067 0.77 0.28
2006–7 4,767 745 5,511 0.77 0.28
2007–8 5,372 716 6,091 0.82 0.30
2008–9 3,673 349 4,022 n.a. 0.22
Source : HM Revenue and Customs and own calculations.
28 The split between the two levies is available only from 2001 onwards. Note that small
differences between values single and sums occur because of rounding when converting
revenues in sterling pound to euro.
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Given the existence of the tax, one should observe that investors discount
higher future transaction costs when trading shares. These costs should be
capitalized in lower share prices. In fact, empirical studies show that the stamp
duty influences the share prices negatively. More frequently traded shares are
more affected than low-turnover shares. For firms that rely on equity as a
marginal source of finance, this may increase capital costs. There are no
estimates on the effects on trading volumes and price volatility of the stamp
duties in the UK. Given results from empirical studies on the effect of transac-
tion costs on trade volumes, it is likely that stamp duties reduce trade volumes
significantly. Whether or not this increases price volatility is disputed, how-
ever, as recent studies tend to find a positive correlation between trade vo-
lumes and price volatility (see Section 5.4.2).
While it is possible to avoid stamp duty by executing and retaining the
instrument outside the UK, in practice the need to register the change in
ownership, combined with various restrictions on the use of unstamped
instruments, means thatmost instruments of transfer are presented for stamp-
ing. The SDRT is difficult to avoid, because the vast majority of UK company
shares are held in the CREST settlement system, which automatically debits
SDRT when they are transferred. Nevertheless, two mechanisms can be used
legally to avoid the SDRT: (1) the American depositary receipts (ADRs) and (2)
the exchange traded fund (ETF). Many UK companies have ADR programmes
that enable them to market themselves in the USA. Shares are issued to a US
depositary bank, which issues ADRs. These receipts rather than the underlying
shares are traded on the US markets. Such trading is exempted from the
standard 0.5 per cent SDRT transfer charges, but, as compensation, there is a
charge, paid only once at the rate of 1.5 per cent, when the shares are issued to
the depositary bank. Placing shares into an ADR system is not regarded as
avoidance. The second option is to use an overseas collective investment
scheme that lists on a UK exchange (an ETF) and qualifies for exemption
from SDRT provided that it is not centrally managed and controlled in the
UK or has a UK share register. The exemption was introduced in 2007 to
encourage overseas ETFs to list in the UK. However, owners of an ETF share
do not legally own the shares in the fund. If investors want to have voting
rights, the ETF cannot be used to avoid stamp duty.
The Swedish experience with FTT is often put forward by its opponents.29 In
the 1980s Sweden experienced strong growth of the financial sector, which
was accompanied by significant increases in the salaries of professionals in
this sector. It was argued that the financial sector’s contribution to the
29 The description of the Swedish experience is based on Umlauf (1993) and Campbell and Froot
(1993). Sweden levied transaction taxes on stock-exchange and stock options, fixed interest
securities, and the connected derivatives.
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economy and the society was small compared to the resources it used. Fur-
thermore, excessive financial transactions were seen as destabilizing the econ-
omy and as promoting disproportionate wage differentials between sectors.
The latter point was politically of great importance. Despite the resistance of
the Ministry of Finance, Sweden introduced a 50 basis points tax on the
purchase or sale of equity securities in January 1984. A round trip transaction
(purchase and sale) resulted therefore in a 100 basis points tax. The tax applied
to all equity security trades in Sweden using local brokerage services as well as
to stock options. The fact that only local brokerage services were taxed is seen
in the literature as the main design problem of the Swedish system. Avoiding
the tax only required using foreign broker services. In July 1986, the tax rate
was increased to 100 basis points. In 1987, the tax base was extended, and half
the normal rate was also applied to transactions between dealers. In January
1989, the tax base was widened again, and a tax on fixed-income securities was
introduced. The tax rate was considerably lower than on equities, as low as 0.2
basis points for a security with a maturity of ninety days or less. On a bond
with a maturity of five years or more, the tax was 3 basis points. Only fifteen
months later, on 15 April 1990, the tax on fixed-income securities was abol-
ished. In January 1991, the rates on the remaining taxes were cut by half, and
by the end of the year they were also abolished completely.
There are various reasons for the abolishment of the tax. First of all, the
revenues from the taxes were disappointing. The revenues from the tax on
fixed-income securities were expected to amount to 1,500 million Swedish
kroner per year, but the average was only around 50 million a year. Further-
more, since trading volumes fell, the capital gains tax became less and less
applicable, and revenue declined. The increase in revenue from equity trans-
action taxes was almost entirely offset by this reduction in capital gains taxes.
The net budget effect was accordingly close to zero. An additional reason
for the decline in revenue from capital gains taxes was the decline in share
prices that accompanied the introduction of the transaction tax. The day the
tax was announced, share prices fell by 2.2 per cent. Taking into account
possible trading based on insider information in the weeks before the official
announcement, the price decline is estimated tohave amounted to 5.35 per cent.
These declines were in line with the net present value of tax payments on future
trades. Investors discounted the future payments, andprices for equitydecreased,
driving up capital costs accordingly.
Next to the low revenue generated from the tax, relocation became a serious
problem in Sweden. Sixty per cent of the trading volume of the eleven most
actively traded Swedish share classes moved to the UK after the announce-
ment in 1986 that the tax rate would double. Thirty per cent of all Swedish
equity trading moved offshore. By 1990, more than 50 per cent of all Swedish
trading had moved to London. Foreign investors reacted to the tax by moving
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their trading offshore, while domestic investors reacted by reducing the num-
ber of their equity trades.
Even though the tax on fixed-income securities was much lower than that
on equities, the impact on the traded volume was much more dramatic.
During the first week after the introduction of the tax, the volume of bond
trading fell by 85 per cent, even though the tax rate on five-year bonds was
only 3 basis points. The volume of futures trading fell by 98 per cent, and the
options trading market disappeared. Trading in money market securities,
which faced a tax as low as 0.2 basis points, fell by 20 per cent. This reaction
was due in large part to the existence of a wide variety of non-taxed substi-
tutes. Once the taxes had been eliminated, trading volumes returned and grew
substantially in the 1990s.
A prominent example of a transfer tax outside the EU is Switzerland.
A transfer tax (Umsatzabgabe) is levied on the transfer of domestic or foreign
securities where one of the parties is a Swiss security broker. Swiss brokers
include banks and bank-linked financial institutions as defined by Swiss bank-
ing law. In addition, companies that own taxable securities of a book value
in excess of CHF10 million qualify as security brokers. A broker who acts as
a party to the transaction must pay one half of the transfer tax for himself
and another half on behalf of each party who is not a broker. If the broker
merely acts as an intermediary, he is required to pay only one half of the
transfer tax on behalf of each party who is not a broker. If a Swiss security
broker deals at a foreign stock exchange in securities that are subject to
Swiss transfer tax, the part of the tax allocated to the other party to the
transaction is not levied. The taxable base is equal to the consideration paid;
if there is no consideration, the taxable base is the fair market value of the
security. The duty is levied at a rate of 0.15 per cent for domestic securities and
0.3 per cent for foreign securities. Eurobonds, other bonds denominated in
a foreign currency and the trading stock of professional security brokers
are exempt. Certain types of transactions are also exempt. The revenue
of the Swiss transfer tax was CHF1.9 billion in 2007. This corresponds to
0.37 per cent of GDP.
Another example of a country with transaction taxes outside the EU is
Taiwan. The securities transaction tax (STT) is imposed upon gross sales
price of securities transferred, and the tax rates are 0.3 per cent for share
certificates issued by companies and 0.1 per cent for corporate bonds or any
securities offered to the public that have been duly approved by the govern-
ment. However, trading of corporate bonds and financial bonds issued by
Taiwanese issuers or companies are temporarily exempt from STT, beginning
1 January 2010. The Taiwanese government argued that this ‘would enliven
the bond market and enhance the international competitiveness of Taiwan’s
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enterprises’.30 The legal taxpayer is the seller of the securities, and tax is
collected by the broker or sales agent or the transferee in cases of direct
transactions.
Since 1998, Taiwan has also levied a stock index futures transaction tax on
both parties to the transaction based on the contracted amount. The transac-
tion tax is levied per transaction at a rate of not less than 0.01 per cent and not
more than 0.06 per cent, based on the value of the futures contract. Revenue
from the securities transaction tax and the futures transaction tax was about
€2.4 billion in 2009. The major part of this revenue came from the taxation of
bonds and stocks (96.5 per cent). The taxation of stock index future shares was
3.5 per cent. In total, this corresponds to 0.8 per cent in terms of GDP.
5.4.5 Implementation
A prerequisite for a global or a unilateral introduction at EU level is a relatively
high degree of coordination of tax bases and rates. To reduce incentives for
shifting to markets with lower tax rates and smaller product coverage, the
coverage of financial products and the tax rates should be the same in all
countries. Theremight also be a need to find agreements with financial centres
outside Europe in order to reduce the migration of transactions. Although
some third countries use such taxes, as illustrated in the previous section, the
tax coverage is usually narrow and allows certain exemptions that might
create possibilities for relocation.
The discussion of the Swedish experience with transaction taxes has shown
that, if evasion and relocation are easy and cheap, market effects can be
dramatic. In such a case, legal security could be a means to decrease the
potential for relocation, as, for example, in the UK, which applies a stamp
duty that covers only transactions in securities of UK-registered corporate
companies and seems to be rather resistant to relocation (even though some
studies indicate that 20 per cent of transactions have relocated, which is a
large number per se). The risk for relocation might be mitigated for exchanges
trading domestic stocks and bonds. It is less clear whether this would also be
possible for foreign stocks and bonds traded domestically and derivatives. The
increased use of registration duties could help to reduce this problem. Network
externalities or agglomeration rents are often seen as reasons why relocation
could be mitigated. The idea is that a very low tax rate would not lead to
relocation, given the advantage from concentration in one marketplace. This
argument has its merits, but it is difficult to evaluate in practical terms. The
effect could be very diverse for different product classes. Furthermore, while in
30 See <http://www.ey.gov.tw/ct.asp?xItem=65822&ctNode=1334&mp=11> for the press
release.
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the short term agglomeration might be considered as an immobile asset of a
region, this is not necessarily the case once new investment opportunities and
market structures evolve. Another possibility to reduce relocation incentives
would be the use of differentiated tax rates. Tax rates could vary for different
markets and products according to their mobility, both geographical and cross
products (a form of Ramsey taxation). This would decrease the potential
relocation but would also reduce tax revenue and increase administrative
costs. Also, it would be difficult in practice to determine the exact cross-
elasticities as to fine-tune the taxes. The differentiated tax rates might create
distortions between the uses of various products. Finally, if the FTT is meant as
a corrective device, differentiated tax rates set according to the mobility of
financial products might undermine this function.
The administrative costs of collecting an FTT could be relatively low. Data
from the UK show that the collection cost of the stamp duty is only 0.21 pence
per pound collected. Themain reason is that the vast majority of UK company
shares are held in the CREST settlement system, which automatically debits
the duty when shares are transferred. In contrast to that, for income tax, the
value is 1.24 pence, and 0.76 pence for corporation tax.31 However, this levy is
a pure securities transaction tax, and does not tax a wider range of non-
securities transactions, such as lending or depositing, for which administrative
costs might be higher.
Legal aspects have to be considered as well. In relation to the original
proposal by Tobin for a currency transaction tax, likely legal obstacles need
to be taken into account, regarding its compatibility with free movement of
capital and payments between Member States and between Member States
and third countries. These concerns might also apply to derivatives. Simi-
larly, the compatibility of such a levy with Article XI of the General Agree-
ment on Trade in Services (GATS), which provides that World Trade
Organizatin (WTO) members cannot apply any restrictions on international
transfer and payments for current transactions relating to their specific
commitments, would have to be further assessed.32 The introduction of a
tax on financial transactions might also require changes to Council Directive
2008/7/EC.33
31 See the Departmental Autumn Performance Report 2009 of HM Revenue and Customs
<http://www.official-documents.gov.uk/document/cm77/7774/7774.pdf>.
32 See also the innovative financing at a global level, Commission StaffWorking Document, SEC
(2010) 409 final (1 Apr. 2010), on this issue.
33 Council Directive 2008/7/EC of 12 Feb. 2008 concerning indirect taxes on the raising of
capital, Official Journal L 46/11 of 21.02.2008.
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5.5 Conclusions
The 2008 financial and economic crisis has left deep strains on public finances
and has shed light on various excesses of the financial sector. These facts have
raised the question of whether additional or increased taxes on the financial
sector would be justified and advisable. This debate is particularly relevant in
the context of the European Union, as the VAT Directive exempts the sector,
arguably leading to its under-taxation.
Two specific taxes have attracted policy attention. The financial transaction
tax, whose origins date from Tobin (1978), would tax financial transactions of
various types on organized or over-the-counter markets. For its proponents, its
attractiveness lies in both its alleged stabilizing effects and its high revenues
potential. Both features are, however, uncertain, as several empirical studies
show increased volatility following the introduction of financial transaction
taxes, and revenues estimates are based on disputed assumptions and sources.
A financial activity tax offers an interesting alternative. Besides interesting
revenues potentials, the tax could be designed as a proxy for value added and
is designed to target economic rents.
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6
Taxation and the Financial Sector
Douglas A. Shackelford, Daniel N. Shaviro, and Joel Slemrod
6.1 Introduction
A looming global catastrophe—daunting problems in measuring the marginal
social damage caused by significant economic activities—international coop-
eration undermined by divergent national interests—concerns that tax-based
solutions will undermine economic growth—accusations of self-serving ex-
perts misrepresenting, or even doctoring, the evidence 1.1.1.
But enough about global warming. Although the topic of this chapter is the
role of taxation in restructuring the financial sector, many of the same issues
arise (with the possible exception of the last). Moreover, a long tradition of
examining tax instruments for addressing pollution externalities, as a substi-
tute for or supplement to regulation, can be brought to bear in assessing how
taxation of the financial sector should respond to the dangerous spillover
effects that, as the 2008 crisis made all too clear, can result from failure by
particular firms. It is only since the first decade of the twenty-first century that
academics and policy-makers have given serious attention to the possible role
of tax instruments in the financial than the environmental realm, reflecting
direct regulation’s predominant role in addressing financial-sector issues.
Indeed, the public economics literature’s engagement with this sector,
whether one looks for theoretical modelling or detailed empirical study, is
startlingly sparse.
Tax policy has already reacted to the financial crisis in several disparate
ways. A number of countries enacted stimulus packages that included tax
cuts. In some countries, these were coupled with tax-rate increases, designed
to address already-large fiscal imbalances that the financial crisis had only
This chapter was originally published as Shackelford et al. (2010).
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made worse.1 The UK enacted a one-time 50 per cent tax on bankers’ bonuses,
rationalized partly on the ground that it would induce banks to build up capital
rather than paying excessive compensation to insiders. There have also been a
number of significant proposals. For example, in the US, the Obama adminis-
tration proposed in 2010 a bank fee on non-depository liabilities in excess of
$10 billion, characterized as a way to help cover the direct fiscal cost of the
Troubled Assets Relief Program (TARP) bailout. The Group of 20 Finance Min-
isters and Central Bank Governors (the G20) asked the International Monetary
Fund (the IMF) to issue a report on ‘the range of options countries have adopted
or are considering as to how the financial sector could make a fair and substan-
tial contribution toward paying for any burden associated with government
interventions to repair the banking system’.2
In this chapter, we examine the role of taxation in the financial sector. We
first look backwards, at the role of the tax system in bringing about the 2008
financial crisis, and at proposals to penalize institutions or individuals who
may have contributed to the crisis. Then we look forward to the tax system’s
potential role in a restructured financial system. Here, going beyond the focus
of the Obama administration and the G20 on simply paying for the specific
cost of past or potential future bailouts, we examine what might be the
features of an optimal Pigouvian corrective tax system that addresses market
failures giving rise to externalities. Relatedly, we address the possible trade-offs
between pure Pigouvian taxation and seeking revenue from the financial
sector, such as to endow a resolution fund to be used in future crises. Along
the way, we discuss the crucial differences between the well-studied case of
pollution externalities and the much less-studied application of corrective
externality taxation to the financial sector. We close by briefly examining
several alternative tax proposals that have recently been enacted or proposed.
An appendix to the chapter discusses an accounting legacy of the crisis that
may affect financial firms’ propensity to repeat the risk-seeking behaviour that
gave rise to the crisis in the first place.
6.2 Looking backwards
6.2.1 Did income-tax systems help cause the 2008 crisis?
As Acharya and Richardson (2009: 195) note, ‘there is almost universal agree-
ment that the fundamental cause of the [2008 financial] crisis was a combina-
tion of a credit boom and a housing bubble’. During the boom-and-bubble
1 Hemmelgarn and Nicodeme (2010) list the EU27 countries’ tax-cut and tax-increase measures.
2 Pittsburgh Summit (2009), item 16, ‘Strengthening the International Financial Regulatory
System’. See also an interim report at IMF (2010b).
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period, numerous financial firms placed huge, highly leveraged bets against a
sector-wide decline in housing prices.3 This left them facing potential or actual
insolvency when housing prices collapsed, with effects that were transmitted
to the broader world economy by mechanisms that we discuss below.
In assessing why the boom and bubble occurred and why financial firms
made such risky bets, most observers have agreed—though with a few dissent-
ing voices—that income-tax systems4 were not a major proximate cause (IMF
2009a; Shaviro 2009e; Slemrod 2009; Hemmelgarn and Nicodeme 2010; Lloyd
in Chapter 8). Instead, more promising lead suspects include the following:
1. mortgage originators who had no stake in the borrowers’ ability to pay;
2. borrowers who accepted easy credit, such as through back-loaded sub-
prime mortgages that financed home purchases they could not afford;
3. opaquely structured securitization that neither sellers, buyers, nor rating
agencies fully understood;
4. the rating agencies’ eagerness to make money by offering AAA ratings to
risky issuances by paying clients;
5. the existence of ‘heads we win, tails you lose’ incentive structures for
financial firms and their managers;
6. capital-adequacy regulations that were riddled with loopholes that finan-
cial firms increasingly learned to exploit;
7. financial institutions’ use of derivative financial instruments to ramp up
and concentrate, rather than offload and diversify, their downside risk
exposure; and
8. failed risk-management models that underweighted the possibility and
impact of a national decline in US real estate prices.
The general consensus that taxation did not play a primary role in causing
the crisis exists, even though, in many respects, ‘the tax system’s “finger-
prints” [were] all over the “crime scene”’ (Shaviro 2009e: 3). For example, in
many countries, albeit in varying degrees, income-tax rules may have encour-
aged both excessive corporate leverage and highly leveraged homeownership.
Income taxes may also have contributed to pervasive governance problems in
publicly traded companies, and to the proliferation of non-transparent finan-
cial instruments that played a key role in prompting the crisis.
3 As the federal civil case against Goldman Sachs highlights, others placed large bets on such a
decline.
4 We focus on income taxation, but note that financial institutions pose challenging problems
for a value-added tax (VAT) as well, such that they invariably receive special treatment that is
generally preferential and always non-neutral. Whether these distortions also pushed in the wrong
direction, with respect to making a financial crisis more likely, has not been explored.
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A key reason for not discerning greater income-tax causation of the crisis is
that these flaws have generally existed for decades, and the timing of the crisis
cannot be linked to any notable expansion of them. Hence, there is not only
no ‘smoking gun’, but little broader reason to believe that income taxation’s
causal role went beyond pushing in the wrong direction by generally exacer-
bating biases that existed in any event. This observation does not, however,
rule out the possibility that the tax biases served, in effect, as extra gasoline
intensifying the explosion once other causes had lit the match. For example,
declining real estate prices would not have created such widespread mortgage
default risk had not loan-to-value ratios been so high (often reflecting tax
incentives for leverage).
Whether taxation’s background role in intensifying the financial crisis was
great or small, however, its already well-known flaws take on new importance
if they affirmatively point in the wrong direction, rather than merely depart-
ing from the usual tax policy prescription of neutrality. Corporate debt bias,
for example, though typically criticized for inducing increased bankruptcy
costs or distorting firms’ responses to asymmetric information problems (Sha-
viro 2009a: 92–4), may be worse than was previously thought if publicly
traded firms would be prone to adopting excessive leverage, from a social
standpoint, even in the absence of tax considerations. Moreover, the wide-
spread bias in favour of owner-occupied housing (often with additional in-
centives for leverage) looks even worse from the perspective of 2010 and
afterwards than it did before. Risk externalization may also have been effec-
tively encouraged by an incoherent system of taxing capital income that
creates tax arbitrage opportunities, often exacerbated by derivatives, while
regulatory responses may have been undermined by tax regimes that draw
strong distinctions between financial institutions that are classified either as
banks, insurance companies, or dealers even when they perform overlapping
functions (Kleinbard 2003).
As we discuss below, a number of potentially complicated and ambitious
new taxes on the financial sector have been discussed. While the 2008 finan-
cial crisis shows how important it is to consider whether such instruments
might help to improve incentives, reform efforts should not unduly focus on
the exotic and new at the expense of the familiar and old. Addressing undesir-
able incentives within the existing income taxmay be as or more important as
creating new tax instruments.
6.2.2 Should those responsible pay up?
We turn now from the relatively abstract question of how structural aspects of
countries’ income-tax rules may have contributed to the financial crisis, to the
very tangible and emotionally salient question of whether particular ongoing
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business enterprises, or even flesh-and-blood individuals, should be blamed
and punished for what happened during the crisis or how they profited
unduly in the run-up to the crisis. Sentiments of blame, retribution, or the
assignment of responsibility for past harm are widespread in the political
environment, and have been expressed by leaders and experts—not just,
say, in the popular press.
Thus, President Obama, in announcing his administration’s bank fee pro-
posal, emphasized that his ‘commitment is to recover every single dime the
American people are owed’, and said his ‘determination to achieve this
goal is only heightened when I see reports of massive profits and obscene
bonuses at the very firms who owe their continued existence to the American
people . . . ’ (Office of the Press Secretary 2010). Likewise, Columbia Univer-
sity’s Jeffrey Sachs, in expressing his support for a financial transaction tax,
told a UK audience that the so-called Robin Hood tax would properly burden
a financial sector that was ‘under-taxed’, ‘out of control’, and enjoying huge
profits at the expense of the general public. As things stood, he argued,
‘bankers are brazenly smirking as they pocket large amounts of our money’
(L. Elliott 2010).
A number of different motives may underlie seeking to punish (or at least
to scale back the rewards enjoyed by) those who are considered responsible
for the financial crisis. Retribution, or at least making wrongdoers pay for the
harm they caused, may be considered good in itself. Or it may be thought to
provide an instructive lesson that might help to restrain similar misbeha-
viour in the future. Finally, widespread public perceptions that banks
and bankers have unduly guided and profited from recovery measures—
reflecting that, as Illinois Senator Richard Durbin put it, they ‘are still the
most powerful lobby on Capitol Hill’ and ‘frankly own the place’ (Yakabuski
2010)—can harm confidence in public institutions, acceptance of needed
policies, and the political careers of incumbents. Addressing such percep-
tions is, therefore, potentially a high political priority, arguably for reasons
both good and bad.
While some of these issues lie outside our areas of expertise, we offer three
comments. First, for individuals whose actions, while working in the financial
sector, may have helped cause the crisis, punishment for wrongdoing other
than breaking specific laws that were in existence at the time is generally
unlikely, given legal bars and social norms against ex post facto punishment.
This lack of punishment is not entirely to be regretted, given how the political
power to impose ex post facto punishment could potentially be misused.
Second, using nominally prospective taxes to punish wrongdoing institu-
tions (or, rather, the people associated with such institutions) for past acts
runs into two distinct types of difficulties under the theory of tax incidence.
In illustration, suppose that a bank fee like that proposed by the Obama
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administration, or a financial transaction tax like that proposed by Jeffrey
Sachs, is enacted, not just to address market actors’ incentives on a forward-
looking basis—although, as we will discuss below, this is an important ratio-
nale for both proposals—but also in response to banks’ past wrongdoing. In
either case, banks would have to remit money to the government that—all
else being equal—would reduce their profitability, and thus the value of their
shares.
Suppose initially that the banks actually bear this tax in the form of reduced
profitability (until the banking sector shrinks), rather than being able to pass it
on to transactional counter-parties such as their customers. This would
adversely affect the value of the banks’ shares, imposing a transition loss on
their shareholders at the time when the tax was announced (or became more
fully anticipated). These, however, may not be the same shareholders as those
who benefited from the earlier run-up in stock prices that may have resulted
from the banks’ increasing their profits through socially reckless ‘heads we
win, tails you lose’ bets or other misconduct.
Alternatively, some or the entire incidence of the new tax might fall on the
banks’ transactional counter-parties after it has taken effect. For example,
depositors might face higher fees or lower interest returns, or customers of
the banks’ stock dealer businesses might face higher transaction costs. Even if
this was appropriate in terms of properly aligning people’s incentives, it would
clearly have no retributive rationale. The precise nature of the tax will affect
who ends up bearing its burden. For example, a tax levied only on large
domestic financial institutions is more likely to be borne by these institutions’
shareholders, as this set of institutions will be less likely successfully to recoup
the tax liability by raising its prices, given that competitors (small domestic
and foreign) do not face the same tax.
Third, a tax that, as a political matter, was most easily rationalized or sold on
retributive grounds (especially given banks’ political power) might indepen-
dently prove to have desirable features from an efficiency standpoint. Properly
aligning incentives is only one example of how this could happen. Purely
backward-looking taxes are inherently non-distorting with regard to future
decisions,5 other than to the extent that they influence perceptions of future
policy—admittedly, an important potential consideration. Moreover, if it
were to turn out that existing financial firms enjoy rents, a tax on those
rents is in principle non-distorting (and would be borne by the firms’ share-
holders, though not necessarily those on hand when any earlier wrongdoing
occurred).
5 Backward-looking taxes are, however, not the least distortionary way to raise revenue in
comparison to an appropriately designed Pigouvian tax.
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6.3 Looking forwards
6.3.1 Lessons of the financial crisis
Whether or not income taxation played a significant role in causing or ex-
acerbating the 2008 financial crisis, new tax instruments might conceivably
be part of the regulatory response to lessons learned about how to reduce the
chance of future crises. To evaluate this possibility, it is useful to begin by
reviewing how the financial sector’s economic and regulatory structure may
have contributed to events.
As noted above, the financial crisis emerged as a consequence of numerous
financial firms’ potential or actual solvency when housing prices collapsed at
the end of the boom-and-bubble period, leaving these firms with huge losses
on their highly leveraged bets against such a decline. In the case of a different
set of firms, thismight havemattered only to their shareholders, creditors, and
employees. However, because of the important role that financial firms play in
the United States and world economy, the distress ended up being transmitted
far more broadly. Accordingly, an enquiry into the possible tax-policy impli-
cations of lessons learned requires the examination of two distinct questions:
why the firms made these risky bets (and conceivably might do so again), and
why the systemic effects of their losses proved so large and widespread.
6.3.2 Incentive problems in the financial sector
Varying explanations have been offered for financial firms’ so widely follow-
ing ‘nickels in front of a steamroller’ strategies, under which one earns extra-
normal returns most of the time but occasionally experiences dramatic losses
(Duarte et al. 2005). For example, some have blamed irrational exuberance
and herd behaviour, arguably key components of asset price bubbles, as dis-
cussed, for example, by Shiller (2005). Whatever role such factors played,
however, it is clear that key actors also had economic incentives to behave
as they did.
With limited liability at the entity level, shareholders of financial firms
could potentially benefit from placing risky bets on the real estate market
under which they would capture profits on the upside but escape bearing
losses on the downside. For example, AIG, bywriting tens of billions of dollars’
worth of insurance against mortgage defaults that would occur in large num-
bers if and only if housing prices steeply declined, ‘guaranteed that the very
problem being insured against—a systemic decline—would prevent the un-
derwriters of the insurance frommaking good when the problemmaterialized’
(Acharya and Richardson 2009: 206). This potentially created expected firm-
level profits even if the bets, analysed properly in the light of the tail risk, had a
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negative expected return. And this is true even without factoring in the
chance of some kind of government bailout in the event of a steep housing-
market decline.
Making things worse, financial firms’ managers frequently had economic
incentives to follow the ‘nickels in front of a steamroller’ strategy, even if the
expected return to shareholders was negative. Reflecting the widespread quest
for ‘alpha’, the ability to generate extraordinary expected returns, and the
rarity of true alpha, firms designed high-powered incentive compensation
schemes that in practice rewarded the creation of ‘fake alpha’—investments
that earned apparently extraordinary returns in normal circumstances but
that bore substantial tail risk (Rajan 2008).
Thus, in the period leading up to the financial crisis, ‘bankers were increas-
ingly paid through short-term cash bonuses based on volume and on marked-
to-market profits, rather than on the long-term profitability of their bets’
(Acharya and Richardson 2009: 206–7). Managers could also anticipate not
being held personally liable for the consequences of making bad decisions, so
long as one could claim that they reflected a defensible business judgement.
These incentives were evidently so compelling that, even as the housing
market began to decline in mid-2006, many financial firms kept on placing
multi-billion-dollar bets on the real estate market that generated millions of
dollars in immediate bonuses for the managers who were placing them.
The incentive problems associated with limited liability and high-powered
yet overly short-term and otherwise poorly designed executive compensation
packages are not, of course, limited to the financial sector. However, three key
factors appear to have made the social payoff here especially toxic. First,
financial firms may have technological ‘advantages’ over others in placing
huge, negative-return bets on which others bear much of the downside.
Especially in the modern financial world with its wide range of multi-billion-
dollar, unregulated derivatives markets, and with the spread of techniques for
evading regulatory oversight, such firms are well positioned to place huge
bets, with only limited capital, that are difficult for others to observe, much
less understand and evaluate.
Second, for reasons we discuss below, the downside of insolvency from the
realization of tail risk was often not as bad for financial firms and their
managers as in other sectors of the economy. Banks with federal deposit
insurance, and other financial firms that had implicit insurance from the
prospect of being bailed out, if necessary, such as on the ground that they
were ‘too big to fail’, could take undue risks with the knowledge that, if they
become insolvent, theymight have their capital replenished and be allowed to
continue operating.
Third, if proper incentives were fully in place, banks and other financial
firms would probably be more cautious than other types of firms in accepting
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tail risk, not less. As we discuss next, their fundamental business model can
make even the mere suspicion, among investors and other counter-parties,
that they face insolvency risk potentially a self-fulfilling prophecy. This dan-
ger creates both firm-level and industry-wide sensitivity to risk that is not
generally matched in other sectors of the economy. Since this is tied to their
broader role in the economy, we discuss it further in the next section.
6.3.3 Broader economic role of the financial sector
When managers of publicly traded companies make costly errors, such as by
placing risky bets that end up generating huge losses, it is always bad news
for somebody. For example, a given firm’s shareholders, creditors, employees,
and customers may be adversely affected if managerial recklessness leads to
insolvency. Often, though, the broader macroeconomic harm is limited.
Moreover, many of the adversely affected parties may have some ability and
incentive to protect themselves, thus further limiting the need for govern-
ment intervention.
Financial firms are in some respects different, however, reflecting their
broader economic role and the consequent harm that they can do even to
people who are not in a contractual relationship with them. Ex post, this can
lead to the compelling policy reasons for financial rescue that helped to
motivate the massive government interventions of 2008 and 2009. It also
greatly matters ex ante, however, because it is desirable to minimize the
chance that neither costly bailouts nor the macroeconomic harm that they
seek to contain will ever be realized.
Fundamentally, banks—and increasingly, other financial firms that are
legally classified as dealers, traders, or insurance companies—supply the
liquidity that both consumers and businesses need, by providing payment
systems that are generally needed for non-cash transactions to occur. They do
so by intermediating between two distinct groups with mismatched prefer-
ences (D. J. Elliott 2010b). The first consists of investors with savings that they
want to invest in a safe and highly liquid manner, permitting them to with-
draw cash whenever they like. The second consists of businesses that want to
use this pool of savings to fund investment projects that may be riskier and are
more long term, requiring a relatively illiquid commitment of funds.
Without the intermediating function, ‘depositors would have to accept
the near-zero or even negative return that [otherwise] would be available’
(D. J. Elliott 2010b: 2). Business investors, meanwhile, would face relative
capital scarcity and have to paymuch higher interest rates ‘if the only funding
sources were pension plans and others with truly long-term investment hor-
izons’ (D. J. Elliott 2010b: 2). But, at least in the short run, banks’ role in
supplying payment systems is potentially even more important. A wide range
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of ordinary business and consumer transactions rely on these systems, and
potentially will not take place if they are disrupted.
To perform their intermediating role between depositors and business in-
vestors, financial firms must be able to meet the depositors’ ongoing cash
demands, despite having loaned funds that therefore are not readily available
in the short term (and may require fire sales to access). Keeping a reasonable
amount of capital on hand helps, and can ensure that, under normal condi-
tions, both random and specifically predictable variations in investors’ daily
cash withdrawal demands will pose no problem for a given financial firm.
Even the best-managed bank in the world, however, makes promises of imme-
diate cash access to its investors that it simply cannot keep if too many of
them act on these promises at the same time.
This phenomenon is known, of course, as a run on the bank. While it
should never happen to any well-managed bank with adequate capital in
hand under ordinary circumstances, it can happen to any bank, anywhere
and at any time, if something triggers a sudden flood of investor withdrawal
requests. For example, a run may result from the spread of concern among
investors that a given bank has lost money on its investments and might face
long-term insolvency even when it is able to realize the cash value of its
investments. What is more, an investor need not believe that the bank is
long-term insolvent in order to have reason for demanding immediate liquid-
ity. All she needs to believe is that enough other investors will believe it is
potentially insolvent—or, like her, will anticipate others believing this (or
believing that it will be believed).6 An externality among investors—the race
to the bank that triggers the run on the bank—thereby potentially triggers the
broader external harm from disappearing liquidity to a national or world
economy.
Against this background, two seemingly contradictory facts about the risk of
bank runs (or the need for similarly disruptive fire sales) hold simultaneously.
First, there is no surer way to trigger a bank run than by generating large losses
that become publicly known—such as by reason of having made huge and
risky bets involving tail risk that is realized when an asset bubble collapses.
Second, even a sound and well-managed firm may be subject to a bank run,
while even one that is unsound—if it can conceal its losses and keep on
bringing in new investors—may indefinitely postpone the day of reckoning.
6 The potential for infinite regress brings to mind Keynes’s famous comment about the stock
market as a beauty contest in which one is rewarded for predicting whom others will pick as the
most beautiful, leading to a situation ‘where we devote our intelligences to anticipating what
average opinion expects the average opinion to be’ (Keynes 1936: 156). The run-on-the-bank
reverse beauty contest looks for anticipation of failure, rather than success, and is only an
exceptional, rather than a regular, phenomenon given that it has no effect on investment
returns under ordinary circumstances.
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Bernard L. Madoff Investment Securities LLCmight be (seemingly) flourishing
to this day if the financial crisis had not triggered cash demands from its
investors that exceeded its on-hand liquid capital.
To clarify thinking about this, suppose initially that there were just one
financial firm, with transparent finances, supplying liquidity for the entire
world economy. If this firm failed, the resulting economic harm would go
beyond the specific cash loss to creditors (such as depositors) to include the
lost surplus from transactions that depended on the liquidity it had been
supplying—potentially leading to the vast welfare loss associated with a global
recession or depression. Given the assumed transparency, a bank runwould be
triggered as soon as the firm incurred losses—or perhaps even risked incurring
them—but otherwise would probably require some other sort of extraordinary
triggering event (for example, a currency crisis).
Add non-transparent company finances and a multiplicity of financial
firms, and the problem gets a lot more difficult. Now beliefs about firm
solvency that could trigger a bank run are potentially more volatile, and new
information about one firm may affect beliefs about others. For example, if
one firm’s losses come to light, investors may conclude—with considerable
reason, though it would not matter even if they were wrong—that others are
likely to have suffered losses as well, whether from following similar strategies
or from counter-party risk in their transactional interrelationships.
In short, there is substantial potential for inter-firm contagion. However,
the determinants of such contagion (both who spreads it andwho contracts it)
are complex and multifaceted. Relevant factors may include firm liquidity,
actual and apparent solvency and riskiness, the complexity or opacity of a
given firm’s financial positions, its size or market share, its interconnectedness
with other firms, and beliefs about its managers (including about their acu-
men, honesty, and political clout).
Explicit deposit insurance, and softer expectations that important (such as
‘too big to fail’) financial firms will be rescued out if necessary, help to reduce
bank runs and the associated harms, but do so in exchange for worsening the
firms’ investment incentives by making losses less painful to the managers
and shareholders. The prospect of rescue conditioned on the risk of major
economic distress may also cause firms actually to prefer large prospective
calamities to small ones. As Weder di Mauro (2010) points out, ‘a driver does
not have an incentive to be involved in a big accident [rather than a small
one], a financial institution does’.
Even where these government backups are operating, however, substantial
harm beyond the bailout cost may result when financial firms suffer losses,
both from interim uncertainty about the scope of coverage and delay in
restoring lost liquidity. If, at the same time, perceived wealth and therefore
consumer demand are independently plunging, because of the collapse of the
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same asset bubbles that triggered the financial firms’ losses, the liquidity shock
may end up doing even greater harm than it would have done otherwise—
although it may also end up being mistakenly over-blamed for the jointly
caused macroeconomic harm.
6.3.4 Optimal government response to financial firm externalities: available
tools and the role of taxation
As we saw above, excessive and unwise risk taking by financial firms triggered
large losses that had huge negative externalities that extended not only to the
federal government’s bailout costs, but to the massive social costs of triggering
or worsening a global recession. Financial firms that were crippled by the
realization of tail risk imposed these costs on society not just directly but
through a process of contagion that undermined the financial sector gener-
ally. Looking forward, one would like to prevent current and future financial
firms and their managers from similarly imposing harm on the rest of society.
The good news is that we have sharp theoretical tools for analysing the
optimal social response to externalities, deployed most prominently in the
economic literature concerning environmental externalities from pollution
and climate change. In environmental policy, no less than government inter-
vention in the financial sector, the traditional approach was regulatory com-
mand, in the form of requiring or banning particular behaviour by private
actors. This approach came to be criticized, however, by economists who,
building on the work of Arthur Pigou (1928), argued that it made too little
use of market mechanisms that could improve efficiency in the achievement
of regulatory objectives.
In theory, regulatory command can achieve optimal results if regulators
have the right incentives and sufficient information. Thus, suppose they
could design limits on pollution emission that ensured that firms would
pollute only when the correctly measured benefits of doing so, compared to
all alternatives, exceeded the social harm. In practice, however, even if cen-
tralized regulators have the right incentives to seek optimal rules, they often
lack the particularized information about firms’ alternatives that would be
needed to prescribe by general rule the socially optimal decision in each case.
Firms are likely to have better information about their own choices, and thus
may be expected to do a better job of optimizing if a mechanism can be found
for properly aligning their incentives. Hence the above makes the case for
using another tool, Pigouvian taxation, when it can be properly designed.
Suppose that regulated firms know much more about the costs of changing
pollution than does the regulator. Ordinarily, theymay have incentives not to
reveal that information. If, however, they are charged a pollution tax, equal to
the expected marginal harm that they cause through their actions (Kaplow
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and Shavell 2002), they will use that information to optimize pollution deci-
sions that the regulator would have got wrong by reason of its being effectively
‘compelled to treat firms the same when in fact they differ’ in dimensions that
it cannot observe (Christiansen and Smith 2009: 2).
Thus, consider global warming. An enforceable carbon tax, set properly and
applying globally, would give businesses the incentive to set carbon emissions
at exactly the right level, given the tradeoff between the value consumers
place on the associated economic production and the costs imposed by
changing the world’s climate. Obviously, in practice, even if all countries
(and the relevant political actors in each country) were willing to cooperate
fully, setting the tax price properly would be extremely difficult.7 In principle,
however, assuming a particular answer to the set of valuation questions, there
is a ‘correct’ carbon tax per unit of carbon emission, applying uniformly across
the world because all carbon is identical.
A perfectly functioning carbon tax of this kind eliminates all need for the
use of regulatory command with respect to carbon emissions. Unfortunately,
however, things are not always so simple (or, rather, the complications are not
always confined to valuing an output that is at least globally uniform). Con-
sider alcohol consumption, which at moderate levels may ‘be fairly harmless
while heavy drinking by some individuals generates large and progressively-
increasing externalities’ (Christiansen and Smith 2009: 6). Thus, a uniform tax
per unit of alcohol consumed would fail to generate the Pigouvian optimum.
Moreover, while in principle one could try to differentiate the tax appropri-
ately, applying non-linear taxes (even to the same consumer) based on a full
assessment of the broader circumstances, in practice this might be infeasible
or overly costly to implement. These difficulties may cause the use of regu-
latory command, such as restrictions on where and when alcohol can be sold,
to be preferable to attempting full reliance on Pigouvian taxation.
6.3.5 Pigouvian taxation of the financial sector
In principle, this analysis clearly applies to a financial firm that makes invest-
ments with significant downside risk. Thus, it is worth asking what costs an
optimal Pigouvian tax would require the firm to take into account. Relevant
items would include the expected costs to (1) uninsured counter-parties from
firm insolvency, (2) taxpayers and beneficiaries of government programmes,
7 The obstacles to setting the carbon tax properly would include (1) the broad empirical
uncertainty in climate models, (2) the difficulty of measuring the welfare cost even of
determinate climate effects, and (3) questions of how to make trade-offs between the welfare of
individuals in very different circumstances (such as people in rich versus poor or advanced versus
underdeveloped countries, or the members of current versus future generations), if any
distributional effects are not offset by any other policy, including tax, changes.
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present and future, who would be worse off to the extent the government
offered explicit or implicit insurance coverage, and (3) anyone else directly or
indirectly affected by the heightened prospect of runs on the bank (at the
same firm or elsewhere) and/or of the negative economic consequences from
the associated harm to the liquidity function that banks and other financial
firms serve in facilitating transactions that generate surplus.
Unfortunately, an optimal Pigouvian tax on financial firms could not, like
an optimal carbon tax, simply apply a simple flat rate to a distinct output.
There is no single activity whose aggregate sum equals expected harm. Indeed,
many distinct aspects of financial institutions’ activities may have negative
externalities, including those that affect:




 size or market share;
 interconnectedness.
Thus, both the activities of a firm and various aspects of its relations with other
firms may matter.8 And, even once an activity is identified, the optimal
corrective tax (or subsidy) is unlikely to be uniform. Rather, it seems likely to
be, not only firm-activity specific and firm-size specific, but also state specific.
If the insurance protection that the government offered was so certain,
comprehensive, and instantaneous as to eliminate the associated harms that
were discussed above (such as lost liquidity from bank runs that spread out-
wards via contagion), a correctly priced insurance fee might come close to
being a full Pigouvian tax. However, any gaps, delays, or uncertainties in the
coverage that caused runs on the bank still to be possible would mean that the
fee fell short of covering all the social harm from risky investments. In addi-
tion, even if bank runs and liquidity loss were now impossible, inter-firm
contagion would permit one firm’s actions to affect the expected cost to the
government of providing insurance coverage to other firms.9
8 Some recent work has tried to quantify the marginal damage, but the formulas are too
complicated to offer a plausible basis for actual legislation; see, e.g., Adrian and Brunnermeier
(2008).
9 Even if the social harm could be reduced to the fiscal cost of supplying insurance protection,
the government would hold a risky position, as the insurer of all financial firms, if its various
investment risks (such as from betting against a downturn in real estate prices) were correlated.
Thus, even with an actuarially fair fee, the insurance fund would have a large positive balance
when tail risk was realized less frequently than expected, and would leave the government with
financial exposure under the opposite scenario. Governments that, like the United States, face
long-term fiscal gaps that raise serious questions about long-term policy sustainability (see, e.g.,
Shaviro 2007; Auerbach and Gale 2009), and that are otherwise also taking ‘long’ betting positions
on the performance of their national economies through their tax and transfer systems, might
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In practice, the precise downside risk attributes of a particular financial
firm’s overall investment position are unlikely to be fully observable by tax
authorities. Thus, an actuarially fair risk-adjusted fee structure not only would
fall short of giving financial firms the right social incentives at the margin
when they make investment choices, but is unlikely to be entirely feasible.
Therefore, the key incentive problem that gave rise to the 2008 financial
crisis—excessive risk-taking by firms andmanagers that did not face the entire
downside—will probably remain even if a fairly well-designed tax instrument
is adopted.
For two distinct reasons, therefore, the tool of regulatory command is likely
to continue being necessary, in addition to any tax instruments that are
adopted. First, expected social harm, other than the purely pecuniary to the
government as insurer, is multidimensional and difficult to measure. Second,
even that pecuniary harm cannot be measured entirely accurately through a
risk-adjusted fee. Thus, the classic tax-or-regulation debate is surely beside the
point with respect to financial institutions, because regulation of the financial
sector both is not going away, and should not. In particular, capital-adequacy
regulations will surely continue to be necessary (D. J. Elliott 2010a), and
indeed must presumably be improved and made harder to avoid given their
failure in many cases during the period leading up to the financial crisis.
Given, however, the multidimensional character of systemic risk, multiple
tax and/or regulatory instruments are likely to be needed.
A risk-adjusted tax or fee for government insurance coverage, even if imper-
fect, clearly can play a positive role within this framework of multidimen-
sional response, by addressing one of the central externalities when such
coverage is provided. It might improve financial firms’ incentives to a degree
if it tended to go up when they increased riskiness in observable ways. More-
over, setting the fee at the right (average) level for financial firms as a whole,
even if it was not correct at the margin case by case, would have the advantage
of eliminating the net subsidy to the sector that otherwise would exist by
reason of the insurance coverage. All else being equal, this net subsidy other-
wise would cause the financial sector to be too large.10
The following are some key principles to keep in mind when designing such
a tax or fee:
 It should recognize the wide variety of activities that come under the
umbrella of the financial sector. Otherwise, financial firms could
reasonably consider this a detriment, unless fully reflected in the pricing for the insurance
coverage.
10 Note that many, such as Krugman (2010a), argue that the financial sector is too large for
reasons wholly apart from the subsidy.
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use excluded activities to impose downside pecuniary risk on the
government.
 It should be derivative proof, so that its intended incentive effects
could not be skirted by the creation of derivative products that
constructed the same financial positions while avoiding its application.
 Its applicability should not depend on the arbitrary designation of what
type of institution was undertaking an action—an important design
element, given that financial institutions with different designations
often perform overlapping functions and sell overlapping products.
Thus, to the extent that it is feasible, it should be activity based but
not institution based, applying automatically to any firm that performed
the banking-type functions (time intermediation and providing payment
systems) that give rise to the need for insurance protection.
 Relatedly, it would properly address predominantly non-financial firms
with financial units, such as GMAC Financial Services (now Ally
Financial), GE Finance, or GE Capital.
 The link between firms paying the tax and those getting government
insurance coverage need not be absolute. Suppose that a given
predominantly non-financial firm that also conducts financial activities is
not expressly covered, but to a degree performs banking functions.
This role might cause it to have implicit government insurance coverage
if bailout was a possibility, and also might cause its failure, if permitted
to occur, to yield the same negative externalities as a bank run at a
covered institution.
 International coordination is desirable, since negative externalities can
easily cross borders.11 Given the realities of international politics,
however, the instrument should be robust to imperfect international
coordination.
 With multiple tools being used to address financial-sector externalities,
any evaluation of the consequences of new tax legislation must be
made in the light of the regulatory environment, which is itself in flux.12
11 In this regard, think of Iceland, whose financial institutions are (actuallywere) large and imposed
costs that crossed the ocean.
12 If the quantity regulation of an activity that generates a negative externality is set optimally,
then any tax set at a rate less than or equal to themarginal social damage will raise revenue, but will
not alter behaviour from the social optimum. Such a tax is attractive because it raises revenue with
no distortion rather than because of its Pigouvian incentives. A tax set at a rate in excess of the
marginal social damage collects further revenue, but at the cost of moving the equilibrium from the
social optimum, with too little of the externality-generating activity. If the quantity regulation is
set too laxly, a tax at a rate below the implicit marginal social damage implied by the regulation will
raise revenue with nomarginal effect, while a tax in excess of that amount (but not greater than the
actual marginal social damage) will both raise revenue and affect activity in the right direction. If
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For example, a tax aimed at large institutions must be evaluated in the
light of regulations designed to limit firm size.
 The cyclical—counter or pro—nature of any state-specific tax is
potentially important. All else being equal, the tax or fee should be
designed so as not to trigger liabilities that sap funds just when the
financial firms, and the system as a whole, are most fragile.
 Given negative externalities apart from the pecuniary cost to the
government of providing insurance coverage, the amount raised by
a well-designed tax or fee could exceed expected payouts under the
coverage. Moreover, if the government creates a resolution fund to make
insurance payouts as needed and decides to credit that fund with the
revenues received, it should not cease to collect the tax even if the fund
reaches a predetermined size that is considered big enough to meet any
expected obligations. The need to address financial firms’ risk-taking
incentives is ongoing and entirely separate from that of whether, in the
aggregate, they are paying for the full expected value of their insurance
coverage.
Given that even imperfect Pigouvian taxation could improve incentives to a
degree, in so far as it was able to put a price on some aspects of externality-
imposing behaviour, we next examine several alternative tax proposals that
have recently been made or discussed regarding the financial sector.
6.4 Tax proposals
In this section we apply the preceding analysis to assess recent proposals for
new taxes on financial institutions or certain financial activities. We focus on
four proposals: a financial transaction tax, a tax on bonuses, and two types of
taxes on financial institutions: an excise-tax-like levy that might fall on excess
profits, and the financial activities tax (FAT) discussed by the IMF in its
preliminary response to the G20 request noted in Section 6.1.
Before we get to the details, a fewwords of background are in order. First, the
proposals generally have multiple motivations and objectives. Thus, although
the effect on the incentives of financial institutions and other market partici-
pants are of concern (à la Pigouvian taxes), revenue-raising and retributive
motivations are also apparent. Second, although in theory (meaning absent
administration, implementation, and political economy issues) an appropriate
the quantity regulation is set too strictly, a tax raises revenue without affecting behaviour; neither
would a subsidy offset the suboptimal level of activity, although it would incur a revenue loss.
Shackelford, Shaviro, and Slemrod
164
This is an open access version of the publication distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-
NoDerivs licence (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/), which permits non-commercial reproduction and distribution of 
the work, in any medium, provided the original work is not altered or transformed in any way, and that the work is properly cited. For 
commercial re-use, please contact academic.permissions@oup.com 
Pigouvian tax would be highly complex, in practice only relatively simple
policies are on the table.
6.4.1 Financial transactions tax (FTT)
The idea of a tax on some set of financial transactions has been around for a
while, and certainly pre-dates the policy reform agenda triggered by the 2008
financial crisis. In a world without derivatives, the tax base would be the
amounts for which specified financial assets were sold. Modern versions of
the proposal also include in the tax base the notional value or spot price of the
assets referenced in transactions involving derivative securities.
Some proponents of an FTT eye the revenue potential, which looks large
relative to the required rates of tax. The economic arguments in support of
imposing such a tax centre instead on its ability, by increasing the costs of
financial asset transactions, to reduce speculative and technical trading that
increases financial markets’ volatility and susceptibility to bubbles. These
issues are certainly related to the financial crisis, and are therefore worth
taking seriously. Although a comprehensive review of the literature is beyond
the scope of this chapter, we think it fair to say that theoretical studies have
not led to conclusive results about the veracity of the claimed benefits, and
that the empirical literature also does not support the claim that an increase in
transaction costs (through higher taxes or other mechanisms) generally im-
proves market functioning (Hemmelgarn and Nicodeme 2010). Instead, its
main effects may include (1) raising the costs of capital for entities issuing new
securities, (2) through its downward effect on trading volume, reducing liquid-
ity and price discovery, while also potentially increasing short-term price
volatility, and (3) displacing securities trades from taxed to untaxed venues
(Matheson 2010: 29).
An FTT is an unlikely candidate as a retributive tax, given its uncertain
incidence, as well as its likely ineffectiveness at retrospectively targeting
those who caused, or profited from, the 2008 financial crisis. Thus, in the
end its principal appeal may lie in the large amount of revenue it can raise,
relative to the tax rate, if not so widely avoided (such as by using derivatives or
moving securities trades to untaxed venues) that even in this respect it ends up
being merely a ‘damp squib’ (Honohan and Yoder 2010: 23).
To say that an FTT (if sufficiently airtight) might raise substantial revenue,
relative to its tax rate, is merely another way of saying that its tax base is at
least nominally large. Supporters often tie this feature to the oft-quoted tax
policy mantra favouring ‘broad-based, low-rate’ taxes over narrow-base, high-
rate taxes. But the logic behind this mantra does not apply to any and all
broad-base taxes, regardless of their underlying efficiency properties. Thus, for
example, economically well-informed proponents of retail sales taxes
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generally agree that ‘broadening’ the base by including business-to-business
sales, rather than just those to consumers, and thus creating a gross receipts (or
turnover) tax, would reduce, rather than increase, economic efficiency, by
generating a cascading tax on economic production by multiple non-
integrated firms.
The FTT similarly imposes a cascading tax, largely on business-to-business
sales. While the cascading base allows a lower rate to raise more revenue than
would an equal-rate tax on, say, income, that is simply because it penalizes the
use of separate firms. We thus are sceptical that the case for an FTT is any
stronger than that for a gross receipts tax,13 although we note that the latter
instrument has come back in fashion as a revenue-raising tool for certain US
states.
6.4.2 Bonus Tax
Both the United Kingdom and France introduced temporary taxes on bonus
payments to employees in the financial sector. Under the British levy, called
the Bank Payroll Tax, bonus payments in excess of £25,000 were taxed at a rate
of 50 per cent on a temporary basis; the measure expired as of 5 April 2010.
The French tax was similar in rate and threshold, and applied to bonuses paid
during the 2009 accounting year. In May of 2010, Senator Jim Webb (D-VA)
offered an amendment to the US financial reform bill under debate that would
impose a one-time, 50 per cent tax on bonuses of more than $400,000 paid to
executives of Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, and other financial institutions that
got at least $5 billion from the Troubled Asset Relief Program Congress
approved in 2008. The proposed bonus tax would apply to income generated
for work in 2009 and paid in 2010.
If expected to recur, a tax on bonuses is an invitation to avoidance, given
the difficulty of ascertaining and monitoring what part of compensation is in
fact a ‘bonus’. This is, of course, not an issue for a tax applied retroactively—
that is, before the characterization had tax-liability implications. As a one-
time, ex post measure, it has the economic advantage of being non-distorting.
Of more political salience but uncertain economic accuracy, it could be per-
ceived as exacting a penalty from those individuals whose mistakes helped
precipitate the crisis and who nevertheless profited in its build-up and from
the taxpayer-financed bailouts that accompanied it. However, a retrospective
tax on bonuses is certainly a blunt instrument for assessing a tax on this kind
of culpability.
13 One could possibly argue for some kind of FTT as a form of presumptive tax on tax-non-
compliant businesses in the informal sector, especially if it is creditable against income tax or VAT
liability. But this is a separate objective from those that we address in this chapter.
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The retrospective nature of the British and French bonus taxes made the
placement of the obligation to remit the amount due critical to its incidence,
as there can be no ex post adjustment ofmarket prices in reaction to a one-time
tax. Because both the British and French bonus taxes were to be remitted by the
employer, the burden would be likely to be borne by shareholders, rather than
by the employeeswho received the bonuses,14 and thus did not assign penalties
across individuals according to culpability, even if one assumes that receiving a
bonus is a good proxy for culpability.
6.4.3 Levies on financial institutions
On 14 January 2010, the Obama administration proposed a levy of 0.15 per
cent on a base equal to liabilities, excluding deposits subject to assessments by
the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (for banks) and certain liabilities
related to insurance policies. The fee would apply only to firms with consoli-
dated assets that exceed $50 billion, of which there were about sixty firms in
2010. The administration estimated that such a fee would collect $90 billion
from 2011 to 2020, which would go into general revenues to offset the
estimated cost of the 2008 bailout fund, and then expire. The Senate bill
initially contained a provision collecting $50 billion from financial firms
and setting the money aside to fund future bailouts. On 31 March 2010, the
German government announced plans to introduce a levy on banks with a
base of liabilities excluding capital and deposits, and a rate that depends on
some measure of systemic risk; details of the risk-varying premium have not
yet been released. In contrast to the US proposal, the revenue from the levy
would be paid into a stability fund that would finance a resolution regime for
systemically relevant banks. The French government has announced it will
soon release its own plan, and on 1 April 2010 German Chancellor Merkel said
that Germany and the United Kingdom would work together to propose a
bank levy to the G20 countries. However, news reports suggest that there is
substantial opposition to such a levy, including fromAustralia, Brazil, Canada,
and Japan (Davis 2010). In addition, there are proposals before the US Con-
gress for a systemic dissolution fund, facilitating the liquidation of large and
significant financial institutions that become insolvent, and funded by a
variable assessment fee. The rate would depend on several factors, possibly
reflecting some measure of risk, but the relevant details have not yet been
settled or announced.
14 We assume that the employment contracts between affected financial firms and the
employees who received bonuses did not provide that compensation would be adjusted to reflect
new firm-level taxes such as the bonus tax.
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These proposals differ on a number of dimensions:
 Is the base uninsured liabilities, or does it also include insured deposits? The
former base provides a disincentive for banks to fund risky lending and
investments with less stable funding. Insured deposits presumably are
safe in this respect, but, on the other hand, one still does not want banks
to make risky bets with these funds based on a ‘heads we win, tails you
lose’ rationale.
 Is the rate risk weighted or flat? If it is risk weighted, what are the risk factors
and how are they measured? The Pigouvian logic supports the use of risk
weighting to measure flexibly the marginal social damage of the activities
of a financial institution. But here the devil is in the details, and the
difficulty of measuring risk factors accurately and transparently.
 Is the tax remitted entirely ex ante, or are there also ex post clawbacks within
the resolution process? The former would reduce the pro-cyclicality of
the levy, except to the extent that any risk weighting triggers higher tax
liability just when financial institutions are most fragile.
 Are the revenues paid into a resolution fund, or do they go into general revenues?
If the former, do the revenues effectively constrain the size of future bailouts?
This is not relevant to the incentive effects and efficiency properties of
the tax unless the designation of such a fund affects the credibility of a
bailout. More crucial is whether the premiums need not be paid once
the fund reaches a certain amount. This would almost certainly be
inappropriate, as the social cost of risky behaviour does not go to zero
when the fund reaches an essentially arbitrary size.
 How does a liability tax interact with mandated regulatory capital?
Maintaining regulatory capital is costly because it limits the amounts of
funds that the bank can invest. Moreover, the amount of required
capital is increasing in the riskiness of the bank. Similarly, a tax on the
bank’s liabilities is a tax on invested funds and it can be structured to be
increasing in the riskiness of the bank—for example, exempting insured
deposits is an example of taking the bank’s risk into account in
determining the base for the liability tax. Thus, raising the amount of
required regulatory capital and levying a liability tax are substitutes for
reducing bank risk and should be coordinated.
The IMF (2010b) report proposes a new tax on financial institutions, called a
financial activities tax (FAT), whose base is profits (in excess of a ‘normal’
return) plus worker compensation above a per-employee threshold.15 The
report argues that this would approximate taxing rents, and therefore invokes
15 Kleinbard and Edgar (2010) suggested a similar levy, with a similar justification.
Shackelford, Shaviro, and Slemrod
168
This is an open access version of the publication distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-
NoDerivs licence (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/), which permits non-commercial reproduction and distribution of 
the work, in any medium, provided the original work is not altered or transformed in any way, and that the work is properly cited. For 
commercial re-use, please contact academic.permissions@oup.com 
the efficiency arguments for rent taxation.16 Kleinbard and Edgar (2010) stress
that the recent extraordinary profits in the financial sector must have been
due either to luck or to temporarily successful risk taking, and that either
account would suggest the identification of a low-distortion tax base.17 They
argue that such an excess profits tax would also mitigate risk taking that is
socially excessive because, as discussed earlier, the losses from bad outcomes
are often borne by people other than shareholders.18 In effect, apparently
extraordinary profits serve as a proxy for identifying inappropriate tail risk.
From this perspective the FAT could be considered as a backup, for flaws in the
regulations designed to limit risk taking. To the end of 2010, however, as
stressed elsewhere in this chapter, the optimal coordination of tax and regu-
latory policies had not been adequately addressed.
IMF (2010b: 20) notes several non-trivial issues of implementation that
would need to be worked out before a FAT is introduced. To these we might
add the difficulty of establishing a ‘perimeter’ for its application. Predomi-
nantly non-financial corporations with significant financial operations would
presumably not be subject to the FAT, in order to minimize the administrative
and compliance costs. However, leaving similar activities out of the FAT base
would encourage migration of these activities to ‘non-financial’ firms, thus
distorting the structure of the true financial sector and potentially undermin-
ing advancement of the regulatory aims.
6.5 Conclusions
Multiple motives underlie the post-crisis flurry of proposals to levy new taxes
on financial institutions or their transactions:
1. a desire for retribution or recompense from parties deemed to have
caused, and/or profited from, the 2008 crisis;
16 They also argue that, appropriately designed, it could offset the usually favourable treatment
afforded financial institutions under VAT. While this argument does not directly apply to the
United States, which does not have VAT, the consumption value of financial services (such as those
provided on low-interest, low-fee personal checking accounts) typically also escapes income
taxation, both in the United States and elsewhere.
17 This argument addresses the fact that a tax on pure profits or rents in any sector has desirable
efficiency properties, but in practice it is difficult to separate pure profits or rents from the normal
return to capital, and so designing a non-distorting tax is difficult. If one can assert that most of the
observed return in a given sector is rent or pure profit, then the potential distorting effect per dollar
raised is arguably low.
18 In view of the argument of Domar and Musgrave (1944), such a tax would reduce risk taking
only given that the tax treatment of losses is punitively asymmetric. Otherwise, a tax on profits
might induce decision-makers to increase pre-tax risk positions in order to restore the after-tax
positions they had in absence of the tax. Note also that ex post increases in the generosity of the tax
treatment of losses is a form of taxpayer bailout.
Taxation and the Financial Sector
169
This is an open access version of the publication distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-
NoDerivs licence (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/), which permits non-commercial reproduction and distribution of 
the work, in any medium, provided the original work is not altered or transformed in any way, and that the work is properly cited. For 
commercial re-use, please contact academic.permissions@oup.com 
2. a desire to align private incentives with the social cost of activities that
demonstrably have potentially catastrophic external contagion effects,
so as to reduce the likelihood of future crises; and
3. a desire to raise revenue to offset the government fiscal imbalances exacer-
bated by the cost of dealing with the financial crisis and subsequent
recession.
The appropriate tax scheme greatly differs depending on themotive, although
most proposals seek to serve more than one.
Economic analysis can clarify what design elements are more likely to
achieve which goals. The theory of incidence is relevant for ascertaining
whether the burden of new taxes will actually fall on those intended to bear
the burden, and cautions that—political rhetoric aside—burdens are not
borne by legal entities such as corporations, but by people. Backward-looking
taxes cannot be shifted, and thus the remitter of the tax is crucial, but for
forward-looking taxes the scope of the tax matters as well as the alternatives
the market participants have to the taxed activity. The large literature on
Pigouvian taxation is helpful, but has mostly been applied to environmental
externalities, which are different in important ways from the type of negative
externalities generated by financial activity. For example, the latter are likely
to be institution specific and state specific. Measuring the marginal cost is
difficult—although perhaps no more so than in the case of climate change—
and thus the theoretically optimal Pigouvian levy is difficult to calculate, may
be difficult to administer and monitor, and is difficult to implement in a
transparent and explainable way. Simple versions of the theoretical optima
should perhaps be designed, but they are likely to be imperfect.
It is true that taxes, as opposed to most regulations, raise revenue, andmany
countries affected by the financial crisis are in a dire long-term fiscal situation.
Yet taxes on financial institutions and activities are not the only way to raise
revenue. Thus, as usual, the issue is whether these ways of raising revenue are
less damaging (or even more supportive) to the economy, with more favour-
able equity consequences, than likely alternatives.
We conclude that, with regard to financial transactions taxes, the answer to
this question is no. The efficiency cost is likely to be high relative to the
revenue raised, given the lack of any good evidence that it improves incentives
or addresses externalities in any clearly identifiable respect. The allure of its
low rate relative to revenue potential is illusory, and its incidence is uncertain.
One-time, backward-looking taxes on bonuses above a threshold have min-
imal efficiency costs, and might even be approximately on the mark in asses-
sing a retributive penalty if collected from employees rather than firms.
Forward-looking bonus taxes would be difficult to administer, however, and
the case that they would improve incentives is hard to make.
Shackelford, Shaviro, and Slemrod
170
This is an open access version of the publication distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-
NoDerivs licence (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/), which permits non-commercial reproduction and distribution of 
the work, in any medium, provided the original work is not altered or transformed in any way, and that the work is properly cited. For 
commercial re-use, please contact academic.permissions@oup.com 
A graduated tax on the uninsured bank liabilities of large financial institu-
tions would potentially provide a socially desirable disincentive for risky
investment backed by less stable funding. Penalizing larger corporations
would be desirable in so far as they pose larger systemic risks to the economy,
although the relationship between size and such risk is not entirely clear. Such
a tax would probably be borne by shareholders and other constituencies of the
larger institutions at the time when enactment first became generally ex-
pected. Loosely tying the revenue from such a tax to a resolution fund
would not necessarily add substantiality to the credibility of pledges about
how and when tomake use of such a fund (for example, if rescue was expected
in any event), and could be damaging if it led to dismantling of the tax once
the fund had reached an arbitrarily determined size.
A tax on financial firms’ profits in excess of a normal return (plus worker
compensation above a per-employee threshold) has potential appeal despite
historical scepticism in the literature concerning the general merits of excess
profits taxes. In this setting, an excess profits tax could be rationalized either as
primarily reaching rents or as indirectly indicating the presence of tail risk that
is an externality from the firms’ (or their employees’) standpoint. However,
the merit and applicability of these arguments remain uncertain, and
imposing such a tax would also pose various design challenges, including
whether and how to apply it to what are effectively financial firms nestled
inside larger firms outside the recognized financial sector.
Future research should be directed towards sharpening the applicability of
the Pigouvian framework to the case of financial-sector externalities. In par-
ticular, the optimal coordination of regulation and corrective taxation should
be explored in more depth. US Treasury Secretary Geithner describes the
administration’s proposed fee as being designed to ‘complement’ regulatory
policies (Geithner 2010), and the IMF (2010b: 2) remarks that any new tax
should ‘reflect and be coordinated with’ regulation, recommending a ‘more
holistic approach’ (IMF 2010b: 22). How these unexceptionable goals are best
achieved should be high on the research agenda.
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APPENDIX
An accounting legacy of the crisis
Even if income taxes were not a major proximate cause of the financial crisis, they will
play a key role going forward in the decisions of most financial institutions because
many of the tax deductions associated with the losses during the crisis have yet to result
in any cash tax savings. The realized tax losses of many such firms were large enough to
offset fully all profits in the year generated and the carry-back years. Such losses now are
being carried forward to potentially offset tax liability in future profitable years.
Besides reducing future tax payments, these net operating loss carry-forwards can
strengthen the financial institution’s current balance sheet and regulatory capital. The
carry-forwards create deferred tax assets that are included on the balance sheet and in
the computation of Tier 1 capital, the key measure used by regulators to assess a
financial institution’s capital adequacy.19 Furthermore, expenditures and losses,
which have been expensed for book purposes but not yet deducted for tax purposes,
also qualify as deferred tax assets. Of particular note for tax purposes, the bad-debt
reserve for the portion of a US bank’s loan portfolio that it does not expect to collect is
not deductible (because a tax deduction is permitted only when a specific loan is
deemed uncollectible and removed from the portfolio), but, instead, the product of
the bad-debt reserve and the tax rate is recorded as a deferred tax asset. The logic is that
the bank will pay fewer taxes in the future when the uncollectible loans are charged off.
However, to the extent that a firm is not expected ever to realize the tax savings
represented by the deferred tax asset, a valuation allowance must be established. The
valuation allowance is a ‘contra-asset’, which reduces the balance of the gross (or total)
deferred tax assets. If the firm cannot establish that it anticipates future taxable income
from one of four sources,20 then a valuation allowance is required. The valuation
allowance can be costly for financially constrained companies, the very firms for
which future taxable income is uncertain, because it reduces the firm’s net deferred
tax assets, accounting earnings, and equity.
Therefore, financially constrained companies face incentives to minimize their valu-
ation allowance. Among the four sources of income that can enable a firm to avoid a
valuation allowance, generating expected future taxable income is the most important
19 See Graham et al. (2010) for a detailed discussion of deferred tax assets and other aspects of the
accounting for income taxes.
20 The four sources are (1) future reversals of existing taxable temporary differences, (2) future
taxable income, (3) taxable income in carry-back periods, and (4) the existence of tax planning
strategies.
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means of establishing that the firm will eventually utilize the tax deductions and thus
does not need to establish a valuation allowance. One way to increase expected future
taxable income and thus reduce the valuation allowance is to shift to riskier invest-
ments. Because of the limits on the refundability of losses, riskier investments with the
same expected income generate more expected taxable income, enabling the corpora-
tion to book a smaller valuation allowance. By booking a smaller valuation allowance,
the firm boosts current accounting earnings, assets, and equity. In summary, the
accounting rules encourage many of the banks that suffered the greatest losses from
the financial crisis (and thus have the largest deferred tax assets) to take more risks than
they would without financial reporting incentives.
Regulators provide even stronger incentives for weak financial institutions to engage
in excessively risky undertakings, because they further restrict the use of deferred tax
assets as a source of regulatory capital. Regulators accept deferred tax assets, net of the
valuation allowance, as Tier 1 capital, but banks can use future taxable income only to
the extent that taxable income is expected in the next twelve months. This restriction
for regulatory capital purposes can be important. Lindo (2009) reports that a study by
the Federal Reserve Board found that, for financial accounting purposes, most banks do
not require a valuation allowance to be invoked if they anticipate taxable income in the
next two to six years, and some banks accept taxable income within ten years as
sufficient to avoid recording a valuation allowance. Thus, the more restrictive twelve-
month rule for regulatory capital purposes means that some banks avoid the valuation
allowance for book purposes but nonetheless have the deferred tax assets disallowed for
regulatory purposes. Furthermore, regulators do not permit deferred tax assets to exceed
10 per cent of Tier 1 capital. Accordingly, even if taxable income is anticipated within
the next twelve months, deferred tax assets will be disallowed to the extent they exceed
10 per cent of Tier 1 capital. Finally, if the 10 per cent of Tier 1 capital rule is binding,
any action that reduces Tier 1 capital (for example, repaying TARP funds) has an
additional adverse impact on Tier 1 capital because it also reduces the permitted
deferred tax assets.
Not surprisingly, banks have repeatedly lobbied the Federal Reserve Board to lift or
limit these two additional regulatory restrictions, as yet to no avail.21 Given that these
bank holding companies can enhance their regulatory capital simply by qualifying
their deferred tax assets for inclusion in Tier 1 capital, it seems plausible that rearran-
ging their affairs, including shifting to riskier investments, will be an attractive, rela-
tively low-cost means of capital enhancement for years to come for many US banks.
The impact of inducing the largest US banks (whose risky endeavours contributed to
the financial crisis) to engage in riskier behaviour than they might otherwise have
preferred, owing to the financial reporting and regulatory incentives surrounding the
deferred tax assets, merits attention from policy-makers.
21 However, in December 2009, state life insurance regulators did relax their treatment of
deferred tax assets by shifting from a twelve-month taxable income requirement to a thirty-six-
month taxable income requirement, and from a limit of 10 per cent of capital and surplus to a limit
of 15 per cent of capital and surplus. The immediate impact was to boost the capital of life insurers
by $11 billion by permitting previously disallowed deferred tax assets to count for regulatory
purposes.
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7
Income Tax Reform Implications
of the Financial Crisis
Daniel N. Shaviro
7.1 Introduction
Gore Vidal once stated that the four sweetest words in the English language are
‘I told you so’. Can tax experts, despite not having predicted the great financial
crisis and economic downturn that broke out in 2008, nonetheless properly
indulge in the pleasure of saying these words? The rationale would be that
defects in countries’ income-tax rules, long emphasized by the experts but
without prompting anypolicy response, helpedbring about orworsen the crisis.
In favour of the above proposition, a number of different tax rules seem
clearly to have pushed in the wrong direction at crucial margins where dam-
age ended up being done. For example:
 Excess leverage contributed to the financial crisis, and income-tax sys-
tems around the world typically encourage corporate debt finance relative
to equity finance.
 The emergence and collapse of housing bubbles also played a crucial role,
and in many countries, such as the USA, income-tax systems provided
strong tax preferences for homeownership that, at a minimum, distorted
investment patterns and may also have specifically fuelled the bubbles.
This chapter is based on a talk prepared for the conference on Tax Policy and the Financial Crisis
at Bocconi University, Milan, on 30 April 2009. I have benefited from conversations with Sam
Eddins, Michael Keen, Geoff Lloyd, Yoram Margalioth, Alex Raskolnikov, and Joel Slemrod. I am
also grateful to Julian Alworth and Giampaolo Arachi for detailed comments on an earlier draft,
and to the D’Agostino-Greenberg Fund for financial support.
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 Pervasive governance problems with respect to publicly traded companies
played a crucial role, and income-tax rules may in some settings have
exacerbated these problems.
 The proliferation of non-transparent financial instruments also helped
trigger the crisis, and tax considerations often encouraged, or at least
provided a convenient rationale, for the use of such instruments.
In short, the tax system’s ‘fingerprints’ are all over the ‘crime scene’ of the
2008 financial crisis. Suggestive though this may be, however, the actual
strength of the causal relationship between the two remains unclear, and is
thought by most observers to be relatively small. For example, in some cases
the tax biases may have been less important than other independent reasons
for behaviour that helped prompt the crisis. It is also noteworthy that differ-
ences in countries’ income-tax rules do not always seem to have been asso-
ciated with differences in outcome, as one might have expected if tax were
playing a key causal role. For example, housing bubbles were not limited to
countries with large tax preferences for homeownership.
Finally, at least one important tax distortion arguably should have leaned
against the crisis. Tax systems with graduated marginal rates or loss non-
refundability can notoriously discourage risk taking. Even if this is not gener-
ally desirable, one might think that it would have helped discourage the
excess risk taking that contributed to the crisis, if tax considerations had
generally been playing a central role. Yet there is little evidence that non-
refundability or graduated rates mattered greatly to the managers who were
taking absurd risks on behalf of publicly traded companies—although this
partly reflects the exact design of the tax rules’ risk discouragement, as distinct
from the overall importance of tax considerations.
Even if one accepts that tax distortions did not play a dominant role in
causing or exacerbating the crisis, the fact that they frequently pointed in the
wrong direction is important. One cannot be sure that they will not play a
greater role the next time around. Moreover, any causal role whatsoever
suggests that the underlying distortions are potentially even more economi-
cally damaging than tax experts had previously recognized. Thus, I offer here a
very brief review of the main areas in which the tax system’s fingerprints
appear near the 2008 crime scene, and of how this association might affect
subsequent tax policy thinking.
This chapter is organized as follows. Section 7.2 discusses the tax law
distinction between debt and equity. Section 7.3 discusses risk taking and
the financial crisis. Section 7.4 discusses the taxation of derivatives. Section
7.5 discusses corporate governance. Section 7.6 discusses the taxation of
housing. Section 7.7 offers brief concluding remarks.
Income Tax Reform Implications
175
This is an open access version of the publication distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-
NoDerivs licence (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/), which permits non-commercial reproduction and distribution of 
the work, in any medium, provided the original work is not altered or transformed in any way, and that the work is properly cited. For 
commercial re-use, please contact academic.permissions@oup.com 
7.2 Tax law distinction between debt and equity
7.2.1 The underlying issue
Tax law, in common with accounting, insists on shoehorning a broad range
of financial instruments, potentially with multiple continuously varying fea-
tures, into the twin categories of debt and equity. The key differences in tax
treatment are twofold. First, payouts by corporate issuers to holders generally
are deductible as interest expense if the instruments are classified as debt, but
are non-deductible dividends if the instruments are classified as equity. Sec-
ond, for debt but not equity, periodic payouts may be imputed for tax pur-
poses even if they are not actually made, leading to mandatory annual
inclusion by holders (and potential deductibility by issuers).1
Thus, equity-financed corporate earnings are potentially taxed twice,
although (1) taxpayers can control the timing of the second tax or even
avoid it permanently,2 and (2) the shareholder-level tax may bear a reduced
rate or receive other benefits such as imputation credits.3 Debt-financed cor-
porate earnings generally are taxed only once, and at the holder’s rather than
the corporate issuer’s marginal rate.
These rules are commonly described as creating an income-tax bias in favour
of debt over equity. However, while frequently true, this statement needs to be
qualified. Suppose a given tax system has marginal tax rates for high-income
individuals that exceed the top corporate rate, and that such individuals can
avoid paying the shareholder-level tax with respect to their corporate equity
holdings. For such individuals, equity rather than debt is tax preferred, as it
permits them to pay tax on their returns to corporate investment at the lower
corporate rate rather than at their own rates (M. H. Miller 1977).
One further tax advantage of debt, given interest payments’ deductibility,
applies to cross-border investment. A multinational corporate group can use
debt to shift net taxable income from high-tax to low-tax countries, both by
having affiliates in the former countries do most of the group’s borrowing and
through the judicious use of intra-group debt—as in the case where a high-tax
affiliate injects equity into a low-tax affiliate and thenborrows themoney back.4
For debt’s frequentlymore favourable tax treatment tomatter economically,
the debt label must correlate with some underlying substance. If taxpayers can
1 Original issue discount rules that have this effect are perhaps most elaborate in the USA, but
exist in numerous other countries as well. See Ault and Arnold (2004: 251–7).
2 In the USA, for example, shares of corporate stock that are held until death can then be
redeemed for their fair market value without generating capital gain. See US Internal Revenue
Code, section 1014.
3 See Ault and Arnold (2004: 329) (describing dividend relief provisions in various countries).
4 Even intra-group borrowing, while not increasing the multinational group’s overall position as
a net debtor, may affect a borrowing affiliate’s other creditors (including not just other lenders but,
for example, trade creditors, workers, and tort claimants).
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simplymarry the preferred economic characteristics of financial arrangements
to whichever tax label (debt or equity) they prefer—a situation that increas-
ingly prevails although still not entirely—then the problem is simply one of
making aggressive tax planning too easy, rather than of distorting economic
decisions (Shaviro 2009a: 52–4).
In cases where the choice really does matter economically, as where a
company decides to issue either classic fixed-rate debt or common stock, the
frequent tax bias in favour of debt can matter for a number of different
reasons. Most pertinently to the financial crisis, it can increase bankruptcy
risk. Or it can lead companies to make the wrong choice, from a pre-tax
standpoint, in using financial instrument design to mitigate agency costs in
the use of investors’ funds. Debt financing, for example, can encourage risky
‘heads we win, tails you lose’ investment choices by managers that the pro-
spective suppliers of funds may find difficult to monitor. While debt also has
potential advantages—for example, it permits prospective investors to limit
their enquiry into a given investment’s economic prospects to the issue of
potential default—creating a tax bias in either direction can undermine pre-
tax optimization of the agency problem.
Thus, there would be a strong case for eliminating debt bias, and more
generally making the debt–equity choice tax neutral, even if the excessive
leverage that contributed to the financial crisis did not make the bias seem
especially pernicious. However, addressing debt bias, or more generally
advancing tax neutrality in financial instrument choice, could take a number
of different forms.
7.2.2 Corporate integration methods of addressing debt bias
For decades, academics have proposed (and countries have in varying degrees
attempted) corporate integration, a term referring to a suite of alternative
reform proposals all of which would move towards causing equity-financed
corporate investment to be taxed, in effect, just once.5 At its most ambitious
(but not in all versions), corporate integration would create tax neutrality not
just between debt and equity, but also regarding the use of corporate versus
non-corporate entities, the timing of corporate distributions, and the form of
such distributions (for example, as between dividends and share repurchases)
(Shaviro 2009a: 152–3). The forms that corporate integration could take
include the following:
5 For this purpose, equity-financed corporate investment is viewed as having been taxed just
once, even if tax revenues are collected at both the entity and the owner levels, so long as the
overall net tax liability is similar to that which would arise if there were only one collection point.
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 Dividend exemption. Permitting shareholders to receive dividends tax free
would address debt bias, but would not achieve tax neutrality in financial
instrument choice when there are tax-rate differences between corpora-
tions and shareholders. Thus, under dividend exemption one would
expect shareholders with high marginal rates (compared to the applicable
corporate rate) to prefer equity froma tax standpoint, while thosewith low
marginal rates preferred debt. The net result might often be tax discour-
agement of holding debt if, as is true in many countries though not, at
present, the USA, the corporate rate was significantly below the top
individual rate. This would not be the case, however, if the marginal
investorswere tax-exempt entities, such as universities and pension funds.
 Dividend imputation. Under an imputation system, dividends are taxed to
shareholders, but their amount is grossed up by the corporate tax pay-
ment attributed to the distributed earnings, and the shareholder receives
a tax credit in the amount of the gross-up. Thus, suppose the corporate
rate was 25 per cent, the shareholder rate was 35 per cent, and that a given
shareholder received a €75 dividend (€100 with the gross-up). For tax
purposes, the shareholder would have €100 of income and a €25 tax
credit, and therefore would owe a further €10 of tax.6 Imputation goes
further than exclusion towards the creation of tax neutrality between
debt and equity, because it causes the shareholder rather than the cor-
porate rate ultimately to apply for equity, just as it does (to the extent of
deductible interest payments) for debt. It does not appear to be the wave
of the future, however. Among the countries that moved away from it in
the 2000s, in response both to complexity concerns and to European
Community (EC) legal issues regarding non-resident investors, are France,
Germany, and the UK (Ault and Arnold 2004: 327).
 Comprehensive business income tax (CBIT). In 1992, the US Treasury
Department released a comprehensive tax-reform plan under which the
tax treatment of debt and equity would largely be conformed, by denying
corporate interest deductions and making the receipt of both dividends
and corporate interests tax free to investors. In effect, this would have
been dividend exemption plus changing the tax treatment of debt to be
like that for equity. The proposal was never seriously considered by the US
political system.
If CBIT had been seriously considered, key problems would have included
transition (for example, how to treat pre-existing debt) and the question of
6 In a relatively pure imputation system, such as that applied in Australia, imputation credits are
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how to treat shareholder capital gain upon selling equity. The obvious solu-
tion would be to exempt the gain, for reasons of consistency with dividend
exemption. This, however,would risk creating tax-avoidanceproblems. Suppose,
for example, that a taxpayer was planning to sell an appreciated building, and
that this ordinarily would lead to a taxable capital gain. Without anti-avoidance
rules, all the taxpayer would need to do, in order to avoid the tax, is incorporate
the building and sell the newly created shares. Obviously, special rules could
be devised to address such scenarios, but theywould add to the complexity of the
CBIT approach and probably leave residual tax-planning opportunities.
In the international setting, the CBIT approach has the advantage of pre-
venting the use of debt by domestic companies to reduce domestic source
taxable income. Yet it arguably errs in centring tax liability at the entity level,
rather than the investor level. In an era of high and rising worldwide capital
mobility, many expect corporate tax rates to face continuing and eventually
substantial downward pressure. The tax rates paid by individuals—at least as
to active business income that is currently consumed7—are not under similar
downward pressure, however, in so far as people remain relatively immobile
and cannot easily hide their income (for example, reflecting international
information exchange agreements between governments). This suggests
that, even if one agrees that the tax treatment of debt and equity ought to
be conformed, it may be preferable to use the debt model, in which the
investor’s tax rate ends up applying, rather than the equity model with its
reliance on the entity’s tax rate (Shaviro 2009a: 163).
 Allowance for corporate equity (ACE). Under an ACE system, corporations
are permitted an interest-like deduction with respect to their equity. This
may be accompanied, as under the business enterprise income tax (BEIT)
proposed by Edward Kleinbard (2007a), by requiring shareholders to
include the notional return to equity even if no dividends have been paid
(in keeping with the common tax treatment of debt, which may accrue
annual taxable income even if interest is not being currently paid). This not
only advances tax neutrality between debt and equity, but causes the
shareholder (rather than the corporate) rate to apply to normal rates of
return on corporate investment. A further advantage is that itmakes the tax
system’s cost recovery rate for corporate investments effectively irrelevant,8
thereby promoting inter-asset tax neutrality and reducing the importance
7 Tax rates on capital income that individuals earn on their savings is, however, frequently tax
exempt at the entity as well as the investor level, reflecting the widespread use of tax-exempt
institutions (such as pension funds) and the use of tax rules (such as those in the USA for individual
retirement accounts) that permit individuals to save for retirement without paying current income
tax.
8 Swifter cost recovery reduces the value of corporate equity on which the ACE deduction is
computed. Or, to put it the other way around, slower cost recovery is offset by the allowance of
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of cross-border variations between systems (Jacobs 1997). ACE systemswere
enacted but swiftly abandoned in Austria, Croatia, and Italy, and continue
to exist in Belgium and Brazil (Klemm 2007). The BEIT has not as yet
received serious political consideration anywhere, though I have argued
elsewhere that it merits serious consideration (Shaviro 2008).
7.2.3 Other methods of addressing debt bias
Given the lack of a clear causal relationship between the tax system’s predom-
inant debt bias and the financial crisis, the adoption of corporate integration
in response to the crisis seems unlikely (even if the case for it has been
modestly strengthened). Thus, it is worth considering other possible responses
to debt bias. Three in particular are worth noting, especially as they have
independent advantages from a tax-policy standpoint.
 Lower corporate rates. Since the mid-1990s, numerous countries, in the Euro-
pean Union and elsewhere, have reduced their statutory corporate tax rates,
often to significantly below top marginal rates for individuals. The motivat-
ing force has presumably been tax competition, reflecting that companies’
locational investment decisions are generally more tax responsive than
individuals’ national residence choices.9 Yet, even though addressing excess
corporate leverage seems unlikely to havemotivated creation of the tax-rate
differentials, the effect on tax incentives for leverage is potentially signifi-
cant. Raising the differential increases the pool of investors who find equity
investment tax preferable because it lowers the initially applicable tax rate.
Thus, corporate rate cuts have the potential tomove the overall system from
one inwhichdebt is predominantly tax-preferred towards one inwhichdebt
and equity simply have different investor clienteles.
 Stronger thin capitalization rules. Many countries have thin capitalization
rules, limiting interest deductions either in general or for interest paid
to non-residents, if some comparative measure (such as the taxpayer’s
debt–equity ratio) suggests that the taxpayer’s level of debt is excessive.
The two principal purposes these rules serve are to limit tax-base-eroding
payments to non-residents, and to prevent avoidance of the double
corporate tax by reason of having only minimal equity. While both of
these concerns sound purely in tax policy, rather than macroeconomic
additional interest-like deductions on the unrecovered equity, thus compensating the taxpayer for
the effect of deferral on the deduction’s time value.
9 Individuals’ mobility in response to national tax-rate differences may be on the rise, however.
See, e.g., Kleven et al. (2010) (finding that European soccer players who are superstars, but not
players of more ordinary ability, respond significantly to national tax rates in their decisions
regarding where to play).
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concern about the potential impact of excess leverage, thin capitalization
rules could easily be designed to address the latter concern more forcefully.
This might require making them significantly tougher, and generally
counting borrowing from tax-paying residents as well as non-residents.
 Worldwide interest allocation rules for multinationals. Since international tax
planning creates an important incentive for the extensive use of debt by
large multinational companies, arguably it should be addressed distinc-
tively, as a way of using the tax system to combat excess leverage, even
if thin capitalization rules are revised (where necessary) to apply equally
to payments to residents and non-residents. One possible mechanism is
the source rules that all income -tax systems use to determine what
portion of a given taxpayer’s income arose domestically.
Nearly all countries—with the important exception of the USA—generally
treat domestic borrowing as reducing domestic taxable income, and foreign
borrowing as reducing foreign taxable income, without regard to where the
borrowing occurred. Thus, suppose a multinational company borrows €100
million in a country with a 30 per cent tax rate, in order to invest the funds in
a country with a 15 per cent tax rate. Suppose the interest rate is 8 per cent (or
€8million per year) and that the investment earns profits at only 7 per cent (or
€7 million per year). While the investment loses money before tax, it is
actually profitable after tax if—as most countries’ tax rules would permit—
the taxpayer can deduct its outlay at a 30 per cent rate while including its
receipt at only a 15 per cent rate.10
The USA attempts to limit this incentive, though just for resident US cor-
porations, by applying complicated ‘worldwide-allocation’ rules to domesti-
cally incurred interest expense that may result in allocating it pro rata to
foreign assets. These rules have been criticized on various grounds, including
their complexity and asymmetric treatment of foreign borrowing (which can-
not give rise to domestic interest expense).11 Unfortunately, the underlying
problem has no good solution, given that the fungibility of money impedes
ascertaining how a given loan was actually used at the margin (in the sense of
what outlay would have been forgone if not for the loan).12 For present
purposes, it is enough to note that, while the US interest allocation rules are
aimed at a tax-policy concern—protecting the domestic tax base—they can in
practice reduce overall tax incentives for excessive leverage.
10 Deducting €8 million at a 30% rate would reduce the annual outlay to €5.6 million after tax,
while including €7 million at a 15% rate would reduce the annual receipt to €5.95 million.
11 See generally Shaviro (2001).
12 What is more, even if a given country’s interest allocation rules ‘correctly’ allocated interest
expense, inconsistency between its rules and those of other countries could cause some of a
multinational’s interest expense to be deducted either more than once or not at all, yielding
peculiar incentive effects.
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7.3 Risk taking and the financial crisis
Excess leverage was merely one input into a fundamental cause of the finan-
cial crisis, which was excessive risk taking by a wide range of large public
companies. Failed or bailed-out companies from the 2008 crisis, such as AIG,
are widely viewed as having followed a well-known strategy under which one
‘earns small positive returns most of the time, but occasionally experiences
dramatic losses . . . [causing it to be known as] picking up nickels in front of a
steamroller’ (Duarte et al. 2006). This strategy gave them years of high profit-
ability, followed by socially costly collapses when, for example, housing or
stock prices finally stopped rising steeply.
The popularity of the ‘nickels in front of a steamroller’ strategy reflected, not
just irrationality, bubble psychology, and herd behaviour, but badly misdir-
ected incentives outside the tax realm. At the entity level, limited liability and
the ‘too big to fail’ scenario made risky bets by large public companies poten-
tially worth making, from the shareholders’ standpoint, even if they had
negative expected social payoffs. At the managerial level, executives with
highly earnings-sensitive compensation arrangements knew that the business
judgement rule (protecting them from liability for almost any arguably rea-
sonable business decision) meant that they could take ‘heads I win, tails you
lose’ bets with the shareholders’money. In addition, the expectation that they
could move swiftly from one company to another often gave them extremely
short-time horizons, and the income effect of being able to earn so much in a
short time often meant that they did not count on having decades-long
successful careers. A couple of big years might set one up financially for life,
even if the ‘steamroller’ hit one’s former company a few years later.
All this is a non-tax story, of course. In so far as the tax system affected
incentives for publicly held financial institutions to take on risk, it seemingly
pointed in the right direction (given the above problems) by discouraging it.
Given loss non-refundability, companies that win their gambles and have
positive taxable income pay tax at the statutory rate, but those that end up
with negative taxable income do not thereby generate negative tax liability
(that is, a right to be paid by the government based on the statutory rate).
Instead, they are limited to claiming net operating losses (NOLs) against
positive taxable income in other years, generally with very limited (if any)
loss carry-backs and more extensive loss carry-forwards. Where losses are
carried forward, at a minimum the present value of the tax saving from
them ends up being reduced, and in some cases they end up never being used.
Leaving aside concerns about excessive risk taking that came to light in the
financial crisis, this asymmetrically adverse treatment of losses has only one
possible justification. It reduces the scope for companies to drain revenues
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from the government by creating artificial tax-shelter losses. As things stand,
tax-shelter losses that survive legal scrutiny, or else are not properly
challenged on audit, can eliminate a company’s positive tax liability (includ-
ing for other years, through the use of NOLs), but at least they cannot generate
net refunds from the government. However, if one were confident that tax-
payers reporting tax losses genuinely had economic losses, the main effects of
asymmetrically adverse treatment of losses would include (1) discouraging
risky investments that might have a positive expected pre-tax return, and
(2) encouraging otherwise inefficient mergers between companies so that
those with positive taxable income could absorb the losses created by unsuc-
cessful gambles.
Given, however, concern about excessive risk taking, should we conclude
that the tax system’s loss limits pointed in the right direction in this regard,
and accordingly that limits on using NOLs ought if anything to be made
stricter? As it happens, in the USA prior to the 2008 crisis, effective corporate
tax rates were rising, largely because tax losses were becoming more frequent
(Altshuler et al. 2009),13 implying that non-refundability mattered. The prob-
lem, however, is that it arguably was misdirected in so far as the ‘nickels in
front of a steamroller’ strategy is concerned. That strategy may have excellent
short-term odds of generating a profit, whereas the eventual loss when the
‘steamroller’ hits may not matter to executives with short-time horizons who
may be long gone by that point.
This suggests that increasing risk neutrality by making the tax treatment of
NOLs more favourable—for example, by lengthening carry-over periods or
allowing the amount carried forward to grow at an annual interest rate—
might not greatly worsen the problems of excessive risk taking in large public
companies that contributed to the 2008 crisis. Two further considerations
should be kept in mind, however. First, lengthening loss carry-forwards
while limiting their transferability (as many countries do) can create a ‘zombie
firms’ problem, in which failing companies that cannot produce efficiently are
kept alive because of the value of their tax attributes. Second, the case for
greater tax neutrality with respect to risk taking does not mean that lengthen-
ing NOL carry-overs, with retroactive application to pre-existing losses, is good
tax or macroeconomic policy in response to a down business cycle. The
retroactive loosening of loss limits is misdirected in so far as risk taking
incentives going forward are concerned and, considered as fiscal stimulus,
may amount to ill-directed ‘stimulus for losers’, since companies that have
been making money derive no benefit from it.
13 The greater frequency of US corporate tax losses in the years before 2008 resulted largely from
a decline in average profitability, rather than from greater variance (Altshuler et al. 2009).
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7.4 Taxation of derivatives
Huge markets in complex derivatives are widely viewed as having helped
trigger the financial crisis. They enabled companies to place huge bets cheaply
(often pursuant to the ‘nickels in front of a steamroller’ strategy), while
hindering investor and regulatory oversight and creating webs of counter-
party risk that ended up transmitting credit problems across the world econ-
omy like a fast-travelling flu virus.
Derivatives are also good for tax planning, because they permit taxpayers to
increase the degree of separation between the economic fundamentals of their
positions, on the one hand, and the tax system’s interpretation of what they
are doing, on the other. To illustrate, suppose one wants the economic con-
sequences of owning a particular stock, but does not want to be treated as the
owner for tax purposes. Derivatives permit one to achieve much or all of the
former without the latter. Thus, by the late 1990s, numerous non-US investors
who wanted to hold stocks in dividend-paying US companies without being
subject to US withholding tax on the dividends learned that they could
achieve this by purchasing total return swaps.
Economically, the swaps gave these taxpayers economic positions that were
identical (counter-party risk aside) to holding the stock directly with debt
financing at, say, the LIBOR rate. As a matter of US tax law, however—at
least as interpreted by sellers of the swaps, without timely pushback from
the Internal Revenue Service—they permitted avoidance of the withholding
tax, based on the fact that US tax law generally treats income from swaps held
by foreign investors as foreign source income. Use of the swaps became
sufficiently pervasive to prompt the Chief of Staff of the US Congressional
Joint Committee on Taxation to refer to a widespread view that ‘only fools pay
withholding taxes on dividends today’ (see Shaviro 2009b).
More generally, derivatives create three main types of problems for the tax
system. The first is asymmetry in the treatment of counter-parties, as in the case
where a periodic time value return can be deducted on one side without being
included on the other. The second is inconsistency in the treatment of a given
economic arrangement, depending on how it is structured (as in the total
return swaps example). The third is imbalance in the tax treatment of gains
and losses, as in the case where one can readily realize an ordinary loss, but in
the event of a gain can either defer it indefinitely or else ensure that it is capital
gain, taxable at less than the ordinary income rate (Raskolnikov 2008).
Despite special cases, such as the pervasive use of total return swaps to avoid
US withholding tax, most observers believe that tax played only a secondary
role in encouraging the growth of the derivatives markets that, in some key
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cases, spectacularly collapsed in 2008.14 One important reason why tax
planning may not have borne greater responsibility for the derivatives explo-
sion, at least in the USA, is that US tax law requires businesses that qualify as
dealers in securities to use mark-to-market accounting with respect to all
inventory items, and treat all gains and losses on such items as ordinary.
Consistent mark-to-market accounting by both sides to a transaction elimi-
nates any problems of asymmetry, inconsistency, and imbalance.
Even in cases with a non-dealer on at least one side, where tax considera-
tions may often have encouraged the use of derivatives, the marginal impact
may not have been great. In practice, companies often used the same carefully
structured derivatives transactions to minimize tax liabilities, manipulate
reported earnings, avoid regulatory constraints, and minimize the effective-
ness of investor oversight. In these overdetermined circumstances, tax con-
siderations, standing alone, may not have made a large difference, even
though they clearly encouraged the underlying transactions.
Given the underlying incoherence of realization-based income taxation, in
particular when it relies on formalistic categories such as discrete ‘debt’ and
‘equity’, the tax rules for derivatives are hard to improve in more than a
piecemeal fashion that targets particular transactions. Broader progress
might require expanding the mark-to-market rules’ range of application.
This, however, would raise administrative questions about how to value assets
that are not publicly traded, along with probable political concerns about
taxpayer liquidity to pay tax on unrealized asset appreciation.
7.5 Corporate governance
One clear lesson of the financial crisis was that corporate governance pro-
blems proved considerably worse than many academics had previously
believed—not just in the 1990s heyday of the ‘Chicago school’ era, but
perhaps even in the aftermath of the wave of accounting scandals (pertaining,
for example, to Enron, Parmalat, and Tyco) that had abounded in the first few
years of the twenty-first century. Managerial incentives to overstate earnings
and create short-term profits, at the price of serious long-term downside
economic risk (Bebchuk and Fried 2004), often proved beyond the disciplinary
capacity of market forces. The problems were especially great with respect to
financial firms, given the far greater difficulty of accurately assessing, say,
AIG’s economic performance than GM’s.
14 However, an important exception to this widespread view is Eddins (2009), who argues that
the growth and collapse of the collateralized debt obligation (CDO) market relied crucially on an
underlying tax arbitrage play that required high risk in order to generate positive after-tax returns.
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Tax considerations contributed to the corporate governance crisis in various
ways. For one, tax-sheltering opportunities offer a rationale for reduced trans-
parency that managers can then exploit to siphon resources from their firms
without being observed by regulatory authorities, shareholders, or investors
(Desai and Dharmapala 2008). For another, at least in the USA, tax considera-
tions may encourage the use of incentive compensation. In particular, such
compensation can be used to avoid an ill-conceived $1 million ceiling on
deductible annual salary payments to top executives at publicly traded com-
panies.15 In addition, executives can often defer their US income-tax liability
on the receipt of valuable property such as stock options.16 While this deferral
may yield no overall tax benefit, since generally the employer’s deduction is
deferred as well,17 it has the optical benefit (from themanagers’ standpoint) of
permitting compensation packages to appear smaller, as they need not be
grossed up to achieve after-tax equivalence with payments that are currently
taxable to them and deductible by the employer. Although incentive compen-
sation is commonly rationalized as improving executive performance, it argu-
ably backfired, both by encouraging an overly short-term focus (along with
outright manipulation of reported earnings), and by reducing executive com-
pensation’s transparency (Bebchuk and Fried 2004).
Standard tax-reform principles would suggest treating different types of
executive compensation neutrally, rather than inducing greater use of incen-
tive compensation. One could even argue, however, for tilting the tax rules
against at least poorly designed incentive arrangements. Thus, suppose one
believes that poor design of executives’ incentive compensation packages is
too deeply rooted in current practice and institutional arrangements for even
the shock of the financial crisis to induce the adoption of adequate changes.18
If one, therefore, supports a regulatory response to the problem, the tax
system offers one possible vehicle. For example, rather than affirmatively
requiring or barring particular types of compensation arrangements, one
could use differences in tax treatment as a non-compulsory thumb on the
scales. This might involve imposing modest tax penalties (including the
15 US Internal Revenue Code section 162(m).
16 See US Internal Revenue Code section 83(a) (generally permitting deferral where the property
is subject to a ‘substantial risk of forfeiture’).
17 See US Internal Revenue Code section 83(h). If employer and employee marginal tax rates are
the same, this makes deferral tax neutral, and thus seemingly irrelevant if the parties would
respond to immediate taxation by grossing up the nominal option value so as to compensate the
employee for it. Managers at publicly traded companies may none the less prefer deferral for optical
reasons, because the gross-up makes their compensation packages appear to be larger.
18 The arguably suboptimal typical design features of typical executive compensation packages
include failing to require retention of one’s financial interest in the employer for a sufficiently long
period (encouraging short-term thinking), and rewarding stock-prices increases even when they are
shared with the stock market, or one’s industry as a whole, rather than reflecting distinctive
company performance. See, e.g., Bebchuk and Fried (2004).
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denial of tax benefits such as deferral on the employee side) for compensation
packages that were viewed as departing from best practices.
A second area in which tax-policy responses to corporate governance pro-
blems have recently been discussed pertains to the relationship between
taxable income and financial accounting income. Managers of publicly traded
companies notoriously attempt, in many cases, to shelter taxable income, on
the one hand, while inflating reporting earnings, on the other, leading some
commentators to suggest that closer relationships between the two income
measures be mandated (Desai 2005; Shaviro 2009c). One of the main counter-
vailing concerns, however, is that this might lead to the politicization of
accounting standards, as legislatures that care more about the tax base
expanded their accounting interventions in response to the linkage (Hanlon
et al. 2005).19
7.6 Taxation of housing
Tax-policy experts have long argued against income-tax preferences for hous-
ing. The chief argument is the standard efficiency point that tax favouring one
form of consumption over others leads to deadweight loss, as assets are shifted
to tax-favoured uses, even when this reduces their pre-tax yield. Tax prefer-
ences for housing, and in particular homeownership, are none the less wide-
spread, albeit not universal. This presumably reflects political considerations,
as well as the administrative difficulty (or perhaps simply the counter-intuitive
character) of taxing homeowners on their imputed rental income.
When exclusion of imputed rental income is accompanied by generally
permitting home mortgage interest to be deducted, as under the US income-
tax rules, the problems caused may go beyond societal over-investment in
homes relative to other assets. Taxpayers with limited net saving are effec-
tively encouraged to hold a risky, undiversified asset with substantial leverage.
If the tax rules also (as in the USA) provide a substantial exclusion for gain
realized upon the sale of a home, while generally taxing other capital gains,
the inducement to neglect elementary principles of investment diversification
is greater still.
Provisions of this kind clearlywould be expected topromote over-investment
in real estate, along with the prospect that, in a down market for real estate,
there could be extensive defaults and a serious impact onmanyhouseholds’net
19 In the European Community (EC), substantial progress towards developing a depoliticized
common consolidated corporate tax base (CCCTB) might pose the question of whether to
re-establish the close relationship between the tax and accounting income bases that existed in
much of the EC until accounting standards began to be internationalized (Shaviro 2009d).
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retirement saving. It is a somewhat different question, however, whether such
provisions should be expected to (or in the early 2000s did) promote the
emergence and collapse of a bubblemarket in real estate.Market bubbles remain
an ill-understood dynamic phenomenon, whereas stable tax preferencesmight
affect only the equilibrium. What is more, the emergence of housing bubbles,
and their collapse in 2008, do not appear to have been limited to countries with
substantial tax preferences for homeownership. In Chapter 3 of this volume,
Hemmelgarn, Nicodeme, and Zangari conclude that ‘the available evidence is
mixed’ regarding the relationship between tax rules and price developments,
‘suggesting that lax monetary policy and increased risk taking by lenders are
more powerful explanations of the housing bubble’.
Nonetheless, the 2008 financial crisis arguably strengthened, in two main
respects, the already well-understood case for more neutral treatment of hous-
ing. First, the crisis dramatically illustrated the dangers of under-diversification
and highly leveraged homeownership. Second, while tax-preferring homeow-
nership is sometimes justified on the ground that it has positive externalities
(for example, by encouraging residents to invest in neighbourhood quality),
the recent fallout suggests that it may also have negative externalities. For
example, the higher transaction costs of moving when one is a homeowner,
rather than a renter, may slow economic adjustment when jobs disappear in
some regions and arise in others. This may adversely affect, not just the home-
owners themselves, but prospective employers and social-welfare systems.
7.7 Conclusions
Tax rules encouraging excessive debt, complex financial transactions, poorly
designed incentive compensation for corporate managers, and highly lever-
aged homeownership may all have contributed to the financial crisis, but do
not appear to have been among the primary causes. Even without a strong
causal link, however, the pre-existing case for tax reform at all these margins is
arguably strengthened by the 2008 financial crisis, which suggests that tax
rules not only fell short of classic neutrality benchmarks but generally leaned
in precisely the wrong direction. With respect to excessive risk taking, while
the tax system arguably leaned in the ‘right’ direction by treating gains and
losses asymmetrically, this seems unlikely to havematteredmuch to corporate
managers who were pursuing short-term profits via the ‘nickels in front of a
steamroller’ strategy.
In most of the above areas, increasing tax neutrality has much to recom-
mend it, even apart from any impact on the likelihood of repeat financial
crises in the future. With respect to corporate governance, however, if greater
regulatory oversight is deemed necessary, the tax system provides a possible
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vehicle for intervention that would rely on shaping incentives through non-
neutral rules (for example, requiring that incentive compensation be appro-
priately designed if it is to receive favourable tax treatment, such as deferral).
Even if this is not done, however, tax rules that treat even poorly designed
incentive compensation more favourably than cash salary are clearly inappro-
priate and should be eliminated.
With respect to the effect of loss non-refundability on risk taking, allowing
greater use of pre-existing NOLs would not improve incentives going forward.
In addition, it might be criticized as misdirected ‘stimulus for losers’, and
should not be structured in such a way as to encourage the perpetuation of
‘zombie firms’ that would otherwise be liquidated.
In addressing the non-neutral tax rules that pointed in the wrong direction
in 2008, the chief obstacle is political choice. Expert views favouring greater
neutrality were well known, but were not heeded. In the aftermath of the
crisis, the lack of a strong causal link suggests that this state of affairs may be
unlikely to changemuch. However, the one case in which discernible political
trends may arguably end up pointing in the right direction concerns the tax
system’s debt bias, which could be significantly reduced if corporate rates
continue declining relative to top individual rates.
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8
Moving beyond the Crisis: Tax Policies for
the Soundness of Financial Markets
Geoff Lloyd
8.1 Introduction
It is widely accepted that tax was not among the root causes of the 2008
financial crisis. But tax measures may have contributed in exacerbating non-
tax incentives to greater leverage, greater risk taking, and a lack of transpar-
ency (see Chapters 2–4).
Most countries’ tax systems contain long-standing systemic biases in favour
of corporate debt financing, even after allowing for a compensating bias
favouring dividends or capital gains from equity investment over interest
income. Changes in investment patterns and cross-border financial flows
brought about by the twin forces of globalization and financial innovation
may have significantly increased the impact of this bias in the first decade of
the new century. A bias to debt finance raises financial stability concerns,
because of the relative fragility of highly indebted companies, and because of
the systemic impact of a credit crunch when the banking sector is exposed to
substantial counterparty risk (Hanson et al. 2011). There is considerable anec-
dotal evidence of the tax bias to debt encouraging higher levels of gearing by
companies, and banks have tended not only to gear up to the levels of debt
allowed under regulatory capital rules but also to issue hybrid, equity-like,
forms of debt, rather than ordinary share capital, where that satisfied both the
regulators and the conditions for a tax deduction.
The common tax preference for investment returns in the form of capital
gains creates a further bias in favour of investment in risky assets, where
returns are likely to come largely in the form of appreciation. The fact that
preferential tax treatment for capital gains is matched by limited tax relief
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for capital losses reduces this bias only if investors actually consider the
possibility of price declines. The same bias favours the relatively risky activities
of private equity and hedge funds, whose managers are typically taxed at
preferential capital gains tax rates, even where there is no risk of capital loss.
Systemic biases in favour of both debt financing and risky assets may each
be exacerbated by increased tax arbitrage activity, again facilitated by globali-
zation and financial innovation.
This chapter examines how the debt biases and the incentives to pursue
returns in the formof capital appreciationmayhave contributed to thefinancial
crisis. It focuses in particular on the use of complex securitization vehicles and
tax havens to achieve complex forms of risk transfer that relied heavily on tax
arbitrage strategies.While these biasesmay inparthave disappeared as a result of
the significant losses incurred by financial institutions, other tax-related asym-
metries may come to dominate behaviour. The response of tax and regulatory
authorities has been to extend and improve the domain of controls; this new
regulatory environment has potentially a number of tax-related implications.
The remainder of this chapter examines first the root causes of the crisis and
the nature of the regulatory response that followed immediately thereafter. It
then looks at potential interactions between tax policy and the soundness of
financial markets focusing on tax biases to corporate leverage, incentives to
tax arbitrage, the role of securitization techniques, private equity and hedge
funds, and the importance of tax havens. An appendix to this paper discusses
the impact of the crisis on tax revenues with a particular focus on the tax
implications arising from the loss position of many financial institutions.
8.2 The financial crisis, its causes, and the regulatory response
It is now widely accepted that the root causes of the financial crisis can be
identified at two levels: global liquidity policies (low interest rates in particular
nurturing a strong credit expansion with cheap leverage and bubble tenden-
cies in asset prices); plus a poor regulatory framework, which not only failed to
prevent the growth of asset bubbles but actually contributed to their growth
and concentration into the specific areas, such as mortgage securitization,
where the credit bubble eventually burst with such damaging consequences.
More immediate causes of the crisis can be categorized as follows (BIS 2009,
2010):
 the boom in credit and asset prices;
 a high appetite for yield and a high tolerance of risk;
 lack of transparency;
 inadequate regulation;
 inadequate governance.
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Particular shortcomings in the regulatory framework that have been com-
monly linked with the crisis include weak controls on securitizations and
other off-balance-sheet transactions; lack of rigour on the part of credit-rating
agencies; inadequate capital adequacy supervision; poor risk modelling; lapses
in corporate governance; and poor levels of consumer and investor protection.
The banking business model facilitated by this regulatory environment has
been characterized by a focus on short-term share-price growth rather than
long-term soundness of banks’ balance sheets and has been especially evident
in the USA. Banks found ways of increasing profits by using derivatives to
insure against high levels of credit and market risk while reducing their
borrowing costs by ring-fencing liabilities in off-balance-sheet conduit sub-
sidiaries. Bank employees were encouraged to seek short-term profits through
bonuses based on fee income and up-front revenue, rather than on sustainable
lending. The same banking model became prominent in other investment
banking centres such as Switzerland, Germany, and the UK, and the same
incentives, as well as market-share pressures, meant that the drive to greater
leverage and off-balance-sheet activity was widely copied around the world,
both in the financial sector and beyond.
Many of the defining elements of the pre-crisis financial sector were global
in scope. The main root causes of the crisis—cross-border debt balances,
exploitation of differences in regulation and in market prices (known as
arbitrage), and the market for the highest-yielding investments—were all
also global. Yet there is a fundamental tension between global integration of
markets and nationally based regulation. In a globally competitivemarket, it is
inevitable that market players will seek the most advantageous regulatory
environment for financial transactions, and, where necessary, exploit differ-
ences in national regulations. Out of this tension between national regulation
and global market integration emerged what has become known as the
‘shadow banking system’.1
The shadow banking system consists of non-bank financial institutions that,
like banks, borrow at short term in liquid forms, and lend or invest at long term
in less liquid assets. Many ‘shadow bank’ institutions and vehicles emerged in
US and Europeanmarkets, between the years 2000 and 2008, and came to play
an important role in providing credit across the global financial system. These
included special purpose vehicle (SPV) companies, conduits, money market
funds, monoline insurers, investment banks, hedge funds, and other non-bank
financial institutions. Like commercial banks, these institutions are subject to
1 The term ‘shadow banking system’ is attributed to Paul McCulley of PIMCO, who in 2007
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market risk, credit risk, and especially liquidity risk, since their liabilities are
short term while their assets are more long term and illiquid. This creates a
potential problem in that they are not depositary institutions and do not have
direct or indirect access to a central bank’s lender-of-last-resort support. There-
fore, during periods of market illiquidity, they could go bankrupt if unable to
refinance their short-term liabilities.
Investment strategies pursued by shadow banking entities can be regarded in
many cases as destabilizing and corrosive of efficient and productive activity.
For example, some of the ‘absolute return’ techniques of hedge funds—de-
signed to secure profits for their investors even if market prices went down
rather than up—could be used aggressively to force share prices deliberately
down. High levels of leverage were able to be used in private equity fund take-
overs to take profits out of the target company, and this led to a rise in leverage
in potential target companies too, as they geared up to avoid takeover. The
profits available to shadow banking entities through regulatory and market
arbitrage opportunities offered by derivatives resulted in part from a diversion
of financial and intellectual capital away from productive activity and into
ultimately unproductive and destabilizing financial transfers. A by-product of
this was a phenomenal growth in derivatives markets, to the point where the
nominal value of derivative contracts outstandingwasmany times higher than
the value of the underlying securities they might have hedged or insured.2
Some of the arbitrage opportunities made possible through the shadow
banking system stemmed from the location of the funds or other entities in
secrecy jurisdictions that lack transparency and are not prepared to exchange
information on cross-border tax abuses. For tax-haven jurisdictions, the offer-
ing in terms of no or low tax and light touch regulationmay have been seen as
much as an expression of their own sovereignty as the tax regimes of other
countries, and in an integrated global market it is inevitable that jurisdictions
will compete for mobile financial business by offering regulatory and tax
benefits, just as others offer benefits of infrastructure and political stability.
There has, of course, been a contraction/consolidation of the financial
sector in the wake of the crisis, and the shadow banking system is the area
in which financial-sector contraction has been greatest. There may, at least for
a time, be some natural wariness of off-balance-sheet and offshore-based
activity, as market players have had their fingers so badly burned. On its
own, though, this trend is unlikely to persist, which is why governments
may look for ways of permanently reining back the shadow banking system
in the future and ensuring that financial-sector activity is suitably regulated
wherever it arises.
2 See BIS Triennial and Regular OTC Derivatives Market Statistics <http://www.bis.org/publ/
otc_hy1011.htm>).
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Against that background, key elements of the coordinated regulatory
response to the financial crisis endorsed by G20 leaders at the London summit
of 2 April 2009 were as follows:
 the creation of a new Financial Stability Board (FSB) to provide
early warning of financial risks and the actions needed to address them;
 extension of regulation and oversight to all systemically important
financial institutions, instruments, and markets, including hedge
funds; hedge funds or their managers will be required to disclose
information, including on their leverage, necessary for assessment
of the systemic risks they pose individually or collectively, and
supervisors will require institutions that have hedge funds as their
counter-parties to have effective risk management;
 the implementation of Financial Stability Forum (FSF) pay and
compensation and corporate social responsibility principles;
 future improvements to bank capital adequacy regulation, which
will prevent excessive leverage—specifically, that risk-based capital
requirements should be supplemented with a simple, transparent
non-risk-based measure to help to contain the build-up of leverage in
the banking system, such as an overall, unweighted, minimum
capital requirement;
 action against non-cooperative jurisdictions, including tax havens
(covered in more detail below);
 call for improved accounting standards on valuation and provisioning
(including strengthening of accounting recognition of loan-loss
provisions and off-balance-sheet exposures), and generally towards a
single set of global accounting standards;
 extension of regulation and oversight to Credit Rating Agencies.
In the first half of 2009, there was significant progress in the adoption of OECD
exchange of tax information standard by a wide range of jurisdictions. All
eighty-four countries monitored by the Global Forum on Transparency and
Exchange of Information have now endorsed international tax transparency
and exchange of information standards. This will reduce the attractiveness
of structured finance products in tax-haven jurisdictions at least for non-
tax-compliant investors.
At the London summit, the G20 in addition:
 called for all countries and jurisdictions to adopt the international
tax information exchange standard;
 agreed to develop a toolbox of effective countermeasures against
jurisdictions that do not meet the tax transparency standard.
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8.3 Potential interaction between tax policies and
the soundness of financial markets
Tax considerations influence virtually all economic decisions and may have
exacerbated other forces at work in the current crisis. Of particular interest
are the taxation issues around securitization, the proliferation of collatera-
lized debt obligations (CDOs), and the extraordinary boom in credit default
swap (CDS) contracts, which played such a central role in the 2008 banking
crisis. There are also more long-standing issues that deserve serious consid-
eration as background influences, such as debt versus equity.
8.3.1 A bias to corporate debt/leverage
One long-standing issue is that there is an overall bias in many countries’ tax
systems encouraging corporate leverage. Changes in investment patterns and
cross-border financial flows brought about by the twin forces of globalization
and financial innovation may have significantly increased the impact of this
bias in recent years. From a financial stability point of view, the key problem
with high levels of leverage is that this makes companies more vulnerable to
economic shocks and increases the probability of bankruptcy. Specifically,
highly leveraged companies are particularly susceptible to volatility in profits
(since they will be required to make interest payments irrespective of profit-
ability) and—unless they have hedged—to volatility in currency or interest
rates. Systemically, if leverage levels become unsustainable and lead to a credit
crunch, firms and households are left without access to the credit they need,
leading to a collapse in demand.
While banking operations are by their nature highly leveraged, for the most
part the leverage has in the past been considered sustainable because banks
rely on most depositors’ desire to keep their deposits with the bank, together
with a cushion of more permanent capital (as required for regulatory pur-
poses), to be able to service claims for repayment of the bank’s borrowing.
However, leverage raises particular financial stability issues for banks, given
the short-term nature of their borrowing and the fact that the regulatory
capital ‘cushion’ consists to a large degree in retained earnings, which are
the result of financial profits, which are volatile in that they are tied to the
variations in stock markets, and (as recent experience has shown) highly
susceptible to a collapse in asset values.
A systemic bias in favour of corporates financing themselves with debt (as
opposed to equity) results from treating interest as a business cost in arriving at
corporate profits, and so deductible for tax purposes against annual corporate
profits, while treating returns to equity finance as a distribution of corporate
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profits, and not deductible in computing those. As a result, profits may be taxed
both at corporate and personal level when they are distributed as dividends (see
Box 8.1).
The tax bias in favour of debt is certainly a key factor in corporate financing
decisions. Market disciplines may work to align the interests of various corpo-
rate stakeholders (that is, shareholders, creditors, and managers) as regards
exposure to risk of individual enterprises. But the overall result may be more
leverage than is desirable from a systemic point of view.
For the regulated financial sector, capital adequacy rules operate to limit the
debt component of a company’s capital, but even there the tax deduction for
interest acts as an incentive for firms to maximize debt financing within the
limits allowed by the regulators. A feature of the Basel capital adequacy regime
for banks is that regulatory capital that takes the form of debt (much Tier
Box 8.1. SYSTEMS FOR TAXING DIVIDENDS AT CORPORATE AND PERSONAL
LEVELS
Systems with no double taxation
 Full imputation (full taxation at corporate level, full credit at personal level): Australia,
Mexico, New Zealand
 No personal taxation of dividends (profits taxed only at corporate level): Greece,Slovak
Republic
Systems with double taxation of economic rents only
 Dividends taxedabove a deemed normal level at the corporate and individual level:
Norway, Belgium.
Systems involving double taxation
 Classical (full taxation at both corporate and personal levels): Austria, Czech Republic,
Germany, Iceland, Ireland, Netherlands, Switzerlanda
o Modified classical (classical system but preferential taxation at personal level):
Denmark, Japan, Poland, Portugal, Spain, United States
o Partial imputation (full taxation at corporate level, partial credit at personal level):
Canada, Korea, United Kingdom
 Partial inclusion (taxation at corporate level, partial exclusion at personal level):
Finland, France, Italy, Luxembourg, Turkey
 Split rate (dividends taxed higher than retained earnings at corporate level): None
 Schedule relief (dividends taxed but at a lower flat rate than progressive income tax):
Hungary
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2 capital and so-called innovative Tier 1 capital) can qualify for a tax deduc-
tion, further reducing the cost of capital. Such instruments work to ensure
stable funding, but the debt-servicing arising from them remains a claim on
the shareholders’ income. There may be a case for tax systems not to encour-
age Tier 1 capital to be issued in the form of debt-like instruments (which in
regulatory terms are functioning as equity).
Opportunities also exist for non-financial firms to reduce their cost of equity
capital by issuing hybrid securities that function as equity for regulatory
purposes but which for tax purposes are treated as debt. To qualify as debt
for tax purposes, the securities are likely to be less permanent, and give the
investor greater rights to dividends/interest, than ordinary share capital.
Global issues of this form of ‘cheap equity’—subsidized by the tax deduction
they attracted—reached almost $180 billion in 2007. Although its status as
equity is clearly a matter for regulators, it is likely that the tax benefits of these
hybrids encouraged a substantial take-up of less secure forms of capital than
would otherwise have been the case.
The greatest tax distortions in favour of debt financing will be in situations
where there is no compensating increase in taxation at the level of the
investor, compared with the taxation of dividends or capital gains on shares.
Such a compensating increase could in theory arise if tax systems systemati-
cally compensated for the bias to corporate debt through reduced taxation of
dividends and capital gains on shares. In practice, the distortion is greatest
when the investor is tax exempt, or when tax is evaded (for example, a non-
resident evading his country’s tax on income not subject to effective informa-
tion exchange, particularly with respect to income not subject to withholding
tax by the source country), or when hybrid structures3 are used to achieve
either a double deduction (‘double dip’) for the interest expense or relief for
the interest expense with no corresponding taxation. These issues are covered
more fully below.
8.3.2 The impact of international tax arbitrage
As long as there are differences in and between national tax systems, there will
be opportunity for tax arbitrage, and to a certain extent governments do and
will continue to accept that this is a given fact in today’s global economy.
Specifically, there is wide scope for taxpayers to exploit international asym-
metries relating to the tax treatment of debt financing, through arbitrage of
3 Hybrid structures are entities, transactions, or transfers that are treated as giving rise to debt for
tax purposes in one jurisdiction or regime and simultaneously giving rise to equity for tax purposes
in another. Tax benefits can be achieved by playing the benefits of these differences off against
each other—known as tax arbitrage.
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the tax treatment of both corporate structures and financial instruments, or to
shift income through stock lending or repurchase agreements in order to gain
access to tax credits for tax withheld at source. Common tax arbitrage struc-
tures (see Box 8.2) provide incentives for both increased leverage and the
taking-on of more risky investment (as marginally unviable projects become










Figure 8A. Example of double-deduction management
Company A has a subsidiary (Company B) in country B, owned by an intermediate,
hybrid, entity that uses third-party borrowing to finance B Co. If the hybrid entity is
regarded as tax transparent by country A, its owner, A Co, will get a tax deduction in
country A for interest paid on the hybrid entity’s third-party loan, and, if the hybrid is at
the same time regarded as tax opaque by country B, it will also get a tax deduction for
that interest in country B, which B Co will also benefit from under the applicable group
tax/fiscal consolidation regime in country B. The effect of this ‘double-dip’ arrangement
is that there is an added benefit for leveraging A Co’s investment in B Co with bank debt,
and as such it adds further to a presumed existing bias for debt financing.
Similar double deductions (and incentive to leverage) can be obtained through
hybrid instruments (treated as debt at one end of the transaction and as equity at the
other) or through a combination of a hybrid entity and hybrid instrument. And, in some
circumstances, highly structured arbitrage using hybrid structures and instruments
allows a third-party lender to access a foreign tax credit that would not otherwise have
been available, and that in effect encourages leverage by providing an unintended
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viable due to the ability to finance them more cheaply by exploiting tax
arbitrage benefits).
Arbitrage in capital markets can generally be beneficial, in tending to
improve the efficiency of capital allocation through the removal of asymme-
tries in response to arbitrage. This is not the case for tax arbitrage, as the fixed
legal parameters giving rise to the asymmetry do not get arbitraged away,
however large the volume of transactions. This makes tax arbitrage potentially
damaging in economic terms, as it encourages a growth in financial derivative
transactions far in excess of the financing required for real investment. This
diversion of productive activity, the encouragement of leverage, plus the fact
that each derivative transaction necessarily introduces a counter-party credit
risk, all potentially adds to financial instability.
8.3.3 Capital gains versus income and securitization
Often for good policy reasons, tax systems commonly contain a preference for
investment returns in the form of capital gains. But this can create a bias in
favour of investment in risky assets, where returns are likely to come largely in
the form of appreciation. The fact that preferential tax treatment for capital
gains is matched by limited relief for capital losses reduces this bias only if
investors actually consider the possibility of price declines. The same bias
favours the relatively risky activities of private equity and hedge funds, whose
managers are typically taxed at preferential capital gains rates, evenwhere there
is no risk of capital loss. It could also provide an important motivation for
securitization, benefiting investors who face higher taxes on their interest
income than they can recover in the event of credit default losses.
For investors, securitizations offer access to a much wider range of risk/yield
investment preferences than would be available from investing either directly
in corporate shares or bonds or through a traditional collective investment
vehicle. This is achieved through a combination of a ‘pay-through’ securitiza-
tion structure (where the incoming interest and principal cash flows from
securitized receivables can be reconfigured to give a different mix of interest
and principal cash flows going out to investors),4 a multi-tranche capital
structure for the securitization financing vehicle (giving a choice of different
risk/yield exposures over the portfolio of securitized cash flows), and credit
enhancement through the use of derivatives (in particular CDSs).
4 This is the case for mortgages in the United States where the 1986 Tax Act created real estate
mortgage investment conduits (REMICs) as vehicles that are not themselves subject to tax but pass
the tax liabilities through to investors much as a partnership does. It shifts the basis for taxation
from the principal and interest received by the REMIC to the form in which it is paid to investors.
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However, research by Samuel Eddins (2009) has highlighted the extent to
which the ‘pay-through’ features of a securitization may provide potential
tax benefits to investors who face higher taxes on their interest income than
they can recover as capital losses in the event of credit default losses. The
availability of these tax benefits to investors allows banks to reduce their
borrowing costs, and can be magnified using a tax arbitrage through which
banks and insurers can in effect sell their ability to take full tax deductions
for credit losses to non-financial sector investors, by writing CDSs. This
arbitrage is at its most profitable in relation to the lowest-quality/highest
credit risk receivables, and is limited only by the level of available savings to
invest and the amount of low-quality credit on the market. As such, this
might have provided a substantial tax-driven incentive for the creation and
securitization of the very kind of subprime debt bubble that was at the heart
of the causes of the crisis, as a result of which tax may have contributed to or
exacerbated the underpricing of credit risk (see Box 8.3).
Box 8.3. TAX ARBITRAGE FEEDBACK THEORY IN SUMMARY
Providers of capital seek to invest where risk-adjusted after-tax returns are the highest.
Free markets are available to all comers and therefore offer the same terms and prices
to any and all investors.
The real world has many investor types subject to different tax rates and rules,
depending on their status and the nature of their investment, but all competing within
the same markets.
For example:
 a ‘traditional’ (individual or corporate) non-financial sector investor is likely to be
taxed at income-tax rates on interest income, but will be taxed (and get tax relief, if
at all) at—lower—capital-gains tax rates on gains (and losses) on the principal
invested;
 a financial sector investor is likely to be taxed (and get tax relief) at income-tax rates
on all profits and losses, without distinction between interest and principal;
 a tax-exempt (or non-compliant) investor will not be taxed (or get tax relief) at all;
 a high-yielding bond subject to relatively high risk of credit default will, therefore,
be subject to a higher tax wedge for a ‘traditional’ investor than a lower-yielding/
lower-risk bond.
Up to a point, this difference can be alleviated through a ‘pay-through’ securitization
in which the investor holds bonds issued by the securitization SPV. Overall, a pool of low
credit quality receivables may, for example, yield only 95% of expected principal repay-
ments, but 10% interest. But this mix can be transformed within the SPV by paying a 5%
coupon on the bonds, and using the balance of income to meet 100% of principal
repayments. The ‘traditional’ investor can, therefore, receive the same cash flows but in a
more tax-efficient way—fully offsetting the underlying capital loss against the income-
tax receipt in a way that would not have been permitted with a direct investment.
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Eddins argues that an arbitrage incentive is created by tax treatment of
interest and credit default losses that is symmetric for financial institutions,
while many taxable ‘buy and hold’ investors face higher taxes on their interest
income than they can recover in the event of losses. This means that insur-
ance against default is worth more to the buy and hold investor than to the
financial institution selling the insurance. The price of the insurance deter-
mines how the difference is shared between the buyer and seller, and Eddins
believes that the market for such insurance was so large that the financial
institutions writing the swaps were able typically to get most of the benefit.
And, since the derivatives contracts allow the credit risk to be separated from
the time value of themoney component of the contractual interest rate on the
security itself, the CDS is a very efficient instrument, as it requires essentially
no capital, since there is no need to pay for the underlying security.
The empirical weight that should be placed on this argument is not clear,
since linking the impact of the CDS through to the ultimate ‘buy and hold’
investors who would benefit from the arbitrage is not straightforward. Never-
theless, it is clear that significant investment into securitized subprime mort-
gage debt wasmade by hedge funds, whichwould have been able to pass those
benefits onto individual investors in the form of higher after-tax returns. More
generally, incentives become embedded in prices, even if no one has a full
But substantially greater tax geared benefits can be achieved by arbitraging the tax
position of the ‘traditional’ investor against that of a financial-sector investor, who—
subject to sufficient tax capacity—can in any event set losses of principal off against
income receipts. This can be done by the SPV enhancing the creditworthiness of the
collateral for its bonds in the form of the securitized receivables by entering into a CDS
with a bank, hedge fund, or insurer, in return for a fee. Tax-paying non-financial-sector
investors will be prepared to finance this fee, through lower yields, in return for achieving
a lower expected tax wedge on their return. For the financial institutions writing the
CDS, this is a pure profit opportunity, financed by the expected tax saving achieved by
the non-financial-sector investors. And the financial institutions in turn could lay off
some or all of the credit risk taken on (while retaining all or some of the tax benefit) by
entering into further mirrored credit derivative transactions with other counter-parties.
Profits available to financial institutions underwriting CDOs in this way are at their
highest when the credit default risk is highest—since it is here that non-financial-sector
investors face the greatest tax wedge compared with financial-sector investors—and are
limited only by the supply of available savings and the supply of low-grade securitized
debt.
It is not necessary for the market players concerned to appreciate that this arbitrage is
essentially founded on the differential tax treatment of income and capital, on the one
hand, and of the financial and non-financial sector, on the other—the profit opportu-
nities emerge simply from the pricing of credit protection in the market. None the less, it
provides a potent tax-driven incentive for a surge in low-grade securitized credit and for
banks to switch from old-fashioned lending activity into the pure profits enabled by a
government-financed tax arbitrage.
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overview of the forces at work, and, since tax rates are fixed legal parameters,
differentials do not get arbitraged away, however large the volume of transac-
tions becomes.
8.3.4 Leveraged buy-outs/private equity
Low investment yields resulting in part from the surplus of global funds in the
run-up to the crisis opened up arbitrage opportunities for companies and
investors to buy higher yielding assets. Private equity firms took up these
opportunities on a significant scale to use leverage to buy higher yielding
corporate assets in the listed equity market, to take companies private and
augment returns further. The strong growth of capital available to private
equity resulting from strong investor demand, together with readily available
and cheap loan finance, increased the pressure to move into increasingly
high-risk and leveraged deals. Leveraged buyouts resulted in target companies
being geared up with high levels of debt, compared with norms for publicly
owned corporates, with a knock-on effect for potential target companies as
they took on more debt to stave off a hostile takeover. This in turn will have
significantly eroded corporate tax receipts. Private equity fund structures may
also in some cases exploit international tax arbitrage opportunities to give a
double tax deduction or ‘double dip’ for the interest expense (see Figure 8.1).
In a typical cross-border private equity structure, as set out in Figure 8.1, a
local holding company is inserted that will initially borrow funds, supple-
menting the equity stakes of the limited partners in the private equity fund, to
acquire the target. It will be part of a fiscal consolidation/tax group with the
target company itself, so enabling interest deductions for its borrowings to be
offset against target profits for corporate tax purposes, before then pushing
debt down into the target itself through refinancing (and in the process
securing early repayment of some of the limited partners’ initial investment).
In some cases tax deductions may also be given for shareholder debt, as thin
capitalization rules often provide only a weak protection against extraction of
corporate profits by shareholders in the guise of interest, even though that is
what these rules are designed to do.
The usual ‘carried interest’5 tax treatment of private equity fund managers
means that rewards to fund managers are taxed at preferential capital gains
rates rather than as income. On one point of view, this is the ‘right’ result in
5 A private equity fund manager is usually the general partner in a fund partnership, and is
typically rewarded with a 2%management fee and 20% share of the realized profits of the fund on
its investments above a certain threshold. This 20% profit share is known as ‘carried interest’,
because the financial capital underpinning it is provided or ‘carried’ by investors, who are limited
partners, even though the management expertise, or ‘sweat equity’, which also contributes to the
profit is provided by the fund manager.
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policy terms, equating the tax treatment of fund managers with that of the
so-called sweat equity introduced into a company by an owner-manager. An
alternative view is that the manager’s returns are akin to professional fees/
employment income, and should be taxed at marginal income-tax rates,
matched by a tax deduction at the level of the fund (or for its investor
partners) for the fees paid to the fund manager. The no-tax status of many
private equity fund investors, however, offers a tax arbitrage under which a
capital gains tax treatment of the fund manager’s reward is always likely to be
beneficial.
For a non-compliant investor, a lack of effective information provision to
tax authorities on the income and gains of private equity fund investors could
add to the potential incentives to invest via cross-border private equity funds;
however, the proportion of high net worth individual (HNWI) investment in
private equity funds appears to have been relatively minor.
8.3.5 Hedge funds
The ‘absolute return’ strategies pursued by many hedge funds—designed to
make profits out of differences or changes in market prices, whether these go
up or down—are likely to have been fuelled by tax arbitrage as well as non-tax















Legal title to shares in GP 
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Economic ownership of shares 
in holding company
Figure 8.1. Representative private equity fund structure
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behalf of its investors is able to profit from reductions in the market price of
bonds or shares that would have given rise to a capital loss had the investor
held the securities directly, and, by structuring investments through a limited
company fed by an investment ‘feeder’ partnership, investors are able to
benefit from taxation of what are essentially financial trading transactions at
preferential capital gains tax rates.
Hedge fund managers also benefit from similar tax-privileged ‘carried-
interest’ treatment as private equity fund managers. And for non-compliant
investors, offshore/untransparent structures6 and a lack of effective informa-
tion provision to tax authorities at an investor level may have provided tax-
related incentives for non-compliant HNWIs to invest via hedge funds,
where the proportion of private investors has traditionally been somewhat
larger than for private equity funds.
8.3.6 Tax havens and SPVs
The interplay between tax and regulation appears to have contributed to the
widespread use of tax havens as jurisdictions for the special purpose vehicles
(SPVs) at the centre of the crisis.
For example, restrictions on credit quality applied to the underwriting
standards of mortgages that could be securitized in the United States are fairly
high. These restrictions could be avoided by the use of SPVs in tax havens, and
the (higher) tax benefits of securitizing lower-quality mortgages could be
obtained. Since certain tax havens levy no business income tax, SPVs offering
CDOs can be structured there as limited liability companies without incurring
any tax liabilities at the level of the SPV. Formortgage investors, this replicated
the tax benefits of real estate mortgage investment conduits (REMICs) across a
wider range of mortgages. For investors in private equity and hedge funds
carrying out active management of businesses they have purchased onshore,
this provided access to passive income without any tax complications arising
from business activity. In particular, non-US and tax-exempt US private equity
and hedge fund investors avoided the need to file returns or pay tax on a share
of ‘effectively connected income’ or ‘unrelated business taxable income’ that
the partnership structure of US-based SPVs would have required.
Non-tax reasons for using such jurisdictions to create SPVs include circum-
venting restrictions on transfers of shares and using equity structures not
permitted in home countries. These would not have played an important
role, however, with fixed interest structured products that accounted for
most of the financing at the heart of the crisis.
6 Some estimates suggest that as much as 70% of these funds operate out of the Cayman Islands.
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More generally, the tax-neutral environment of tax havens means they can
facilitate the conversion of income to capital or the deferral of income, which
will generate higher after-tax yields or lower after-tax costs of capital through
tax arbitrage, increasing incentives to leverage and distorting the allocation of
resources. A lack of effective exchange of information for tax purposes also
provides a draw for non-tax-compliant investors safe in the knowledge that
high returns from their investment will not be disclosed to home tax autho-
rities. This applies not only to non-residents, but also to resident businesses
and individuals who are able to route their investments through an offshore
haven to take advantage of the generally more advantageous tax benefits
reserved for non-residents.
8.4 Conclusion
Tax was not among the root causes of the financial crisis. But tax measures
may have contributed in exacerbating non-tax incentives to greater leverage,
greater risk-taking, and a lack of transparency.
This chapter has examined how the greatest distortions in favour of debt
finance have arisen from the asymmetry between taxation of the debtor and
creditor—for example, if the creditor is exempt from tax, or if hybrid struc-
tures or instruments are used to exploit international differences such as
through getting a double dip for interest relief. Arbitrage in capital markets
can generally be beneficial, tending to improve the efficiency of capital allo-
cation by arbitraging away asymmetries in pricing. This is not the case for tax
arbitrage, since fixed tax parameters mean the distortion remains and can be
exploited semi-permanently. This can lead to lost government revenues,
wasted resources, increases in borrowing to finance the arbitrage, increased
complexity, through use of financial derivatives to carry out the arbitrage
(which in turn introduces new counterparty credit risks), and ever more
complex tax measures introduced to protect tax revenues from arbitrage.
Revenue authorities have evidence of attempted tax arbitrage by multina-
tional companies on a significant scale, although some of this affects only
transactions within groups of companies and so will not necessarily lead
directly to increased leverage.
Differences in the tax situations of different investors encourage the forma-
tion of tax clientèles, where investors’ choices depend on their particular tax
situation. As well as limiting efficient risk diversification, this opens up op-
portunities for tax arbitrage that distort efficient market pricing. The collater-
alization of subprime debt through securitizations and associated CDS activity
may have provided incentives for just this kind of arbitrage. Investors subject
to capital gains tax (and restricted capital loss relief) were able to share in the
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high yields from low-grade debt as a result of the ‘slice and dice’ repackaging
within securitization SPVs and from entering into CDSs with financial traders
who could get full tax relief for default losses. This arbitrage among different
tax clienteles was potentially most advantageous for the riskiest debt with the
highest expected default rates.
Tax havens have been at the heart of the shadow banking system, which in
turn has been at the heart of the high levels of leverage and risk taking at the
root of the crisis. They are home to many of the conduits (SPVs and the like),
money funds, hedge funds, and other non-bank financial institutions through
which the pre-crisis bubble was inflated. The tax-neutral environment of
havens means they can facilitate the conversion of income to capital or the
deferral of income that will generate higher after-tax yields or lower after-tax
costs of capital through tax arbitrage, increasing incentives to leverage and
distorting allocation of resources. A lack of effective exchange of information
for tax purposes also encourages non-compliance, as investors are aware that
information will not be disclosed to their home tax authorities.
The OECD has achieved substantial progress in addressing risks of tax
evasion through exchange of information, with over 100 member countries
of the Global Forum on Transparency and Exchange of Information endorsing
international tax transparency and exchange of information standards.7 This
will reduce the attractiveness of structured finance products in tax-haven
jurisdictions at least for non-tax-compliant investors.
To date there has been less coordinated action by governments to address
potential systemic distortions caused by tax preferences for debt financing and
for capital gains, partly because of the lack of hard evidence of the actual
impact of such distortions, and partly because of the diversity of national tax
systems and tax policy preferences in which these financial stability issues are
just one element.
As part of an overall strategic response to the financial crisis, priorities in this
area could be to raise awareness of the incentives to financial instability caused
inadvertently by common features of national tax systems, to evaluate the
impact of these incentives, and to identify whether there are well-targeted
reforms that might reduce or remove tax distortions to excessive leverage,
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APPENDIX
Addressing Tax Risks Involving Bank Losses8
Potential scale/fiscal cost of banks’ tax losses
The effects of the 2008 financial and economic crisis on bank profits worldwide have
been phenomenal, with reported write-downs and losses of $1.3 trillion up to January
2010 either directly related to the financial crisis, or coming from effects throughout
the banking sector. Industry-wide returns on equity fell from 17.9 per cent in 2006 to
3.2 per cent in 2008 (Dayal et al. 2010). Of the 4,500 banks worldwide monitored by
The Banker, around 200 incurred pre-tax losses of $5 million or more in 2008, totalling
around $400 billion (Lambe 2009). The largest commercial losses arose in those banks
directly exposed to the collapse of the property market, which was the immediate
trigger for the financial crisis. These were banks involved as originators of subprime
mortgages, issuers of collateralized debt obligations (CDOs) linked to property assets,
investors in asset-backed securities, or any combination of the three. These large
commercial losses can be regarded as the flip side of large profits made in the years
prior to the crisis, which in part were due to a combination of increased bank leverage
coupled with asset valuations that underpriced risk, and a regulatory arbitrage involv-
ing transfer of assets to off-balance-sheet conduits that required only a fraction—
typically less than 20 per cent—of the regulatory capital otherwise needed.
Reliable information on the likely extent and fiscal cost of banks’ tax losses is not
publicly available. However, the growth over time in published balance-sheet figures
of net deferred tax assets can be taken as a broad proxy of what a bank believes is the
growth in the stock of realized and unrealized tax losses carried forward, which the
bank thinks it probable it can utilize. On these assumptions, and as a rough calcula-
tion, the stock of realized and unrealized tax losses at the end of 2009 may have been
at least $700 billion, with a potential fiscal cost of some $230 billion.9 There are
indications that it may take between three and eight years for this overall stock of
bank tax losses to be utilized, with some banks remaining in a loss position for many
more years to come.
8 This section has been prepared with Raffaele Russo. It summarizes the principal results of
OECD (2010a).
9 Authors’ calculations derived from The Banker database <http://www.thebankerdatabase.
com>.
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Relevant country tax rules for recognizing and relieving losses
Country rules differ in the extent to which write-downs and losses on banks’ loans and
securities are recognized for tax purposes. There are also wide variations in country rules
giving relief for overall tax losses. This gives rise to potential international tax planning
opportunities.
Tax loss relief rules are complex, and differ from country to country, giving rise to
further potential tax risks for both business and revenue bodies. Sideways loss relief is
available in most countries, while others ring-fence loss relief to particular types of
income or profits. Group taxation regimes of one kind or another are available in many
countries, although cross-border group taxation regimes exist in only a small number of
countries. Carry-over of losses (forward or backward) is a feature of all tax systems,
though here too there are marked differences between countries, with only a minority
allowing the carry-back of losses, and most imposing a time limit on loss carry-forward.
There are also different restrictions to the carry-over of losses triggered by a change in
the ownership and/or the activity of the loss-making company, and the definitions of
these terms also vary between countries. These restrictions may not apply in some
countries on internal reorganizations within a group of companies, if there is no tax
avoidance, or if there are specific exceptions to facilitate commercial rescue/restructur-
ing plans. From a cross-border perspective, whether losses of foreign branches are
relieved depends generally on whether double taxation relief is provided by way of a
tax credit or exemption, while losses of foreign subsidiaries are generally not deductible
in the country of the parent company (though there are some exceptions). ‘Double-dip’
reliefs for losses are expressly ruled out in some countries.
Main issues for banks
Losses give rise to various tax risks from the perspective of banks, which for the most
part relate to certainty. Banks would normally not expect revenue bodies to revisit
valuations signed off by auditors and more generally would like tax to follow accounts
write-off treatment. Banks also expect revenue bodies to apply domestic and interna-
tional tax rules consistently to both profits and losses. In addition, banks have a key
non-tax interest in ensuring that they receive full tax relief for commercial losses, as tax
losses can in some circumstances count towards regulatory capital available to support
their business. Certain banks have indicated that revenue body support—in real time—
for tax loss claims has directly influenced regulators in accepting tax losses as available
to contribute to regulatory capital. Without this, the banks would have needed to issue
new capital, repay borrowings, and/or reduce their lending activity, and this may have
affected their recovery strategy.
Main issues for revenue bodies
Revenue bodies are concerned with ensuring the right amount of tax is paid at the right
time, and will pay particular attention to the incentives that may affect that outcome
one way or the other. Banks in many countries sustained substantial commercial losses,
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and revenue bodies will want to ensure that relief for those losses is given in accordance
with the applicable law. However, revenue bodies are also concerned at the potential
risk to tax systems posed by the extent to which banks might use aggressive tax
planning schemes to extend relief for losses beyond what is due. To some extent,
there are factors that potentially mitigate this concern, at least in the short term. The
value of tax losses to banks as a source of regulatory capital in many countries may in
some cases reduce incentives for banks to seek to sell those losses to unrelated parties.
Beyond that, a contraction of the structured finance activity in the wake of the crisis
may have temporarily reduced opportunities for aggressive tax planning involving
structured finance products. Even so, the scale of the stock of tax losses, and the
potential regulatory capital, profitability, and cash-flow benefits for banks able to
convert them to cash, mean that revenue bodies are alert to potential compliance risk
in a number of areas.
Transfer pricing
Transfer pricing is a key risk area in international taxation in general and may trigger
particular attention in the case of loss-making banks or loss-making affiliates within
profit-making banking groups. In the banking sector, the allocation of risks within a
group has a very important and distinct role in profit/loss allocation, and revenue bodies
are monitoring whether losses are allocated where the risks related to them belong.
Particular attention will be devoted to the consistency of the transfer pricing policy of
banks with the business models adopted over time. Revenue bodies are concerned that in
somecases loss-makingfinancial assetsmaybe allocated to relativelyhigh-tax jurisdictions,
through non-arm’s length transactions or dealings. Transfer pricing concerns have also
been identified in relation to financial transactions—for example, non-arm’s length prices
for guarantee fees, related party interest rates, and split hedges.
Corporate reorganizations
A further potential compliance risk involves transfer of losses/profits through reorga-
nizations. Tax rules do not always provide for symmetrical treatment of profits and
losses, particularly where that might encourage tax-driven distortions, and revenue
bodies are alert to techniques that frustrate necessary restrictions, including techniques
that anticipate likely losses or that exploit CFC rules to import losses. Revenue bodies
(in particular those where real-time working is the norm) are already examining the tax
consequences of changes of ownership and reorganizations to ensure that the rules are
being complied with. Techniques that raise concerns from the perspective of revenue
bodies are, for example, the acquisition of a loss-making company for the only purpose
of merging it into a tax group with profit-making companies, thereby reducing the
taxable profits of other group companies by the losses of the acquired company. In
other cases, revenue bodies have noticed an increase in the acquisition of loss-making
companies towards the end of a tax year, before losses materialize for tax purposes. This
may be due to the fact that restrictions on the carry-over of losses or on different forms
of group taxation regime rarely apply in relation to parts of a tax period. Revenue bodies
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have also encountered cases where, in the course of corporate reorganizations, banking
entities with loss-making activities have been allocated highly mobile income (such as
income from financing or licensing of intangibles) so as to be able to offset their losses
against the related income, despite the fact that they were not carrying out the eco-
nomic activity giving rise to this income.
Profit shifting using financial instruments
The use of financial instruments as means of shifting profits or losses among different
taxpayers is another potential area of concern for revenue bodies. Potential tax risks
that have been identified in this area are the use of call/put options to transfer profits or
losses for tax purposes, and the purported transfer of risks through swaps, other
derivatives, and debt waivers. Some revenue bodies have identified back-to-back trans-
actions that are primarily or exclusively motivated by the willingness to transfer or
optimize the use of tax losses. There may also be cases where instruments that are in
economic terms a loan or deposit to the bank are instead structured in a way that they
qualify for tax purposes as shares giving rise to dividends. More generally, revenue
bodies are alert to new tax planning techniques involving financial instruments that
take advantage of the tax exhaustion of banks, as opposed to the (more traditional)
techniques designed to shield profits from taxation.
Loss carry-over rules
Circumvention of loss carry-over rules is another area of potential compliance risk. The
possibility of carrying back or forward losses against the income of other group com-
panies is a particular concern in relation to group reorganizations. Country variations
in loss relief rules may themselves create an incentive for tax planning. Countries
allowing loss carry-back may attract tax planning aimed at releasing tax paid by
companies reporting profits in previous years. Similarly, countries that provide for
short loss carry-forward expiry dates may be particularly exposed to tax planning
aimed at acceleration of loss utilization or loss refreshing, while other countries may
be particularly exposed to planning aimed at loss importation. Examples of attempted
loss-refreshing schemes that have been identified by revenue bodies include a bank’s
transfer of its perpetual loan obligation to a subsidiary at a value below its nominal
amount, for which it claims to realize profits against which it can set off its expiring
losses, in return for a potential future loss in the subsidiary.
Loss recognition rules
There is also concern regarding possible manipulation of bank loss recognition rules. In
some countries different items of income are treated differently for tax purposes, and
profits/losses from each type cannot be offset against each other. There is a risk that
taxpayers try to circumvent these rules in order to obtain upfront relief for their losses.
This includes, for example, the opportunities arising because of the different tax
treatment of loans and securities, which in some instances are taxed on a realization
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basis and in others on an accrual basis, as banks are potentially able to control when
they recognize a loss by deferring sales or bringing forward sales as needed.
Double dips
Another area of potential concern for revenue bodies is the multiple deduction of what
is economically the same loss, generally through the use of hybrid mismatch arrange-
ments. An increasing number of countries have rules dealing with schemes whose aim
is to exploit the arbitrage possibilities that are due to the existence of differences in the
applicable tax rules. In some cases these rules are based on a linking principle, according
to which the domestic tax treatment is linked to the tax treatment in the foreign
country, therefore preventing, for example, the deduction in more than one country
of what is economically the same loss.
Tools available to revenue bodies to address compliance risk
Revenue bodies have a number of tools to help manage potential compliance risks,
starting with encouraging responsible tax reporting through cooperation and dialogue.
Initiatives aimed at establishing a fruitful and effective dialogue with the taxpayer are
considered to be very useful in addressing the main compliance issues from the per-
spective of the revenue bodies, and these also carry important benefits for the taxpayer
in terms of the greater certainty that comes from real-time working with the tax
authority. Even where a dispute will be resolved through litigation, dialogue can help
to clarify the positions taken by each party, and to reduce the costs to each party of the
dispute being unnecessarily protracted. Real-time intelligence gathering on industry
developments, the use of questionnaires, taxpayer alerts, hiring experts, and related
staff training ensure that dialogue between the tax authority and banks is on a ‘com-
mercially aware’ footing. Requests for rulings and clearances from revenue bodies also
play an important role in gathering relevant information about banks’ intentions and
risk appetite. Disclosure rules also serve as an early warning system and may put
aggressive tax planners on notice that the revenue body will want to analyse certain
transactions in detail. For all countries, audits constitute an important tool to detect
aggressive tax planning behaviour, and are clearly a key backstop to real-time dialogue
and intervention. International cooperation among revenue bodies is particularly
relevant in order fully to understand the details of taxpayers’ activities, particularly in
the area of complex financial instruments involving multiple countries. Joint audits
may also play a useful role in this respect, since they allow revenue bodies to obtain
relevant information in an efficient manner. Cooperation between revenue bodies and
local regulators may also be an effective tool, since banks are required continuously to
monitor their own risks, including their tax risks.
Way forward
There are differences in the experiences of different countries in relation to the taxation
of bank losses, as well as differences in administrative, legal, and cultural frameworks.
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Against that background, OECD (2010a) makes a number of recommendations for
revenue bodies and banks. These recommendations are set out in full below.
Recommendations for revenue bodies
To improve commercial awareness in order better to understand, assess, and respond to
tax risks, while facilitating sustainable business activity, revenue bodies should work
constructively with the banking sector and regulatory bodies to gain a shared under-
standing of the commercial context and the links between tax and regulatory reporting,
building on the engagement that has underpinned this report. This could involve joint
training, secondments, seminars, and workshops, including on a multilateral basis
where appropriate.
To encourage transparent tax compliance and improve detection of aggressive tax
planning, revenue bodies should:
 encourage real-time engagement and open and transparent relationships between
banks and revenue bodies;
 consider with regulatory bodies how the transparency of financial accounts in
relation to provisions for tax exposures might be improved;
 consider the use of disclosure rules for aggressive tax planning involving losses;
 remain alert to and actively monitor potential compliance risks involving bank
losses; in this regard, revenue bodies could use deferred tax asset statements as a
tool for better understanding banks’ incentives for tax planning involving losses.
To reduce tax risks arising from complexities and uncertainties in the operation or
interaction of country rules, revenue bodies should:
 consider the adequacy of their guidance for banks on how national loss relief rules
apply and, where possible, to offer real-time discussion and resolution of issues;
 bring to the attention of their government tax policy officials those situations that
may potentially raise policy issues, and in particular those where the same tax loss
is relieved in more than one country as a result of differences in tax treatment
between jurisdictions, in order to determine whether steps should be taken to
eliminate that arbitrage/mismatch opportunity.
To benefit fully from international and domestic cooperation, revenue bodies should:
 share intelligence and information on aggressive tax planning involving banks’
losses, including through an international network of revenue body officials and
by contributing to the OECD Aggressive Tax Planning (ATP) Directory non-tax-
payer-specific information on schemes involving tax losses, including on bank tax
losses;
 share experience and best practices on how to identify and where possible address
cases of multiple deduction of the same economic loss;
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 take opportunities to work closely with national regulatory bodies in addressing
aggressive planning to maximize the use of losses for tax purposes, including in
cases where that tax planning is intended to produce non-tax, regulatory, benefits.
To encourage earlier certainty, revenue bodies should:
 consider an enhanced relationship approach, where appropriate to a country’s
circumstances, based on the benefits to both taxpayers and revenue bodies; in
this regard, revenue bodies should recognize the importance for banks’ business
activity in securing early certainty on the availability of tax losses within the
applicable tax rules, and give appropriate priority to the resolution of potential
disputes over tax losses.
Recommendations for banks
In order to reduce their tax risks involving losses, banks can contribute in the following
ways:
 Banks have a key role in supporting a better commercial understanding of their
business by revenue bodies, and could encourage that through dialogue, joint
training, secondments, seminars and workshops.
 Banks should be open and transparent with revenue bodies in their planning
involving tax losses, whether or not that is primarily tax or non-tax driven.
 Banks’ boards should ensure appropriate corporate governance processes are in
place around tax risk management, including resourcing internal audit activities,
as a means to confirm that such policies are adhered to.
 Banks should highlight areas of uncertainty in the operation of current country
loss recognition and loss relief rules, thus allowing revenue bodies and their tax
policy officials to address that uncertainty in a timely manner.
 Consistent with the OECD (2010c, 2010d), banks are encouraged to support the
way they have allocated tax losses to a particular jurisdiction with appropriate
documentation, as this may reduce substantially the potential for disputes.
 In setting their business strategy, banks should consider the benefits of an
enhanced relationship with revenue bodies, including early certainty, reduced
compliance costs, and reduced reputational risk.
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9
Government Debt Management at Low
Interest Rates
Robert N. McCauley and Kazuo Ueda
9.1 Introduction
The advisability of central banks’ extraordinary buying of government
bonds is much debated. However, the question of how treasury debt man-
agement can contribute to maintaining the growth of bank assets, lowering
long-term government bond yields, or reducing net government interest
payments is rarely posed. The Bank of England’s and Federal Reserve’s
March 2009 announcements of outright purchases of gilts and Treasury
bonds drew more attention than the respective treasuries’ announcements
of large issues of bonds around the same time. Inattention to debt manage-
ment in the context of proposals to alter the duration of government debt
in private hands is puzzling. After all, the government balance sheet tends
to bulk large in relation to that of the central bank. As a result, a substantial
change in the central bank’s assets can be offset by a small change in
government liabilities.
This chapter first discusses the objectives of debt management and mone-
tary policy and the complementarities and tensions between them, especially
at low interest rates. It then reviews the interaction of central bank purchases
of government bonds and debt management in the United States in the 1930s
and Japan in the late 1990s and the 2000s. A discussion of initiatives under-
taken in the United Kingdom, Japan, and the United States follows.
The authors thank Naohiko Baba, Claudio Borio, Brendan Brown, Michael Cross, Jacob
Gyntelberg, Richard Koo, Kenneth Kuttner, Hiroshi Nakaso, Akira Otani, and Frank Packer for
discussions, and Jhuvesh Sobrun for assistance. Any errors remain those of the authors. Authors’
views are not necessarily shared by the Bank for International Settlements. This chapter was
originally published as McCauley and Ueda (2009).
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9.2 Interactions between debt management
and monetary policy
A government with sizeable financial obligations must choose its debt com-
position: fixed-rate or short-term/variable rate; domestic or foreign currency;
nominal or price indexed. These choices comprise debt management. Nowa-
days, debt management generally aims to minimize cost, to limit variability of
interest payments and bunching of cash flows, to offset variation in taxes and
spending, or to achieve some combination of these. Not so long ago, debt
management was given a role in stabilizing the economy, alongside, or even
as a part of, monetary policy.
Monetary policy seeks to stabilize prices and economic activity by influen-
cing spending by firms and households. When activity strains an economy’s
capacity, policy restrains spending. When activity falls short, policy attempts
to stimulate spending. In many countries, monetary policy had come to focus
on hitting an inflation objective by setting a short-term interest rate.
The goals and conduct of debt management and monetary policy can
complement each other, but can also give rise to tensions. The traditional
view was that the cost of debt service was secondary to the need to ‘fund’ the
debt—that is, to issue fixed-rate debt so long dated that banks would not hold
it (or it would not serve as near money for non-banks). Structurally, skilful
debt management aids monetary policy in producing a deep, liquid, and
resilient market for operations. However, debt management aimed only to
minimize costs might create tensions with monetary policy by relying on
short-term debt (given the normal upward slope of the yield curve). Over
the business cycle, debt management can ‘get in the way’ of monetary policy,
for instance, if bonds are issued heavily when the central bank is easing.
The scope for interaction and even tensions depends on how the economy
works and howmonetary and debt management policies are implemented. In
terms of the economy’s functioning, this scope is minimal if the mix of bills
and bonds does not matter for the shape of the yield curve or the economy at
large. Private investors may treat treasury bills and bonds as perfect substi-
tutes, pricing bonds as an average of expected bill yields over the bond’s life. In
this case, the mix of bills and bonds will not affect yields.1 For the scope for
interaction to be minimal, debt composition must also not affect firm and
household spending through its effect on broad money (Box 9.1).
1 For a recent discussion of the case of perfect substitutability, see Clouse et al. (2003), and the
evidence in Baba et al. (2005) and Oda and Ueda (2007). For imperfect substitutability, see
Bernanke et al. (2004) and Kuttner (2006).
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Box 9.1. BOND BUYING AND DEBT MANAGEMENT: A QUANTITATIVE VIEW
Following Congdon (2003), this box simplifies the economy’s balance sheet to show the
quantitative differences among various operations that can be carried out at very low
interest rates. The upshot is that a central bank’s purchase of government bonds can be
seen as a compound of quantitative easing, defined as the central bank injecting funds
into the banking system, and a debt management exchange of treasury bills for treasury
bonds. This graphical ‘T-account’ exercise is consistent with King’s emphasis (2009) on
the purchase of gilts from the ‘wider economy’, and not just banks, as well as the Bank of
England’s purchase of gilts of five to twenty-five years’ residual maturity, usually held by
non-banks.
In the initial situation (Figure 9A, top left-hand panel), the government has a mix of
bill and bond liabilities. The bills are held by the central bank and the commercial
banking system. The non-bank private sector holds bonds and deposits in the banking
system. Cash holdings are abstracted away, so that bank deposits comprise the stock of
money. The corporate and household sectors as borrowers from banks and issuers of
bonds are also abstracted away.
In this simple schema, one can represent quantitative easing as an operation between
the central bank and the commercial banking system (Figure 9A, upper right-hand
panel). The central bank buys treasury bills with its liabilities, and bank reserves increase.
Not much happens: the banks hold fewer treasury bills paying essentially no interest but
Initial situation Quantitative easing: central bank buys billsa









































Figure 9A. Stylized monetary and debt management policy
a The central bank buys 100 bills from commercial banks. Their cash reserves increase by 100.
b Held by the private sector.
c Commercial banks’ deposits with central bank.
d The government sells 100 in bills to the commercial banks and buys 100 in bonds.
Sources: Congdon (2003); authors’ adaptation.
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Until recently, the way monetary and debt management policies were im-
plemented had narrowed the scope for their interaction. As noted, monetary
policy entailed setting the overnight interest rate in response to inflation and
growth forecasts. Though details differed, central banks operated at the short
end in secondary markets or against collateral and thus left the mix of govern-
ment bills and bonds in private hands unaffected. In this sense, monetary
policy left debt management policy to the debt manager. For their part, debt
managers had generally opted to ‘regularize’ debt by issuing steadily and
predictably to minimize costs (Garbade 2007). Such debt management hardly
enters into the central bank’s forecast.
There is some mapping between institutional arrangements and the inter-
actions of the two policies. A generation ago, the Bank of England and the
Reserve Bank of India both served their governments as debt managers, con-
sistent with a concept of monetary policy as embracing debt management.
Subsequently, as the Bank of England focused on inflation targeting through
short-term rate setting, debt management was moved to a separate dedicated
office (Bleijer 1999). Many governments in the euro area have also set up debt
management offices (Kalderen and Blommestein 2002), given Eurosystem
monetary operations that advance against broad collateral rather than buying
government debt outright. In the United States, where the central bank’s
more similarly unremunerative bank reserves. This simplifies the Bank of Japan’s opera-
tions, which used a wide set of instruments and counter-parties, and the range of holders
of bank reserves (which included holdings of foreign banks that had swapped dollars for
yen), but it captures the disconnect between rapid growth of bank reserves and muted
growth of the money supply that was observed in Japan.
A debt management operation can in principle have greater effect, at least in this
simple financial system (Figure 9A, bottom left-hand panel). The Treasury sells bills to
commercial banks and buys bonds from non-bank investors with the proceeds. The non-
bank private sector holds less risky treasury bonds and more bank deposits (more
money). (Bank reserves are assumed to be a non-binding constraint.)
A central bank that buys treasury bonds basically combines these two operations
(bottom right-hand panel). The central bank credits the bank of the seller of the bond
with bank reserves, and the bank credits the non-bank investor with a deposit. Money
holdings increase, as with the debt swap of bills for bonds, but banks hold more excess
bank reserves rather than bills.
In the real world, the results in this simplified financial systemmay not follow through.
The non-bank private sector has in fact borrowed from the commercial banks. Thus,
purchases of government bonds by the government or central bank might finance non-
banks’ repayment of such bank debt rather than boosting broad money (UK House of
Commons 2009). (In particular, an institutional investor might sell a government bond
and purchase a newly issued corporate bond, and the issuer might repay a bank loan.)
Finally, even if broad money can be increased, it is not clear that would necessarily
increase spending by firms and households.
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mission remained broader, the Treasury and the Federal Reserve have
continued to cooperate in debt management as principal and agent.
The scope for interaction between monetary policy and debt management
has widened. In part, this is due to the tide of opinion, which has been
running against the view that bond yields approximate the average of future
short-term rates, rendering bills and bonds perfect substitutes.
The sceptics of this perfection point to the market reactions to the Bank of
England’s and the Federal Reserve’s surprising announcements in March
2009, when yields fell by about 40 basis points in each case (Figure 9.1).
Moreover, bond market anomalies during the financial crisis have heightened
doubts about the power of arbitrage and speculation along the yield curve.2 To
many other observers, however, these market reactions amounted to no more
than a spasm of short covering subject to reversal over weeks.
More fundamentally, the scope for interaction has increased in three ways
with the extraordinary policy responses to the crisis that began in 2008. First,
short-term yields near the zero limit have led central banks to use their balance
sheets to affect quantities and yields (BIS 2009: ch. VI). As the room for man-
uvrewithpolicy rates shrank, central banks advanced funds andbought assets
in size, originally shedding government debt in some cases, but now including
government debt. Domestic assets on central bank balance sheets have risen
in some cases to double digit percentages of GDP, though still generally well
below the government’s domestic currency liabilities (Figure 9.2).
5 March (Greenwich Mean Time)a 18 March (Eastern Standard Time)b
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Figure 9.1. BoE and Fed buyback announcements: ten-year government bond yields (%)
a The vertical line marks the Bank of England’s £75 billion asset purchase programme
announcement.
b The vertical line marks the Federal Reserve’s announcement of $300 billion in purchases of
Treasury coupon securities.
Sources: Bloomberg; BIS calculations.
2 Anomalies include the inversion of swap yields below government yields at long maturities,
implausible deflation indications from price gaps between benchmark bonds and illiquid inflation-
indexed bonds, and the pricing of floating rate notes in the JGB market (see below).
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Second, as short-term interest rates approach zero, central bank liabilities
and treasury bills become very close substitutes (Ueda 2001).3 As a result,
when money yields nothing, central bank purchases of government bonds
and the government debt manager’s swapping of bills for bonds are ‘indistin-
guishable’ (King 2004: 11). Figure 9A in Box 9.1 traces graphically the similar-
ity in terms of balance sheets and holdings of broad money.
Third, the central bank is often urged to take actions that are the province of
the debtmanager. For instance, Auerbach andObstfeld (2005) suggest that the
central bank reduce the net cost of government debt service by buying bonds
at yields stuck at levels well above zero short-term rates. This proposal draws
on the long-standing notion that debt management can be used to hedge
macroeconomic risks and associated variation in tax receipts and expenditures
(Missale 1999). In particular, reliance on short-term or floating rate debt will
save on interest payments if the economy remains weak and subject to defla-
tion, while higher taxes will offset higher interest payments in case of an
economic rebound. Such proposals may be well taken or not, but there is no
necessary central bank role unless debt management is on autopilot.
In sum, starting from a situation in which monetary and debt management
remained in their respective corners, current circumstances have brought
them closer. What can we learn from a review of two episodes in which the























Figure 9.2. Gross government debt and central bank assets (domestic currencies, as a
percentage of GDP in 2008)
a The line indicates the change from 2006 to the latest period.
Note: Countries represented are Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Chile, China, Chinese Taipei, the euro
area, India, Indonesia, Korea, Mexico, the Philippines, Poland, South Africa, Sweden, Switzerland,
Thailand, Turkey, the UK, and the USA. For central bank assets, 2007 figures for China; 2006 figures
for the Philippines; for the euro area, 2007 figures and total debt instead of government debt. Gross
government debt and central bank assets for Japan (not shown) are 180% and 21%, respectively.
Sources: IMF; JPMorgan Chase; national data.
3 Payment of interest on excess reserves or issuance of interest-bearing central bank bills make
central bank liabilities close substitutes for treasury bills even at positive yields.
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9.3 US debt management in the early 1930s and Federal
Reserve bond purchases
There are two accounts of the monetary policy mistakes of the early 1930s in
the United States. They agree that bank deposits (the money supply) should
have kept growing, but they differ on how this should have been done.
US monetarists say that the Federal Reserve erred in not buying more
Treasury securities in order to increase bank reserves held at the Federal
Reserve (Friedman and Schwartz 1963; Meltzer 2002). Large, sustained Trea-
sury purchases, either bills or bonds, would have pushed short-term interest
rates to zero and provided banks with large excess reserve. At some stage, they
would have made loans and thereby sustained bank deposits. (In terms of
Figure 9A in Box 9.1, these US monetarists leave it unclear whether their
recommended policy is the top or bottom right-hand panel.)
Others say that the Treasury erred by not supplying bills in exchange for
bonds in order to maintain bank assets and thus bank deposits (Culbertson
1957). After the collapse of share and commodity prices, private borrowers
paid down securities credit and non-real estate loans, and banks thereby
lost the bulk of their liquid assets. Banks could have replaced these private
advances with holdings of Treasury bills, introduced in 1929 (Garbade
2008). Instead, the Treasury rolled over maturing First World War bonds
with new bonds and left a vacuum on bank balance sheets. (In terms of
Figure 9A in Box 9.1, this account corresponds to the bottom left-hand
panel.)
These two arguments agree in their support for increased private-sector
holdings of highly liquid claims, either excess reserves at the central bank or
Treasury bills. They disagree in that the US monetarists see bills and bonds as
perfect substitutes, and as a result do not specify whether the Federal Reserve
should have purchased (or did purchase) one or the other. To them, bank
reserves (‘high-powered money’) differ from Treasuries, and, in sufficient
amounts, eventually lead to credit and broad money growth. On the other
side, bills and bonds are considered as different and held in different portfolios
so that a shift towards bills tends to boost broad money growth. In this view,
when short-term interest rates are near zero, exchanging excess bank reserves
for Treasury bills is seen as not helpful (as in the top right-hand panel of Figure
9A in Box 9.1).
In terms of price effects, at least some Federal Reserve officials at the time
believed that their buying of Treasury bonds could raise their price and bring
down their yields. For instance, in June 1930, Governor Harrison of the Federal
Reserve Bank of New York argued to his fellow governors that purchases of
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Treasury bonds could ‘lower long-term rates, increase loans to foreigners and
thus stimulate exports’ (Meltzer 2002: 307).
In terms of fiscal effects, if Treasury bills had been substituted for bonds
(or the Federal Reserve had bought Treasury bonds in size), the immediate
interest savings could have been substantial. It is remarkable how little
long-term Treasury yields responded to the decline in Treasury bill rates
through the first half of 1931 (Figure 9.3). Even if Treasury bond yields had
not fallen owing to a shift from bonds to bills, interest costs could have
been lower.
In the event, Federal Reserve purchases of Treasury securities barely reduced
the amounts of bonds held by private investors through 1932 (Figure 9.4, left-
hand panel). In particular, the bond purchases of the summer of 1930 are
hardly visible. The Federal Reserve Bulletin reports Treasury debt in millions of
dollars, but the Federal Reserve balance sheet in thousands. And, except in the
summer of 1930, the Federal Reserve generally held more Treasury bills (and
certificates) than bonds.
Broad money shrank as the decline in bank credit to private borrowers was
not offset by increased holdings of Treasury securities. Even given the lack of
an expansive fiscal policy that would have increased the supply of Treasury
securities, the Treasury’s choice to replace maturing bonds with new bonds
failed to provide the banking system with safe and liquid assets. The result,
hardly affected by Federal Reserve bond purchases, was that overall assets and
bank deposits declined (Figure 9.5). Such was not the experience in Japan in




















Figure 9.3. Three-month treasury bill and ten-year bond yields (%)
a Option-adjusted Treasury bill rates calculated by Cecchetti (1988).
Sources: Cecchetti (1988); national data.
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Figure 9.4. Holdings/issuance of government bonds and notes
a Outstanding amounts, in billions of US dollars.
b In trillions of yen.
c Treasury minus Federal Reserve holdings of bonds and notes.
Sources: Federal Reserve Bulletins; Ministry of Finance of Japan; authors’ calculations.
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Figure 9.5. Bank credit and money growth (%)
Notes: Annual growth rates for money supply; for credit, percentage point contribution, calculated
as the year-on-year change in the level of the credit series divided by total bank assets of the
corresponding period of the previous year. Money supply: For the USA, M1, calculated as currency
held by the public plus demand and time deposits at commercial banks. For Japan, M2+CDs,
calculated as cash currency in circulation plus deposit money, quasi-money and certificates of
deposit. Credit to the private sector: For the USA, total bank assets minus investments in US dollar
government securities of ninety leading member banks. For Japan, bank claims on the private
sector plus net foreign assets. Credit to other sectors: For the USA, investments in US government
securities of ninety leading member banks; for Japan, money supply minus credit to the private
sector.
Sources: Bank of Japan; Federal Reserve; Friedman and Schwartz (1963); Koo (2008); authors’
calculations.
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9.4 Japanese debt management since 2000
and BoJ JGB purchases
At the bottom of the Japanese recession in the early 2000s, there was discus-
sion within theMinistry of Finance (MoF) on the possible contribution of debt
management to macroeconomic stabilization. For example, Kuroda (2002),
then the MoF’s Vice Minister of Finance for International Affairs expressed his
view that the scope of debt management could possibly be ‘widened so as to
pursue price stabilitymore explicitly’. However, he recognized that this ‘might
mean a compromise with the traditional objective of debt management’. The
stated general purpose of the MoF’s debt management (2008) is to ‘maintain
markets’ confidence in the capacity of the government to manage stable
issuance of JGBs [Japanese government bonds] and Financing Bills and to
repay its outstanding debt’. The report’s Japanese-language version is more
pointed: ‘lowering interest payment cost on JGBs is a serious policy goal.’
Given this, it might have been difficult to refrain from issuing long-dated
debt at historically very low bond yields, albeit with a potential for tensions
with monetary policy.
Some argued in the early 2000s that debt management might contribute to
price stability by concentrating issuance at the short end, where yields would
be held down by Bank of Japan (BoJ) policy. This would leave less issuance of
JGBs at the long end and might allow longer-term bond yields to fall further.
At its extreme, such an approach might have meant to ‘target’ bond yields
in an attempt to lower them and to stimulate the economy. The idea did
not become policy probably because of doubts about the practicality of
controlling bond yields by merely changing the composition of debt.
Even in the pursuit of the goal of interest cost minimization, officials
struggled to respond to the environment of near-zero short-term interest
rates. This was the case especially after 1999, when the BoJ adopted the so-
called zero interest rate policy (ZIRP). Some argued for much larger issuance of
financing bills and short-term bonds, while others recognized the rollover and
interest rate risks inherent in such a strategy. In the event, they adopted a
middle-of-the-road approach. In the MoF’s cost-at-risk analysis, an optimal
debt issuance structure is determined by the trade-off between cost minimiza-
tion and interest rate risks, especially when short-term rates are unusually low
(Ministry of Finance of Japan 2008).
Thus, fiscal years 1999 and 2000 saw a shortening of the maturity of
JGBs issued, perhaps in response to the ZIRP (Figure 9.6, left-hand panel).
The next few years (2000–3) seem to have been a period in which the
MoF, in an attempt to maintain stable issuance of JGBs in the face of balloon-
ing budget deficits, introduced various new types of debt instruments:
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fifteen-year floating rate notes (2000), three-year discount bonds and five-year
coupon bonds (2000), and JGBs for individuals and inflation-indexed
bonds (2003). These innovations helped to limit the tension with monetary
policy. In 2003–4, however, the economy and tax revenue subsequently
rebounded and the MoF’s attention shifted to medium-term control of inter-
est payments. Hence, the average maturity of issuance lengthened during
this period.4
When long-term government bond yields began to rise sharply from the
end of 1998, some politicians called for the BoJ to revert to the abandoned
practice of underwriting government bonds (Tomita 2002: 5). As a means to
achieve the step-ups in current-account balances that were at the centre of the
quantitative easing starting in 2001, the BoJ ramped up its monthly outright
purchases of JGBs from 400 billion yen to 1.2 trillion yen in four steps over
fourteen months (Figure 9.6, centre panel). There was no reference to these
purchases’ affecting bond yields. In fact, the BoJ set a rule for buying JGBs,
which, starting in June 2001, included medium-term (two-, four-, five-, and
six-year) as well as ten-year JGBs, which resulted in its purchase of JGBs of
fairly short remainingmaturity.5 As a result, the remainingmaturity of the BoJ
portfolio declined from over five years in 2001 to under four years in 2005
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Figure 9.6. JGB issuance and BoJ purchases and holdings of JGBs
a Average, in years.
b In trillions of yen.
c Weighted average remaining maturity of fixed coupon JGBs held by the BoJ; June observations.
The weights are based on the face value of the JGB series on the observation date.
Sources: Bank of Japan; Ministry of Finance of Japan, Finance Bureau (2008); BIS calculations.
4 The MoF has bought back large amounts of existing JGBs using funds from the special account
of the Fiscal Investment and Loan Plan since 2002. It has carried out interest rate swap transactions
since 2006, in common with many debt managers, which has certainly complicated the
relationship between the maturity structure of debt and the yield curve.
5 In addition to the change in policy to purchase medium-term bonds, the expectation of
persistently low policy rates may also have led to bonds of relatively short remaining maturity
being tendered to the BoJ.
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(Figure 9.6, right-hand panel). Broadly, the rule permitted market participants
to choose which bonds to discount in price in order to sell to the central bank.
In particular, on the day of the bond buying, the BoJ would accept JGBs with
the widest gap between the offered yield and the yield curve at the end of the
previous day.
In limiting its purchases of government bonds, the BoJ set a maximum at
the note issue, which was seen as giving rise to a permanent need to supply
funds; up to this limit JGBs could be held to maturity. Outside observers
suggested risk management alternatives. Congdon (2003) urged that the gov-
ernment exchange bills for bonds in the market instead of central bank
purchases of government bonds, which run the risk of central bank losses
from a rise in bond yields. If the central bank were to purchase government
bonds, he proposed that the government offer an indemnity against any
losses (see UK policy below). When proposals for the BoJ to buy JGBs in
quantity were met with the objection that the resulting holdings would risk
central bank losses, Bernanke (2003) proposed that the government replace
the fixed-rate bonds held by the BoJ with floating rate debt. Implicitly or
explicitly, both proposals pointed to debt management.
In the event, how did the step-up in BoJ purchases of Japanese government
bonds affect JGB holdings by private parties? First, recall that the central bank
stepped up JGB purchases against the backdrop of a lengthening of issuance in
2001 and 2002 by the debt managers (Figure 9.6). This recalls the experience
with Operation Twist in the United States in the 1960s (Box 9.2).
Second, despite the step-up in central bank purchases, JGB issuance to be
absorbed by investors other than the central bank continued to grow. When
government issuance is juxtaposed with central bank buying, the effect of BoJ
purchases was only to decelerate the net supply of JGBs (Figure 9.4, right-hand
panel). The introduction of floating rate notes helped, but did not change the
outcome qualitatively (Box 9.3). In retrospect, although attention focused on
the central bank purchases of JGBs, issuance policy determined the outcome.
Views on these purchases’ effect on bond yields vary. Baba et al. (2005) and
Oda and Ueda (2007) find that BoJ purchases had little effect on long-term
yields. It is hard to distinguish the partial effect of central bank bond pur-
chases from the powerful effect of the central bank’s commitment essentially
to keep the overnight rate at zero until the return of inflation (the so-called
policy duration effect). Bernanke et al. (2004: 70–1) find that a few surprises
(measured, inter alia, by a market participant’s forecasts of BoJ bond-buying
announcements) had a small but significant effect on JGB yields. Some JGB
market participants put weight on the scale of purchases.
Notwithstanding their reliance on JGBs, debt managers’ issuance of
medium-term bonds sufficed to allow banks to maintain their assets in the
face of debt repayment by businesses (Figure 9.5, right-hand panel). As a
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result, M2 plus certificates of deposit continued to grow even as the private
sector continued to deleverage by paying down bank debt (Shirakawa 2001).
Moreover, because the BoJ commitment to keeping short-term interest rates
near zero held downmedium- to long-term interest rates, the opportunity cost
of not selling more short-term or floating rate debt was limited (Figure 9.3,
Box 9.2. OPERATION TWIST REVISITED
In the early 1960s, the US economy was thought to need elevated short-term rates to
defend the US dollar and lower bond yields to encourage investment. The Federal
Reserve engaged in Operation Twist, departing from the earlier bills-only policy to buy
Treasury bonds and to sell Treasury bills.
This policy experiment is often thought to have been a failure. In fact, the experiment
never happened. The Treasury’s extension of maturities overwhelmed the Federal
Reserve sale of bills and purchase of bonds (Figure 9B). ‘In the four years 1961–4,
net purchases outside the 1-year area amounted to only $6.9 billion, of which only
$2.3 billion represented over-5-year maturities. For every dollar of intermediate- and
long-term bonds purchased by the System, the Treasury has sold many times that
amount’ (Beard 1965: 59). Moreover, the way that the Federal Reserve bought bonds
minimized any impact on rates: ‘Typically, the Manager did not solicit offerings from
dealers, but only purchased some of the intermediate- and long-term securities offered
at the dealers’ initiative’ (Beard 1965: 60).
As described by Roosa (1963), the Treasury’s strategy was to boost issuance of
Treasury bills in which central banks then invested their US dollars. At the same time,
advance refundings of coupon securities approaching maturity reduced outstanding
debt in the ‘belly’ of the curve—i.e. in the one- to five-year maturities. In current
parlance, the Treasury was issuing in ‘barbell’ fashion—at three months and beyond
five years. It is not clear that studies that related a ten-year Treasury bond yield to a three-
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Figure 9B. Residualmaturity of US Treasury debt and Federal Reserve holdings of Treasuries
a Includes foreign central banks.
Note: The shaded areas indicate Second World War and post-war interest rate caps (Mar. 1942–Feb.
1951) and the Operation Twist period (Feb.1961–June 1965). The vertical line indicates the
cancellation of the 30-year bond (October 2001).
Source: Kuttner (2006).
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right-hand panel). On both counts, the experience in Japan in the 2000s
compares favourably to that of the United States in the early 1930s.
Still, debt management in Japan may have missed opportunities in recent
years in leaving much duration to be absorbed by the private sector. The
debate over the role that the Bank of Japan could in effect play in debt
management may have crowded out a broader debate over the course of
debt management more generally.
9.5 Debt management and monetary policy since 2008
In March 2009, the UK, Japanese, and US central banks all announced or
enlarged programmes to buy government debt. The context for these policies,
and the policies themselves, showed some similarities and differences.
In all three cases, huge fiscal deficits and purchases of financial assets require
financing. What maturity should the debt have? Apart from a debate in the
United Kingdom (see, e.g., Booth et al. 2008), discussion of the contribution
that debt management might make with interest rates very near zero has been
notable by its absence. Instead, the three debt managers seem intent on
Box 9.3. JAPANESE FIFTEEN-YEAR FLOATING RATE NOTES
An important innovation in debt management took place in Japan in this century. Debt
managers hesitate to shorten the duration of government debt because it can increase
rollover risk. This risk is usually neglected for top-rated sovereigns, but prudent debt
managers cannot be indifferent to large financing requirements. Fitch (2009) recently
warned that ‘sizeable and sustained increases in governments’ reliance on short-term
funding would entail additional risks’, recalling the downgrade of Belgium in the 1990s
when financing requirements hit a third of GDP.
The Ministry of Finance (MoF) limited such rollover risks by introducing a fifteen-year
bond (the CMT) in 2000. Its coupon, payable every half year, is set equal to half the
average ten-year JGB auction yield over the prior six months less an issue-specific
number of basis points (alpha). This ranged from 81 basis points in the first auction, to
a peak of over 100 basis points in 2005, to 40–50 basis points in 2007. The floating rate
notes reduced the supply of fixed-rate debt significantly (Figure 9.4, right-hand panel).
Nevertheless, like the central bank purchases, issuance of floating rate notes only slowed
the growth of issuance of fixed-rate debt.
Since mid-2007, market pricing of these floating rate bonds has fallen below their
‘theoretical’ values, by as much as 10% in late 2008, and the MoF cancelled issuance for
the balance of the 2008–9 fiscal year. It is said that these bonds had come to be heavily
held by hedge funds speculating on a convergence between the market price and the
higher theoretical price (Bank of Japan 2008: 58–9; 2009: 45). The widening of the gap
between the market and theoretical price is thought to reflect the shrinkage and
deleveraging of hedge fund positions.
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relying on longer-duration debt, as well-rated sovereigns tend to do (Figure
9.7). To be sure, the US Treasury shortened its debt when it sold bills in late
2008 to help the Federal Reserve sterilize the dollar funding extended to other
central banks. However, following legislation allowing the Federal Reserve to
pay interest on bank reserves, the US Treasury is stepping up long bond
issuance.
Despite the similar timing of the policy changes in March, the goals of the
central bank purchases of government bonds and their relationship to debt
management show some differences (Table 9.1). The Bank of England’s objec-
tives include both quantity (faster money growth) and price (a lower bond
yield) (Dale 2009). Indeed, thequantitative goal guided the choiceof £75 billion
in initial gilt purchases, which amounts to 5 per cent of broad money (UK
House of Commons Treasury Committee 2009). The Bank of Japan’s objective
is to take the burden away from short-term operations. The Federal Reserve’s
goal in buying Treasury bonds is ‘to help improve conditions in private credit
markets’ (Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System 2009b).
The central bank bond purchases also interacted with debt management in
different ways. The Bank of England acted before the Debt Management
Office had announced its provisional plan of gilt sales for the new fiscal
year. The Governor asked for and obtained a promise from the Chancellor
that the Office would not alter its plan in the light of central bank decisions
on the size, scope, and timing of gilt purchases (Bank of England 2009; UK
Chancellor of the Exchequer 2009). In Japan, the government’s large supple-
mentary budget for 2009 implies an issuance of about 17 trillion yen of JGBs
in addition to the amount already planned in the initial budget. This is

















Figure 9.7. Rating, duration, and average term tomaturity of OECD sovereign domestic
debt, 2007
Notes: Duration—Macaulay or modified duration; average term to maturity—in years.
Source: OECD (2008b).
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Table 9.1. Overview of three central bank policies to buy government bonds, 2009
Bank of England Bank of Japan Federal Reserve
Date 5 March, 7 May 18 March 18 March
Action Initial purchase of £75 billion of gilts and
corporates over three months, to £125
billion in May, £52 billion purchased by
6 May.
Monthly purchases of JGBs raised
from ¥1.4 to ¥1.8 trillion
Purchase of $300 billion in Treasury bonds




£300 billion outstanding in 5- to 25-year
bonds as of 6 May; issuance of 7- to
15-year gilts in April 2009–March 2010,
£70 billion
¥679 trillion at end-2007 $4.4 trillion Treasury notes and bonds
outstanding on 30 April; borrowing
for current fiscal year estimated at
$1.3 trillion
Rationale Boost nominal demand by increasing broad
money (bank deposits), lowering gilt
yields and improving corporate credit
markets
Take burden off short-term
operations
Improve the terms of private credit
Market reaction 40–60 basis points on gilt yield and 30 basis
points on corporate bond yield (Dale
2009)
2–3 basis points 40 basis point immediate reaction
Risk management Exchange of letters between Chancellor and
Governor; indemnity for any Bank of
England losses
JGB holdings by BoJ limited to note
issue; JGBs to be purchased in
specific brackets of residual
maturity to control the maturity of
BoJ’s portfolio
No reference in Board of Governors of the
Federal Reserve System (2009b)
Sources: UK Debt Management Office (2009); US Treasury Office of Debt Management (2009); Bank of England; Bank of Japan: Federal Reserve.
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goal of stable issuance of JGBs. The Bank of Japan has not referred to any
interaction with the government’s debt plan in its own announcements.
Similarly, the Federal Reserve, acting after the first Treasury refunding
announcement in the first days of the new administration, made no reference
to the government’s funding plan.
9.6 Conclusions and prospects
Government debt management may have a role to play amid private delever-
aging and very low policy rates. Some observers emphasize the potential to
lower bond yields by swapping treasury bills for bonds in private hands,
reinforcing the effect on bond yields of the prospect of sustained low policy
rates. Monetarists emphasize that ample issuance of short- and medium-term
government debt (including state-guaranteed bank debt) would allow banks
to maintain deposit growth even as households and firms pay down their
debt. Widespread deleveraging of financial firms’ balance sheets may
strengthen either argument. Despite the expansion of some central bank
balance sheets, treasuries continue to enjoy more scope to alter the weight
of bills and bonds held by private investors. For now, treasuries can issue long-
term debt with interest rates tied to short-term bill rates in the confidence that
monetary policy will keep bill yields low. In doing so, treasuries stand to
benefit from interest cost savings as long as short-term rates remain low.
When economic activity quickens and interest rates rise again, they stand to
benefit from higher taxes in compensation for higher debt servicing costs.
230
Robert N. McCauley and Kazuo Ueda
This is an open access version of the publication distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-
NoDerivs licence (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/), which permits non-commercial reproduction and distribution of 
the work, in any medium, provided the original work is not altered or transformed in any way, and that the work is properly cited. For 
commercial re-use, please contact academic.permissions@oup.com 
10
The Effects of Fiscal Consolidation on
Short-Term Growth: A Review and
Implications for the UK
Katarzyna Anna Bilicka, Michael P. Devereux, and Clemens Fuest
10.1 Introduction
This chapter analyses the economic situation in the UK as it attempts to
recover from the financial and economic crisis that began in 2008. In particu-
lar, we focus on the probability that the fiscal consolidation, introduced by the
new coalition government in 2010, is likely to be either expansionary or
contractionary. To analyse this we first briefly survey the large economic
literature on the impact of government borrowing on economic growth. We
identify the key factors that empirical evidence suggests affect the probability
that a fiscal consolidation will be expansionary. We then examine these
factors in the context of the UK to identify whether they are favourable or
not towards the consolidation being expansionary.
The conventional ‘Keynesian’ view of a fiscal consolidation is that a decline
in government expenditures or an increase in taxes will inevitably lead to a
decline in demand relative to a baseline in which the consolidation did not
take place. Other things being equal, this would depress the rate of growth of
GDP.When the economy is fragile, fiscal consolidation could tip the economy
into recession. This is certainly a view expressed in the UK. In 2011, the
recovery from the recession induced by the financial crisis is weak. The pros-
pect of significant cuts in public spending, combined with a rise in taxes, has
led many to fear that the UK is poised to return to a recession.
However, the Keynesian view has been challenged by the empirical obser-
vation that some countries havemanaged to carry out significant programmes
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of fiscal consolidation without a significant decline in GDP. For example, one
widely cited example is the fiscal consolidation programme in Denmark in the
early 1980s; this coincided with a strong increase in GDP growth, driven
mainly by private investment demand, along with surprisingly stable growth
in private consumption. The experience of Denmark and some other
countries has given rise to a debate on the possibility that fiscal consolidations
may be expansionary: that is, they may actually increase economic growth.
The arguments in favour of this view are based mainly on the impact of
fiscal consolidation on expectations of consumers and investors about the
future. While the Keynesian approach assumes that consumption and invest-
ment decisions are based on current income, more general macroeconomic
models allow for intertemporal effects: economic agents make decisions based
on the expectations of future income and wealth. In this context, a reduction
in public spending, for example, could lead to expectations that taxes will be
lower, and hence post-tax incomes will be higher, in the future. This could
induce agents to increase demand in the short run.
We do not survey all theoretical and empirical research on these issues in
this chapter. Instead, we focus primarily on the empirical literature that
explicitly investigates the factors that are important for whether a consolida-
tion may be expansionary. The key factors identified in that literature are that
the probability of the consolidation being expansionary is higher if: the size of
the consolidation is large; the composition of the consolidation is focused
more on spending cuts than on tax increases; the initial level of public debt is
high; interest rates are not at a lower bound; and there is a devaluation of the
exchange rate. Not all studies find evidence that all of these factors are
significant, and in some cases studies find some of these factors not to be
significant. Nevertheless, there is some broad agreement in the literature that
these are important factors.
We focus our empirical examination on the UK both because it is an
important country, and because it is planning to undertake a very significant
fiscal consolidation between 2010 and 2014.We consider data from the UK on
each of the factors identified in the literature, with the aim of making an
assessment of whether they are favourable for the prospects of economic
growth in the UK.
The chapter is organized as follows. Section 10.2 briefly summarizes what
macroeconomic theory has to say about the impact of fiscal consolidation.
Section 10.3 turns to empirical studies. It discusses some conceptional issues
and surveys the results of this literature. In Section 10.4 we discuss the
implications of these results for the UK programme of fiscal consolidation.
Section 10.5 concludes.
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10.2 Effects of fiscal consolidation on short-term
growth in macroeconomic theories
According to the traditional, ‘Keynesian’ view of a fiscal consolidation, a
decline in government expenditures or an increase in taxes lowers aggregate
demand and, hence, GDP. When the economy is fragile, fiscal consolidation
could, therefore, tip the economy back into recession. This view of fiscal
consolidation is widespread, but it is based on strong assumptions regarding
the impact of changes in fiscal policy on the economy, in particular the
assumption that private consumption or investment is largely determined
by current income.
Modern macroeconomic theory shows that there are many ways in which
fiscal policy can affect aggregate demand and output (see, e.g., EEAG 2011:
ch. 3). Suchmodels put less emphasis on the link between current income and
spending and instead emphasize the wealth and inter-temporal substitution
effects of fiscal policy. For example, a permanent cut in public expenditure can
be expected to lead to lower taxes in the future, and hence increase the
perceived present value of lifetime income. This can boost current private
consumption. This effect is reinforced if the decline in government borrowing
reduces interest rates, in which case households will tend to bring consump-
tion forward to the current period. In addition, in open economies, lower
interest rates tend to reduce capital imports, so that net exports increase.
A positive wealth effect may also arise if the costs of tax distortions are high,
so that tax cuts generate efficiency gains.
The fact that private consumption and investment decisions may depend
not just on current income but also on expectations for the future also has
further implications. As Bertola and Drazen (1993) point out, ‘a policy
innovation that would be contractionary in a static model may be expan-
sionary, if it induces sufficiently strong expectations of future policy in the
opposite direction’. For example, if fiscal consolidation takes the form of
higher taxes, the effect on demand will depend on the type of tax instru-
ment used and the timing of the tax increase. The announcement of a future
increase in value-added tax is likely to have an expansionary effect on
demand in the short term because it creates incentives to purchase con-
sumption goods, in particular durables, before the tax increase. In contrast,
the announcement of a future increase in income tax is likely to reduce
current consumption spending.
The credibility of fiscal consolidation is another factor that can affect cur-
rent economic activity. If a fiscal consolidation plan is not perceived as credi-
ble, then private households and firms will have greater uncertainty over
future economic conditions: they may therefore postpone consumption and
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investment decisions until they have more information about future policies.
A more credible policy commitment would reduce such uncertainty, and
hence reduce this dampening effect on the economy.
Some authors also argue that the impact of fiscal policy depends on the
particular situation of the economy, including the exchange-rate regime, the
current levels of interest rates, and the current level of government debt. For
example, Sutherland (1997) shows that, in a model where consumers have
finite lives, a decrease in spending (or increase in taxes) has contractionary
effects at low debt levels but is expansionary at high debt levels. The IMF
(2010a) emphasizes the interaction between fiscal and monetary policy and
argues that fiscal consolidation is more likely to be harmful where interest
rates are already low, so that the reduction in government borrowing can lead
to only a minimal reduction in interest rates.
These considerations have led to a debate as to whether fiscal consolidations
can be expansionary, and, if so, under what conditions. Alesina and Ardagna
(2010) emphasize two channels through which expansionary effects may
occur. On the demand side, the effect depends on expectations. If agents
believe that the current fiscal policy eliminates the larger and more disruptive
adjustments in spending cuts or tax increases in the future, as suggested by
Blanchard (1990), then consolidation might generate a positive wealth effect.
Consumers anticipate that their lifetime disposable income will increase and
as a result may increase their current private consumption. For similar reasons
firms may also increase their investment. Both effects would lead to higher
aggregate demand. These effects may be reinforced by a reduction in interest
rates: if the fiscal adjustment is credible, the probability of a default on
government debt falls, and the rate of interest at which the government can
borrow will also fall. If this affects the interest rate charged to consumers and
firms, there could be a further positive effect on consumption and investment.
Lower interest rates can also result in the appreciation of stocks and bonds,
thus causing agents’ financial wealth to increase and trigger still higher con-
sumption and investment.
The second channel is the supply side, where expansionary effects might
occur through the labour market. Here the composition of the fiscal adjust-
ment can play a critical role. A reduction in government spending may result
in lower public-sector employment and lower public-sector wages. Both of
these will tend to reduce the wage rates in the private sector as well—through a
higher supply of workers to the private sector as workers lose public-sector
jobs, and by reducing the reservation wage of private-sector workers. This will
tend to increase profits, and hence investment. However, a fiscal consolida-
tion based on higher tax may induce private-sector employers to increase the
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wage rate to offset the higher tax at least partly; this would have the opposite
effect.1
In short, a brief review of macroeconomic theory suggests that the impact
of fiscal consolidation programmes on short-term growth is ambiguous.
The impact depends on several factors, including the type and credibility of
the consolidation. In the light of this, wenow turn to review empirical evidence
on the conditions under which consolidations have been expansionary.
10.3 Empirical studies on fiscal consolidations
10.3.1 Conceptual issues
A large number of empirical studies have investigated the impact of fiscal
policies on growth and employment. We do not attempt to provide a survey
of this literature, but instead focus only on highlighting the key aspects,
which allow us to assess the probability of a fiscal consolidation being
expansionary.2
One body of literature focuses on estimating the size of the fiscal multiplier.
This is typically defined as the ratio of the change in output following a policy
initiative, relative to the size of that initiative. For example, the multiplier
would take the value of 1 if a rise in government expenditure of 1 per cent of
GDP led to a rise in GDP of 1 per cent. A positive multiplier for government
expenditure indicates that a reduction in spending leads to a reduction in
GDP. In contrast, a negative multiplier for a rise in taxes would indicate a
reduction in GDP. Identifying the size of the fiscal multiplier is difficult, since
in principle it is necessary to identify the effects on GDP of some exogenous
change in policy. If the change in policy is endogenous—for example, if the
economy is hit by a shock that affects both the government deficit and GDP—
then any resulting estimates of the fiscal multiplier are likely to be biased. The
literature has attempted to devise several ways in which this problem of
endogeneity can be overcome. For example, one example is the narrative
approach used by Ramey and Shapiro (1998), among others. This attempts
to identify an exogenous change in spending or taxation by identifying some
exogenous event, in this case a build-up in military spending, or analysing the
political discussion leading up to the change. A more detailed description of
this and other approaches is provided in EEAG (2011). A drawback of much of
1 Formore detailed theoretical analysis, see, e.g., Giavazzi and Pagano (1990), Alesina and Perotti
(1996), Giavazzi and Pagano (1996), Alesina and Ardagna (1998), Perotti (1999), and Ardagna
(2004), or the comprehensive summaries done by Nickel et al. (2010) or Rother et al. (2010).
Additionally, Rzonca and Cizkowicz (2005) give a very detailed explanation of the mechanisms
behind the non-Keynesian effects.
2 For detailed surveys, see, e.g., Mahfouz et al. (2002) and Blanchard et al. (2009: app. II).
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this branch of the literature is that it typically does not explore heterogeneity
in the size of the multiplier, but implicitly assumes that it does not vary with
economic conditions.
By contrast, the second branch of the literature does focus on factors that
may affect the size and sign of themultiplier. However, rather than estimating
multipliers directly, this literature attempts to identify factors that determine
whether a fiscal consolidation is expansionary or contractionary. This
approach requires a judgement to be made about (a) whether a particular
change in a budget deficit should be regarded as a fiscal consolidation, either
ex-ante or ex-post, and (b) whether the effect on GDP should be regarded as
expansionary.
For the first issue, the most common approach used in the literature is to
measure the cyclically adjusted primary budget balance (CAPB).3 The CAPB is
calculated by taking the actual primary balance—revenue less spending, not
including interest receipts or payments—and adjusting for the estimated
effect of business cycle fluctuation. Correcting for cyclical adjustments may
to some extent reduce endogeneity compared to using the raw primary bal-
ance. However, as the IMF (2010a) argues, it seems unlikely that this approach
corrects for all endogeneity, for two reasons: the cyclical adjustment is likely to
suffer from measurement error, and even then, as with the fiscal multiplier
literature, shocks may be correlated both with the deficit and with GDP. By
contrast, the IMF (2010a) uses a form of the narrative approach to identify
fiscal consolidations, attempting to identify specific policy decisions on tax
increases or spending cuts from IMF and OECD reports. However, the IMF
(2010a) methodology is open to criticism as well. Alesina (2010a) argues that
the approach involves too many judgemental calls, implying that endogene-
ity is not fully eliminated. The IMF report does not go into detail of policy-
makers’ intentions, as do, for example, Romer and Romer (2010). Cos and
Moral-Benito (2011) raise the issue of endogeneity in both the narrative and
the CAPB approaches, and instead treat fiscal policy decisions as endogenous;
they conclude that endogeneity biases are chiefly responsible for the non-
Keynesian results previously found in the literature.
Leaving the broad approach to one side, the literature varies considerably as
to what change in the CAPB constitutes a fiscal consolidation. For example
Alesina and Ardagna (1998) identify a fiscal consolidation on the basis that the
CAPB changes bymore than 2 per cent of GDP in one year, or 1.5 per cent over
two consecutive years. Alesina and Perotti (1996) use a cut-off of 1.5 per cent
of GDP in one year and 1.25 per cent in two consecutive years. Others use
3 Studies using this method include, e.g., Alesina and Perotti (1995, 1996); McDermott and
Westcott (1996); Alesina and Ardagna (1998, 2010); Alesina et al. (1998); Alesina et al. (2000);
Guichard et al. (2007); and Broadbent and Daly (2010).
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a simple 1.5 percentage point threshold,4 and another uses a threshold of
1 per cent of GDP in one year or in two consecutive years with at least 0.5 per
cent occurring in the first of the two years.5 The variations in these definitions
mean that there is no commonly accepted set of events that are treated as
fiscal consolidations in the literature.
The second issue is the definition of whether a consolidation is expansion-
ary. The key problem here is the counterfactual: what would have happened
to GDP in the absence of the fiscal consolidation? Two broad methods of
identification of expansionary fiscal consolidations have been used:
 Alesina et al. (1998) and Alesina and Ardagna (2010) define an
expansionary episode of fiscal consolidation as a period when the average
growth rate of GDP in the first period of the episode and in the succeeding
two years, less the G7 average over the same period, is greater than the
value of 75th percentile (or average in case of Alesina et al. 1998) of the
same variable empirical density in all episodes of fiscal adjustments.
 Alesina et al. (2002) defines a fiscal consolidation as follows: ‘an episode of
fiscal adjustment is expansionary if the average real GDP growth in
each adjustment year and in the two years after is greater than the average
real GDP growth in the two years before.’ This definition has also been
used by Giudice et al. (2007) and Cos and Moral-Benito (2011).
These two definitions are clearly very different. The first essentially identifies
an expansionary outcome as being in the top 25 per cent of outcomes of fiscal
consolidations (relative to the G7). Not only is this arbitrary, but it does not
appear to capture any notion of expansion. For example, even if all conso-
lidations led to dramatic falls in GDP, this approach would still identify
25 per cent of such consolidations as being expansionary. The second defini-
tion is also not convincing. For example, a period of fiscal consolidation
typically follows a period of crisis: if so, the change in the growth rate since
before the consolidation will depend heavily on the rate of economic growth
in the crisis just before the consolidation. Fiscal episodes identified by the two
methods described here are listed in Tables 10.1 and 10.2.
In sum, there are numerous reasons to be sceptical of the empirical literature
used here. Nevertheless, this is the most promising approach to estimating the
4 Alesina et al. (1998); Tavares (2004); Alesina and Ardagna (2010); and Broadbent and Daly
(2010).
5 See Guichard et al. (2007). In addition, McDermott and Westcott (1996) define ‘aggressive
fiscal impulse’ as a tightening of the budget of at least 1.5 percentage points of GDP for at least two
years. Giavazzi et al. (2000) define ‘large and persistent fiscal impulse’ as one in which the full
employment surplus (as a per cent of potential output) changes by at least 1.5 percentage points
per year over a two-year period, which is similar to Giavazzi and Pagano (1996).
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likely effects of a particular consolidation, such as that initiated in the UK in
2010. We therefore turn to summarizing briefly the results of relevant studies.
10.3.2 Results of empirical studies
A large number of studies estimate the size of the fiscal multiplier, typically
distinguishing between expenditure and tax multipliers. Most estimates of
expenditure shocks find multipliers between zero and one,6 implying that the
impact is positive, although not very large. If applied to cuts in expenditure,
this would imply such a cut would tend to be contractionary, rather than
expansionary. Estimates of tax multipliers are typically smaller than estimates
of expenditure multipliers, but there is less agreement on the sign. An excep-
tion is the study by Romer and Romer (2010), which finds a large tax multi-
plier of –3, implying that a tax increase of 1per cent of GDP would reduce GDP
by 3 per cent. Some papers analyse the impact of changes in government
expenditures on different components of GDP. However, this literature does
not tend to examine how different conditions might change the sign of the
multiplier. An exception is Ilzetzki et al. (2010), who identifies varying sizes of
Table 10.1. Episodes of fiscal consolidation using method defined in Alesina and Ardagna
(2010)
Austria 1996 1997 2001 2005
Belgium 2006
Canada 1995 1996 1997
Czech Republic 2004 2007
Denmark 2004 2005
Estonia 2009
Finland 1994 1996 1998 2000
France 1996
Germany 1996
Greece 1994 1996 2005
Hungary 1999 2003 2007 2008 2009
Iceland 1995 2004 2005 2009
Italy 1997 2007
Japan 1999 2001 2006
Luxembourg 1994 1997
Netherlands 1996 2004
New Zealand 2000 2002




Sweden 1994 1996 1997 2000
Switzerland 1999
UK 1996 1997 1998
Note: Only episodes where CAPB improvement was greater than 1.5% of GDP are included.
6 See, e.g., the surveys in Hebous (2009) and Group (2010).
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fiscal multipliers depending on the level of country development, degree of
exchange-rate flexibility, degree of openness to trade, and the ratio of debt to
GDP, and finds multipliers to be very small, sometime turning negative. The
examples of negative fiscal multipliers occur for government spending in
developing countries, flexible exchange-rate countries, open economies, and
countries with a debt to GDP ratio above 60 per cent. Conditions for multi-
pliers to change signs are also discussed by Mahfouz et al. (2002).
In the absence of many studies examining conditions under which multi-
pliers may change signs, we focus more on the results of the second approach,
in an attempt to identify the conditions under which fiscal consolidations are
likely to be expansionary. Table 10.3 summarizes the key results. For each
study listed, the table indicates whether it found empirical evidence of an
effect of each of the factors listed in the columns. We discuss each of these
factors in turn.
10.3.2.1 THE MAGNITUDE OF FISCAL CONSOLIDATION PROGRAMMES
Several studies find evidence that the response to fiscal consolidations is more
likely to be expansionary the larger is the adjustment. Evidence for OECD
Table 10.2. Episodes of fiscal consolidation using method defined in Guichard et al. (2007)
Australia 1997 2002
Austria 1996 1997 2001 2005
Belgium 1998 2006
Canada 1995 1996 1997
Czech Republic 2004 2007
Denmark 1999 2004 2005
Estonia 2003 2009
Finland 1994 1996 1997 1998 2000
France 1994 1996
Germany 1996 2007
Greece 1994 1996 1998 2005
Hungary 1999 2003 2007 2008 2009
Iceland 1995 1999 2004 2005 2009
Ireland 2000 2003
Italy 1997 2007
Japan 1999 2001 2004 2006
Luxembourg 1994 1995 1997 2007
Netherlands 1996 2004 2005
New Zealand 1994 2000 2002
Norway 1994 1995 1999 2000 2004 2005 2006 2007
Poland 2005
Portugal 1995 2002 2006
Spain 1994 1996
Sweden 1994 1996 1997 1998 2000 2005
Switzerland 1999
UK 1995 1996 1997 1998
Note: Only episodes where CAPB improvement was greater than 1% of GDP are included.
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countries is provided by Giavazzi and Pagano (1996); McDermott and West-
cott (1996); Giavazzi et al. (2000); and Ardagna (2004). Giavazzi et al. (2000)
focus on developing countries and find a non-linear relationship between
fiscal contractions and the effects on GDP, with the effects on GDP increasing
with the size of the consolidation. This chapter finds that expansion also
tends to occur in periods in which debt is accumulating rapidly, regardless
of its initial level. However, Alesina and Perotti (1996), Ardagna (1999), and
Alesina et al. (2000) find no effect of the magnitude of the consolidation; in
Alesina et al. (2000), after controlling for the composition of the fiscal
impulse, there is no evidence that private investment reacts to large fiscal
Table 10.3. Summary of the empirical literature findings on the effects of fiscal consolidation
on growth

















+ + + +
Alesina et al. (2000) + x +
Alesina et al. (2002) + x +
Alesina et al. (1998) + +
Ardagna (1999) + x










Giavazzi et al. (2000) + + + x
Giudice et al. (2007) + + x x
Guichard et al. (2007) +
Ilzetzki et al. (2010) + + +




Perotti (1999) + + +
Perotti (2005) + x
Rzonca and Cizkowicz
(2005)
+ + + +
Tavares (2004) + + +
Notes: For expansionary effects of fiscal consolidation: + if the paper finds positive effect, – if the paper finds negative
effect, x if no effect found, blank if it was not analysed. International environment is not included in the table, as the only
evidence is provided by the simulation in the IMF (2010a) report. Credibility is also not included in the table, as there is
no empirical evidence on the importance of that variable: almost all studies mention that credibility is an important factor
determining whether the magnitude and composition matter, but none analyses it as an empirical variable.
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adjustments differently from normal times. Giavazzi and Pagano (1996) find
that consolidations are more likely to be expansionary if they are not only
large, but also persistent. They also point out that those effects can result from
both changes in government spending and increase in taxes. Alesina et al.
(2002) find that the magnitude of fiscal adjustments relying on tax increases is
smaller than those on the expenditure side. Tavares (2004) finds that, the
larger the decrease in public spending or public consumption, the larger the
increase in output and its components.
10.3.2.2 THE STRUCTURE OF THE FISCAL CONSOLIDATION PROGRAMME:
HIGHER TAXES VERSUS EXPENDITURE CUTS
Several papers—e.g. Alesina and Perotti (1996), Alesina et al. (2002), Alesina
and Ardagna (2010), Broadbent and Daly (2010), IMF (2010a)—find that
fiscal adjustments that rely primarily on tax increases and cuts in public
investment are more likely to be contractionary. These papers also typically
find that fiscal adjustments that rely primarily on cuts in current spending,
in particular cuts of transfers and the public-sector wage bill, are more likely
to be successful in reducing the deficit and less likely to be contractionary.
Alesina and Ardagna (1998) also find that the probability that a fiscal consol-
idation is expansionary is highly positively correlated with cuts in transfers
and government wages.
10.3.2.3 THE INITIAL DEBT LEVEL
The initial level of public debt is a factor that has beenmuch less studied in the
empirical literature. However, Perotti (1999) presents empirical evidence
showing that, when public debt is high, deficit cuts are more likely to be
expansionary. This is supported by OECD (2010b). However, as Table 10.3
indicates, several other studies have not found that the initial level of public
debt is a significant factor in whether a consolidation is expansionary.
10.3.2.4 THE ROLE OF MONETARY POLICY AND INTEREST RATES
Ardagna (2004) argues that monetary policy and nominal interest rates play
no major role in determining the effects of fiscal consolidations. On the other
hand, Ahrend et al. (2006) find that consolidation efforts are more likely to be
pursued and to succeed if the monetary policy stance is eased in the initial
stages of the episode, thus contributing to offsetting the contractionary
impact of fiscal tightening. Other authors point out that a contractionary
effect of fiscal consolidation can be avoided only if monetary policy is expan-
sionary (IMF 2010a; Krugman 2010b). In particular, these authors argue that
fiscal consolidation is particularly contractionary in situations with low inter-
est rates. One problem for the empirical investigation of this point is that there
is only a limited number of cases where low interest rates and fiscal policy
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action coincide. According to the IMF (2010a), the only episode with interest
rates near zero since the 1990s occurred in Japan; all other episodes were
associated with interest rate cuts. Therefore we cannot draw conclusions for
zero interest rate countries from the basic analysis. To overcome this problem,
the IMF (2010a) employs a simulation approach.
Additionally, in his critique of Alesina and Ardagna (2010), Krugman refers
to work by Almunia et al. (2010), which uses data from 1930s—an era of low
interest rates—and uses defence spending as an instrument to identify spend-
ing changes, similar to Blanchard and Perotti (2002), Barro and Redlick (2009),
and Hall (2009). They find that fiscal stimulus was effective in a low interest
rate environment, which is in contradiction to previous studies on that
period. In addition to those studies, Corsetti et al. (2010) use a standard new
Keynesianmodel with a zero bound on interest rates to show that anticipation
of the medium-term spending cuts usually enhances the expansionary effects
of a short-run fiscal stimulus. They advise not to withdraw stimulus too early
in favour of spending cuts, as this may lower fiscal multipliers and lengthen
the zero lower bound episode.
10.3.2.5 EXCHANGE-RATE DEPRECIATION
In countries with flexible exchange rates, depreciation can stabilize demand
for domestically produced goods and services by increasing exports and reduc-
ing imports. The study by IMF (2010a) provides some evidence on the role of
exchange rates, finding that depreciating exchange rates have a mitigating
effect on the decline in GDP. They show that, in response to fiscal consolida-
tion of 1 per cent of GDP, the exchange rate depreciates 1.1 per cent in real
terms, increasing net exports by about 0.5 per cent of GDP, and reducing
domestic demand by about 1 per cent of GDP. In this study, the mitigating
effect of the exchange rate means that the negative effect of fiscal consolida-
tion is cut in half. Alesina and Perotti (1996) suggest that devaluation may
increase the probability of an expansion following a consolidation, but only if
the composition of the adjustment had the other features that they discuss.
10.3.2.6 THE FISCAL SITUATION OF OTHER COUNTRIES
In the context of the current economic crisis, many observers have argued that
fiscal consolidation will be less likely to be expansionary because many
countries are switching to fiscal austerity at the same time. IMF (2010a) uses
simulations with and without a zero interest rate floor to shed some light on
the issue. It concludes that, with an interest rate floor, a fiscal consolidation of
1 per cent of GDP in a small open economy would generate a loss of output of
about 1 per cent, whereas, if the rest of the world consolidates at the same
time, the output cost increases to 2 per cent. Without the interest rate floor,
the difference is smaller, but still present. However, none of the studies listed
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in Table 10.3 provides any direct empirical evidence on this issue. We there-
fore do not discuss this issue further in Section 10.4.
10.3.2.7 SUCCESSFUL FISCAL CONSOLIDATION
The literature that deals with expansionary effects of fiscal adjustments also
analyses determinants of ‘successful’ fiscal consolidations, where success is
measured by a decline in public debt to GDP. For example Alesina and
Ardagna (2010) define success as a period in which ‘the cumulative reduction
of the debt to GDP ratio three years after the beginning of a fiscal adjustment is
greater than 4.5 percentage points’. There is evidence that the success of a
fiscal consolidation affects whether it is expansionary. Alesina and Perotti
(1996) and Alesina et al. (1998) find that rate of growth of GDP relative to
the G7 countries increases during a successful adjustment but decreases dur-
ing an unsuccessful one. They also find growth after successful adjustment
comes mainly from the investment boom, with consumption contributing
slightly less, though still being significant.
Since there is evidence that the success of fiscal adjustment affects growth,
the determinants of successful fiscal consolidation may indirectly contribute
to the possibility of expansionary fiscal adjustment. We therefore summarize
the empirical results in the literature on how different factors contribute to
successful fiscal adjustments. Table 10.4 summarizes the position, using the
same factors as Table 10.3. We briefly consider each factor in turn.
 Magnitude of adjustment. McDermott and Westcott (1996) find that the
greater themagnitude of the fiscal consolidation, themore likely it is to be
successful. Ardagna (2004) finds that the success of fiscal adjustments
depends more on the size of the fiscal contraction and less on its
composition.
 Composition of adjustment. McDermott and Westcott (1996) and von
Hagen and Strauch (2001) find that fiscal adjustments based on spending
cuts are more likely to be successful in reducing the debt ratio. Moreover,
Nickel et al. (2010) conclude that major debt reductions are drivenmainly
by decisive and lasting (rather than timid and short-lived) fiscal
consolidation efforts focused on reducing government expenditure, in
particular, cuts in social benefits and public wages. Alesina and Ardagna
(1998) find that the probability of success depends on the composition on
the adjustment but not on the size, with successful adjustments being
more probable for cases of primary expenditure or cuts in wages and
transfers.
 High initial deficit and debt relative to GDP. Alesina et al. (1998) show that
successful fiscal adjustments tend to be undertaken when public debt as a
share of GDP is relatively high. Von Hagen and Strauch (2001) show that
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a large debt–GDP ratio increases the probability of a consolidation being
successful. Additionally, von Hagen et al. (2002) find that consolidations
tend to last longer if they start from large debt–GDP ratios. They claim
that these findings confirm the evidence found by Alesina and Ardagna
(1998) for OECD countries, showing that the likelihood of a
consolidation success increases in the debt level. Guichard et al. (2007)
find that large initial deficits have been important in boosting the overall
size and duration of consolidation.
 Monetary policy. Von Hagen and Strauch (2001)and Lambertini and
Tavares (2003) argue that monetary policy does not affect the success of
fiscal adjustments. Specifically, von Hagen et al. (2002) argue that
domestic monetary conditions during a consolidation episode do not
play a significant role in explaining the duration of consolidation
Table 10.4. Summary of the empirical literature findings on successful fiscal consolidations








Ahrend et al. (2006) + + +
Alesina and Argadna
(1998)







Alesina et al. (1998) + +







Giavazzi et al. (2000) +
Guichard et al. (2007) + + +
Lambertini and
Tavares (2003)
+ + – – +
McDermott and
Westcott (1996)
+ + + –
Nickel et al. (2010) + +
OECD (2010b) + +
Tavares (2004) – + +
von Hagen and
Strauch (2001)
+ + – +
von Hagen and
Strauch (2001)
+ + – +
von Hagen et al.
(2002)
+ + – +
Notes: For success of fiscal consolidation: + if the paper finds positive effect, – if no effect found, blank if it was not
analysed. All the above papers study the determinants of the successful fiscal consolidation, thus all find the consolida-
tion to be successful under some set of conditions. Again credibility is not in the table, as there is no empirical evidence
on the importance of that variable. Almost all studies mention it as an important factor determining whether the
magnitude and composition matter, but none analyses it as an empirical variable.
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episodes. However, Guichard et al. (2007) find that high interest rates
have been important in prompting fiscal adjustment and also in boosting
the overall size and duration of consolidation. Alesina and Perotti (1996)
find that nominal long interest rates, relative to G7 rates, fall during
successful adjustments, but increase during unsuccessful ones.
 Exchange rates. Lambertini and Tavares (2003) find a strong and robust
association between depreciation of the exchange rate before the fiscal
adjustment and the persistence of the adjustment. Additionally, they find
that successful adjustments are almost always preceded by large nominal
and real depreciations, with 1 per cent average depreciation in the two
years preceding a fiscal adjustment leading to a roughly 1 per cent
increase in the probability of success. Alesina et al. (1998) make the
observation that both successful and unsuccessful adjustments tend to be
accompanied by currency depreciation, though this is slightly larger
before a successful adjustment.
 Fiscal situation in other countries. Von Hagen et al. (2002) find that fiscal
tightening in OECD countries tends to increase the duration of a fiscal
consolidation. Moreover, von Hagen and Strauch (2001) find that the
stance of fiscal policy in OECD countries is an important determinant of a
government’s choice of fiscal consolidation strategy, making it an
important determinant of the success of fiscal consolidation.
The link between successful and expansionary fiscal adjustment is two way, in
that economic growth fosters successful fiscal consolidation. Specifically, Cos
and Moral-Benito (2011) find that, in order to succeed in reducing budget
deficits, economic growth is the only relevant ingredient. Nickel et al. (2010)
find that robust real GDP growth increases the probability of a major debt
reduction because it helps countries to ‘grow their way out’ of indebtedness.
Overall, the key insight emerging from research on the impact of fiscal
policy on short-term growth suggests that this impact may be very different,
depending on the design of the consolidation programme and the economic
situation of the country where the fiscal policy change occurs. In the next
section we discuss the current (2010–11) situation of the UK and use the
insight of the literature on fiscal policy summarized so far to assess the likely
impact of fiscal consolidation on the UK economy.
10.4 Implications for the UK
In the UK, both the public-sector deficit and the level of public-sector debt
increased substantially during the recession, as indicated in Figures 10.1 and
10.2. The debt–GDP ratio nearly doubled from just over 40 per cent to over
The Effects of Fiscal Consolidation
245
This is an open access version of the publication distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-
NoDerivs licence (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/), which permits non-commercial reproduction and distribution of 
the work, in any medium, provided the original work is not altered or transformed in any way, and that the work is properly cited. For 
commercial re-use, please contact academic.permissions@oup.com 
80 per cent from 2006 to 2011, passing the 60 per cent threshold in the
Maastricht Treaty in 2009. This rapid growth arose partly because of automatic
adjustment, which was due in part to a reduction in revenues when spending
continued according to plans set out in 2007. In addition, the government
further deliberately increased the deficit as part of an attempt to stimulate the
economy.
Figure 10.3 and 10.4 provide a comparison of the deficit and debt levels in
the UK in 2011 with a number of other leading industrialized countries.
Although the stock of public debt in the UK is not much higher than in
other countries, the budget deficit is very high, and lies only behind Ireland
and the USA in the ranking of the ratio of debt to GDP.
There is no doubt that the deficit faced by the UK in 2010–11 is unsustain-
able in the long term, and by 2010 there was a consensus that the large deficit
needed to be reduced, although there was less of a consensus about the speed
at which it should be reduced. The March 2011 plans for the deficit and the
debt–GDP ratio are also shown in the figures. The government aims to reduce
the deficit to zero by 2015. However, under these plans, the debt–GDP ratio
will continue to rise until 2013 before stabilizing.
This section attempts to examine the probability that the current UK
programme of fiscal consolidation will be expansionary. We use the findings of
the research surveyed in the preceding sections to provide guidance as to the




































UK deficit to GDP Mastricht Treaty deficit level
Figure 10.1. UK deficit to GDP level, 2006–16
Source: IMF World Economic Outlook Database.
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Before undertaking that analysis, we consider what the growth forecasts of
the UK Office for Budget Responsibility (OBR) imply for whether the current
consolidation will be expansionary. The average growth rate in 2010 and in
two years following that is forecast to be 1.8 per cent. The equivalent
IMF World Economic Outlook forecast for the G7 weighted average over the



















UK debt to GDP level Mastricht Treaty level
Figure 10.2. UK debt to GDP level, 2006–15
Source: IMF World Economic Outlook Database.

































Figure 10.3. Debt–GDP ratio, country comparisons, 2011
Source: IMF World Economic Outlook Database.
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–0.6 per cent. Using the Alesina and Ardagna (2010) method of fiscal episodes
identification and IMF World Economic Outlook growth rates, we calculated
this difference for each past episode considered to be a fiscal consolidation.7
The 75th percentile of the distribution of these differences was 1.19 per cent.
So, according to the Alesina and Ardagna (2010) method, the current UK
consolidation is well below the cut-off point for describing the fiscal consoli-
dation as expansionary.
In contrast, however, the identification method proposed by Alesina et al.
(2002) gives a different picture. Average UK growth for 2008 and 2009 was
–2.19 per cent. This clearly means that growth in 2010 and 2012 is expected to
be considerably higher than prior to the consolidation. Based on this approach
and the OBR forecast, the current UK consolidation would be identified as
expansionary. Of course, the difference between these two approaches high-
lights one of the numerous problems in this literature.
What is more, using the definition of successful fiscal consolidation
provided by Alesina and Ardagna (2010) and comparing it to the current
OBR forecast, we can see that the UK is not expected to be a case of a successful
fiscal consolidation either. The UK general government debt–GDP ratio will
expand until 2013 before beginning to fall only in 2014. The ratio will not fall
relative to the 2010–11 position over the following five years, as the forecast
shows.




























Figure 10.4. Deficit–GDP ratio, country comparisons, 2011
Source: IMF World Economic Outlook Database.
7 For the list of all the episodes identified, see Table 10.1.
Bilicka, Devereux, and Fuest
248
This is an open access version of the publication distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-
NoDerivs licence (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/), which permits non-commercial reproduction and distribution of 
the work, in any medium, provided the original work is not altered or transformed in any way, and that the work is properly cited. For 
commercial re-use, please contact academic.permissions@oup.com 
Leaving these different interpretations to one side, we now focus on the
factors that the literature has identified as being significant for the growth
outcome for the UK. For each of the main factors, we assess the situation in
the UK.
10.4.1 Magnitude of the consolidation
As pointed out in the preceding section, research surprisingly indicates that
larger consolidations are more likely to have an expansionary impact on
growth. The OBR forecast, shown in Table 10.5, predicts that UK will reduce
its CAPB substantially after 2009–10, with reductions of 2.3 per cent of GDP in
2010–11, 2.2 per cent of GDP from 2010–11 to 2011–12, and 1.5 per cent of
GDP from 2012–13 to 2013–14. Based on the definitions in the literature,
discussed above, these reductions clearly qualify this period as a case of fiscal
consolidation.
However, it is useful to ask how large these cuts are, relative to those
investigated in the literature. Figure 10.5 presents the projected reductions
in CAPB for the UK in the context of historical consolidations; the data are
taken from the OECD Economic Outlook 88 database.8 Because the literature
typically draws conclusions for episodes of fiscal adjustments where the
improvement in CAPB is larger than 1.5 per cent of GDP, with the lowest
threshold analysed being 1 per cent (Guichard et al. 2007), we show only
those episodes.9 The figure indicates that there has been a wide divergence in
the size of past consolidations. A number of consolidations have been in
excess of 3 per cent of GDP in a given year. However, about 85.5 per cent of

















Public-sector net borrowing 11.1 9.9 7.9 6.2 4.1 2.5 1.5
Surplus on current budget –7.6 –7.1 –5.8 –4.5 –2.7 –1.2 –0.2
Primary balance –9.2 –7.1 –5 –3.5 –1.3 0.3 1.3
Cyclically adjusted net borrowing 8.9 7.4 5.3 3.7 2 1 0.5
Cyclically adjusted surplus on current
budget
–5.3 –4.6 –3.2 –2 –0.6 0.4 0.8
HM Treasury estimate of CAPB –6.9 –4.6 –2.4 –0.9 0.8 1.9 2.3
8 Here our measure of the CAPB is the sum of the general government cyclically adjusted
balances and general government net debt interest payments.
9 For the list of all the episodes with CAPB improvement higher than 1%, see Table 10.2.
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the observations have the size of the consolidation lower than 3 per cent of
GDP and 66.3 per cent of observations smaller than 2 per cent of GDP.
The projected UK consolidation of a reduction in CAPB of more than 2 per
cent for three consecutive years therefore ranks the UK consolidation as
relatively large. To the extent that the literature is correct in identifying larger
consolidations as being more likely to be expansionary, then this is a positive
indication for the growth prospects of the UK.
10.4.2 Composition of the consolidation
There is a reasonable consensus in the literature that consolidations based
primarily on cuts in public spending are more likely to be expansionary. The
UK programme of fiscal consolidation includes both higher taxes and lower
expenditure, but the government has placed emphasis on spending cuts.
Table 10.6 shows the planned changes in tax receipts and public spending
for the consolidation period in the UK. The spending share of the total
discretionary consolidation is expected to be 59 per cent in 2010–11, rising
to 76 per cent in 2015–16. The government’s intention is, therefore, to reduce
the deficit primarily through spending cuts.
Again we need to assess these plans against the past consolidations analysed



























































































































UK OBR 2011 UK OBR 2012 UK OBR 2013 UK OBR 2014 UK 2010
Figure 10.5. Number of fiscal consolidations by size (CAPB measure) since 1994
Note: Projected reductions in CAPB for the UK are represented by dots.
Source: OECD Economic Outlook 88 database.
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consolidations used in Alesina (2010b), based on Alesina and Ardagna (2010).
The figures suggest that fiscal consolidations that are expansionary have been
constituted by on average 56 per cent cuts in expenditure and 44 per cent
increases in tax. The share accounted for by spending cuts is substantially
higher than for consolidations that were contractionary. The medium-term
aim for the UK clearly exceeds the average for expansionary consolidations.
Based again on the results of the literature, this suggests that the UK’s consoli-
dation is more likely to be expansionary.
10.4.3 Initial debt level
There is only moderate evidence that an initially high ratio of debt to GDP
improves the probability of a fiscal consolidation being expansionary, though
there is more of a consensus that this may affect the probability of a successful
fiscal consolidation. Table 10.8 gives some numerical examples from the
literature, where it is clear that the debt-to-GDP ratio in expansionary fiscal
consolidations was lower than in contractionary ones. However, in these
examples, the proportions are reversed in comparing successful to unsuccess-
ful consolidations.
In comparison to these examples, the debt-to-GDP ratio in UK in 2010 was
76.1 per cent. This exceeds almost all the examples in the table. It certainly
Table 10.6. Total consolidation plans, UK, 2010–16














9.4 41 61 88 110 126
Spending (£bn) 5.5 22 38 59 80 95
Tax (£bn) 3.8 20 23 29 30 30
Spending share of
consolidation (%)
59 53 62 67 73 76
Source: HM Treasury Budget, Mar. 2011.
Table 10.7. Contribution of primary expenditure and total revenue to fiscal consolidation,




Successful Expansionary Unsuccessful Contractionary
Primary expenditure 67.44 56.02 38.86 37.33
Total revenue 32.56 43.98 61.14 62.67
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exceeds the examples of expansionary consolidations, as well as both success-
ful and unsuccessful consolidations. The literature and these estimates pro-
vide only very weak evidence for the probability that UK consolidation can be
expansionary.
10.4.4 Credibility of the consolidation
An important part of the case that a fiscal consolidation may be expansionary
is that the planned cut in the deficit must be credible. The more credible it is,
the lower the uncertainty surrounding future policy. Credibility is difficult to
measure, and there have been no formal tests of the importance of credibility
in the fiscal consolidation literature. Here we consider various measures that
give some indication of the credibility of the UK consolidation.
A starting point is to compare the credit ratings of UK and other European
countries; this is summarized in Table 10.9. The sovereign credit rating for the
UK in 2011 is Aaa, a higher rating thanmost other countries currently engaged
in a consolidation: for example, Ireland is at Baa1, Greece at Ba1, Spain at Aa1,
and Portugal at A1. The CDS spread suggests a similar position. The UK spread
in January 2011 was a little higher than that of Germany, but considerably
lower than in a number of other countries, including all those with high
deficit or debt levels. The CDS-IR Gap measures the gap between CDS Implied
Ratings and Issuer Credit Ratings; this indicator is found to be strongly related
to future rating actions and is often used to anticipate the rating agency
actions. For the UK, this was –5 in January 2011, indicating some probability
that the UK rating may be downgraded. However, overall, the information in
Table 10.9 suggests that markets and ratings agencies believe that the proba-
bility of the UK government defaulting on its sovereign debt is very low.
Table 10.8. Average debt to GDP levels during fiscal consolidation episodes















1960–94 55.86 59.87 72.15 49.37
Alesina (2010b) 1970–2007 57.53 71.8
Alesina et al. (1998) 1965–92 68.11 44.34
Giudice et al. (2007) 1970–2002 75.1 67.4
Tavares (2004) 1960–95 68.63 44
Note: Method of identifying fiscal episodes is CAPB, method of identifying expansionary fiscal episodes outlined in stub.
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Figures 10.6 and10.7 respectively take this analysis a little further, by plotting
the CDS spread for each country against the deficit to GDP ratio and the debt to
GDP ratio. These figures use the CDS spreads in Table 10.9 and the deficit and
debt ratio from Section 10.4. As would be expected, in general the CDS spread
depends positively on the size of the deficit and the size of the debt: this is
shown by the trend line in each figure. However, one way of evaluating the
Table 10.9. European Sovereign Credit Ratings as of 11 January 2011
Country Sovereign Credit Rating CDS spread CDS-IR CDS-IR Gap
Spain Aa1 349 B1 –12
Portugal A1 540 Caa1 –12
Belgium Aa1 247 Ba2 –10
Ireland Baa1 666 Caa2 –10
Greece Ba1 1099 C –10
Italy Aa2 244 Ba2 –9
France Aaa 108 Baa2 –8
Austria Aaa 101 Baa1 –7
UK Aaa 71 A2 –5
Netherlands Aaa 60 Aa2 –2
Denmark Aaa 48 Aaa 0
Finland Aaa 37 Aaa 0
Norway Aaa 23 Aaa 0
Sweden Aaa 35 Aaa 0
Switzerland Aaa 44 Aaa 0
Germany Aaa 60 Aa2 –2
USA Aaa 33 Aaa 0




























Figure 10.6. Deficit levels versus CDS spreads, 2011
Source: IMF World Economic Outlook Database and Moody’s.
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credibility of the UK is to identify its specific position relative to the trend line.
In both cases the UK is some way below the trend line. This suggests that the
CDS spread for the UK is lower than would be expected, given the size of its
deficit and debt. One important factor in generating such a low CDS spread is
likely to be that markets believe that the announced fiscal consolidation in the
UK is credible—and, indeed, more credible than in most other countries. Even
in the absence of empirical evidence of the importance of credibility, it seems
reasonable to suppose that this is a positive factor for the probability that the
UK’s consolidation will be expansionary.
10.4.5 Monetary policy
Although there is no overwhelming econometric evidence on the importance
of the monetary policy for the expansionary fiscal consolidation, it does seem
plausible that the part of the effects of a fiscal consolidation should depend on
its effects on interest rates. For example, IMF (2010a) and Krugman (2010b)
argue that fiscal consolidation is likely to be less contractionary in an environ-
ment with high interest rates; this is because in this case the consolidation can
help to reduce interest rates, which in turn can help to stimulate the economy.
For the UK, however, Figure 10.8 clearly demonstrates that in 2011 the UK is
in a low-interest environment. Interest rates decreased rapidly as part of the
Bank of England’s response to the financial crisis in mid-2009, and have not
yet risen again. There is, therefore, little potential benefit from the consolida-


























Figure 10.7. Debt levels versus CDS spreads, 2011
Source: IMF World Economic Outlook Database and Moody’s.
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10.4.6 Exchange-rate depreciation
Sterling has depreciated considerably since the beginning of the financial
crisis. This is illustrated by Figure 10.9, which shows the value of sterling
relative to both the US dollar and the euro. It is plausible that depreciation






































































































Figure 10.8. Monthly interbank three-month LIBOR, % p.a., 2000–11, UK















































































































Figure 10.9. Exchange rates for sterling, 2007–11
Note: The dotted line indicates the exchange rate between British sterling and US$. The dashed line
indicates the exchange rate between British sterling and euro. Both cases show how much foreign
currency £1 is worth.
Source: Office for National Statistics.
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expansionary—by boosting the demand for domestically produced goods.
However, the econometric evidence discussed above does not in general
suggest that this has a strong effect. We are therefore cautious about drawing
any conclusions on whether the depreciation in sterling will have much effect
on the possibility of the consolidation to be expansionary or contractionary.
10.5 Conclusion
This chapter attempts to evaluate factors in the UK that are important deter-
minants of whether the UK fiscal consolidation announced in 2010 is likely to
be expansionary or contractionary. Based on the empirical literature, we
identify in particular five factors that are likely to be of significance. They
are: the size of the consolidation; the composition of the consolidation
between spending cuts and tax increases; the initial level of public debt;
whether interest rates are at a lower bound; and whether there is a devaluation
of the exchange rate.
Of these factors, there is rather more empirical support that the first two are
important for whether a consolidation is likely to be expansionary. In com-
parison with consolidations studied in the empirical literature, and with other
consolidations taking place alongside that of the UK, both of these factors are
positive for the UK. The planned consolidation is relatively large, and rela-
tively focused on spending cuts. Both of these factors are likely to make it
more likely that the UK consolidation is expansionary. Other positive factors
for the UK are that the initial debt level is relatively high, and that sterling has
been devalued. In addition, there is evidence to suggest that the planned
consolidation is credible. The only factor pointing in the opposite direction
is that interest rates are very low, and hence cannot be reduced any further by
the consolidation.
Based on the empirical literature, this suggests that the factors that are
associated with a fiscal consolidation being expansionary are largely in place
in the UK. Caveats are in order, however. Importantly, there are a number of
weaknesses in the empirical literature. These include the lack of very clear
identification of both fiscal consolidations and expansionary effects. Even
putting this to one side, the favourable probability of the consolidation
being expansionary is only relative to other consolidations. Despite the rela-
tively good position of the UK, there must still be considerable doubt as to the
eventual outcome.
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11
Regulation and Taxation: Economics
and Politics
Donato Masciandaro and Francesco Passarelli
11.1 Introduction
The balance and interconnections between regulation and taxation of finan-
cial activities have come under closer scrutiny as a result of the crisis that
began in 2008. The main reason is that both regulation and taxation represent
policy tools for curbing systemic risk, a peculiar case of externality resulting
from contagion in financial markets.
The possible failure of a financial intermediary can produce a generalized
fear of counter-party credit risk, with potential domino effects spreading
across markets. The externality arises because these potential effects are not
completely internalized by the contracting parties. In a perfect Pigouvian
world, taxation and regulation would be equivalent policy tools: both policies
can achieve the first best outcome if well calibrated to deal with the external-
ity. In the real world, dominated by uncertainty and asymmetric information,
policy-makers usually choose financial regulation to produce progressive ef-
fects in economic agents’ risk taking (IMF 2010c), while taxation is used to
produce proportional effects, using flat tax schemes (Goodhart 2010).
Thus, from a normative viewpoint, the choice between regulation and
taxation is made by looking at the shape of the externality and the distribu-
tion of costs. In this chapter we offer a positive perspective, based on a
theoretical framework developed in Masciandaro and Passarelli (2011),
which in turn is based on a political economy argument proposed for a general
pollution problem by Alesina and Passarelli (2010).
In a nutshell the main argument is as follows. Suppose that regulation by its
nature—as argued at length below—is structured to have a stronger impact on
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highly risk-polluting portfolios, while a tax is levied proportionally and hence
on low-polluting portfolios as well. Furthermore let us assume that the choice
between regulation and taxation is made by voting. Under these circum-
stances a majority of low-polluting portfolio owners may have a strategic
incentive to choose regulation in order to charge the minority a larger share
of the externality reduction burden. This may lead to a suboptimal instrument
choice. This also explains why regulation is so frequent in financial markets,
whereas taxation is rarely employed to cope with systemic risk problems.
J. M. Keynes (1936) was one of first proponents of a systemic risk tax. He
identified security contracts as a source of financial instability. Thus he pro-
posed to tax only those kinds of contracts. Subsequentlymany others took the
same view (among them, Stiglitz, 1989). We claim that attention should be
focused on the overall financial playing field, rather than on on a specific
subset of financial transactions. The default of any specific financial contract
may originate negative and amplifying effects not only on the lender’s and/or
the borrower’s portfolios, but also on other interconnected operators’ claims.
In principle, any financial contract can be characterized by its level of
‘toxicity’ in terms of system risk externality (SRE). In other words, any single
financial portfolio produces a certain amount of systemic risk pollution, even
an extremely small one. Therefore, curbing systemic risk represents a general
interest policy task and any citizen’s portfolio choice is potentially affected by
that policy.
Our attention here is mainly focused on the ‘political distortion’ that occurs
when the choice of policy instrument is made by voting. As in the political
analysis of income taxation (Meltzer and Richard 1981), the distortion de-
pends on the position of the median relative to the average voter.1
Taxes and rules, however, are different in the way they allocate the sacrifices
of the externality reduction. In the case of regulation, most sacrifices are made
by top risk producers. Thus, even when the median voter produces an amount
of risk that is above the average, the majority prefers regulation that is too
restrictive. By contrast, with a tax, low-risk producers bear a significant bur-
den. Thus a low median is induced to prefer taxes that are too low. The two
instruments are quite different in the political distortion: regulation is very
likely to be too restrictive; taxation is likely to be too low.
This argument is based on the assumption that, independently of the
toxicity measure adopted, regulation has a more than proportional impact
on more toxic instruments—that is, it forces people to progressive toxicity
reductions. For example, a full prohibition rule (such as, ‘all instruments
whose toxicity level is above a given level are banned’) has a dramatically
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progressive impact and it would resemble an extremely convex tax schedule
(such as ‘a 100 per cent toxicity tax is levied above a given level’). By its nature
taxation tends to be less progressive, if not regressive.
Our assumption that regulation is more progressive than taxation is strai-
ghtforward if regulation consists in full prohibition of toxic instruments. Apart
from this extreme case, the assumption can be justified if one considers that
usually lending institutionsmeet regulation on operational risk by drastic cuts in
their most toxic activities. Vice versa, with a tax they may decide to keep some
high-risk activities and pay taxes if they make high profits from those activities.
In addition, the idea that regulation ismore progressivemay be justified by a
measurement problem. In principle, the base of both taxation and regulation
should be a non-distorted toxicity measure. However, measuring toxicity may
be quite costly, if not virtually impossible. In reality, rules and taxes are
applied to differently distorted measures of toxicity.
Our idea is that rules may have progressive effects because they affect
directly the supply of most toxic instrument, rather than the production of
toxicity by any kind of instrument. Taxes are usually levied on non-linear
measures of toxicity, with a regressive effect. For example, a fixed tax on
financial transactions is independent of actual risk production and, hence, is
regressive in SRE. Realistically, the measurement problem seems to be more
severe with taxation. This possibly explains why both the political debate and
the academic debate have paid relatively little attention to taxation.
A basic assumption of SRE taxation is that it is possible to evaluate the
marginal systemic externality (Acharya et al. 2009; Adrian and Brunnermeier
2008) of each financial firm. In the presence of ameasurement bias, taxation is
highly suboptimal. Regulation is less subject to ameasurement problem. Rules
can be more detailed and easier to implement than taxation. Soft information
is easier to use in regulation than in taxation (IMF 2010c). We argue here that,
owing to a measurement bias, regulation is more progressive than taxation. As
a consequence, a majority of low-risk portfolio owners prefers regulation.
The measurement bias may also explain why a proper SRE tax has not been
among the proposed taxes on financial activity—that is, levies on banks on an
ex post basis that are based on funding or profits, or banking bonuses (IMF
2010c). In general, financial activity taxation does not follow the SRE princi-
ple. There are, however, specific areas in which SRE principles have been
applied, such as securities, currency, bank or real estate transactions, insurance
premiums, and capital levies. Since 2000 several G20 countries have imposed
different forms of financial transaction tax, although the current trend is a
reduction in their application.2
2 See Matheson (2010) for a complete survey.
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Of course, taxation is not necessarily a substitute for regulation. In practice,
regulation is the primary instrument to reduce systemic risk, while corrective
taxation plays a complementary role (IMF 2010c). Taxation of the financial
industry can also address goals that are different from externality reductions,
such as the implementation of general taxation design (Lockwood 2010);
ensuring that banks meet the direct financial costs of possible bailouts; the
implementation of bankruptcy schemes (IMF 2010c), and macroeconomic
policies in managing aggregate demand (Tobin 1978).
In this chapter we argue that regulation is more likely to be preferred to
taxation in a direct democracy, in which citizens/voters are heterogeneous in
their portfolio toxicity. One might object that a lobbying model, such as that
of Stigler (1971), is possibly more appropriate to address politico-economic
issues in financial markets. In this case, however, one would need to explain
why banks would lobby for regulation rather than for taxation. Moreover, the
idea that financial policies are specific interest policies is questionable. We
rather think that any policy intervention in financial market is in principle a
general interest policy. Any citizen is a potential portfolio owner. Thus anyone
perceives the private consequences of any policy measure that may affect,
directly or indirectly, the relative cost of alternative portfolio and the relative
benefits from systemic risk reduction.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. In Section 11.2 we
outline a simple political economy model of the financial system with two
types of agents. The following section examines how a median voter equilib-
rium leads to an inefficient level of regulation. The role of taxation in curbing
systemic risk is discussed in Section 11.4. The remaining two sections compare
regulation with taxation and provide some concluding remarks.
11.2 Financial portfolios and systemic risk
We consider a continuumof investors, which are at the same time voters. Each
investor/voter makes a portfolio choice. A certain amount of systemic risk is
associated to the financial instruments in any possible portfolio. Let ti, be the
risk produced by an investor of type i when he chooses his most preferred
portfolio. In a sense the type is a measure of the ‘polluting’ activity of the
investor when his portfolio choice is not constrained whatsoever.
Types are measures in the unit line and represent the only source of hetero-
geneity among investors. We say that an investor is a ‘low’ type when the risk
of his most preferred portfolio is low, and vice versa. A low-type investor
chooses a portfolio with a small amount of ‘toxic’ instruments. Vice versa,
high type means that the investor prefers highly polluting instruments.
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We can specify the distribution of types in the unit interval. This function
describes how systemic risk is distributed across the population when inves-
tors choose their most preferred portfolios. For example, a rightward-slanted
distributionmeans that there are relatively few big-risk producers, whereas the
majority of investors prefer a low amount of toxic instruments in their
portfolios.
Assume for simplicity that the population has unit measure. By definition,
an investor maximizes his utility when his actual portfolio choice matches his
type. Choosing a portfolio with a different amount of systemic risk entails a
disutility that can be described as a cost function that is increasing in the
distance between type and actual portfolio choice.
If an investor’s actual choice is a portfolio with lower risk associated with
respect to his type’s choice, then he generates a social benefit that spreads over
the population, but he bears a private burden given by the cost of making a
choice that is different from his type.
Since individuals are infinitesimal in the population, the private benefit that
an individual obtains from his own externality reduction is infinitesimal too.
Hence, nobody has an incentive to reduce unilaterally his portfolio’s systemic
risk below his types. A free-riding problem eventually emerges as a result of the
discrepancy between private and social benefits from externality reductions.
Investors make portfolio choices with too much systemic risk production.
There is scope for government intervention through either regulation or
taxation.
11.3 Regulation
By financial regulation we denote a policy that tends directly to prevent
financial institutions from issuing instruments having too much systemic
risk. The supply of large SRE instruments is strongly limited; therefore inves-
tors with those kinds of instruments in their portfolios will have to make
substantial changes. Arguably, this type of policy has a quite strong impact
on ‘highly polluting’ portfolios, while it only moderately affects the low-
polluting ones.
We can describe this idea by assuming that a rule forces investors to more
than proportional reductions in systemic risk production. We can also assume
that the regulation level can be captured by a quantitative parameter, r
When r is enforced, individuals must choose a portfolio with a level of risk b
that decreases more than proportionally with respect to their types. Consider
investor i and assume that for any i the relationship between risk produced
and regulation is the following:
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biðti; rÞ ¼ ð1 rtiÞti ð11:1Þ
As can be seen from this expression there is a more than proportional rela-
tionship between regulation and risk production. This captures the idea that
regulation has a progressive impact on risk. For example, suppose that the risk
produced before regulation by a low type, l, is given by tl = 0.2. With a
regulation r = 0.5 the investor is obliged to reduce risk production to
l = 0.18; thus risk is 10 per cent lower. For a high type, tk = 0.8, portfolio
choice is lowered down to bk = 0.48, with actual risk production being lowered
by 40 per cent.
Thus, for any level of the regulation parameter, risk production decreases
more than proportionally with respect to risk before regulation.
The decision regarding the level of the regulation parameter is made by
voting. The timing is the following: at time 1, given the distribution of types,
individuals compute their preferences regarding the regulation parameter; at
time 2, they select a Condorcet winner in pair-wise voting; at time 3, they
choose their portfolios and their actual pollution levels.
Under regularity conditions, we can imagine that preferences for the policy
parameter are concave. Thus each agent has a unique most-preferred level of
regulation (a ‘bliss’ point) where the private benefit due to a marginal increase
in the rule parameter equals the marginal private cost of complying with the
rule.
The fact that all individuals are single peaked rules out strategic voting and
allows for the existence of a Condorcet winner that is unique under the simple
majority rule (Black 1948). Arguably, bliss points are negatively related to
types: heterogeneity in policy preferences is due to differences in types.
An investor with highly polluting portfolio (a high type) wants a low rule; a
low type prefers a high rule. The reason is simple. Private benefits are the same
for all, but for any rule a higher type bears larger private costs. Since private
costs are increasing, an individual’s utility is maximized with a lower rule. The
median voter theorem applies: under the bare majority, the voting outcome is
the bliss point of the median type.
The efficiency of this policy outcome can be studied by comparing the
median voter’s choice with that of a Social Planner that maximizes total
utility.
In a model in which the cost of complying with regulation is convex and
the regulation has a progressive impact on risk reductions, a median that is
lower than the average is a sufficient condition for the emergence of a too-
restrictive rule. Restrictiveness can also occur if the median is slightly above
the average. It is easy to see that, with more convex costs, the rule is too
restrictive even if the median is consistently above the average. This result is
not affected by the assumption about the shape of the externality function.
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The main idea is that, when financial regulation is decided through voting,
a too restrictive policy is rather easy to emerge. Even if the median voter
pollutes more than the average, he opportunistically chooses a to-restrictive
rule in order to force the minority of top polluters to substantial portfolio
changes. The reason is that regulation impacts mostly on top-polluting in-
vestors, forcing them to large adjustments in their portfolio choices.
The median voter does not consider the cost incurred by top polluters. He
rather looks at regulation as a way to charge them the main burden of the
externality reduction. Therefore, voting on financial regulation is likely to
yield rules that are socially too restrictive. Voting outcome inefficiency is
larger when costs are more convex and when the median is in a relatively
low position with respect to the highest types. It can be proved that this kind
of inefficiency is larger if the impact of regulation on portfolio choices is even
more progressive than the one assumed above (Masciandaro and Passarelli
2011).
11.4 Taxation
An SRE tax aims to increase the private cost of systemic risk production. The
problem with this instrument is that risk is usually not easy to measure. Thus
the tax is often levied on distorted SRE measures, as, for example, the
monetary amount of financial transactions. Agents who make the same
amount of financial transactions pay the same amount of tax, independently
of actual systemic risk produced. We will see below that taxing a biased
measure of the externality is not only socially inefficient; it also affects the
political distortion.
11.4.1 Tax on systemic risk
Let us start by considering the policy benchmark. Suppose that the Social
Planner is able to detect the true systemic risk in any portfolio—that is, the
actual externality level produced by any single agent. A basic result in optimal
taxation theory applies here: welfare ismaximized if, for any agent, the after-tax
private marginal cost equals the social marginal externality. An optimal tax
must also ensure that marginal costs are the same for all agents.
Assume that preferences are quasi-linear. If the externality depends on the
total risk produced, then the optimality condition is satisfied by a propor-
tional tax with lump-sum refunds of proceeds. The idea is that the Social
Planner sells the ‘rights’ to produce risk at a fixed unit price, and this can be
done with a proportional taxation of risk.
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In fact, agents are induced to optimize their portfolio by choosing a risk
level such that the marginal cost of decreasing risk equals the tax (or the price)
per unit of risk. Thus, given the tax rate Ł, all agents reduce the systemic risk in
their portfolios by the same amount:




At the margin, each agent pays a marginal cost that is equal to the marginal
externality produced—that is, Ł* =1. This first best condition is achieved
thanks to the government’s ability to detect and tax actual systemic risk
production.
11.4.2 Tax on financial transactions
As pointed out earlier, the problem with a tax is that in reality it is levied on
distorted measures of systemic risk, such as financial transactions. In order to
study a transaction tax we have to specify how the tax is related to the risk
produced.
Arguably, the systemic risk in a portfolio is due to two factors:first, the number
of toxic instruments; second, the portfolio ‘size’—that is, the number of tran-
sactions made by the investor. With a proportional transaction tax, however,
an agent pays only according to the second factor. Somehow a proportional
transaction tax does not bear on the full amount of the externality produced.
Thus we can realistically assume that a tax that is proportional to financial
transactions is de facto regressive with respect to the externality produced.
Applying taxes in this fashion results in an outcome that is second best.
Taxing transactions forces the government to adopt a tax that is de facto
regressive in the externality, whereas the first best instrument would be a
proportional tax. Departures from the first best occur because the government
taxes a distorted measure of risk. The difference between first and second best
increases in the measurement bias.
If the ability to tax externalities through transactions is low such that only a
low amount of externality is taxed, then it is better to have a low tax rate. Vice
versa, as the measurement bias tends to zero, the socially optimal transaction
tax approaches the first best.
Finally, observe that, with a regressive tax, the optimal rate must be higher
when the average type is larger, because on average the marginal cost de-
creases. In synthesis, when the Social Planner adopts a tax on financial trans-
actions, it chooses a too-low level. The reason is because a distortedmeasure of
risk is adopted. Top-risk polluters do not pay enough taxes; their private
marginal cost is too low, compared to marginal externalities, and vice versa
low-risk polluters pay too much.
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11.4.3 Political distortions
Let us now turn to the political distortion that may occur when the decision
about taxes is made by voting. First, consider the case in which a proportional
tax is levied on risk production directly and there is no measurement bias.
11.4.3.1 TAX ON SYSTEMIC RISK
In this situation the Social Planner chooses the first best tax rate. What does a
majority choose in this case? Not surprisingly, the majority chooses a possibly
different tax rate.
Recall that tax proceeds are redistributed on a lump-sum basis out of a
balanced government budget. Any individual receives a refund that is equal
to the average tax burden. It is easy to see that higher types want lower tax
rates. They pay larger amounts of taxes because their after-tax risk production
is higher. Since bliss points are inverse monotone in types, the majority
chooses the median’s bliss point. A distortion occurs in this case because the
amount of taxes paid by, say, a low median is lower than the average.
A low median has an incentive to fix a high rate in order to have others pay
for a larger share of the pollution reduction cost. Political distortion is avoided
only if the median and average’s risk production are equal.
When the government is able to tax systemic risk, the political distortion is
determined only by the difference between median and average types. This
result on externality taxation is similar to a well-known result in the public
finance literature on income taxation (Roberts 1977; Meltzer and Richard
1981).
11.4.3.2 TAX ON FINANCIAL TRANSACTIONS
Consider now the political distortion when a tax is levied on financial transac-
tions. A measurement bias occurs: systemic risk is not entirely taxed. In the
voting stage, most preferred tax rates are decreasing in types. This means that
in this case also agents with low-polluting portfolios want higher taxes. It also
means that the transaction tax chosen by the majority is the one preferred by
the median type. Political distortion is given by the sum of two factors.
The first factor is the relative position of the median. Because of regressivity,
a high median wants too high a tax rate because the amount of taxes that he
has to pay is relatively low compared to the risk produced. This lowers his
marginal cost and induces him to prefer a socially too low tax rate.
The second factor is the ‘usual’ political distortion, which works in the
opposite direction: a high median wants a low tax rate since he pays a large
amount of taxes. Interestingly, the net political distortion depends on the
measurement bias parameter. Suppose the median is lower than the average.
In this case the ‘usual’ political distortion occurs only if the ability to tax
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systemic risk through a transaction tax is sufficiently high (that is, if the
regressivity is low). In this case the second factor prevails. If this is not the
case, a low median chooses a too-low tax because regressivity, rather than a
low position, plays a major role.
11.4.3.3 THE NATURE OF POLITICAL DISTORTION: REGULATION
VERSUS TAXATION
Let us compare the political distortion in the case of a transaction tax with that
of a rule. Consider the most interesting case: transactions are a poor measure
of risk. Suppose the median is lower than the average. A rule is always too
restrictive: a low median uses the rule as a tool to charge a high-polluting
portfolio the largest share of total cost, but this causes a social welfare loss.
By contrast, a tax is too low: because of tax regressivity, a low median must
pay large amounts of tax and thus prefers too low a tax level. This relationship
between political distortions andmedian’s position is continuous. Thus, if the
median is moderately above the average, the rule is too restrictive and a tax is
too low. With a very high median both a rule and a tax are too restrictive.
Summing up, with both instruments, either taxation or regulation, majority
voting produces a political distortion. This may cause large inefficiency losses.
However, the distortion is considerably different when voting concerns a tax
instead of a rule, especially if there is a problem of measurement bias.
Too restrictive rules are more likely to emerge than too restrictive taxes. The
reason is that rules are a progressivemechanism, whereas taxes on transactions
are regressive. Thus, on the one hand, a relatively low median voter, which is
not necessarily below the average, prefers restrictive rules in order to force
higher types to large risk reductions; on the other hand, the median voter
prefers a low tax rate, because otherwise he would have to pay high taxes.
11.5 Regulation or taxation?
Suppose now that themajority determines not only the level of the policy, but
also which instrument to adopt. We can realistically assume that voting takes
place sequentially: first, themajority selects the instrument; then it chooses its
level.3
3 In general, with bi-dimensional policy issues the existence of a Condorcet winner cannot be
taken for granted. However, with sequential voting in which the first issue is binary, this problem
does not arise. Consider, however, that with bi-dimensional sequential voting the outcome is
sensitive to the voting sequence. In our situation we do not have such a problem. An inverse
sequence in which the majority decides the instrument after having decided the level of the policy
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Voters know that, whatever the instrument, the level that will pass at the
second stage is the one preferred by the median. Any voter compares his own
utility in both cases, and chooses his most preferred instrument.
At the first stage, the majority behaves as a Stackelberg leader: it selects the
instrument and it lets a possibly different majority choose the level at the
second stage. There is no scope for a strategic vote.
When does the majority choose a rule at the first stage? A low-polluting
investor has to make small adjustments with a rule, whereas with a tax he has
to pay a relatively large amount, because of regressivity. Thus he prefers a rule.
A top-polluting type has reversed preferences: a tax is better than a rule
because, with a tax, the burden of systemic risk reduction is borne mostly by
low-polluting investors.
A likely situation is that, if the number of low polluters is sufficiently large,
then a majority on the rule will form. Observe that we do not require that the
median is below the average in this case. If the rule is strongly progressive,
then also moderately high types will prefer it.
Vice versa, a regressive tax is preferred by high-polluting investors. If regres-
sivity is stronger, more moderate types prefer the tax. Thus a majority on a tax
will form if it is strongly regressive with respect to the rule and the population
of low polluters is relatively small.
Let us consider the normative characteristics of these positive results. In our
model the social cost of systemic risk is linear. Thus, the Social Planner is not
interested in who produces the externality; it is rather interested in choosing
an instrument that shares costs evenly.
A rule is strongly progressive; the cost is concentrated on high-risk investors.
Vice versa, a tax levied on a biased risk measure may be regressive; thus the
cost is concentrated on low polluters. The socially optimal instrument is a tax
if regressivity is not too high—that is, if the measurement bias is not too
strong.
Consider, however, that, when the measurement bias causes strong regres-
sivity or when the distribution is slanted towards top-polluting portfolios, a
majority of voters prefer the rule. In this case a double political distortion
occurs. First, the majority selects the wrong instrument: regulation instead of
taxation. Second, the majority of low polluters choose a too-restrictive level of
taxation.
11.6 Conclusion
The main point in this chapter is that, when policies to reduce financial
systemic risk are made by voting, the political aspects of the decision are
quite relevant and may cause significant distortions. These distortions are
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substantially different when taxation rather than regulation is under
discussion.
We approached systemic risk contagion as an externality issue and we
considered it as a general interest policy. In a sense, everybody is interested
in reducing systemic risk; as a consequence of the selected policy, all investors
must readjust their portfolio or bear a cost.
If regulation is adopted, most costs and adjustments are supported by high-
risk producers; with taxation, sacrifices are more evenly distributed across
population. Political distortions hinge on the distribution of sacrifices for
the externality reduction. A majority of small portfolio owners with low-risk
production will tend to choose regulation in order to concentrate sacrifices on
high-risk producers. Even a median that is above the average might prefer
regulation, provided it has a sufficiently progressive effect on risk adjustments.
We showed that regulation may be highly inefficient. In particular, majo-
rities tend to choose too-restrictive rules. Loosely speaking, if ‘risk is due to
everybody’ (as in the case where externalities are linearly related to risk), and
the cost of complying with the rules grows at a fast rate, concentrating risk
reduction on top-risk producers is not socially optimal. However, if the major-
ity is made by low-risk producers, the decision will be harsh regulation.
With a tax, the political distortion is quite different. Systemic risk is reduced
by taxing distorted measures of risk, such as transactions, intermediaries’
profits, or their turnover. We argued that this is likely to yield a regressive
effect: small-risk producers pay proportionally more than large-risk producers.
As a consequence, a majority of small-risk producers has less incentive to
choose a tax; if this will be the case, it chooses too low a tax rate. This political
economy argument is possibly helpful to understand reality in which taxes on
risky financial instruments are usually rare and low, whereas financial regula-
tion is much more frequent.
Of course, there might be many other circumstances, not considered in this
chapter, that explain the frequency and efficiency of policies. For example,
taxes can be better calibrated to financial activity, and produce more gradual
externality reductions.
From a normative viewpoint, taxation is preferable when the contributions
to system risk are more evenly distributed across financial instruments and
investors. Vice versa, regulation is more effective when there are information
concerns. If risk production is private information, a rule that limits specific
financial activities is more effective than a tax on those activities.
Financial risk externalities may clearly be an international issue. In these
circumstances, common decisions rely on the existence of institutions that
ensure a sufficient degree of coordination among parties. Incentives and
enforceability issues may severely limit the set of available policy options
and distort common decisions.
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Finally, as already mentioned, financial intermediaries may find that
engaging in lobbying activities is profitable in order to distort the political
decision in a favourable direction. These are relevant aspects of the policy-
making of systemic financial risk. They are not alternative, but rather comple-
mentary, to the points made in this chapter, and they may eventually suggest
extensions of our approach.
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